MODERN GERMANY

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ITS RISE, GROWTH, DOWNFALL AND FUTURE

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"THE FOUNDATIONS OF GERMANY," "THE GREAT PROBLEMS OF BRITISH STATESMANSHIP"
"ECONOMIC STATESMANSHIP," ETC. ETC.

SIXTH EDITION, ENTIRELY RE-WRITTEN
AND VERY GREATLY ENLARGED

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PREFACE

THE Sixth Edition of *Modern Germany* is, as the title-page states, "entirely re-written and very greatly enlarged." It is in reality a new book. Hence the question arose whether it should appear under its old title or under a new one.

The first five editions were mainly devoted to pointing out the probability and danger of a German attack upon civilisation, and to analysing the sources of the strength of Imperial Germany and the elements of its weakness. The attack, of which I had warned the nations in general, and England in particular, in numerous books and articles ever since 1900, took place at the exact moment which I had indicated in 1907 (see p. 447 of this work), and it ended as I had often foretold (see, for instance, pp. 447 to 450), in Germany's defeat and downfall, in revolution, and in the disappearance of the Hohenzollern dynasty. A new Germany is arising. Owing to the march of events readers are no longer interested in the aims and ambitions and the foreign and domestic policy of defunct Imperial Germany. They wish to understand the causes of Germany's meteoric rise, of its wonderful political and economic success and of its downfall, and to form an idea as to the future of New Germany and of the German race. To analyse and describe these is the purpose of this book. Therefore, it had to be re-written throughout.

There was a considerable demand for a new edition of *Modern Germany* both in England and in the United States. As portions of the fifth edition have been embodied in the present volume, it seemed only fair to intending purchasers to indicate that fact by preserving the old title for what is practically a new book. Of course, very drastic changes had to be made to bring it up to date. Large portions contained in the fifth edition, which are no longer of

interest except to historians, have been omitted, and the new situation created by the War has been considered from every point of view. The portions of the old text used have been compressed to the utmost. Thus the present issue gives in the most concise form all the information of permanent interest and value which was contained in the previous one, and considerably more than a hundred pages of additional matter. Seven chapters are entirely new.

In its present form *Modern Germany* is a companion volume to *The Foundations of Germany—A Documentary Account Revealing the Secret of her Strength, Wealth, and Efficiency*, the second and very greatly enlarged edition of which appeared in the autumn of 1918. The two books are designed to supplement one another, and may almost be considered the first and second volumes of a single work. Both should be equally useful to students of German affairs.

Modern Germany has had a most gratifying success in England and abroad. It has been used as a text-book at some of the leading American Universities, and has even been translated into Japanese and Mahratti. I hope that the present issue will meet with as kind a reception as its five predecessors.

The bulk of this volume has previously appeared in the *Nineteenth Century and After*, the *Fortnightly Review*, the *Contemporary Review*, and the *National Review*. However, the chapters are not merely reprints of articles, some of which are now more or less out of date. The original essays have in many cases supplied only the framework of the various chapters, and they have been organically connected. I would very cordially thank the editors of the periodicals mentioned for allowing me to reprint part or the whole of my contributions.

For the convenience of readers the chapters of this book are briefly summarised in the Introduction.

J. Ellis Barker.

London,
January 1919.

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MODERN GERMANY

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

STATES are usually created by the collaboration of the many. Most democracies owe their rise to the people of whom they are composed. Modern Germany, Prusso-Germany, was an exception to the general rule. Like some ancient feudal estate, it was the creation of a single family, of the Hohenzollerns.

The Hohenzollerns were, as is pointed out in the second chapter, a family of adventurers, of daring and thriving Suabian robber-knights who obtained in the beginning of the fifteenth century the poor, neglected, lawless, and almost valueless district of Brandenburg from the King-Emperor in return for services rendered. They established in that savage country on the outskirts of the Empire a small State which flourished greatly, and which grew, by successful violence and trickery, into a kingdom and an empire. Thus a family of feudal robber-knights, possessed of a robber-knight morality and following a robber-knight policy, created in the wilds a robber State which they treated as if the land and the people dwelling therein were their personal possession.

Nominally Prusso-Germany was a federation of independent self-governing States. Germany and the States of which it was composed possessed indeed all the paraphernalia of constitutional, popular, and democratic government. However, in reality Germany was merely an enlarged Prussia. The King of Prussia could with more truth proclaim *l'état c'est moi* than Louis XIV. or Napoleon I.

The Hohenzollern rulers, considering the country their property, administered it in accordance with ancient custom as if it were a huge estate. They directed absolutely, and as a rule in person, the army, the civil administration, the foreign and domestic policy of the State, industry, trade, and commerce, the Protestant and the Roman Catholic Churches, the schools, the universities, and the press. They not only controlled and directed all the activities of the State, but they moulded the character of the people and controlled the speech, thought, and action of the citizens from the cradle to the grave.

The character and welfare of a State so ruled and so constituted depend of course entirely upon the personality of its ruler, who, owing to his enormous power, is able to imprint his character upon the entire nation. During the reign of the moderate and well-balanced King-Emperor William I. Prusso-Germany behaved sanely and moderately, and the State grew great owing to the able direction of eminent experts, such as Bismarck, Moltke, and Roon, who were given the fullest scope. Under the personal rule of the vain, boastful, capricious, impetuous, conceited, and utterly incompetent William II., in whom were combined the vices of most of his ancestors, the character of State and nation changed completely, as is shown in Chapter III. Experts in the art of government and administration were replaced by applauding courtiers and by spineless sycophants. The complicated and delicate machinery of the State was thrown out of gear by the clumsy interference of its incompetent director. The character of the people was degraded by the Emperor's policy, teaching, and pernicious example. The whole nation became boastful, capricious, conceited, and utterly unscrupulous.

Soon after his advent the Emperor proclaimed that he would be his own Chancellor, that he would steer the young Empire over a new course, his own course. He dismissed Prince Bismarck, and Germany's foreign policy began to reflect the Emperor's rashness, incapacity, and utter untrustworthiness. By his constant interference, bluster, and

threats, William II. completely transformed the character of Germany's policy and damaged irretrievably the political reputation of the State. Thus William II. destroyed Germany's predominance in Europe which Bismarck had created, and forced France, Russia, and England to combine in self-defence, as is shown in Chapter IV.

Prusso-Germany was, by its history and tradition, a robber State. It had grown great by successful aggression. According to the Hohenzollern tradition, the army was the bodyguard of the sovereign, and its strength and efficiency were the principal interest of the ruler. Moltke resigned shortly after the advent of William II. His successors, as those of Prince Bismarck, were chosen not for their ability, but for their subserviency. They were servile courtiers and flatterers of William II., not men of the highest qualifications possessed of a strong character. The Emperor became not only his own Chancellor and his own Minister of Foreign Affairs, but his own Minister of War and his own Chief of the Staff as well. His constant interference with military matters was as disastrous to Germany as was his interference in foreign and domestic politics. Thus William II. destroyed not only the life-work of Bismarck, but that of Moltke and of Roon as well, as is shown in Chapter V.

William II. had often proclaimed that he would lead Germany towards a great and glorious future. Bismarck, after having made Germany supreme on the continent of Europe, desired his country to follow a moderate and peaceful policy. He attached particular value to good relations with England. William II. thirsted for glory. He completely lacked the sense of proportion. He wished to acquire the rule of the seas and the mastery of the world. He proclaimed in resounding sentences that Germany's future lay upon the water, and created a navy designed to humble England and the United States, as is shown in Chapters VI. and VII. He called into being a nation-wide agitation for the creation of a predominant fleet. The preamble of the Navy Law of 1900 proclaimed : " Germany requires a fleet of such strength that a war with the mightiest

Naval Power would involve risks threatening the supremacy of that Power." The entire governmental machine of Germany and the great semi-official apparatus were employed to promote the Emperor's naval ambition by preaching hostility to England, by preaching war with England. The whole tribe of Government servants, of Government nominees and of place-hunters, title-hunters, and decoration-hunters, of generals and admirals, professors and schoolmasters, clergymen, lecturers, and journalists, was mobilised for this purpose. These men demanded in unmeasured and threatening language Germany's supremacy on the sea, the humiliation of England and of the United States, and the establishment of a German world-empire dominating the universe. These demands were joyfully received and noisily supported by the masses of the people, who had been trained to obey implicitly and unquestioningly the directions received "from above."

Owing to the criminal folly of William II. and of his pliable and characterless supporters in the various Government offices, Germany challenged and provoked England and the United States not only by her naval armaments and her naval agitation, but by her diplomacy as well. The fact that Germany was chiefly, one might almost say solely, responsible for the strained relations with England previous to the War may be seen from Chapter IX., which shows, exclusively by means of German evidence, where lay the guilt for the protracted and acute Anglo-German tension.

After the Franco-German War of 1870–71 Bismarck ensured Germany's security and peace by creating the Triple Alliance, and he made France impotent for a war of revenge by skilfully isolating it. William II. provoked in turn not only Russia, England, and the United States, but France as well, and he tried to humiliate that country by his intervention in Morocco in 1905 and 1911. The history of Germany's relations with France and the story of the very interesting and important Morocco crisis of 1911 are told in Chapters IX. and X.

Before the War German education was universally

over-estimated. It was not sufficiently recognised abroad that the chief purpose of the German schools was not to elevate the character of the people, but to make them abjectly obedient tools in the hands of their ruler and of his government; that they were designed to create not ability and individuality, but servility; that much of the boasted training in the German educational establishments, even in the universities and technical schools, was totally misapplied. Mis-education has undoubtedly perverted the mind of the German nation. That has clearly been proved during the course of the War. Chapter XI., on "Education and Mis-Education in Germany," gives a critical appreciation of German education, which is substantially reprinted from previous editions of this book. It was first published in the *Contemporary Review* in October 1906, and scandalised at the time many English educationalists who blindly admired the German educational system and wished to copy it in almost every particular.

Chapters XII. to XVIII. deal with Economic Germany. The German rulers, not the German people, created the State and the nation, and they created also Germany's economic success. The German industries owe their rise and growth largely to the economic policy of the State, and particularly to skilfully-framed Protective Tariffs. The result of Protection, which was introduced by Prince Bismarck in 1879, is shown in Chapter XII.—"The Fiscal Policy of Germany and its Results."

Chapter XIII. describes at length the rural industries of Germany and analyses the causes of their extraordinary prosperity.

Chapter XIV. deals with the railways and the railway policy of Germany. That chapter should be particularly interesting to those who wish the State to take over and manage the private railways. Germany has managed its State railways with considerable ability and success through its all-powerful and practically irresponsible bureaucracy. Whether England will be as successful in managing its railways as a State undertaking depends, of course, chiefly

on the ability and the authority of those who will be called upon to direct them. Bureaucratic management of economic enterprises can be efficient only if it is carried on in a businesslike manner by the ablest experts, provided of course that these are not constantly hampered by party-political interference. The supremacy of bureaucratic routine, of "red-tape," of electoral influences, and the meddling of party politicians with the railways for party-political purposes would, of course, destroy their efficiency and their profit-earning capacity. Bureaucratic automata are as incapable of directing a great business undertaking successfully as are party politicians who are mainly interested in obtaining votes.

It is not generally known that Germany has a very highly-developed system of inland waterways, that before the War the tonnage of its inland fleet was twice as great as that of its merchant marine, that its greatest harbour was not Hamburg, but Ruhrort. Chapter XV. supplies full details as to Germany's Waterways and Canals, which should be of particular interest to all who have the development of inland transport by water at heart.

In its economic policy Germany was guided not by its professors, but by its business men, not by abstract theories and principles, but by practical considerations. Hence it adapted its political means to the economic end in view. While it developed its gigantic manufacturing industries by means of fiscal protection, it created a prosperous shipbuilding and shipping industry with the help of Free Trade. However, it fostered its shipbuilding and shipping industries also by preferential railway tariffs granted by the State Railways and by various other means, as is shown in Chapter XVI.

In the chemical industry, and especially in the manufacture of dyes, Germany became predominant throughout the world not so much owing to the policy of Protection and to the high ability of its chemists—the greatest chemical discoveries were made by Englishmen and Frenchmen—but by State aid freely given for chemical research and for

chemical tuition, and especially by organised research, by mass research, by team work, by the co-operation of an army of chemists for certain predetermined ends, as is described in Chapter XVII.

Chapter XVIII. sums up the results of Germany's economic policy. It gives a picture of the vast and rapid economic progress of the country, and furnishes full details of the extraordinary prosperity which the German classes and masses enjoyed up to 1914.

In Chapters XIX. and XX. the home-political position of Germany previous to the War is dealt with. The former chapter considers the rise, growth, and character of the Social Democratic Party, its organisation, its achievements, and its doctrines. The latter analyses the German parliamentary position previous to 1914, and shows incidentally that increasing difficulties in the field of domestic politics were a contributory cause to the World War. Prusso-Germany was ruled by the Emperor through a practically irresponsible military and bureaucratic administration, with the help of a subservient Conservative-governmental majority in the Reichstag. However, this majority of pro-Government deputies represented only a minority of the electorate. It misrepresented the people as a whole. The great bulk of the electorate was opposed to the Government and its policy. The growing numerical strength of the opposition parties in the country made the management of the Reichstag extremely and increasingly difficult for the Government and its Conservative and other pro-Government supporters in that assembly. It was feared by many that before long the Government would find it impossible to secure a docile and obedient Reichstag majority. Consequently many Conservative politicians and soldiers thought that the maintenance of the military and autocratic form of government imperatively demanded the disfranchisement of the Liberal and Social Democratic masses by an alteration of the franchise, which could be brought about only by a Governmental *coup d'état*. Many of the Emperor's staunchest adherents thought that such a step could comparatively

easily be effected after a successful war. They believed that a great victory would so immensely enhance the prestige and authority of the Emperor and of his Government that the disfranchisement of the masses could safely be undertaken.

In Chapters XXI. to XXVIII. the Great War, its causes, and its consequences are considered. Chapter XXI. deals with the principal factors which led to its outbreak. The chapter following it describes the causes which estranged Italy from Germany and Austria-Hungary, and which impelled that country to abandon its partners in the Triple Alliance and to join the Entente group.

Chapter XXIII. depicts how the military ruled Germany before the War; how ambitious and reckless military leaders, enjoying the support of the Emperor, were allowed to destroy the authority of the civil administration and to make the German Foreign Office a subordinate branch of the General Staff; how the soldiers managed and mismanaged Germany's foreign and domestic policy; how they influenced, guided, and corrupted public opinion throughout the country; how they caused an aggressive jingoism to permeate even the heart of the young children in the elementary schools; how they warped and distorted the mind of the whole nation by preaching unceasingly a war of conquest and of spoliation and by preparing the people for a great war of aggression. The famous Zabern incident is described in the same chapter.

Prusso-Germany has been made great by its army and has been ruined by it, as is shown in Chapter XXIV. Bismarck and Moltke had in collaboration laid down a plan of campaign in case of a war with France and Russia combined. According to that plan, Germany was to respect strictly Belgium's neutrality and France was to be induced to violate it. If that plan had been carried out, England would scarcely have intervened at the beginning of the struggle. It would probably have preserved its neutrality, and very likely it would have sided against France, had France invaded Belgium, as Bismarck had expected.

Everything was to be done to tempt France to invade Germany through that country. Had Germany acted upon the wise Bismarck-Moltke plan of campaign, the Germans might have defeated their neighbours in the East and West and acquired absolute supremacy in Europe. However, to William II. or to those courtier-soldiers who succeeded the great Moltke this safe and sound plan seemed too obvious and too commonplace. They wished to dazzle the imagination of the world. They wished for a more spectacular, for a more overwhelming victory. Desiring to take Paris by a rush and to destroy or capture the whole of the French field armies by rapidly getting into their flank and rear, the military leaders resolved to invade France by way of Belgium. Thus they incurred at the outset the hostility of Great Britain. Not satisfied with having forced England into the ranks of their enemies, the military leaders of Germany outraged and exasperated the conscience of the world by their barbarous and criminal warfare, and thus created a world coalition against Germany.

In Chapter XXV. the war aims of the German intellectuals are given in the form of a weighty petition signed by more than a thousand university professors, high military and civic dignitaries, leading business men, etc. Chapter XXVI. supplies representative extracts from statements in which Germany's domination of the world was demanded during the War.

Chapters XXVII. and XXVIII. treat at considerable length the future of Germany and of the German race. Germany may follow two courses. The country may either preserve its unity or become dissolved into its component parts. Both possibilities have to be considered.

If the country should remain united, it will be utterly ruined economically. In consequence of its defeat, it has lost in Alsace-Lorraine, in Poland, and in the Danish districts 7,000,000 wealth-creating citizens. In addition it has lost large stretches of agricultural territory, nearly one-half of its coal, the bulk of its iron ore, vast quantities of potash and of mineral oil, its Colonies, the bulk of its foreign trade,

of its foreign investments, of its shipping, etc. While Germany's wealth-creating resources and income have been very greatly diminished, the country's financial burdens have been hugely increased through the War debt and through the necessity of paying enormous indemnities to the victorious nations. Consequently, Germany is bound to remain poor for decades. As the people will find it difficult to make a living in Germany, the birthrate should decline. Millions of Germans will have to emigrate, and they may be able to obtain abroad only the lowest and meanest work, because of the hatred which they have aroused against themselves throughout the world. The Germans settled abroad and those Germans who will emigrate from their country in the future will hasten to become completely de-Germanised in order to lose the terrible stigma which the War has imprinted upon the whole people. In consequence of the huge emigration of people from Germany which must be expected, and in consequence of the complete absorption of the Germans abroad by the people around them, the German race may become stationary, if not retrogressive.

It seems extremely doubtful whether the Germans will succeed in preserving their political unity. Rightly considered, the Germans are not a single race, but are men belonging to several distinct and very different races who happen to speak the same language. There are fundamental differences between the various German races which have fought each other in the past, and which only lately have become united rather by force than by the natural course of things. The differences between the various German races, and especially between the Prussians and the non-Prussians, are so great that it seems extremely doubtful whether the Germans will be able to preserve their unity. Very likely the country will be dissolved into its component parts. Moreover, the German peoples may be troubled for a very long time by civil commotions, for men who have lived in abject, unreasoning servility for centuries cannot easily establish democratic self-government. Successful

democracies cannot be made. They grow up slowly and painfully. They require men of a democratic temper and a democratic frame of mind. The Great War may have destroyed not only the Hohenzollern dynasty and the German Empire, but may also have destroyed the greatness of the German race. William II., desiring to become the ruler of the universe, may have ruined not only himself and his family, his brother monarchs, his allies and his country, but even the future of his race.

CHAPTER II

THE RISE AND FALL OF PRUSSO-GERMANY [1]

The world-empires which military conquest has created in the past have, as a rule, proved exceedingly short-lived. The gigantic dominions subdued and ruled by Alexander the Great, Julius Cæsar and his successors, Charlemagne, Otto the Great, Attila, Jenghiz Khan, Tamerlane, the Abbasids, Soliman the Magnificent, Charles V., and Napoleon have rapidly declined and decayed, but never in the world's history has a vast military empire collapsed so suddenly and so utterly as that of William II. The Bolsheviks were Germany's tools and Germany's agents. Hence all Germans saw in Russia a German protectorate, a German possession, a German India. In the summer of 1918 the empire of William II. extended from Zeebrugge to Vladivostok and to the Behring Strait, and from the Arctic Circle to the gates of India. It comprised 350,000,000 inhabitants. The last of the Hohenzollern rulers held sway over an immense empire, the territory of which vastly exceeded the gigantic empires conquered by the Romans, by Charlemagne, and by Napoleon. Only the empires conquered by Attila and by Jenghiz Khan could be compared to the new German world-empire. The Germans thought that they had firmly established the power of their country over the larger part of Europe and of Asia. Their faith in the permanence of their domination may be seen from the fact that after the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk they invested vast sums in Russia, and that, as late as the middle of September, Stock Exchange quotations in Berlin, which had steadily been rising, were

[1] From the *Fortnightly Review*, December 1918.

still at their highest. In a few weeks the greatest military empire the world has ever seen tumbled down like a house of cards, and Germany itself became a prey to a revolution which may lead to the permanent dissolution of the State. Overnight Germany has been precipitated from the giddy height of domination over the two most populous continents to the bottomless pit of ruin, chaos, poverty, and despair. The powerful and apparently invincible Germany of yesterday, which seemed firmly established for all time, has fallen and may never rise again. Let us then inquire into the causes of its downfall, and let us endeavour to cast a glance into its future.

We can understand the historical events of the present only if we are guided by the knowledge of the past.

In 1915 an eminent German historian, Herr Otto Hintze, published a history of modern Germany. It was entitled *The Hohenzollerns and their Achievements—Five Hundred Years of German History.* The writer had chosen a most appropriate title for his book. Modern Germany, Prusso-Germany, was indeed not a national, but a purely dynastic State. It was the State of the Hohenzollerns. The Hohenzollern dynasty had firmly imprinted its character upon the German State and nation. In fact the dynasty was the State. Louis XIV.'s words, "L'état c'est moi," was far more applicable to the realm of the Hohenzollerns than it was to that of Louis XIV. and of Napoleon I.

The Hohenzollerns were a family of daring and ambitious Suabian robber-knights who lived by plunder. They possessed the formidable castle of Zollern, perched high in the Suabian Alps, whence they descended and plundered the passing caravans of merchants and the townspeople round about. By ability, violence, and cunning they had succeeded in concentrating in their hands a considerable amount of territory, wealth, and power. Owing to their commanding position in the neighbourhood, they were made hereditary Burgraves, military governors, of the important city of Nuremberg. As Burgraves they had to defend the castle, the burg, of Nuremberg, and to protect the Emperor's

interests. They were hereditary imperial officials, who had to keep order, defend the town and district, and look after its administration.

In the past Germany had elected rulers. One Frederick VI., Burgrave of Nuremberg, a man of considerable gifts, rendered very valuable services to the Emperor Sigismond. By unscrupulously influencing the election, he secured for that monarch the crown of Germany. He assisted Sigismond with advice, with money, and with arms, and received as a reward the hereditary viceroyship of the turbulent Mark of Brandenburg, with the government of which the much-coveted electoral dignity was connected. Thus, five centuries ago, Frederick VI. of Nuremberg became Frederick I. Margrave of Brandenburg and Elector of the Holy Roman Empire.

Brandenburg was at the time a wild district on the outskirts of Germany. The aboriginal inhabitants were Slavs. They were ruled, or rather exploited, by a number of reckless robber-knights, the Quitzows, Rochows, Putlitzs, and others, who plundered the country mercilessly and flouted the Emperor. The modern Prussian Junkers are the direct descendants of these men. Margrave Frederick created order by the ruthless persecution of the evil-doers and made the robber-knights his servants. His successors increased the territory of Brandenburg and acquired, in addition, a considerable district situated outside the German Empire, the Dukedom of Prussia, which had been in the possession of the Teutonic Knights. These had settled among the Slavonic heathens and had governed the country with incredible barbarity.

The Hohenzollerns and the Teutonic Knights before them, acting like the Germans of the present in their African colonies, ruled the heathen Slavs under their sway with the greatest cruelty. They endeavoured to attract settlers from the civilised south and west of Germany to the raw and barbarous east by granting them the land of the natives which they confiscated. Many of the new settlers were impecunious robber-knights. Many were criminals who

had fled from justice. These men formed henceforth part of the Brandenburg-Prussian aristocracy. The native inhabitants and the poorer German settlers as well became enslaved by a race of cruel, pitiless, and largely criminal, feudal taskmasters. Their entreaties and complaints were disregarded, and their revolts were suppressed with the utmost ferocity. In many districts the native Slavs were completely exterminated. Thus the policy of blood and iron became the traditional policy of the Hohenzollerns and of their supporters, and the native Prussians, who at one time had been a spirited people, became a nation of dull, dumb, and downtrodden serfs, who were ruled by homicidal fighting men whose will was law, whose argument was the sword, and who spent their lives in gambling, drinking, and robbing. Thus robber-knights with robber morals created in the wilderness of Eastern Europe a robber State. It flourished greatly. The growth of Brandenburg-Prussia-Germany may be visualised from the following table :

	Sq. Kilometres.
Elector Frederick the First	29,478
Elector Frederick the Second	39,985
Elector Albrecht Achilles	42,272
Elector Johann Cicero	36,353
Elector Joachim the First	38,130
Elector Johann George	39,413
Elector Johann Sigismond	81,064
Elector Frederick William the Great	110,836
King Frederick the First	112,524
King Frederick William the First	118,926
King Frederick the Great	194,891
King Frederick William the Second	305,669
King Frederick William the Third	278,042
King Frederick William the Fourth	279,030
King-Emperor William the First	540,742

Robbery in the form of war had been the trade of the Hohenzollerns since the earliest ages. Violence was their traditional policy, and their chief interest was the army. They had originally created a military State on a feudal basis, a State composed of a servile people dominated by an all-powerful fighting aristocracy. Gradually the adminis-

trative functions of the all-powerful aristocracy were transferred to an all-powerful bureaucracy, and an all-powerful military organisation took the place of the irregular feudal levies. Both the bureaucracy and the military apparatus were autocratically directed by the ruler, who treated the country as if it were his own personal property and the people as if they were his serfs. Thus a highly-organised one-man government was introduced. Frederick William the Great Elector created the first standing army in Europe. Prussia became an armed camp. Mirabeau wittily said that Prussia was not a State which possessed an army, but an army which possessed a State.

The table which gives a picture of the territorial growth of Brandenburg-Prussia-Germany shows that practically all Hohenzollern rulers greatly increased their possessions. They had created an extensive and powerful State out of the smallest and most unpromising beginning. Expansion by conquest became the principal Hohenzollern tradition, became the settled policy and the creed of the House.

The Hohenzollerns were not merely a family of glorified robber-knights. Desiring to retain their conquests, they strove to organise their new territories and to reduce their inhabitants to unquestioning obedience. They recognised at an early date that a spirit of submissiveness to authority can be created not only by ruthless severity, but also by gentler means, by a suitable secular and spiritual education. Hence the Hohenzollerns cultivated with equal zeal their armies and their schools. The schools were created not so much for the purpose of increasing knowledge among the people, and of making them intellectually independent, as for that of making them useful to their rulers and of inculcating in them absolute obedience and blindly devoted loyalty. In Prusso-Germany both the School and the Church were made parts of the all-powerful bureaucratic apparatus through which the Sovereign ruled the country.

Although, according to the Prussian Constitution of 1850, teaching is free in Prussia, the private schools were suppressed. The State directed the whole educational appa-

ratus. The schoolmasters formed a powerful supplementary army. The teachers were civil servants whose official position was deliberately disguised by not furnishing them with uniforms. The principal aim of the elementary schools was to teach patriotism and obedience to the Government, but patriotism in Prussia did not so much mean love of country as blind veneration of the Hohenzollerns.

German education was purely secular, and its basis an unreasoning worship of the power of the State, personified in the ruling House, was Hohenzollern worship. Mr. de Montmorency correctly stated in a letter to the *Times* that the German schools taught "knowledge divorced from morality, efficiency divorced from responsibility, and life divorced from religion." Religion was purely formal and conventional. On the other hand, the King-Emperor was treated as the only veritable divinity. The Deity, religion, and the civic virtues were considered matters of small account. The fact that the King-Emperor was placed high above the Deity may be seen even from the dry paragraphs of the German Penal Code. While blasphemy, a verbal insult to the Deity, was punishable by imprisonment from one day to three years, *lèse-majesté*, a verbal insult to the ruler, was punishable with imprisonment from two months to five years. Prosecutions for blasphemy were very rare and punishments mild, but prosecutions for *lèse-majesté* were frequent and punishments rigorous.

Both the Protestant and the Roman Catholic Churches were made part of the all-powerful bureaucracy, were made subservient to the dynastic interests, to the ambitions, and to the absolute direction of the Hohenzollerns. The King-Emperor, as all-powerful *summus episcopus* of the Prussian Church, directed through his personally-appointed Supreme Church Council, the State-trained, State-selected, State-appointed, and State-salaried Protestant clergy. By indirect but exceedingly well-designed means the authority of the ruler and of his government over the Roman Catholic bishops and clergy was made almost as great as that over the official Protestant establishment. The clergy, like the

teachers, formed a well-drilled army, whose duty was the defence of Hohenzollernism. Herein lies the reason that both the Protestant and the Roman Catholic clergy in Germany disgraced themselves during the War by applauding every crime of the Emperor, by blasphemously declaring that the War was a just and holy one, and by excusing and even encouraging the greatest atrocities of the German Army and Navy.

Both the schools and the churches of Germany had for many years taught a perverted morality, a mediæval robber-knight morality. They had taught that in political matters might is right, that craft, untruthfulness, intrigue, violence, robbery, murder are praiseworthy if they benefit the State. Dr. Muehlon, a former director of Krupps, wrote sadly in his diary on the 31st of August 1914 :

"Until the ways and aims of politics cease to be at variance with the plain principles of morality universal among men, the vocation of politics will be only an occupation for criminals. All servants of the State to-day maintain the dogma that the State's advantage is the highest object, and one which consecrates all means. Craft, lies, forgery, deception, treachery, corruption, and murder now call forth no disgust if only the State be advantaged."

While the mind of the German masses was corrupted by the Governmental elementary schools and by the servile Protestant and Roman Catholic Churches, that of the classes was similarly perverted in the Government-directed higher schools and universities. Whenever the Hohenzollerns conquered a new portion of territory, they immediately created in it high schools and universities, and the bureaucracy took good care that all the professors of history, philology, philosophy, law, etc., were reliable and active political propagandists, who with servility and unwearying zeal devoted themselves heart and soul to the cult of the Hohenzollern family and of the Hohenzollern ideal of conquest. Thus universities and schools were planted in conquered districts to act as instruments of Prussification.

Practically all the historians of Prusso-Germany have been official historians, courtier-historians, and the result has been that the history of the Hohenzollerns and of their State, as written by Hohenzollern subjects, has been falsified and distorted to an incredible extent. As foreign historians relied for information largely on native German sources, the fables relating to the Hohenzollerns which were set on paper by these servile official scribes were only too frequently accepted by the non-German historians who wrote on German affairs. To this fact the Hohenzollerns owe much of the prestige which they have enjoyed both in Germany and abroad. According to the German historians, nearly all the Hohenzollerns were supermen, were men of the highest character and of the greatest ability in peace and war. They were endowed with all the human virtues. In reality, the great majority of the Hohenzollern rulers were personally worthless. They were men who were distinguished by their rapacity, their unscrupulousness, their immorality, and their incapacity. Even those who were politically great were personally despicable. Frederick I., who in 1701 acquired the royal crown, was a vain and worthless debauchee, and his son, Frederick William I., "the drill-sergeant," was a choleric, homicidal brute. His successor, Frederick the Great, was an utterly unscrupulous cynic and a reckless gambler in human lives, who nearly ruined Prussia by his totally unjustified attack on Silesia, which furnished William II. with a great precedent. King Frederick William II. was a weak and despicable voluptuary, who dabbled in mysticism and religion. His successor, Frederick William III., was a dull, unprincipled nonentity. His son, King Frederick William IV., was a muddle-headed dreamer, who suffered from incipient insanity, and who died from softening of the brain. His younger brother, the King-Emperor William I., was a conscientious worker and a well-balanced normal man, whose successes in peace and war were due to Bismarck's guidance. The personal character of nearly all the Hohenzollerns was evil. They were reckless, ruthless, and faithless robber-barons, who

gave a free rein to their inherited criminal instincts and propensities and to their personal vices. Most possessed neither administrative nor military ability. Only the Great Elector, King Frederick William I., and King Frederick the Great were brilliant exceptions, for they were great organisers and soldiers.

The State of the Hohenzollerns was historically and traditionally a robber State. Its rulers were men who possessed a robber morality and who followed a robber policy. That was, of course, never admitted by the venal professors. On the contrary, these prostituted themselves and their sciences by excusing, encouraging, praising, and promoting a policy of naked and shameless violence and faithlessness. They were the jackals and hyænas of Hohenzollernism and were thrown some bones for their services. For them, as for their masters, moral considerations did not exist. So the Prussian philosophers and historians spent their lives in laboriously expounding the logic, the beauty, and the virtue of " Realpolitik," of " Machtpolitik," and furnished a pseudo-scientific cloak to political crime. In the peaceful lecture-rooms and countless publications they preached a policy of conquest, of treachery, of unrestricted brutality, of national crime, and pegged out claims of conquest. All sciences were made subservient to the Hohenzollern policy of aggression and plunder. For instance, Professor Daniel, an eminent geographer, in writing a compendium of geography of about 4,000 pages, which was first published in 1862, claimed for Germany the possession of Switzerland, Belgium, Holland, and Denmark. His book was very widely read, especially by advanced students, and particularly by the great army of school teachers who formed the mind of modern Germany. In the preface of the second edition of 1867 the author stated :

" Indignation has been expressed abroad at my treating Switzerland, Belgium, Holland, and Denmark as appendages to Germany. . . . In the third and fourth volumes I treat Germany as a physical entity. Now, can anybody seriously deny that these four States, parts of Switzerland

excepted, lie within the physical frontiers of Germany? And can anybody seriously deny that the historical justification for their attachment to Germany is as strong as is the geographical justification? Switzerland and Holland belonged to Germany till 1648, and Belgium till 1801, while Denmark has at one time been a part of the Holy Roman Empire."

The ninth section of Vol. IV. is superscribed "The Outlying German States—Switzerland, Belgium, Holland, Luxemburg, Denmark." In the text following this headline we read:

"The five States mentioned can only be described as the outlying States of Germany. Apart from small portions of Switzerland, the Faroe Islands, and Iceland, all the States mentioned lie within Germany's natural boundaries, and they are inhabited by men of Germanic race. All of these States have belonged to the old German Empire in the past and were subject to feudal service. Germany deplores the loss of these valuable members, and the population of Switzerland and Belgium has strong sympathy for Germany. . . . Germany is advancing. Owing to the increase of its formidable military strength it will more and more become Europe's centre of gravity. The Swiss, the Belgians, and the Dutch are related to us Germans by race and by language. They will necessarily and gladly incline towards a powerful Germany, and both sides can only gain by such a reunion."

In the first chapter of Daniel's third volume, which deals with the physical geography of Germany, we read:

"The most northerly point of Germany is Cape Skagen, in the north of Denmark, the most southerly the Gulf of Fiume, the most westerly Cape Grisnez, on the English Channel, and the most easterly point lies on the River Warthe, in the neighbourhood of Rzgow and Tuszyn."

The eminent and widely-read German geographical authority pegged out vast political-territorial claims for Germany, not only within the immediate neighbourhood of the country, for his zeal took him much farther afield. In

the second volume of the edition of 1875 Professor Daniel stated in the section which considers France :

" In view of French arrogance it must always be asserted that we Germans possess historically justified claims to the territories on the Rhone. At any rate, we must not be more unhistorical than the French are themselves. Therefore we add to the French names the German ones."

Continuing, the learned professor deals with the Provence (Provintz), Marseilles (Marsilien), Arles (Arelat), Aix (Waelsch Aachen), Orange (Orense), the Dauphiné (Delphinat), Grenoble (Graswalde), Vienne (Waelsch Wien), Lyon (Waelsch Leyden), Bescançon (Bisanz), Montbeliard (Mümpelgart), Belfort (Beffort), Toul (Tul), Verdun (Virten), Nancy (Nanzig), Luneville (Lünstadt), Lille (Ryssel), Douai (Dauwey), Cambrai (Kameryk), Valenciennes (Schwanenthal), Maubeuge (Malboden), etc.

Dozens, nay, hundreds, of eminent scientists acted like Professor Daniel, as the advance guards of aggressive Hohenzollernism, inculcating in the people the divine right of conquest, and claiming for Germany the possession of the lands of other nations as a matter of right on philosophical, ethical, historical, geographical, ethnological, military, philological, and economic grounds.

The servile German historians not only falsified German history, but all history, for the furtherance of the Hohenzollern idea of conquest and ruthlessness. The historians of antiquity, such as Mommsen, extolled the policy of conquest and of faithlessness, and treated democracy and the policy of righteousness with withering contempt. That may be seen by Mommsen's description of Julius Cæsar and by his opinion on the breach of the Caudine Treaty by the Romans. His attitude is representative of practically all German historians. Attila and other savage conquerors were held up to the admiration of the Germans. According to the German historians, France was decadent and foppish ; England, senile, cowardly, frivolous, and altogether despicable ; the United States were not a nation, but merely

a cosmopolitan crowd entirely devoted to mammon-worship, etc. The fact that other nations had achieved great things both in peace and in war was suppressed in the German text-books. "Deutschland über Alles" summed up the attitude of German science and German teaching towards other nations. There was only one great nation in the world, and that was Germany. Germany was foremost among the peoples in character, culture, military strength, ability, genius, and the Hohenzollerns were the greatest and the most gifted race of rulers that had ever lived.

Prussia is, and always was, the most barbarous part of Germany. Until a short time ago she had no science, no art, no industry, no wealth. Frederick the Great despaired of Prussia ever acquiring a true civilisation. German culture and German science were developed in the non-Prussian South and West of Germany and in the non-Prussian sea-coast towns. Prussia, having annexed by force of arms the non-Prussian districts of Germany, proceeded to annex their cultural achievements as well and to proclaim them as her own. The Prussians were taught to consider all great Germans as their countrymen in the narrower sense of the term. Lately the Prusso-Germans were even taught that theirs was not merely the greatest but the only true civilisation in the world. Ludwig Woltmann devoted his life to proving by the most reckless assertions and with the help of magnificently illustrated books that all the most eminent Frenchmen, Italians, Englishmen, etc., were really Germans, were of German race, or at least of German descent, or possessed at all events German physical characteristics or German features. After the outbreak of the war he tactfully tried to gain for Germany the support of the Italian people on cultural grounds. Therefore, he asserted in a publication addressed to the Italians:

"Anthropological investigations of the physical type have proved beyond a doubt that most of the great geniuses which Italy has produced were of German descent. To the blond German type belonged Giotto, Dante, Donatello,

Massaccio, Leonardo da Vinci, Raphael, Botticelli, Titian, Galilei, Tasso, Columbus, and among the modern Italians Morgagni, Alfieri, Volta, Foscolo, Leopardi, Garibaldi, Cavour, Bellini, Rossini, Donizetti, Canova, Manzoni. Only a few Italians, such as Michelangelo, Ariosto, Machiavelli, Palestrina, Verdi, belonged to a mixed type."

Succeeding Hohenzollern rulers had tightened up the national system of education, and had made it more and more an instrument of dynastic propaganda and of provocative jingoism. In all schools, from the highest to the lowest, a robber-knight morality was inculcated. Appointments, promotions, favours, honours, and money went to those teachers and scientists who were most active in promoting the Hohenzollern idea. Learned men are often feeble, poor, and vain. German science was deliberately corrupted and debauched by the Government. Eminent scientists vied with each other in flattering their rulers and extolling their very vices as the virtues of strong men. Professorial sycophants fawned for official favours and prostrated and prostituted themselves and the sciences to which they were supposed to devote themselves to the Hohenzollern fetish. Eminent German authorities on international law shamelessly taught that international law, as applied to war, existed only in the text-books and in the imagination of weak, foolish, unwarlike, and decadent nations, that power was more important than right, that in case of war all international rules and conventions should be thrown to the winds, that for the State necessity was the highest law, that the German Army could of course not be hampered by the sacredness of treaties and by considerations of humanity. Political philosophers and others, eager to curry favour, taught that the State could flourish only if it were above law and morality, and advocated a policy of unrestrained brutal force, a robber-knight policy on the largest scale. They taught the Germans not only that might was right, but urged the German Government and people into a war for the conquest of Germany's neighbour States, of the sea, of England, of the world. Professor

Treitschke and many other German historians spent their lives in urging Germany to embark upon a policy of conquest and of spoliation, in which they saw a holy duty. Professor Schmoller and many other leading political economists advocated for economic reasons a war with England. Scientists are supposed to devote themselves to the promotion of science and of truth, for science is incompatible with untruth. However, the unceasing advocacy of a robber-policy and the exaltation of a robber-morality had so completely destroyed the instinct of responsibility and of truth among Germany's intellectual leaders that ninety-three of Germany's most eminent scientists, among them many prominent theologians and legists, disgraced themselves and German science for all time by issuing in 1914 a manifesto to the world, in which they mendaciously proclaimed that the other Powers had forced a war upon innocent and peaceful Germany; that upon France, England, and Russia rested the blood-guiltiness; that Germany fought a clean war of self-defence.

The Hohenzollern Government had regimented, drilled, and corrupted not only the schools, the churches, and German science, but had also hired and suborned the German Press. Independent scientific thought and independent journalism, if in opposition to the Government and its aims, were not allowed to exist. Dr. Muehlon wrote in his diary on the 25th of September 1914:

"The state of siege under which we are living suddenly brings to the front all the venal scoundrels who lend the Government their pens for every deed of shame, as bravos hire their stilettos. The pick of the infamous writers belong to three species. They consist, firstly, of those offensively stupid retired officers who could not be utilised as soldiers even in time of war; secondly, of clerical dignitaries who, with cold soul and kindly smile, trumpet forth each bit of baseness as an heroic feat of German Protestantism; and, thirdly—the worst of all—of the countless university professors of the modern type—men overloaded with titles and distinctions—who swim with every patriotic stream, creatures who have been bought or have stolen

their way in, who outside their special department seek no truth and thoroughness but the fame of the day. This highly esteemed scum of the three fashionable Prussian circles tries to make history by lying, tries to create 'archives' and 'data' by impudent assertion."

The Hohenzollern cult and the cult of unrestricted violence and of aggressive war were made the universal faith. The German people were deliberately miseducated, misinformed, and misled from the cradle to the grave. Even the arts were made subservient to the dynastic idea of conquest, to the worship of brute force. German music, German architecture, German painting, German scuplture abandoned the cult of the beautiful for that of the forceful, of the shapeless, of the imposing, of the gigantic, of the overwhelming. Religion itself came to be considered simply as a political and military asset. Many Germans believed that the gentle teachings of Christ were unfavourable to the worship of power and of military success, to the Hohenzollern idea, and that Christianity should be thrown on the scrap-heap, as being no longer in accordance with the spirit of the times. The result was that numerous ethical and pseudo-religious societies arose throughout Germany which preached that Christianity was a worn-out Oriental faith which was quite out of place in a Germanic world. These societies aimed at increasing the warlike spirit of the people by purifying and energising the race and by weeding out the mild Christian idea, which was supposed to enfeeble the national fighting spirit and the will to victory. Turning their backs upon Christianity, many intellectual Germans advocated the creation of a new, of a German, religion. Many asserted that the ancient Germans had evolved the highest form of religion in their primeval forests, and demanded that the worship of the merciless heathen gods of battle, of Wotan and Thor, should be revived. Wotan and Thor were once more to lead the nation. Pseudo-religious organisations tried to renew and to popularise the worship of the ancient tribal gods. Part of the Germans had

become utterly materialistic, part had become frankly pagan. Wotan worship was spreading apace.

It has often been stated that Germany's frenzied attack upon the world was caused by the example and teaching of Bismarck. That is scarcely correct. Bismarck blended in his policy daring with wisdom and caution. Therefore he was successful in all his undertakings. Unfortunately he had given to the German people a Constitution in which the King-Emperor was as all-powerful as were the petty Hohenzollern rulers in the old feudal days. The King-Emperor's absolute authority could not endanger the country as long as the sovereignty was possessed by a ruler of the unemotional caution and carefulness of William I., who allowed himself to be directed by the practical wisdom and experience of his great Chancellor. The advent of the impetuous, headstrong, vain, impulsive, short-sighted, and irresponsible William II. endangered the future of the Empire. Bismarck, clearly recognising that Germany could remain great only if she pursued a peaceful policy, that the new Emperor might by his recklessness involve Germany in ruin, wrote in his Memoirs, his political testament :

"In the future not only sufficient military equipment, but also a correct political eye, will be required to guide the German ship of State through the currents of coalition, to which, in consequence of our geographical position and our previous history, we are exposed.

"We ought to do all we can to weaken the bad feeling among the nations which has been called forth through our growth to the position of a real Great Power, by the honourable and peaceful use of our influence, and so convince the world that a German hegemony in Europe is more useful and less partisan, and also less harmful for the freedom of other nations, than would be the hegemony of France, Russia, or England.

"In order to produce this confidence it is, above everything, necessary that we should act honourably and openly, and be easily reconciled in case of friction or untoward events."

Bismarck foresaw, and frequently foretold to his intimates, that the rashness, aggressiveness, and megalomania of William II. were likely to involve Germany in ruin, and many passages in his Memoirs unmistakably hint at that danger. Germany's downfall can therefore scarcely be ascribed to Bismarck's policy and example.

Prusso-Germany was not a national, but a dynastic State. It was the State of the Hohenzollerns. Hence many of the Hohenzollern rulers were able to imprint their personal character upon their submissive and docile subjects. Under the government of the cautious, courteous, and reserved William I. the German nation had also acted cautiously and soberly. Under the government of a blatant, vain, and boastful megalomaniac the whole nation fell into a megalomaniacal frenzy, for William II. was faithfully supported in his histrionic extravagances by his abject courtiers and by the bureaucratic, military, professorial, ecclesiastical, educational, and journalistic leaders of Germany, who thirsted for recognition and promotion, for place and power, and who were only too willing to be the tools of the Emperor and of his Government. Thus the vanity, boastfulness, and megalomania of the last of the Hohenzollern rulers infected and morbidly affected the whole nation.

Since the early days the Hohenzollerns have claimed infallibility for themselves and for their government. The people were taught, especially in the time of Frederick the Great, that their ruler, his bureaucracy, and his military advisers could not err. The gigantic and universal successes of Prusso-Germany in Bismarck's time had strengthened the belief of the people in the wisdom and infallibility of its appointed rulers. A child-like faith that German diplomats and generals could not err, that the war was being fought "according to plan," that Germany was bound to triumph, that the German people and the German Army were irresistible and unconquerable, prevailed throughout the country up to the autumn of 1918, and the military authorities maintained their reputation of

invincibility almost to the end by mendacious bulletins and by an equally mendacious Press. The faith in victory remained general in Germany up to the day when the news of Bulgaria's downfall and unconditional surrender fell like a thunderbolt. Then the scales dropped from the eyes of the people. They were not prepared for failure, and still less for utter defeat and disaster. The shock was too great to be borne. They became a prey to despair. The strength of the nation and of its army was suddenly broken.

The Prussians were supposed to be the most loyal of subjects. The Hohenzollerns were believed to be the most firmly-rooted dynasty in the world. The unexpected and unexampled defeat of Germany has destroyed five hundred years of dynastic endeavour and of almost unparalleled dynastic success. It has destroyed the Hohenzollern legend and the Hohenzollern creed. William II. has pulled down the mighty fabric which his ancestors had laboriously reared since the day when they settled in Brandenburg. He has destroyed the life-work of Bismarck, of Frederick the Great, of Frederick William I., and of the Great Elector. Germany's faith in the Hohenzollern dynasty and in their traditional policy has been destroyed, probably for all time.

The future of Germany is dark. The people have had a terrible awakening. Their dream of power and of domination is gone. The Great War will leave them permanently impoverished. Their military history may be at an end, for wealth is power. The greatest resources of Imperial Germany were its mineral riches. Half of Germany's coal will fall to Poland. Practically all its iron ore will fall to France. The war will leave the country without allies, without friends, without colonies, with vastly diminished resources, and with a gigantic war debt. In addition, Germany will have to make good the colossal values which her soldiers have destroyed in other countries. The German people will be crippled for decades and perhaps for centuries. Militarism may become for them an impossible luxury. Poverty and dissatisfaction may become wide-

spread and permanent. The population may become stagnant and perhaps retrogressive, for wealth determines population. Moreover, a nation which has been herded like sheep for centuries does not easily and quickly learn the art of governing itself. Centuries of mechanical obedience, of *Kadavergehorsam,* may have destroyed not only the conscience and will of the people, but even their mind and their soul. It is difficult to convert a servile race into a race of freemen. Besides, grave difficulties are bound to arise between the harsh and backward Prussian East and the advanced and comparatively gentle non-Prussian South and West of Germany. The Prussians are hated in the South and West of Germany. The non-Prussian Germans see in the Prussians the cause of their downfall, their task-masters, and their enemies. Germany may split up along racial lines. Possibly it will never recover from its defeat.

CHAPTER III

WILLIAM II.—HIS CHARACTER, POLICY, AND ACHIEVEMENTS [1]

Ever since his coronation in 1890 William II. was the most-talked-about figure on the stage of the world. Very likely more columns of the international press were filled with accounts of his doings and sayings than with those of all other sovereigns taken together. William II. was not only an emperor and a king, but also an active statesman, administrator, and politician, a commanding general and admiral, a painter and a composer, a bustling stage-manager, a conductor of an orchestra, and a sportsman. The world heard him preach sermons, and give lectures on naval matters and on commerce, on yachting and on socialism, on agriculture and on new art, on archæology and on boat-building, on education, on theology, and on countless other subjects. In consequence of his numerous accomplishments and his feverish activity, he had come to be considered to be either a genius of infinite range and wonderful intelligence, or a restless, many-sided, over-ambitious, over-enthusiastic, and exceedingly vain and conceited charlatan.

William II. was distinctly a talented man, endowed by nature with a very active brain, rapid comprehension, a retentive memory, and a fertile imagination. These characteristics showed themselves in his earliest childhood. For instance, once, when his governess, before inflicting bodily chastisement, solemnly assured the little prince that his punishment would hurt her more than it would hurt him,

[1] From the *Fortnightly Review*, November 1902.

little William at once inquired whether it would hurt her in that place where it would hurt him.

The German Emperor was very highly strung, nervous, and irritable ; impetuous to rashness, swayed by sudden impulses, possessed of unbounded self-confidence, and imbued with that fervent belief in himself, in his divine mission, and in the special protection of Providence, which is usually found in great men of the first order, such as Alexander and Cæsar, Cromwell and Napoleon. Having a considerable gift of speech, it is only natural that his utterances were never commonplace, but highly dramatic, strenuous, and emphatic.

As Frederick the Great treated the "Unterthanen-Verstand" with sublime contempt, administered at the same time all the great offices of State in peace, commanded the armies in war, and whiled away his spare time with his flute and philosophy, with writing poetry and history, composing and sketching, thinking himself great in all these subjects, to the amusement of Voltaire, even so William II. felt capable not only of ruling Prussia and the German Empire, so to say, single-handed, but also of directing its commerce and education, its music and art—in short, the whole machinery of the empire, and the whole intelligence and activity of the nation. Frederick the Great was the Emperor's ideal and model, and there was some resemblance between William II. and his great ancestor. Bismarck once remarked of the then Prince William : "In him there is something of Frederick the Great, and he is also able to become as despotic. What a blessing that we have a parliamentary government ! "

Bismarck had prophesied that the Emperor would be his own Chancellor. Nevertheless, he was unwise enough not to resign when the old Emperor died. Moltke was wiser. He resigned six weeks after the new Emperor's advent.

Frederick the Great was a poet, an administrator, a philosopher, and an author, but he was essentially a soldier. In him the ambition to enlarge his dominions, which has been characteristic of all the Hohenzollerns, was particularly

strongly developed, and he succeeded in nearly doubling the territory under his sway, and in elevating Prussia to the rank of a Great Power. William II., whose interests and pursuits were far more multifarious than even those of Frederick the Great, was also principally a soldier, and his desire to increase the territory of his country was more than an ambition with him ; it was a violent passion, as it was with Frederick the Great.

The Emperor was a soldier by nature. Nowhere did he feel more at home than among the officers of his army and navy. He visited their mess-rooms very frequently, not as an emperor, but as a comrade, and stayed for hours with them, talking, jesting, and laughing. He did not mix with civilians in a similarly cordial and unceremonious way. His military education, as well as his inborn military inclinations, together with his love for Frederickian traditions, not only coloured his political views and ambitions and influenced his ideas of government, but they also tinged his public utterances, which therefore usually took the form of Imperial commands. Consequently, his frequent pronouncements on art and education, religion, socialism, etc., were not only of startling originality, but of a still more startling vigour, especially as he never hesitated to fling the whole weight of his Imperial authority into the balance in order to enforce his private views upon an unwilling section of the community or upon the whole nation.

The former rulers of Germany stood, on principle, above the political parties. William II. cheerfully descended into the party arena, and joined the fray with the greatest vigour, and, sometimes, with very unfortunate results. Utterances such as the following were typical for him :

"For me, every Social Democrat is synonymous with enemy of the nation and of the Fatherland."

This was addressed to the largest German party in his speech of the 14th of May 1889.

Suprema lex regis voluntas, written as a demonstration to

parliamentary and popular opposition in the Golden Book at Munich.

Sic volo sic jubeo, written under his portrait given to the Minister of Public Worship and Education.

" Only one is master in the country. That am I. Who opposes me I shall crush to pieces."

These sayings sound especially strange if we remember that Germany was supposed to be a constitutional monarchy, and that the " crushing to pieces " of German subjects could only be effected by the independent law courts. These utterances, and many more of similar tone, which caused much speculation in other countries, and consternation in Germany, did not so much spring from the sudden impulse of a passionate mind as from the Emperor's vanity and conceit, from his deep-rooted conviction of his own genius, and from a mystical belief in the absolute monarchical power by divine right, vested by Providence in the German Emperor.

Under the Imperial Constitution of 1871 the powers of the German Emperor were extremely great. The Constitution said :

" . . . . The Emperor can declare war and conclude peace, make alliances and other treaties, and nominate and receive ambassadors. (Art. 11.)

" The Emperor can call, open, adjourn, and dissolve the Federal Council and the Imperial Diet. (Art. 12.)

" The Emperor can issue and promulgate laws, and supervises their execution. The Imperial enactments . . . require the counter-signature of the Chancellor, who thereby assumes the responsibility for them. (Art. 17.)

" The Emperor nominates officials . . . and orders their dismissal." (Art. 18.)

Besides appointing all Imperial officials, the Emperor appointed all officers of the German Navy and of the Prussian Army, as well as the highest officers of the armies belonging to the other German States included in the Empire.

Compared with the power of the British monarch, the powers of the German Emperor with regard to foreign and home politics were almost boundless. Nevertheless, Wil-

liam II. was not satisfied with his constitutional power, so he increased it at the cost of his Chancellor, of his Ministers, and of the Imperial Diet. Imperial decrees were issued by the Emperor without the counter-signature of the Chancellor, required by Article 17 of the Constitution. Besides, it should not be forgotten that the counter-signature of the German Chancellor, who by counter-signing assumed the responsibility for the Emperor's acts, became a mere formality when the Chancellor was not an experienced and independent official, but simply an obedient tool appointed by the Emperor whose duty it was to put the Imperial will on paper.

In Bismarck's time the actual administration of the country was in the hands of responsible experts, and, what was more important, German policy was directed by the wise foresight, unrivalled experience, calm deliberation, and firmness of purpose of a great statesman. Though Bismarck was generally believed to be all-powerful, if not tyrannical, a belief that stood him in good stead, his position was much less commanding than is generally known. His plans had to be submitted to the Emperor, who, in his turn, used to talk the matter over with his wife. The old Emperor was the soul of honour, conservative, cautious, and somewhat slow to move. The Empress was pious and peace-loving, with a distinct leaning towards Liberalism. Consequently, Bismarck's boldness and daring in foreign affairs were often tempered by the Emperor's wisdom and caution, and the influence of the Empress over her husband made for moderation in home affairs. The old Emperor acted as a brake upon Bismarck, and the Empress as a brake upon her husband. William I. was to Bismarck what the House of Lords is to a Liberal House of Commons, and the combination of Bismarck, the Emperor, and his wife was an ideal one for foreign policy, ensuring the even continuance of a vigorous, wise, discreet, and successful policy.

While Bismarck was in office German foreign and domestic policy ran an even course, German policy was understandable abroad. Bismarck did not embark upon many risky

enterprises at once, but concentrated his master-mind upon a few really important questions. His policy was at the same time great and simple, as was his character. William II. had not the commanding talent of a Bismarck for foreign policy, nor was he subject to the restraining influences which moderated the more adventurous plans of the great Chancellor. Furthermore, William II. took as much interest in the direction of the army and navy, of the national administration, of shipping and commerce, of education, art, sport, and countless other matters, as in the direction of foreign politics. Consequently, he had not sufficient leisure to concentrate his mind upon anything. Hence German foreign policy became fitful, enigmatic, and unstable, a replica of the Emperor's character.

Bismarck's diplomatic activity after the Franco-German War was chiefly directed towards two great objects—the maintenance of the Triple Alliance and the prevention of an alliance between France and Russia. As long as Bismarck was in office, France and Russia were kept asunder. Germany was the strongest and most respected Power on the Continent, and its arbiter. Soon after Bismarck's dismissal Germany ceased to be the first Power on the Continent. Russia, who had been a reliable friend to Germany until William II. came to the throne, was estranged by the Emperor. The traditional good relations between Russia and Germany, which had proved so valuable to her in 1870, came to an end. Only fifteen months after Bismarck's dismissal, in July 1891, the rejoicings occasioned by the visit of the French Fleet at Cronstadt proclaimed to the world that William II. had not only been unable to continue the skilful isolation of France and to enjoy the friendship of Russia, but that the Emperor had driven these Powers into one another's arms by sheer bad diplomacy. The work of which Bismarck was even more proud than of the fashioning of the Triple Alliance, the keeping apart of France and Russia, had been rapidly destroyed.

After Bismarck's dismissal independent, able Ministers were replaced by time-servers and figureheads whose power

was extremely circumscribed. From a powerful, impersonal, and therefore national ministerial policy by experienced men, tempered by the moderation of a wise and cautious ruler, German foreign and domestic policy became the personal uncontrolled policy of a talented, vigorous, impulsive, very self-satisfied and highly self-conscious monarch, and was tinged by accidents of his health, and by his personal feelings, moods, and prejudices.

The Emperor treated his Ministers not as experienced and independent chiefs of the Departments of State, entitled to opinions of their own, but as the executors of his will, and he removed them as soon as they did not succeed in fulfilling his wishes. His Ministers were changed with surprising rapidity. Continuity of policy in foreign and home affairs became impossible. Projects of great importance were hurriedly brought forward and dropped in nervous haste, and the suddenness with which the highest officials were replaced taught them that it was not safe to oppose or to criticise the wishes of the Emperor, that it was wisest for them to execute his wishes and his whims without question. Thus the high offices were filled with place-hunters and spineless nonentities.

The German Parliament was already in Bismarck's time little more than a money-voting and law-assenting machine and a general talking-shop, possessing hardly any influence, and no control whatever, over the administration and policy of the Government. The degradation became complete under William II.

The Emperor interfered not only in matters of State, but in minor matters as well, as the following anecdote, told by a prominent German architect, will show: Drawings for a new church in Berlin were submitted to the Emperor for assent or correction. The Emperor, intending to make a marginal remark with regard to the cross on the top of the steeple, put a letter for reference above the cross, and drew a straight line from the letter down to the cross. Then he changed his mind, and crossed the letter vigorously through. When the architect received back his plans he studied

carefully the Emperor's corrections, but mistook the crossed-through letter for a star. Knowing better than to ask questions, he built the church, and put a big star on a huge iron pole high above the top of the cross. This strange excrescence was in existence a few years ago, and may still be visible. For similar reasons many monuments and public buildings in Berlin and other parts of Germany are of astonishing ugliness.

Blind obedience became the watchword in official circles throughout the Empire, and even in professorial appointments by the nominally independent universities and in judicial decisions by nominally independent judges a desire to please the Emperor, a desire to please even the most unreasonable Imperial wishes, became painfully apparent. As the Emperor, apart from the powers already cited, could influence those whom he wished to influence by bestowing titles and decorations, and by social preferment, abject flattery became rife in his surroundings and throughout the empire. Examples of such flattery on the part of the highest dignitaries of the empire were fitly described in Germany under the name of "Byzantinism."

The domestic policy of the Emperor was an unfortunate one. His anti-Polish policy infuriated the Poles. The lack of toleration which became characteristic of German home policy drove the Liberal elements of Germany into the ranks of the Social Democratic Party, which came to include numerous manufacturers, merchants, bankers, professional men, etc. During the reign of William II. Social Democracy became by far the strongest party in the empire. The following figures show the numbers of Social Democratic votes polled at the various general elections :

	Total of Votes polled.	Social Democratic Votes.	Percentage of Social Democratic Votes.
1887 . . .	7,540,900	763,100	10·11 per cent.
1888 . . .		(Accession of William II.)	
1890 . . .	7,228,500	1,427,300	19·74 ,,
1893 . . .	7,674,000	1,786,700	23·30 ,,
1898 . . .	7,757,700	2,107,076	27·18 ,,
1903 . . .	9,495,586	3,010,771	31·71 ,,
1907 . . .	11,262,800	3,259,000	28·94 ,,
1912 . . .	12,206,808	4,250,329	34·82 ,,

It was only natural that Social Democracy grew by leaps and bounds, trebling its votes in twenty years. The Emperor began his reign as the "Arbeiter-Kaiser," called an international congress for the benefit of the workers, and received their deputations. Then turned round and proclaimed, "For me every Social Democrat is synonymous with enemy of the nation and of the Fatherland." Lastly, he had a Bill brought before the Reichstag, upon his personal initiative, making incitement to strikes a felony punishable with penal servitude, from three to five years. If anything was calculated to shake the confidence of the German workers in their Kaiser and to increase Social Democracy it was the Emperor's untimely, impulsive, and ill-advised meddling and the "Penal Servitude Bill."

As the Emperor had not succeeded in increasing Germany's territories by the arts and stratagems of diplomacy, he turned towards his armed forces and immensely strengthened them. A comparison of Germany's armed strength in 1888, the year of the Emperor's accession, and its strength in 1914 is therefore interesting :

PEACE STRENGTH OF THE GERMAN ARMY

1888	491,726 men	84,091 horses
1914	800,646 ,,	160,092 ,,

The great increase of the peace army was small if compared with the increase in its war strength.

The following was the strength of the German Navy at the beginning of the Emperor's reign and in 1914 :

1888 . .	189,136 tons	182,470 horse-power	15,573 men
1914 . .	1,041,010 ,,	1,832,840 ,, ,,	79,357 ,,

The Emperor was uniformly unsuccessful in his foreign policy and in his domestic policy. Being rather a soldier than a diplomat, and being aware that the greatness of Germany was won on the field of battle, William II. naturally turned in his political disappointments towards the *ultima ratio regis*. When his campaign against the Social

Democrats had failed, he addressed the officers of the Berlin garrison, and admonished them to stand by him and to shoot the malcontents in case he commanded them to do so, as the Prussian soldiers shot the Berlin revolutionaries in 1848. Again, when his attempts at seizing the Philippines and his pro-Kruger campaign had failed, he turned towards his fleet. On the 9th of October 1899 the Boers issued their ultimatum ; nine days later, on the 18th of October, the Emperor made the celebrated speech in Hamburg containing the winged words, "Bitter not ist uns eine starke Deutsche Flotte." German colonial aspirations in Africa had been foiled by British diplomacy, and the speech mentioned was the starting-point of the violent anti-British agitation in Germany which culminated in the passing of a Bill authorising the construction of a fleet, intended, according to its preamble, to be so strong as to be able to encounter successfully the most powerful enemy on the seas.

While the German Emperor was showering the most assiduous attentions upon England and America, as well as upon France and Russia, and while peace was in his mouth, a huge fleet was being built with the greatest possible dispatch and his army was increased with the utmost rapidity.

The German Emperor possessed that abnormal versatility and flexibility of mind which is sometimes described with a different name. First he sat at Bismarck's feet as his admiring disciple. Then he dismissed his great master without ceremony, and completely changed the Bismarckian foreign and domestic policy of Germany. First he gave Caprivi a free hand. Then he ruled alone. First he took up the cause of the working men, and then he threw them over. First he was anti-colonial, and gave away the best German colonies in exchange for the rock of Heligoland. Then he strained every nerve to acquire colonies. First he provoked France, and then he flattered her. First he flirted with the Poles, and then forbade Polish schoolchildren to say even their prayers in their own language.

At the end of this chapter I wrote, when it appeared as an article in the *Fortnightly Review* in November 1902 :

"In view of the Emperor's rapid and alarmingly frequent changes of mood, and the equally rapid and kaleidoscopic changes of his policy, in view of the bitterness which must have been engendered in his mind by the failure of his attempts at territorial aggrandisement and domestic legislation, and in view of the nearly absolute control which the German Emperor exercises, perhaps not *de jure*, but certainly *de facto*, over the foreign policy of Germany and over her army and navy, it appears not unlikely that William II. may some day act against some 'friendly' Power with the same startling rapidity with which his great ancestor, Frederick the Great, acted against Austria, when he flung his armies into Silesia without any warning and without any cause.

"It has been said that Great Britain has nothing to fear from Germany, because of the family ties which connect the Emperor with the British dynasty. Those who believe that sentimental considerations of a purely personal kind will be allowed to stand in the way of the Emperor's policy can hardly be acquainted with the diplomatic steps which William II. took against Great Britain when he dispatched his telegram to Mr. Kruger. They should also remember that the German Emperor placed himself unreservedly on the side of the Turks in the Græco-Turkish War, notwithstanding the fact that his own sister was the wife of the heir to the Greek throne.

"In view of the character of the German Emperor, his well-known ambitions and his enormous power, it would seem that those nations at the cost of which Germany could possibly increase her territory should ever be watchful, and should ever be prepared against sudden surprises. They would do well to study the pan-German manifestoes, which, though they are of course disavowed and discredited in official circles, give certainly some indication of Germany's political aspirations. We find in them recommendations for the 'alliance or absorption' of 'Germanic' Holland, Switzerland, and Denmark, for the incorporation of the western half of Austria-Hungary, creating a German Empire stretching across Europe from the Baltic down to Trieste, and for the acquisition of colonies in a temperate

zone in Asia Minor, South Brazil, Argentina, South Africa, or 'wherever else opportunity should offer.' How many of these projects will be accomplished within the Emperor's lifetime ?

"The theory has often been advanced that the time of the personal policy of kings and emperors is gone, never to return. The future may disprove that theory, and may prove the German Emperor a political factor of the greatest magnitude, and of unexpected influence upon the history of Europe and of the world."

My forecast came true twelve years after it had been made. William II. was not a ruler of men, but merely a vain, conceited, many-sided, and incapable crowned amateur, who in a busy and strenuous life achieved nothing except the ruin of his country, of his dynasty, of his allies, and of the minor sovereigns of Germany.

CHAPTER IV

THE FOREIGN POLICY OF PRUSSO-GERMANY [1]

GERMANY, as known to the older generation, was a country peopled with philosophers, poets, composers, slow and sleepy officials, and backward peasants; it was an æsthetical, sentimental, day-dreaming land. The Germany of 1914 was matter-of-fact, hard-headed, calculating, cunning, business-like, totally devoid of sentimentality and even of sentiment, and very up-to-date. But modern Germany and old Germany were two different countries. New Germany was an enlarged Prussia. Old Germany continued to vegetate and to dream dreams under the name and under the banner of Austria. It should not be forgotten that those Germans who used to be considered typical representatives of Germany, such as Goethe, Schiller, Lessing, Wieland, Jean Paul, Schlegel, Uhland, Lenau, Hegel, Fichte, Beethoven, Mozart, Haydn, belonged to old Germany and were non-Prussians.

Five hundred years ago the country where the foundation of Prussia was laid was a wilderness infested with robber-knights. With fire and sword the Hohenzollerns reduced the rebellious knights and the independent cities of Brandenburg-Prussia to obedience, and created an absolutely centralised State ruled by the sword. It remained military in character, partly because the population was composed of lawless and reckless adventurers and criminals from everywhere, partly because the State was ever threatened by the neighbouring Slavs and by the armies of then powerful Poland. Thus, up to a comparatively recent time,

[1] From the *Fortnightly Review*, December 1905.

savagery and arbitrary rule prevailed in Prussia. In 1650 London had 500,000 inhabitants, Paris had 400,000 inhabitants, Amsterdam had 300,000 inhabitants, whilst Berlin was a village of 10,000 inhabitants. Up to a very recent time Prussia was a semi-barbarous State.

Prussia, like Rome, was founded by a band of needy and warlike adventurers. Both States were artificial creations, both could maintain themselves only by force of arms and extend their frontiers only by wars of aggression, and the character of both States may be read in the records of their early history. By the force of events and by the will of her masterful rulers Prussia grew up. For centuries she was a nation in arms. This may be seen from the following figures, which more clearly illustrate the history of Prussia than would a lengthy account:

	Square Kilometres of Prussia.	Inhabitants of Prussia.	Number of Soldiers in Standing Army during Peace Time.	Percentage of Soldiers to Population.
1688 . . .	113,000	1,500,000	38,000	2·5
1740 . . .	121,000	2,250,000	80,000	3·6
1786 . . .	199,000	5,500,000	195,000	3·6
1865 . . .	275,500	18,800,000	210,000	1·1
1867 . . .	347,500	23,600,000	260,000	1·1
1914 (Germany) .	541,000	67,000,000	800,646	1·2

Between 1688 and 1914 the population of Great Britain has grown fivefold. During the same period the territory ruled by the Hohenzollerns has grown fivefold in size and its population has increased no less than forty-fold. In 1688 Great Britain had five times more inhabitants than had Prussia, but in 1914 Germany had 50 per cent. more inhabitants than Great Britain. These few figures prove how successful had been the policy of the Hohenzollerns, and in view of their success it is only natural that modern Germany closely followed Prussia's political methods and traditions. The foregoing table shows also that the marvellous rapidity with which Prusso-Germany grew was due to the strength of her army. *Machtpolitik*, the policy of force, the policy of the mailed fist, was always Prussia's favoured policy; it had been exceedingly effective, and it

had, therefore, not unnaturally, become Prusso-Germany's policy as well.

In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries the little State of Prussia used to maintain a much larger army than Austria, France, and other great, densely populated, and wealthy States. Her army was, as a rule, exceedingly well drilled and absolutely ready for war, and by her army and by her not over-scrupulous diplomacy Prussia succeeded in aggrandising herself at the cost of her neighbours.

Up to the death of King Frederick William I. Prussia's diplomacy was simple, crude, and clumsy, though energetic. Frederick William's successor, Frederick the Great, opened a new era in Prussia's foreign policy, for that monarch gave to the diplomacy of his country a new character.[1] The main principle of Frederick the Great's foreign policy was to act with startling rapidity against an unprepared and unsuspecting opponent. In his *Exposé du Gouvernement Prussien, des Principes sur lesquels il roule, avec quelques Réflexions Politiques*, which was written either in 1775 or 1776, he advised his successor as follows : "Constant attention must be paid to hiding, as far as possible, one's plans and ambitions. . . . Secrecy is an indispensable virtue in politics as well as in the art of war."

During the year before he came to the throne, Frederick the Great wrote his celebrated book, the *Anti-Machiavel*, in order to confute Machiavelli's *Prince*, a book which, according to Frederick's preface, was one of the most monstrous and most poisonous compositions which had ever been penned. Frederick dedicated the *Anti-Machiavel* to his brother sovereigns. At the end of chapter vi. Frederick emphatically proclaimed, "Let Cæsar Borgia be the ideal of Machiavel's admirers, my ideal is Marcus Aurelius."

The *Anti-Machiavel*, which was published in 1740, the year in which Frederick ascended the throne, seemed to be

[1] A very full account of the policy of Frederick the Great and of Bismarck will be found in my book *The Foundations of Germany*, John Murray, London.

a political pronunciamento of the highest importance and the political programme of the King, and very likely it was meant to appear as such in the eyes of the world and to impress foreign rulers with Frederick's love of peace. However, in December of the very year during which the *Anti-Machiavel* had appeared and had proclaimed that Frederick meant to be a prince of peace, the King, under the shallowest of pretexts and without a declaration of war, invaded Silesia and wrested it from Austria, "because," as he frankly confessed in his Memoirs, "that act brought prestige, and added strength, to Prussia."

Marcus Aurelius was Frederick's ideal only in his *Anti-Machiavel*. In one of his testaments Frederick the Great showed himself an admirer and disciple of Machiavel, for we read in that document: "A war is a good war when it is undertaken for increasing the prestige of the State, for maintaining its security, for assisting one's allies, or for frustrating the ambitious plans of a monarch who is bent on conquests which may be harmful to one's interests." In other words, every advantageous war is a good war.

In 1741 Sweden declared war against Russia. Frederick assured Russia on his word of honour that he had not instigated that war, but his assurances were unavailing, and Brakel, the Russian Ambassador in Berlin, warned his Government "not to believe the King, who was consumed with ambitious projects and who would not keep the peace as long as he was alive." It was Frederick's settled policy to foment wars among his powerful neighbours. This policy was formulated in the following words by Frederick the Great in his *Exposé du Gouvernement Prussien*, which was written for the guidance of his successors: "If possible the Powers of Europe should be made envious against one another in order to give occasion for a *coup* when opportunity offers."

Frederick the Great's attitude towards Russia furnishes us with the key to Germany's historic and traditional policy towards her Eastern neighbour. In Frederick the Great's *Histoire de mon Temps* we read:

" Of all neighbours of Prussia the Russian Empire is the most dangerous, both by its power and its geographical position, and those who will rule Prussia after me should cultivate the friendship of those barbarians, because they are able to ruin Prussia altogether through the immense number of their mounted troops, whilst one cannot repay them for the damage which they may do because of the poverty of that part of Russia which is nearest to Prussia and through which one has to pass in order to get into the Ukraine."

Russia was dangerous to Prussia, and she possessed nothing worth the taking. A war with Russia, even if victorious, was therefore bound to be very unprofitable. Hence it was in Prussia's interest to make Russia harmless either by peaceful means or by involving her in wars with other countries.

The easiest way to neutralise a powerful country and a possible future enemy seemed to the King an alliance with that very State. Therefore we read in his *Exposé du Gouvernement Prussien :*

" One of the first political principles is to endeavour to become an ally of that one of one's neighbours who may become most dangerous to one's State. For that reason we have an alliance with Russia, and thus we have our back free as long as the alliance lasts."

In another part of his writings Frederick advised his successors : " Before engaging in a war to the south or west of the kingdom every Prussian prince should secure at any cost the neutrality of Russia if he be unable to obtain her active support."

According to Frederick's advice, alliances were to be formed by Prussia, not so much for the defence of Prussia's possessions as for their extension. Alliances were to be considered as engagements which were to serve rather for Prussia's benefit than for the mutual advantage of the allies, and were to be instruments which were to serve more for aggrandisement than for preservation and for defence.

Frederick's views as to the sanctity of a ruler's obligations

under a treaty of alliance are exceedingly interesting. As the views of Frederick the Great and of Bismarck with regard to a nation's duties under a treaty of alliance coincided, and as these views considerably differ from the English conception as to the sanctity of treaty bonds, it is worth while quoting Frederick's views as to the binding force of treaties which he expressed in his Memoirs as follows :

" If the ruler is obliged to sacrifice his own person for the welfare of his subjects, he is all the more obliged to sacrifice engagements the continuation of which would be harmful to his country. Examples of broken treaties are frequent. . . .

" It is clear to me that a private person must scrupulously keep his word even if he has given it rashly. If he fails to do so, the law will be set into motion, and after all only an individual suffers. But to what tribunal can a sovereign appeal if another ruler breaks his engagements ? The word of a private man involves but an individual ; that of a sovereign involves, and may mean misery for, whole nations. Therefore the problem may be summed up thus : Is it better that a nation should perish or that a sovereign should break his treaty ? Who would be so imbecile as to hesitate how to decide ? "

The foregoing explanation reminds of Bismarck's cynical remark recorded by Busch : " What are alliances ? Alliances are when one has to."

On the 6th of December 1772 Frederick the Great wrote to Voltaire, " The world is governed only by skill and trickery," and one is amazed at the skill and trickery with which, during many years of laborious, most intricate, and unceasing diplomatic negotiations, Frederick II. endeavoured to involve Russia and Austria, his strongest neighbours, in war with one another. Sometimes Poland was the object which was to serve Frederick's policy, sometimes Turkey. In countless letters Frederick never tired pointing out that Russia's advance meant a frightful danger to Austria. On the 3rd of September 1770 Frederick met Prince Kaunitz, the Austrian Prime Minister, at Neustadt, and impressed upon him that " Austria can on no account allow Russia to cross the Danube. . . . I am aware that, if

the Russians cross the Danube, you would be unable passively to look on. . . . Could you not persuade France to make a declaration to you that, if you were to break with Russia and to make war against her if the Russians should cross the Danube, France would send 100,000 men to help you ? You would confide the news to me and I would make use of it."

In these attempts to commit Austria against Russia we have the model which served Bismarck in 1866. At the time of the Austro-Prussian War Napoleon III. endeavoured as an offset to Prussia's conquests to obtain some territorial compensation for France on the left border of the Rhine. Bismarck, unwilling to let it come to a rupture between Prussia and France at that awkward moment when hostilities had not yet ceased, proposed to Napoleon that he should take Belgium, as he, Bismarck, had frequently advised the Emperor in former years. Napoleon fell into Bismarck's trap, and Benedetti handed at Bismarck's request a draft agreement to Bismarck which was to be placed before the King of Prussia. As soon as Benedetti had given to Bismarck that compromising document, it was sent to Russia to be shown to the Tsar, and Bismarck explained to Benedetti that the delay in deciding upon it was caused by the hesitation of the King of Prussia. By this trick Bismarck succeeded in convincing the Tsar that France was a disturber of the peace, and in securing Russia's support in the subsequent war against France.

Frederick's skill and trickery was not confined to his unceasing attempts to create war among his neighbours. The division of Poland was Frederick's work, but he knew how to put the odium of that transaction on the shoulders of Russia, who, apparently, took the initiative. Austria had intended to keep aloof from the partition of Poland, and a short-sighted Prussian statesman would have endeavoured to take advantage of Austria's disinclination to participate in that shameful transaction in order to secure a larger portion of Polish territory for Prussia. However, Frederick looked farther ahead. He wished to induce Austria to assist

in the spoliation of Poland. On the 16th of February 1772 Frederick wrote to Solms: "If Austria gets no part of Poland all the hatred of the Poles will be turned against us. They would then regard the Austrians as their sole protectors, and the latter would gain so much prestige and influence with them that they would have thousands of opportunities for intrigues of all kinds in that country." In these words we find the reasons which caused Frederick to work upon Austria for years until he at last succeeded in persuading her against her will that it would be in her own interest if she took part in the division of Poland. By giving Austria a part of Poland Frederick made his own share of the plunder smaller but more secure. At the same time he weakened Austria by furnishing her with a disaffected province and a cause of friction with Russia, for those parts of Poland which fell to Austria were coveted by the Russians. The partition of Poland bound the three confederates in that crime to one another. Thus Frederick succeeded in creating a situation which allowed Prussia to aggrandise herself easily at the cost of the minor German States and of France.

Bismarck's political successes were founded on, and made possible by, the partition of Poland which had made Russia Prussia's traditional friend and ally. He imitated Frederick's policy when, in 1878, at the Congress of Berlin, he estranged Italy and France by securing for France Tunis, upon which Italy had the strongest claim, and when he estranged Russia and Austria-Hungary by giving Bosnia and Herzegovina to Austria, while Russia returned from the Congress empty-handed. Owing to this arrangement, Austria and Russia and France and Italy were set against one another. For their own safety Austria and Italy had to seek Germany's support. Thus the Triple Alliance was made a necessity.

Frederick the Great had said in his *Exposé*: "All far-off acquisitions are a burden to the State. A village on the frontier is worth more than a principality two hundred and fifty miles away." Bearing in mind the wisdom of Frede-

rick's maxim, Bismarck refused to embark in risky but dazzling adventures which appealed to the imagination, and which were suggested to him by the representatives of old Germany, South German professors, and cosmopolitan philanthropists who, fifty years ago, agitated in favour of making Germany a sea Power. Not heeding their recommendations, Bismarck kept in mind "the village on the frontier." Believing that he ought first to settle the business nearest at hand, he intended, before embarking on the sea, to make Prussia the strongest Power on the Continent of Europe. Nor was Bismarck willing to follow the policy recommended to him by the German Liberals, who, guided by the declamation and the rhetoric fireworks of Mr. Cobden, Mr. Bright, and other distinguished Englishmen, preached disarmament, the weakening of the executive of government, the establishment of a universal brotherhood among nations in a universal commonwealth of commerce and the universal freedom of trade. Believing that the Millennium was not yet at hand, Bismarck refused to be guided by the somewhat hazy sentiments of unpractical, though large-hearted, enthusiasts, and resolved to rely on the old Prussian political traditions and methods, which he summed up in the words "Blood and iron." He meant to raise Prussia to further greatness not by a sentimental policy of drift, but by vigorous action and by the sword.

Immediately on coming into power Bismarck doubled the Prussian Army, and, bearing in mind Frederick's advice to ally Prussia with her most dangerous neighbour, her future antagonist, he induced Austria in 1864 to enter, in alliance with Prussia, upon a common campaign against Denmark, who was deprived of Schleswig-Holstein with the harbour of Kiel, and of more than 1,000,000 inhabitants. Thus Bismarck brought Prussia back to her traditional policy of conquest and reopened the war-era in Europe. Two years later, after having secured Napoleon III.'s benevolent neutrality in return for vague promises that France should have Belgium, Bismarck attacked Austria, Prussia's ally in the Danish campaign of 1864, being

determined to humble Austria and to secure for Prussia the leadership of the German States.

Having secured Russia's support, Bismarck turned against France, who, by her benevolent attitude towards Prussia during the Austro-Prussian War, had assisted materially in Prussia's aggrandisement, exactly as Austria had done in 1864. Through Bismarck's skilful management of the Spanish question—the alteration in the text of the Ems telegram was merely a minor incident—war broke out between France and Prussia in 1870, and, after a victorious campaign, in which the South German States had to join, the German Empire was erected on the ruins of France. The South German States became amalgamated with Prussia. Thus Prussia became almost synonymous with the German Empire. The King of Prussia became the monarch of Germany, which, as William I. somewhat contemptuously, though very truly, said, was merely "an enlarged Prussia."

Having raised Prussia to greatness, Bismarck, like Frederick the Great, endeavoured to weaken his most powerful neighbour, Russia, who, at the outbreak of the Franco-German War, had announced that she would assist Germany if another Power should assist France. Thus Russia had kept Austria, Italy, and Denmark at bay, who were willing to help France, and had enabled Prussia to defeat France and to raise herself to further greatness. Encouraged, incited, and almost pushed by Bismarck, Russia made war upon Turkey in 1877. This war utterly crippled her strength, and, thanks to Bismarck's manipulation at the Congress of Berlin, she was deprived of the fruits of her victory, which she had expected Germany would, in gratitude for her past services, assist in securing for her.

When Bismarck had established Germany's greatness and had secured her paramountcy on the Continent of Europe by weakening all her neighbours by creating discord between all European Great Powers, he thought that the time had come for Germany to seek expansion in other continents. He, not William II., originated Germany's

world policy. Already in 1876 Bismarck had contemplated acquiring a large part of South Africa with the help of the Boers. According to the very reliable Poschinger, Santa Lucia Bay was to be acquired by Germany, and German merchants were found ready to build a railway from that harbour to Pretoria, and to run a line of ships to Santa Lucia Bay, whereto, by specially cheap fares, a great stream of German emigrants was to be directed. Thus a German South Africa was to be founded. The sum of 100,000,000 marks (£5,000,000) was thought to be sufficient for financing that enterprise, and German business men were willing to find that sum, provided 5 per cent. interest on that sum was given them by the State during ten years. At that time Germany was financially exhausted through a violent Stock Exchange crisis, and Free Trade had crippled her manufacturing industries. Therefore this project had to be abandoned for lack of funds. In 1884 Bismarck made another and more determined attempt at acquiring Santa Lucia Bay, but this second attempt miscarried through the incapacity of his son, to whom the negotiations had been entrusted.

Since the time when Prussia and Germany were given Parliaments, Prusso-German policy was no longer exclusively shaped by the ruler and his trusted minister, but it was influenced to some considerable extent by the will and by the wishes of the people. Consequently, if we wish to understand the foreign policy of Germany, we must not only consider the attitude of the actual political leaders and the influence of those political traditions which have become the leading political axioms of State, but also the views of the very influential German professors.

The German university professors have played a very important part in the foreign policy of Germany. There were twenty-three universities in Germany, in which more than four thousand professors taught more than eighty thousand students. These four thousand university professors not only formed the minds of the professional men and of the future high and low officials, and thus influenced

cultured public opinion in the making, but they also wrote much for the newspapers. The views of the German professors carried very great weight with the public, and thus they profoundly influenced not only the cultured circles but the whole nation.

None of the German university professors has exercised a greater influence upon the shaping and the development of Germany's foreign policy than Professor von Treitschke, the historian, who, during about thirty years, enjoyed the greatest authority in the lecture room and with the Press in matters political. No German professor of his time had a greater weight and a more lasting influence with the German patriots. Therefore we must take note of his leading views and of the political doctrines which he inculcated.

Treitschke gazed ahead towards the time when his dream of a Greater Germany, whose dominions would extend beyond the seas, would be realised ; when Germany would be able to enter upon a world-embracing policy; when, after having acquired the harbours of Holland and built an enormous fleet, she would be able to measure her strength with that of the Anglo-Saxon countries. The claim of the Pan-Germans to the possession of the whole Rhine was not of recent origin. It was based on Treitschke's claim which he formulated in his book, *Politik*, as follows :

" Germany, whom Nature has treated in a stepmotherly manner, will be happy when she has received her due and possesses the Rhine in its entirety. . . . It is a resource of the utmost value. By our fault its most valuable part has come into the hands of strangers, and it is an indispensable task for German policy to regain the mouths of that river. A purely political union with Holland is unnecessary, because the Dutch have grown into an independent nation, but an economic union with them is indispensable. We are too modest if we fear to state that the entrance of Holland into our customs system is as necessary for us as is our daily bread, but apparently we are afraid to pronounce the most natural demands which a nation can formulate."

In view of Germany's dearth of habours the acquisition of the Netherlands was considered the first step towards entering upon a world-embracing policy and acquiring a predominant position not only in Europe but in the world across the ocean. It was clear to Treitschke that Germany could acquire such a position only after England had been crushed and after the rule of the sea had been wrested from her. Then, and then only, would Germany find a free field for her energy in every quarter of the world. This was his view, and he explained the nature of the future relations between Germany and this country with his usual candour at every occasion. The policy which he recommended towards England, and his opinion of her, may be seen from the following characteristic extract from his paper, *Die Türkei und die Grossmächte*, published on the 20th of June 1876 :

"Whatever one may think of British liberty, England of to-day is no doubt a Power for action in the society of nations, but her power is clearly an anachronism. It was created in the olden time when the world's wars were decided by naval battles and by hired mercenaries, and when it was considered good policy to rob well-situated fortresses and naval ports without any regard to their ownership and history. In this century of national States and of armed nations a cosmopolitan trading Power such as England can no longer maintain itself for any length of time. The day will come and must come when Gibraltar will belong to the Spaniards, Malta to the Italians, Heligoland to the Germans, and the Mediterranean to the nations who live on the Mediterranean. . . . England is to-day the shameless representative of barbarism in International Law Hers is the blame, if naval wars still bear the character of privileged piracy."

Treitschke detested England, wished to see her crushed, and hoped to see a huge German World Empire arise on the ruins of Anglo-Saxondom. Decades would have to pass by until Germany would be strong enough to destroy the Anglo-Saxons. Meanwhile the most pressing need of Germany seemed to Treitschke the acquisition of large

colonies situated in a temperate zone whereto a stream of German emigrants might be directed. In *Deutsche Kämpfe* we read :

"In the South of Africa circumstances are decidedly favouring us. English colonial policy, which has been successful everywhere else, has not had a lucky hand at the Cape of Good Hope. The civilisation which exists there is Teutonic, is Dutch. The policy of England in South Africa, which vacillates between weakness and brutality, has created a deadly and unextinguishable hatred against her among the Dutch Boers. . . . If our Empire has the courage to follow an independent colonial policy with determination, a collision of our interests and those of England is unavoidable. It was natural and logical that the new Great Power of Central Europe had to settle affairs with all Great Powers. We have settled our accounts with Austria-Hungary, with France, and with Russia. The last settlement, the settlement with England, will probably be the lengthiest and the most difficult one."

Having taken note of the world-embracing political measures which Treitschke advocated, let us now consider the leading maxims of his political philosophy. Treitschke lectured not only on history but on policy as well. The political theories which he taught were of very great importance in developing the political mind and the political conscience of modern Germany. It would lead too far to describe Treitschke's system of policy. It must suffice to say that his system is an elaboration of the political teachings of Machiavelli and the glorification of the political methods which have been adopted with such marvellous success by Frederick the Great and by Bismarck. We read in the beginning of his book *Politik* :

"It will always redound to the glory of Machiavelli that he has placed the State on a solid foundation, and that he has freed the State and its morality from the moral precepts taught by the Church, but especially because he has been the first to teach : 'The State is Power.'"

Starting from the fundamental conception that "The State is Power," that it is not a moral agent, but merely power,

Treitschke logically arrived at the following conclusion regarding the sacredness of treaties: "Every State reserves to itself the right of judging as to the extent of its treaty obligations."

If we bear in mind Treitschke's teaching, can we wonder that Treitschke's pupils gave such a peculiar interpretation to the treaties signed by Germany? Seeing in the State not a moral representative of the nation, but merely power personified, Treitschke was the most determined opponent to international arbitration, for we read in his book *Politik*:

"The institution of international and permanent courts of arbitration is incompatible with the very nature of the State. Only in a question of secondary or tertiary importance would it be possible to obey the ruling of such a court. For vital questions there exists no impartial foreign power, and to the end of history arms will give the final decision. Herein lies the sacredness of war."

Treitschke died in 1896, but his work survived him. The seed which he had sown broadcast in countless lectures, books, pamphlets, and newspaper articles bore fruit. Thus he helped in opening an era of universal political unscrupulousness in Germany and in creating a mighty popular movement towards expansion oversea, with the object of destroying the power of Anglo-Saxondom.

Bismarck's successors continued Bismarck's policy, and had to improve upon it. Though Bismarck ostensibly was Russia's friend, he had strengthened Turkey against Russia by providing her with arms, with money, with railways, and with officers. Bismarck's successors continued that policy and extended it towards England as well. In Egypt and in China Germany's agents intrigued against Great Britain. The South African War would never have broken out had Germany not deluded the Boers into the belief that, as the German Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs declared to England in writing, "the independence of the Transvaal Republic is a German interest," and had she not lavishly supplied the Boers with arms and ammunition.

Germany unceasingly tried to create an effective counter-

poise against Great Britain. Bismarck encouraged Anglo-Russian differences in Asia and set France and England against one another over Egypt. He encouraged Russia and France in their anti-British attitude, and his successors continued Bismarck's policy. Germany's Venezuela policy aimed at setting the United States against England. When the United States took umbrage at the Anglo-German Venezuela expedition and Great Britain wished to withdraw, Germany insisted that it should be carried through, arguing that some show of energy on the part of the strongest naval and of the strongest military Power would cause the United States to climb down and teach them to be modest for at least thirty years. Happily British diplomacy did not stumble into the trap, and saw the point of the argument, which was similar to that of Frederick the Great when he told the Austrians that they could not allow the Russians to cross the Danube, and that they should oppose their crossing in alliance with France.

Some years ago the movement towards the unification of the British Empire began to take shape. Canada offered preferential fiscal treatment to the Mother Country. Other colonies were inclined to follow. Mr. Chamberlain cordially responded to the advances made, and began to work for a British Imperial Fiscal Union. Treitschke and his followers had frequently declared that the British Empire was an empire only in name, that it would gradually fall to pieces, that the United States would have a similar fate. Germany resolved to kill the movement towards Imperial Unification, and declared commercial war against Canada. As the penalising of Canada's exports failed to have the desired effect, further measures were threatened. On the 29th of June 1903 Lord Lansdowne made the following extraordinary statement in the House of Lords :

" The position between Germany and Canada with which we were threatened is not one which His Majesty's Government could regard as other than a serious position. It is not merely that we found that Canada was liable to be made to suffer in consequence of the preferential treatment

which the Canadian Government had accorded to us, but it was actually adumbrated in an official document that if other colonies acted in the same manner as Canada, the result might be that we, the Mother Country, would find ourselves deprived of most-favoured-nation treatment."

Not satisfied with crippling British industries and trade, Germany tried to oppose the political unification of the Empire by threats.

CHAPTER V

THE WAR MACHINE OF PRUSSO-GERMANY—ITS CREATION AND ITS DESTRUCTION [1]

ALL the great empires which the world has seen, with perhaps one solitary exception, that of the Chinese Empire, have become great by force; and all the great empires which have declined, or which have disappeared from the world's stage, have been diminished or destroyed by force. Diplomacy is fond of euphemisms, and diplomats like to speak of gradual expansion by allowing free play to the national forces and to the forces of Nature. They speak of creating protectorates, of mapping out spheres of interest, etc., when they are in reality bent on the aggrandisement of the nation by force. Hence it comes that countries are permanently and forcibly taken from their rightful owners by what diplomats are pleased to call temporary occupation, by peaceful penetration, by lease, by loan, etc. However, notwithstanding all these conventional euphemisms and diplomatic fictions, and notwithstanding the fact that the foreign policy of all countries is always ostensibly guided by the noblest motives, such as justice and humanity, the fact remains that hitherto all policy has been based on force. The territories which are possessed by modern States are held by right of conquest—that is, by that right which springs from the possession of superior force.

Even the cleverest diplomat will prove unsuccessful unless his words are backed with adequate force. The diplomatic ability and success of Frederick the Great, Napoleon I., Talleyrand, Metternich, Palmerston, Bismarck, etc., con-

[1] From the *Nineteenth Century and After*, October 1902.

sisted largely, if not principally, in the superior material force which these men were able to wield. Owing to the fact that their diplomacy was backed by sufficient force, they were exceedingly successful in their policy. The fact that foreign policy is based upon force was nowhere more clearly understood than in Prussia.

For two hundred and fifty years, since the time of the Great Elector, Prussia has been always proportionately by far the strongest military power in Europe. At the death of Frederick William I., Prussia, which then had only about 3,000,000 inhabitants, had a standing army of 80,000 soldiers; at the death of Frederick the Great, Prussia had 5,500,000 inhabitants and an army of no less than 195,000 soldiers. Modern Germany had in 1914 a population of 67,000,000 inhabitants and a standing army of 801,000 men, but if the proportion of soldiers to the total population had, in 1914, been as great as it was at the time of Frederick William I. or Frederick the Great, she would have had before the Great War a standing force of more than 2,000,000 men.

Germany was a nation in arms. Every able-bodied man had to serve in the army, and the number of men enrolled year by year amounted to about 350,000. The army on a war footing was made up of a number of these levies, and it could be made greater or smaller at will by calling out a greater or lesser number of such yearly levies which were called Reserves, Landwehr, Landsturm. The number of men yearly enrolled had of late greatly increased, in accordance with the increase in the peace strength of the army.

The Prusso-German Army has gone through varying vicissitudes. Under Frederick the Great it proved itself to be the first army in Europe. Twenty years after Frederick's death, it was found to be quite worthless against Napoleon I., and it fell to pieces at Jena and Auerstädt. After the fatal year 1806, the Prussian Army was rapidly reorganised and reformed by Scharnhorst and his able co-workers, and later on it was again reorganised and remodelled by Roon and Moltke. It is worth while to

inquire why Frederick the Great's incomparable army so rapidly decayed after his death, and how the rotten army of 1806 was rapidly and thoroughly reformed.

The army with which Frederick the Great had successfully fought the united forces of nearly the whole Continent during the Seven Years' War was organised upon an utterly bad, wrong, and unhealthy basis. Only noblemen could become officers, advancement went by length of service, obedience was absolute and blind, restricting all initiative among officers as well as among the rank and file. Detailed regulations made thinking unnecessary, and had to be carried out to the letter without question. The whole military organisation of Prussia was absolutely centralised in Frederick the Great, who attended to its smallest details. If a foreigner wished to witness a parade, he had to appeal to the King. But what the army lacked in a practical common-sense organisation, in individuality, and in initiative, which qualities alone can make an army a healthy living organism, was amply made up for by the King's immense personal capacity. He ruled the army with a hand of iron, and knew how to manage it, notwithstanding its fundamental unsoundness. He inspected his troops very frequently, his sharp eyes saw everything, and every officer who did not come up to the King's expectations was immediately dismissed. He knew the capacity of every officer, foresaw all and prepared all. His detailed regulations were to the point, his magazines were well filled, all was ready for war, and his army remained up to his death by far the first in Europe. Yet, but twenty years after his death, it was easily smashed by Napoleon I. at Jena and Auerstädt. When the great King was dead the faulty system remained, and no personality arose either to fill his place in that perverted system or to reform it root and branch. With the death of Frederick the Great the huge Prussian Army became a body without a soul, imposing to look upon by reason of its size, but deficient in every other qualification. Therefore it was predestined to fall.

Lacking the necessary understanding and energy, his

two successors, Frederick William II. and Frederick William III., were contented to administer the army according to Frederickian tradition, in the spirit of precedent. They would have considered it a crime to introduce any reform into the army, and blasphemy to doubt its proved excellence. The warnings and entreaties of sagacious patriots to modernise the army fell on deaf ears. The whole interest of Frederick William III. with regard to military matters was concentrated upon parades and drills, the buttons and laces of uniforms, the shape of shakos and helmets, and similar futilities, in which, as Napoleon remarked, he was a greater expert than any army tailor.

Only after Prussia's terrible defeat, and the loss of half her territory in 1806, did the King and his advisers wake up and begin to inquire seriously into the state of the army. Progressive military men, among them the future Field-Marshal Gneisenau, the intellectual leader of Blücher's army and his Chief of Staff, attributed the collapse of the army largely to the neglect of preparations for war in time of peace, to its occupation with futile drill exercises calculated only for show on the parade-ground, to the neglect of warlike manœuvres and of target-shooting, to the inferiority of the Prussian arms as compared with the armament of the French in guns and rifles, to the slavish copying of various institutions existing in foreign armies, which were quite unsuitable to the needs of Prussia, to the blind conceit of officers and of the nation in the invincibility of the army, and to the incapacity of generals who were automatically promoted by length of service, and not by merit, who had partly become imbecile with old age.

A commission for the reorganisation of the army was called, which did not consist of fossilised generals, or of civilians unacquainted with war and with the military needs of the nation, but of a select few of the ablest young officers who had proved their value in the field, and who were sure neither to be doctrinaires nor to be unduly bound by tradition and text-books. This commission consisted of two major-generals, four lieutenant-colonels, and one major.

It did not dazzle the nation with an imposing array of titles, but it was destined to accomplish great things, for among its members were men like Scharnhorst, Gneisenau, Grolmann, and Boyen. The members of this commission were young men. Scharnhorst, the oldest commissioner, was fifty-two years old; Grolmann, the youngest, was only twenty-nine years old. Their recommendations were thorough and to the point. Soldiering was to be taken seriously by the officers. The army was to lose its character of a Society institution, it was to be democratised, and was to be managed on business principles. Among the recommendations of the committee the following were the most important:

"Advancement shall take place, without regard to the years of service, solely by merit. In case it is found necessary, the youngest general is to command all others. Age or length of service is to have no influence upon appointments. Few generals are to be made in peace, and brigades are to be largely commanded by staff officers in war, so that those who prove themselves the worthiest on active service may be advanced to generalship. In peace a claim to officer's position can only rest upon military knowledge and education, and in war upon conspicuous bravery, activity, and circumspection. Therefore all individuals in the whole nation who possess these qualifications have a claim to the highest command.

"In giving only to the nobility those privileges, all talent and ability in the other classes of the nation was lost to the army, and the nobility did not consider itself under the obligation to take soldiering seriously, and acquire military knowledge, as good birth and a long life were bound to advance well-born individuals to the most exalted military commands, without either merit or exertion on their part.

"This is the reason why our officers were so behindhand in knowledge and education as compared with men of other professions in Prussia. For these reasons the army had become a State within the State, instead of being the union of all moral and physical forces of the nation. Advancement by years of service had killed all ambition and emulation among officers, for a good robust constitution alone granted

all that could be desired. True merit and talent proved in free competition among officers was lost to the State, and the deserved advancement of military genius became impossible."

Besides, the commission insisted on the decentralisation of the administrative machinery of the army. Each corps was to be made independent, but was to be fully responsible, and everything required for mobilisation, arms, stores, horses, commissariat, etc., was to be kept at the head-quarters of each corps or division in order to facilitate rapid and smooth mobilisation in case of war. The endless train of baggage, which had so greatly hampered the movements of the Prussian Army when opposed to the mobile troops of Napoleon, was to be diminished, new arms were to be introduced, up-to-date tactics were to take the place of obsolete barrack-square drills, and the soldier was to be treated better in peace time in order to make soldiering more attractive.

Largely owing to the measures taken upon these recommendations, without overmuch regard to the obstinate resistance of the tradition-bound generals of the old school, Prussia, which Napoleon believed crippled for ever, was able seven years later to meet the French Army in the field with conspicuous success.

Since the time of Napoleon I. the art and science of war had made enormous progress. A new era opened with the advent of the prince of military scientists, the "Schlachtendenker," Moltke, who elevated the art of war to the level of an exact science. Let us see what Moltke did.

Frederick the Great and Napoleon I. used to make elaborate preparations for war, but their preparations were clumsy and superficial if compared with the minute study and the detailed preparations for war made by Moltke. As Napoleon concentrated the fire of hundreds of guns on that point of the enemy's position which to him was of the greatest importance and battered it in, even so Moltke concentrated the organised intelligence of hundreds of the

best brains in his army on the one point which to him was the most valuable one. Moltke's chief aim was to surprise the enemy by the unparalleled celerity of the mobilisation of his army, to fall upon him while he was still unprepared, and to smash him before an attack was expected. With this end in view he re-created the Prussian General Staff, and made it the active brain of the army.

Moltke, like most great commanders, did not lay down his principles for the conduct of war in the shape of a book. He evidently did not believe in taking the world and possible enemies of his country into his confidence. We must therefore look to his campaigns and to the official accounts of his wars for his guiding principles. In the introduction to the history of the Franco-German War, edited by the historical department of the General Staff, over which Moltke presided, occurs the celebrated passage :

" One of the principal duties of the General Staff is to work out during peace in the most minute way plans for the concentration and the transport of troops, with a view to meet *all* possible eventualities to which war may give rise.

" When an army first takes the field the most multifarious considerations—political, geographical, as well as military—have to be borne in mind. Mistakes in the original concentration of armies can hardly ever be made good in the whole course of a campaign. All these arrangements can be considered a long time beforehand, and—assuming the troops are ready for war and the transport service properly organised—must lead to the exact result which has been contemplated."

How Moltke acted upon the principle of " working out all possible eventualities of war in the most minute way " may be seen from a few examples. Every reservist and every militiaman possessed written or printed instructions which told him exactly to which place he had to go for enrolment in case of war. When he arrived at his place of enrolment, his complete outfit for war, measured to his person in peace, would be found waiting for him. Every commander throughout the empire had complete general

instructions what to do in the case of war. The confidential particular instructions regarding the final disposition and direction of troops, transport, etc., towards the frontier, were also in the possession of each commander, contained in sealed envelopes, which were only to be opened on the receipt of the order to mobilise. The military stores were placed where they were wanted in case of war, in order to avoid loss of time and congestion of railways in forwarding them. A special department of the General Staff, consisting of about twenty officers, studied the means of transport, the capacities of the railways, and the number of trucks and engines required for the conveyance of each unit, and drew up a complete programme for the dispatch of the countless trains required in case of war, upon which programme the confidential sealed instructions were founded. Consequently the transport of a million men or more, with their horses, guns, stores, and baggage, to any frontier could take place smoothly and rapidly without a hitch. The arrival of each corps at the point where it would be required was calculable, so to say, to the minute, and every now and then the whole enormous arrangement of time-tables had to be recast in order to allow for the conveyance of additional troops or stores, or for the use of an additional piece of railway recently completed. Furthermore, the detailed plans for any and every campaign in which Prussia could possibly be involved were always kept ready in time of peace, and were frequently changed and brought up to date. For instance, Moltke's first plan of campaign in case of a war with France was dated 1857, and his final dispositions, which were exactly carried out in 1870, were made in winter, 1868.

However, not only were the resources of Germany studied "in the most minute way" by Moltke and his staff, but also those of all possible enemies. As a matter of fact, he knew more about the strength and armaments of the French Army, the time required for its mobilisation, the configuration of the French frontier provinces, the capacity of the French railways for transport, etc., than did any

man in the French War Office. In other words, Moltke created an organisation which, by means of most minute studies and the painstaking collection and comparison of countless exact data, made war no longer the risky vague encounter with hostile elements of uncertain strength, at an uncertain time, and in an uncertain and unknown country, as it had formerly been, but made war an encounter with certainties, and with clearly defined calculable chances.

How well Germany was prepared for the war of 1870–71 may be seen from the fact that we read in the *Denkwürdigkeiten* of the then Prussian Minister of War, Count Roon :

" Roon has frequently said that the two weeks following the memorable night of the mobilisation have perhaps been the idlest and the freest from care during his career. As a matter of fact, the mobilisation machine worked with such exemplary exactitude, and so completely without friction, that Roon and the War Office had not to reply to *one* inquiry of the commanding generals or of other commanders. This was the case though the order for mobilisation was given without any previous warning, and though many commanding generals and Staff officers were on their summer holiday, and a good number of them were even abroad."

Napoleon III. was vaguely aware of the numerical inferiority of his army, as compared with the troops of Germany. Consequently his idea had been to act with the lightning rapidity and energy of his great ancestor, to throw himself upon the south of Germany before Germany was ready, carry the Southern States with him, and then march against Prussia, strengthened by the accession of the South German contingents. The plan was well conceived, and might have succeeded if Napoleon III. had calculated, not guessed, how long it would take France and Germany to mobilise their armies, and if he had prepared everything in peace time for such a rapid stroke in the complete manner of the Prussian Generalstab. But

in view of the preparedness of Prussia, and of France's unpreparedness, this plan of campaign collapsed. The Prussian Generalstab knew better than Napoleon III. what France was able to do. In Moltke's memoir of 1868 we find the time necessary for the mobilisation of the French Army correctly given. While France wanted three weeks to complete the mobilisation of her army, Germany took only eleven days. Consequently Napoleon's brilliant plan of campaign, which looked as fine on paper as did his army, miscarried, for the well-schooled and perfectly-equipped German army corps fell into their places with mathematical precision, and with incredible rapidity crossed the frontier in overwhelming numbers long before the French were ready for their contemplated dash into the south of Germany.

Germany's victory over France was less due to superior strategy or to superior tactics than to her great superiority in methodic preparatory organisation. The victory of 1870–71 was a triumph of German organisation, and if we study the history of the collapse of the French Army in 1870 in detail, and try to deduce the principal causes of the success of the German Army, we arrive at the conclusion that highly-organised foresight, fore-study, and fore-calculation, represented by the Prussian Generalstab, led the Germans to victory, and that the absence of these qualities caused the defeat of the French.

The Prussian Generalstab did not only directly prepare for war in the manner already described, but it also prepared indirectly for war by studying strategy and the innovations introduced into the tactics of other nations, studying new arms and equipments, investigating everything and adopting what was useful, educating officers in regular courses under Moltke's personal supervision, surveying the country, etc. In short, the Generalstab served as the intellectual centre of the army, as the clearing-house of most valuable information. It was the highest supervising, inspecting, inventing, and organising authority. It was an organism which enabled Moltke to hold all the threads of the army in his hand, and make it obey the slightest pressure.

Ruled by the Generalstab, the German Army was no longer a clumsy and soulless military machine as it had been in 1806, but became a living, sensitive, and intelligent organism. In order to perpetuate his work, Moltke implanted firmly his spirit of thoroughness and his strategical ideas into the Generalstab, being its chief during thirty-one years. Moltke not only served as an example to his officers, and created a school of independent military thinkers in Germany, but his principles of minute comprehensive inquiry and of careful foresight were also applied to commerce and industry; they helped in making Germany surprisingly successful in the more peaceful arts.

The efficiency of the Prusso-German Army depended upon its direction. William I. left it to Moltke. William II. meant to direct the army in person. Court favourites took the place of experienced soldiers. As his own Chancellor the Emperor destroyed the life-work of Bismarck, and as his own Commander-in-Chief and Chief of the General Staff he destroyed the life-work of Moltke. Germany requested the Allies for an armistice because her army had become completely demoralised, and demanded peace practically at any price! The *Vossische Zeitung* stated on the 7th of November 1918, in an article signed by "an officer at the front":

"The German corps of officers has been brought up in loyalty and rigid obedience, and, as long as the Kaiser does not voluntarily proclaim an urgent desire to abdicate, opinions to the contrary must not be expressed, and so people may think that all the officers stand behind the Kaiser. But even if it really were so, the officers, and especially the higher officers, are not the army. Our army has long ceased to be a real unit, and it has long been absurd for the leaders to speak in the name of the army. . . .

"For a long time past there have been practically no regular officers left at the front. The real army is so war-weary, has been through such indescribable things, and has achieved such wonderful things without any thanks except in empty words, that its feelings are blunted towards the question whether the Kaiser stays or goes. This army

wants peace. The best parts of it want peace in honour, but men and officers will not be willing to continue the war for another day for sake of the Kaiser.

"This army must be asked its opinion. Hitherto it has kept silent, fought and suffered, but much discontent, and much just discontent, has accumulated in it, and the leaders, who in the course of years have lost touch with the army, must not deceive themselves. In the end these 7,000,000 or 9,000,000 men in arms are the decisive factor for the internal development and the whole future of Germany. This army must be heard; its just wishes must find satisfaction. This they have deserved of us and of Germany. If those who have led the army hitherto are unable or unwilling, it is the duty and the highest responsibility of the new Government to discover the facts through a civilian War Secretary—if only in order to secure an orderly demobilisation.

"All these questions are at least as important as the question whether the generals and the staffs are opposed to an abdication of the Kaiser. Everybody who for years has fought for his country and his Kaiser, who in the first years of war and in the intoxication of victory was honoured as the highest symbol of the German people and army, must be extremely reluctant to advocate abdication, but at bottom he is moved to it by the same duty and courage which urged him forward against enemy machine-guns. The individual can go under; the people must live. This applies to the ruler as much as to the least of his citizens."

CHAPTER VI

THE IMPERIAL GERMAN NAVY AND ITS PLANNED OVERSEA OPERATIONS [1]

THE navy of Imperial Germany was constructed rather for military than for naval purposes. It was to serve as an instrument of conquest which was to be effected by operations oversea after the defeat of the English and American Fleets. The true purpose of the German Fleet was clearly expressed in a very interesting pamphlet entitled *Operationen über See*, by von Edelsheim, a member of the German General Staff, from which I would give the following extracts :

"Moltke declared that landings and operations with landed troops were enterprises of subordinate importance ; but the military commanders of the future will have to count the preparation for, and the execution of, wars oversea among their most important tasks. There is no State in the whole world which possesses better forces and greater means than Germany for the enterprise of war by landing. In the first place the excellence and the readiness of our army, and the celerity with which large masses of troops can be mobilised, are not equalled by any other great Power ; in the second place, Germany disposes of the second largest commercial marine in the world, and has in the rapid large steamers of her shipping companies a splendid transport fleet, the excellence of which is not exceeded even by that of England herself ; in the last place, the increase and strengthening of our navy which is at present taking place will guarantee increased security to the transport of our troops oversea. These factors, which are peculiarly favourable for Germany's power, open a large field for our world

[1] From the *National Review*, April 1905.

policy, and render it possible for us to make our strong military forces also useful for the greatness of the Empire, and to conquer by the development of German power oversea the same feared and esteemed position in the world which our victories of the last decennia have earned for us in Central Europe.

"A further stimulus in this direction is to be found in the fact that our navy will not be able at once to attain such development that it can alone solve all tasks which may have to be solved in an energetic world policy. Therefore it is desirable that the strength of our army should be made visible and available oversea to such nations as have so far looked at Germany as a State by which they cannot be reached. Thus we must consider not only landings in conjunction with territorial wars, but also operations against States which we can reach only by sea.

"Operations oversea must not be improvised, because there is hope for their success only when the whole complicated mechanism down to the smallest details has been prepared in time.

"The possibility of utilising favourable situations and favourable times for undertaking operations oversea is one of the most important conditions for their success. When the landing has been effected in such a way that the opponent has been taken by surprise, even a strong country will hardly succeed in concentrating sufficient forces in time wherewith to meet the invader. The preparations for landing operations must therefore be furthered in time of peace to such an extent that in time of war we feel sure of having the advantage of surprising the enemy by our celerity in mobilising and transporting our troops.

"The aim of our operations must be kept entirely secret, and attempts should be made to deceive the enemy at least with regard to the purpose for which the first preparations are undertaken. Napoleon's expedition to Egypt and the manner in which it was commenced may be considered still to-day as a model.

"A landing on the coast of the enemy is only possible if the assailant has forces superior to those which the defender can collect at the decisive moment in order to prevent a landing. If a landing has taken place, even a victorious naval battle is useless to the defender unless he disposes of armies sufficiently strong to meet the invader with success.

Therefore it is absolutely necessary that the strength of our German Navy should be developed so far that the security of the troops during a possible crossing is certain, and that it is able to defeat, or at least to detain, any hostile fleet which the opponent may collect at the moment when the landing operation is contemplated. Therefore the way for a transport of troops oversea should usually be opened by an operation of the fleet, and the fact that a landing becomes absolutely impossible if the battle on sea has an unfavourable issue for us has to be taken into account. Thus the principle may be deduced that all men-of-war which can be used should be used for operations oversea in order to open the way for a fleet of transports.

"For operations oversea a detailed plan of mobilisation must be drawn up in exactly the same way as is done for operations on land. The troops which are to be mobilised must be determined in peace, their transport by railway, their harbour of embarkation and the preparation for embarkation must be prepared in order to ensure the greatest possible celerity. As we have seen in the foregoing, it is before all necessary to proceed with a surprising quickness which alone can assure us success.

"If the opponent disposes of considerable forces a simultaneous landing at several spots seems questionable. . . . If several places of debarkation are chosen, the protection of these places towards the sea requires many ships of war; the scouting towards the land is made more difficult, and the enemy will easier be able to attack in superior numbers the separate parts of the landing troops. Lastly, the unity of command at the beginning of the operations will meet with great difficulties, and time and means will be missing to obviate these difficulties. Therefore it is recommendable, if it is at all possible, to select only one spot of debarkation and to bring up the transport fleet as closely as possible to the coast.

"For a debarkation a harbour is naturally best. Less favourable but still advantageous is a closed, protected bay; least favourable is the open coast. On the other hand, a landing on the open coast will find the least resistance on the part of the enemy, because it can be executed with the greatest chance of surprise. If the point of landing selected is close to a bay or to a harbour, the first task of the troops which are landing will be to take possession of such

a place, in order to enable the fleet of transports to disembark the majority of the troops, horses, and material at that spot. The possession of a harbour will greatly accelerate these operations and increase the security of the disembarkation against a hostile attack from sea and land. If such a *coup* does not succeed, the landing of the whole expeditionary army must immediately take place by boats on the coast without loss of time, and all preparations must be made for such a possibility. Every transport must have with it a sufficient quantity of material for disembarkation, in order to be able to land everything on the open shore. It is impossible to land in the face of strong fortifications or of a strong hostile force; the Russian landing manœuvres which have been made have fully proved that.

"The best security for landing by boats is always afforded by the surprise. Therefore it is impossible to explore a point of landing by ships sent in advance, which would only show the opponent which the probable point of landing would be, and he would therefore be enabled to take his measures in time. Such proceedings can only be used in order to deceive the enemy. The exploration of the possible points of landing must have taken place already before the beginning of the operations.

"The well-known naval author Mahan recognises that the offensive is characteristic of landing operations. The history of war teaches how the success of well-executed landings, such as those at Aboukir or Cape Breton, have been partly marred by over-great caution of the landed troops, because it was not recognised by the commanders that energy and celerity in execution will counterbalance all strategical disadvantages to such an operation. Quick and energetic operations with closely concentrated forces on the line of the smallest resistance are absolutely necessary for the success of landing operations.

"Napoleon's campaign in Egypt proves that an army may subsist for years, even in a country possessing poor resources, when the connection with the home country is cut off. Such independence is greatly facilitated in a civilised, thickly-peopled, and rich country, as it will then be much easier to get all that is required in the way of food, horses, material, etc., from local sources, and even ammunition may be manufactured in the enemy's country.

"An expeditionary army must economise to the greatest

extent its forces. Bloody victories may act like defeats on them. Therefore, attacks on fortifications must be avoided if they are avoidable. The chief thing is always the surprising celerity of the operations, and in order to attain the main object aimed at all forces must be used with the greatest energy and with an absolute lack of all consideration.

" At present the view prevails in our military circles that operations oversea in connection with territorial wars are worthless, and are even harmful, as greater success appears likely by using those troops on land which might be used as an expeditionary force.

Operations against England

" A conflict with England must be considered by Germany, for a powerful progressive German trade forms for the power of England at least as great a danger as the progress of Russia towards India. In a purely naval war with England we could count on success only at the beginning of operations, but soon England would be able to bring to the field such enormous naval forces that we should be limited to the defensive and could hardly count on a fortunate issue of such operations. Even if we conclude an alliance with Russia we might harm England permanently, but we would not be able to directly threaten that State. Only an alliance with France could menace England, but owing to her geographical position and the great loss of time which is occasioned by every operation initiated by allies, England would always be able to bring into the field a maritime superiority even against that alliance unless she be taken by surprise.

" England's weakness lies in that factor which constitutes our strength, the army. The English Army corresponds neither in quantity nor quality with England's position as a Great Power, and does not even correspond with the size of the country, for England feels convinced that the invasion of her territory can be prevented by the fleet. That conviction is, however, not at all justified . . . for though England can collect immense fleets after some time, those of her naval forces which are ready for war during the very first days are not so overwhelming. Consequently an opponent who is considerably weaker on the sea, and who concentrates his forces and keeps them in a state of readiness, can expect a temporary success. Therefore, in case a war with England

should be threatening, Germany should endeavour to throw part of her army on the English coast, and thus to shift the decision from the sea on to the enemy's country. As our troops are far superior to the English troops, England's enormous naval power would not have the slightest influence upon the final decision.

"The army of England consists of the field army, the reserve, the militia, the volunteers, and the yeomanry. In case of an invasion by surprise, we need only consider of these the field army with its reserve. The militia requires so much time for concentration and equipment that only a small fraction will be able to assist the field army in the first and decisive struggle. The volunteers and the yeomanry cannot in a short time bring into the field any considerable forces useful for war. Besides, we must remember their small military value, owing to which they would not be serious opponents to our well-trained troops. The English field army consists nominally of three army corps, each composed of three divisions. Of these corps half the third is composed of militia. Therefore it has either to be completed from the militia and will then come too late for action in the first decisive battles, or it will march in its peace strength and can then not be much stronger than a division. Of the second army corps two divisions and one brigade of cavalry are quartered in Ireland, of which at any rate the larger part will remain there in order to prevent a rising of the Irish, to whom the German invasion would bring the liberty they long for. Immediately ready for war are therefore only :

Three divisions of the first army corps,
About two divisions of the second army corps,
About one combined division of the third army corps and three brigades of cavalry.

"As the mobilised strength of an English division amounts in round numbers only to 10,000 men, whilst that of a German division amounts to 16,000 men, four German divisions and one cavalry division would already possess a superiority over the British field army. However, we are able to ship in the shortest time six infantry divisions, or five infantry and one cavalry division, to England. How such an operation against England oversea should be conducted can of course not be described in this place.

"If the weather be fair, the transport from our North Sea harbours should be effected in little more than thirty hours. The English coast offers extensive stretches which are suitable for landing troops. The country contains such great resources that the army of invasion could permanently live on these resources. On the other hand, the extent of the island is so small that the English would never succeed in vanquishing any army of invasion, once it had been victorious. It is unlikely that such a war would be long drawn out, or that considerable reserves would be required. The material is largely renewable in the country itself. Therefore we may without hesitation maintain that it will be unnecessary to keep open communications with our own country.

"The first object to be aimed at in invading England would be the English field army; the second would be London. However, in all probability both objects would be attained simultaneously, as in view of the small value of the volunteers the whole field army would be required for the defence of the fortifications of London. It would obviously be impossible to let the capital fall into the hands of an invader, especially in view of the pressure of public opinion. But if London is taken by an army of invasion, one or the other naval harbours will also have to be occupied, in order to create a base for supplies and for further operations which we are justified to think will lead to the conquest of England.

Operations against the United States

"Operations against the United States of North America would have to be conducted in a different manner. During the last years political friction with that State, especially friction arising from commercial causes, has not been lacking, and the difficulties that have arisen have mostly been settled by our giving way. As this obliging attitude has its limits, we have to ask ourselves what force we can possibly bring to bear in order to meet the attacks of the United States against our interests and to impose our will. Our fleet will probably be able to defeat the naval forces of the United States, which are distributed over two oceans and over long distances. But it would be a mistake to suppose that the defeat of their fleet will force the United States with its immense resources into concluding peace.

"In view of the small number of American merchant-men, in view of the small value of the American colonies which are not even pacified, in view of the excellent fortifications with which the great American seaports are provided, and which cannot be taken except with very heavy losses, and in view of the large number of American seaports, all of which we cannot blockade at the same time, our fleet has no means to force that opponent through successful maritime operations to conclude a peace on our terms.

"The possibility must be taken into account that the fleet of the United States will at first not venture into battle, but that it will withdraw into fortified harbours, in order to wait for a favourable opportunity of achieving minor successes. Therefore it is clear that naval action alone will not be decisive against the United States, but that combined action of navy and army will be required. Considering the great extent of the United States, the conquest of the country by an army of invasion is not possible. But there is every reason to believe that victorious enterprises on the Atlantic coast, and the conquest of the most important arteries through which imports and exports pass, will create such an unbearable state of affairs in the whole country that the Government will readily offer acceptable conditions in order to obtain peace.

"If Germany begins preparing a fleet of transports and troops for landing purposes at the moment when the battle fleet steams out of our harbours, we may conclude that operations on American soil can begin after about four weeks, and it cannot be doubted that the United States will not be able to oppose to us within that time an army equivalent to our own.

"At present the regular army of the United States amounts to 65,000 men, of whom only about 30,000 could be disposed of. Of these at least 10,000 are required for watching the Indian territories and for guarding the fortifications on the seacoast. Therefore only about 20,000 men of the regular army are ready for war. Besides, about 100,000 militia are in existence, of whom the larger part did not come up when they were called out during the last war. Lastly, the militia is not efficient ; it is partly armed with muzzle-loaders, and its training is worse than its armament.

"As an operation by surprise against America is impossible, on account of the length of time during which the

transports are on the way, the landing can be effected only by surprise. Nevertheless, stress must be laid on the fact that the rapidity of the invasion will considerably facilitate victory against the United States, owing to the absence of methodical preparation for mobilisation, owing to the inexperience of the *personnel*, and owing to the weakness of the regular army.

"In order to occupy permanently a considerable part of the United States and to protect our lines of operation, so as to enable us to fight successfully against all forces which that country, in the course of time, can oppose to us, considerable forces would be required. Such an operation would be greatly hampered by the fact that it would require a second passage of the transport fleet in order to ship the necessary troops that long distance. However, it seems questionable whether it would be advantageous to occupy a great stretch of country for a considerable time. The Americans will not feel inclined to conclude peace because one or two provinces are occupied by an army of invasion, but because of the enormous material losses which the whole country will suffer if the Atlantic harbour towns, in which the threads of the whole prosperity of the United States are concentrated, are torn away from them one after the other.

"Therefore the task of the fleet would be to undertake a series of large landing operations, through which we are able to take several of these important and wealthy towns within a brief space of time. By interrupting their communications, by destroying all buildings serving the State, commerce, and the defence, by taking away all material for war and transport, and, lastly, by levying heavy contributions, we should be able to inflict damage on the United States.

"For such enterprises a smaller military force will suffice. Nevertheless, the American defence will find it difficult to undertake a successful enterprise against that kind of warfare. Though an extremely well-developed railway system enables them to concentrate troops within a short time on the different points on the coast, the concentration of the troops and the time which is lost until it is recognised which of the many threatened points of landing will really be utilised will, as a rule, make it possible for the army of invasion to carry out its operation with success under the

co-operation of the fleet at the point chosen. The corps landed can either take the offensive against gathering hostile forces or withdraw to the transports in order to land at another place.

"It should be pointed out that Germany is the only Great Power which is able to tackle the United States single-handed. England could be victorious on sea, but would not be able to protect Canada, where the Americans could find consolation for their defeats on sea. Of the other Great Powers, none possess a fleet of transports required for such an operation."

CHAPTER VII

PRUSSO-GERMANY'S WORLD POLICY AND ITS POLICY TOWARDS THE ANGLO-SAXON STATES [1]

Up to 1870 the ambitions of the Germans were for national unity and for a leading rôle among the Continental nations. When this object had been achieved by Bismarck's genius, and when the fabric of the German Empire had been consolidated and strengthened, the German horizon was rapidly enlarged. Though not unmindful of her exposed Continental position and of the possibility of seeing her empire expanding east, south, and west, Germany resolved to become a great colonial Power.

Many decades back some of the greatest German thinkers, among them Treitschke, Schliemann, Roscher, List, Droysen, pointed out that the problem of disposing of Germany's surplus population in a temperate zone was an urgent one, but at the time when these men wrote and spoke Germany was still divided against herself and was powerless and poor. She then possessed neither a navy nor a merchant marine worthy the name, nor manufacturing industries, nor foreign commerce, and for some thirty years the agitation for colonies was restricted to the Universities, being ignored, or even discountenanced, in official and in commercial circles. Nothing illustrates the attitude of the German people and Government in those times better than the acquisition, in 1848, of a small fleet paid for largely by the voluntary contributions of colonial enthusiasts, and its subsequent sale by auction, in 1852, by the Government.

During the last few decades, but especially since Germany's consolidation in 1871, the population of the empire increased

[1] From the *Fortnightly Review*, March 1903.

with wonderful rapidity. The population of Germany within her limits of 1914 has risen as follows :

	German population.	Average increase per annum.
1840	32,800,000	—
1850	35,400,000	260,000
1860	37,700,000	230,000
1870	40,800,000	310,000
1880	45,200,000	440,000
1890	49,400,000	420,000
1900	56,300,000	690,000
1913	67,000,000	850,000

German emigration, which accounted for the loss of 220,000 citizens in 1881, had sunk to only 18,545 in 1912, but this slight loss in population was more than counterbalanced during recent years by a large immigration into Germany from Austria, Russia, and Italy. Professor Schmoller estimated that the German population would amount to 104,000,000 in 1965, Hübbe-Schleiden prophesied that it would rise to 150,000,000 in 1980, and Leroy-Beaulieu, the first French authority on these things, had estimated that it would be 200,000,000 within a century. Germany was loth to strengthen foreign nations with her emigration. The former German colonies did not offer a sufficient outlet for the emigration of white men. Consequently the resolution had arisen to acquire territories in a temperate zone whenever and wherever possible.

The rooted conviction that Germany must possess colonies almost at any price, which had emanated from professorial circles, gradually pervaded in the end the whole nation from the highest to the lowest.

The German politicians and bureaucrats, who had no experience in colonial policy, who often lacked sympathy, understanding, enterprise, and imagination regarding colonial matters, and who viewed the turbulent clamour for colonies of the professor-led multitude with the hearty dislike with which the initiative of the people was frequently viewed by official Germany, quickly became the most enthusiastic and the most uncompromising of colonial fanatics when William II. lent his unreserved support to

the colonial movement and gave it its anti-Anglo-Saxon character.

Astonishment was frequently expressed at the peculiar means by which Germany tried to acquire colonies, but those who are well acquainted with the character of official and unofficial Germany could not wonder. Modern Germany owed her greatness to the sword, and her national character had nothing in common with the better-known character of the Germany of the past.

In old Germany the centre of gravity lay in the more easy-going south. Her character resembled that of Austria. Modern Germany had been conquered by the East Prussian nobility, the descendants of those hardy knights of the Teutonic Order, who had wrested East Prussia from the Slavs in countless battles, and converted the independent heathen inhabitants into obedient Christian serfs. The East Prussian nobility ruled the aboriginal inhabitants of Prussia with the greatest harshness, and various mediæval institutions—for example, serfdom—prevailed in Prussia even in the eighteenth century. Though serfdom in Prussia was nominally abolished in 1807, its last remnants continued to exist until a short time ago. Even recently the down-trodden peasant in East Prussia humbly kissed the hands of the squire and of his children and the hem of his wife's garment, and submitted to correction by the whip. East Prussia, with her arrogant nobility and submissive peasantry, strongly resembled her neighbour Russia, in which country also the nobility and the Government established themselves by force. In East Prussia, as in Russia, the nobility was wasteful, the estates were encumbered with mortgages, the peasantry was ignorant, poor, and hard-worked, manufacturing industries were practically non-existent, and the only way to acquire money known to the noblemen was by force or by craft, not by industry. The descendants of the valorous Teutonic knights did not introduce industries on their estates or up-to-date methods into agriculture, as will be shown in another chapter, but tried to obtain from the Government high protective tariffs and other

favours through their representatives in the Reichstag, the Agrarians.

The best example of the new German spirit was afforded by Bismarck, who was a typical East Prussian in his policy and in his methods. His appearance and his personality suggested that he had a considerable amount of Slav blood in him. At all events, Slavs and Slav methods were most sympathetic to him, and nowhere did he feel more at home than amongst the Russians in Russia. Bismarck's political methods, which at first shocked German sentimentalism, had made her great, and, owing to the assiduous and somewhat uncritical Bismarck cult which was carried on in that country, these methods became in German eyes the natural and classical methods of German statecraft and diplomacy.

The East Prussian squires were always treated as the chief pillars of the throne, and they occupied the most important official positions in Prussia and in Germany. Consequently, it was only natural that, when the question of acquiring colonial possessions came to the front, Prusso-German officialdom turned instinctively to those means which had proved so eminently successful in the past under Bismarck. It did so the more readily as to the Prusso-German official, who had grown up in feudalistic ideas, the liberal Anglo-Saxon institutions were as hateful as they were to the Russian official, for the spreading of the Democratic idea threatened to subvert the reign by caste and to destroy the privileged position of the nobility and the bureaucracy. To the German or Russian patriot, who looked back upon the glorious expansion of his country by conquest from the small beginnings made by the Hohenzollerns and the Ruriks, the continued growth of his country by conquest seemed as natural and as legitimate as expansion by peaceful means appears to the Anglo-Saxons. To him the sword was not the *ultima ratio Regis*, but an ordinary implement.

The anti-British movement in Germany was not a spontaneous outburst of irresponsible popular opinion, but an agitation which was kindled and fanned by the Government. The anti-British, as well as the anti-American, movement

emanated from the Government and those near it, and it was assisted by the intellectual leaders of the nation.

In considering the opinions expressed by leading Germans on German colonial expansion and on Anglo-Saxon countries, the fact that those opinions were by no means merely the private opinions of irresponsible private citizens should never be lost sight of. The rigorous discipline which Imperial Germany enforced on her citizens was doubly rigorous in respect of officials and officers, both on active service and on the retired list. An opinion unfavourable to the Government or to a measure taken by the Government, even though privately expressed by an official or an officer, would, if reported to his superior, bring on him severe "disciplinary" punishment, or even dismissal. The Government could also bring considerable pressure to bear upon the nominally independent University professors, who thirst after preferment by the State, titles, and decorations. Consequently, it may be said that the publicly-expressed opinions of acting and retired officials and officers, and of the University professors, with regard to German colonial policy and Anglo-Saxon nations were approved of and endorsed by the Government.

German professors have in the past played a great part in German history. Professor Luther brought about the Reformation. The renascence of Prussia after her collapse in 1806–1807 was largely due to the patriotic activity of the German professors, among whom Professors Arndt, Fichte, and Niebuhr were most prominent, and the unification of the German Empire was the ideal and constant thought of the professors long before the advent of Bismarck, though they intended to attain it by methods less vigorous than those of blood and iron. The old national Parliament of Frankfort and the German Fleet of 1848 are witnesses to their aims. Therefore professorial utterances on matters of policy could not be dismissed as being only "irresponsible professors' talk."

German politicians and German colonial enthusiasts thought very highly of the value of tropical colonies, but

the acquisition of settlement colonies in a temperate zone was their principal aim and ambition, because these would afford an outlet to the German surplus population. Seeing that most habitable and thinly-populated lands oversea were in Anglo-Saxon hands, official and unofficial Germany had been seriously considering the question whether it would be possible to wrest suitable territories from Great Britain or America. In making their plans for colonial expansion and surveying their chances against the Anglo-Saxon countries, the Germans had come to the conclusion that Great Britain was a senile, declining nation, and that the United States were a young and vigorous nation, whose political future and military potentialities seemed unlimited unless, indeed, their progress was arrested by force. The plans of the colonial enthusiasts, and of official Germany as well, were shaped in accordance with these views.

The official and semi-official publications of Germany were of course very careful not to reveal Germany's ultimate aims as a world Power, which could only be gauged from the opinions and hopes expressed by persons moving in well-informed circles. Those ultimate aims which were in everybody's mouth were expressed with delightful candour in a pamphlet, *Die Abrechnung mit England*, by C. Eisenhart, Munich, 1900. In this book it was shown how Germany with the help of her new fleet, first destroys the navy of Japan and gains a footing in the East; how afterwards, while Great Britain is crippling Russia in Asia for the convenience of Germany, she destroys the British Fleet; and, lastly, how the "insolence" of the United States is punished by their complete defeat, Germany's victories resulting in the acquisition of the best Anglo-Saxon possessions, including Australia, and in Germany's paramountcy over Anglo-Saxondom the world over. To this writer, as to many others, German world policy was synonymous with German world supremacy and German domination over the entire globe. Another candid writer, who, however, either did not see as far as Mr. Eisenhart, or who did not care to make known to the world the whole of his views, from

political considerations, said in his book, *Deutschland beim Beginn des Zwanzigsten Jahrhunderts*, Berlin, 1900 :

" We consider a great war with England in the twentieth century as quite inevitable, and must strain every fibre in order to be prepared to fight that war single-handed. The experience of all time shows that colonial empires are more fragile and less enduring than continental empires. We do not require a fleet against France or Russia, let them even ravage our coasts in case of a war. We require a fleet *only against England*."

In a similar strain the *Koloniale Zeitschrift* wrote on the 18th of January 1900 :

" The old century saw a German Europe ; the new one shall see a German world. To attain that consummation two duties are required from the present German generation—to keep its own counsel and to create a strong naval force."

Again, on the 28th of March 1900, the same journal said :

" The nineteenth century was not the German century ; it was the Prussian century. In the history of the world the twentieth century will be called the German century."

In a leading article entitled " German World Policy," the *Deutsches Wochenblatt* wrote on the 1st of February 1899 :

" It can hardly be doubted that at the outbreak of the next great war Russia will take Constantinople. . . . It is possible that a general war against England will come before the breakdown of the Ottoman Empire. . . . If Russia attracts to herself the Slavonic peoples round the Danube, our way *via* Salonika towards Asia Minor and Suez will be lost for all time. . . . Our motto should be : With the whole Continent against England ; with Austria against Russia when the time comes."

" Teutonicus " wrote in the same journal on the 19th of August 1899 :

" Our adversaries in a naval war would probably be our Samoa partners (the United States and Great Britain). . . . Now, as ever, the existence of our fleet depends upon the goodwill of England. Therefore, it is clear that the North Sea will be the theatre of war where our fate will be decided, whether we fight for our interest in the China Seas or on the eastern coast of America. Consequently, in a future naval war, our North Sea fleet and our army of embarkation would be mobilised at the moment when the English Mediterranean fleet should effect a suspicious movement."

These utterances were more than the bombastic rodomontades of fantastical sensation-mongers, for the authors of them had palpably taken their cue from the no less unmistakable though slightly more diplomatically expressed utterances of the Emperor, who set the ball rolling and gave to the colonial movement its aggressive character by pointing out that German colonial ambitions could only be satisfied *after Germany had secured the supremacy on the ocean*—that is, at the cost of Anglo-Saxon countries. As far back as the 24th of April 1897 William II. said in Cologne at a banquet:

" Neptune with the trident is a symbol for us that we have new tasks to fulfil since the empire has been welded together. Everywhere we have to protect German citizens; everywhere we have to maintain German honour: that trident must be in our fist ! "

On other occasions he coined the winged words:

" Our future lies upon the water." " Without the consent of Germany's ruler nothing must happen in any part of the world." " May our Fatherland be as powerful, as closely united, and as authoritative as was the Roman Empire of old, in order that the old *Civis Romanus sum* be replaced by ' I am a German citizen ' ! "

On the 18th of October 1899 William II. made a speech in which he said:

" We are in bitter need of a strong German navy. . . . If the increase demanded during the first years of my reign had not been continually refused to me in spite of my

pressing entreaties and warnings, for which I have even experienced derision and ridicule, how differently should we be able to further our flourishing commerce and our interests oversea."

It can hardly be doubted that the Emperor's bitterness at his inability to "further our interests oversea" was caused by the political situation in South Africa. At the time when he was speaking the Boer ultimatum had been dispatched only nine days, and a strong German fleet, had it then existed, might no doubt have been able to further "the German interest in the Transvaal as an independent State." On the 1st of January 1900 the Emperor William announced in a speech his determination to possess an overwhelmingly strong navy, in the following words :

"As my grandfather reorganised the army, so shall I reorganise my navy, without flinching and in the same way, so that it will stand on the same level as my army, and that, with its help, the German Empire shall reach the place which it has not yet attained."

It may be objected that these and similar utterances of William II. were the spontaneous and ill-considered private opinions of a private man who happened to be the head of the State, not *pronunciamientos* deliberately launched by the head of the Empire ; that they were in fact not sanctioned by the official representatives of German policy, and, therefore, devoid of political significance. People who express such views are evidently ignorant of the far-reaching, nay, almost unlimited, political power which was vested in the German Emperor under the Imperial Constitution, and are not aware that William II. was his own Chancellor.

Similar views to those pronounced by the German Emperor were also uttered by his responsible Ministers. For instance, on the day of the disaster at Magersfontein, the 11th of December 1899, the then Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Prince Bülow, said in the Reichstag in support of an immensely increased naval programme :

"The necessity to strengthen our fleet arises out of the present state of the world and out of the circumstances of our oversea policy. Only two years ago no one would have been able to foresee in which way things would start moving. It is urgent to define the attitude which we have to take up in view of what is happening. . . . We must create a fleet strong enough to exclude attack from *any* Power."

Again, a fortnight after the disaster of Spion Kop, Admiral Tirpitz, the Secretary of State for the Imperial Navy, spoke thus :

"We do not know what adversary we may have to face. We must therefore arm ourselves, with a view to meeting *the most dangerous naval conflict possible.*"

Prince Bülow said on the 12th of June 1900 :

"It is necessary that Germany should be strong enough at sea to maintain German peace, German honour, and German prosperity all the world over."

In all these official speeches a distinct hint was conveyed as to the probability of a conflict with Great Britain, from whom the supremacy at sea was to be wrested, and the regret was guardedly expressed that Germany could not turn the British difficulties and disasters in South Africa to account, owing to the weakness of her fleet.

That the German Emperor's phrase, "That trident must be in our fist," was not merely a metaphor spontaneously born from banquet-heated enthusiasm, but the deliberate statement of a well-considered policy, may be seen from the dry, matter-of-fact preamble to the German Navy Bill of 1900, which said :

"*Germany must have a fleet of such strength that a war against the mightiest naval Power would involve risks threatening the supremacy of that Power.*"

Some years afterwards Mr. Bassermann, the leader of the Liberal Party in the German Reichstag, thought it necessary to endorse, on behalf of his party, the official utterances

quoted in the foregoing, and said at the Liberal Party Congress on the 13th of October 1903 :

"In our attitude towards England we must keep cool, and, until we have a strong fleet, it would be a mistake to let ourselves be drawn into a hostile policy towards her. . . . The development of the United States of North America and their desire for expansion is likewise a lesson for us not to be forgetful of our armaments, especially at sea."

Bearing in mind the dependence of German public opinion upon the views of the Emperor and his Government, it need hardly be asserted that the official and authoritative utterances cited above were carefully weighed and well considered, and that official statements such as these were responsible for the less veiled, but more forcible, views expressed in *Die Abrechnung mit England*, *Deutschland beim Beginn des Zwanzigsten Jahrhunderts*, the *Koloniale Zeitschrift*, the *Deutsches Wochenblatt*, and hosts of others, and that the violent anti-British campaign had little or nothing to do with German sympathy with the Boers.

Some years before the War M. E. Lockroy, a man of great ability and of sound judgment, who three times had been Minister of Marine in France, visited Germany and was allowed to inspect the German Fleet and dockyards, even to the smallest details. That this permission was granted to Germany's "hereditary enemy" seems astonishing, unless we bear in mind that the numerous advances to France made by the Emperor William II. and his Government aimed less at ensuring the peace of Europe, or at breaking up the alliance with Russia, than at securing the assistance of the French Fleet for the overthrow of Great Britain. That view was repeatedly expressed in *Die Grenzboten*, by far the most influential political weekly in Germany, which very frequently spoke with the authority of the German Foreign Office. In view of the close relations existing between that journal and the German Foreign Office, the views expressed in it are of exceptional weight and interest, and they will consequently be occasionally cited hereafter.

On the 5th of October 1899 an article appeared in *Die Grenzboten*, which said :

" All differences between France and Germany benefit only the nearly all-powerful enemy of the world. As long as the French keep one eye fixed on Alsace-Lorraine, it is no good that they occasionally look at England with the other eye. Only when the German Fleet has a strength commensurate with her sea interests will the French seek our friendship instead of being humiliated by their hereditary enemy."

M. Lockroy, who might have become an important factor in favour of a Franco-German alliance, in the event of his returning subsequently to the Cabinet, seems not to have been left in the dark about Germany's ambitions by his official German hosts, for in his *Lettres sur la Marine Allemande*, which appeared in 1901, he summed up his impressions about the purpose of the German Navy in the following way :

" Germany will be a great naval power in spite of her geographical position and history. Her claim to rule the waves will bring on a war with Great Britain earlier or later. That war will be one of the most terrible conflicts of the twentieth century. What its result will be no one can foretell, but so much is sure, that Germany does everything that human forethought and the patience and energy of a nation can suggest."

His words confirm the existence of the wish of German diplomacy to form an anti-British alliance with France, a wish which was hinted at in 1899 in *Die Grenzboten* and in many other inspired journals. This wish dictated also the numerous personal advances made by William II. to individual Frenchmen and the advances made by German diplomacy.

The views of the most distinguished and most respected German professors with regard to Germany's policy of colonial expansion at Anglo-Saxon cost coincided with those expressed in *Die Abrechnung mit England* and similar publications. They breathed the fiercest hatred against Anglo-Saxon countries, especially against Great Britain, the more immediate object of Germany's attention.

Count Du Moulin-Eckart, professor of history at Munich, wrote in his book *Englische Politik und die Mächte* :

" Our present relations with England are similar to our former relations with Austria. To both nations we are related by race, by both we have been hampered in our progress, and by both we have been deceived times without number. Time will show whether co-operation with England is possible. If it be impossible, a war will become necessary, and then : Hail thee, Germany ! May the genius of a Bismarck grant us then a second Königgrätz ! "

The late Professor Schmoller, a most prominent lecturer on political economy at the Berlin University, a member of the Prussian Privy Council and of the Prussian Upper Chamber, gave a lecture in Berlin, Strasbourg, and Hanover, which was largely circulated in print, in which he said :

" In various States, arrogant, reckless, cold-blooded daring bullies (Gewaltmenschen), men who possess the morals of a captain of pirates, as Professor Brentano called them so justly the other day, push themselves more and more forward and into the Government. . . . We must not forget that it is in the freest States, England and North America, where the tendencies of conquest, Imperial schemes, and hatred against new economic competitors are growing up amongst the masses. The leaders of these agitations are great speculators, who have the morals of a pirate, and who are at the same time party leaders and Ministers of State. . . . The conquest of Cuba and the Philippines by the United States alters their political and economical basis. Their tendency to exclude Europe from the North and South American markets must needs lead to new great conflicts. It must also not be forgotten how England tried to wreck our Zollverein, how she tried to prevent us from conquering Schleswig-Holstein, and how anti-German she was in 1870. . . . These bullies (Gewaltmenschen), these pirates and speculators *à la* Cecil Rhodes, act like poison within their State. They buy the press, corrupt ministers and the aristocracy, and bring on wars for the benefit of a bankrupt company or for the gain of filthy lucre. Where they govern modesty and decency disappear, as do honesty and respect for justice. Legitimate business cannot maintain itself, and

all classes of society are exploited and ill-used by a small circle of capitalistic magnates, stock-jobbers, and speculators. . . . We mean to extend our trade and industries far enough to enable us to live and sustain a growing population. We mean to defend our colonies, and, if possible, to acquire somewhere agricultural colonies. We mean to prevent extravagant mercantilism everywhere, and to prevent the division of the earth among the three world powers, which would exclude all other countries and destroy their trade. In order to attain this modest aim we require to-day so badly a large fleet. The German Empire must become the centre of a coalition of States, chiefly in order to be able to hold the balance in the death-struggle between Russia and England, but that is only possible if we possess a stronger fleet than that of to-day. . . . We must wish that at any price a German country, peopled by twenty to thirty million Germans, should grow up in Southern Brazil. Without the possibility of energetic proceedings on the part of Germany our future over there is threatened. . . . We do not mean to press for an economic alliance with Holland, but if the Dutch are wise, if they do not want to lose their colonies some day, as Spain did, they will hasten to seek our alliance."

Another distinguished professor of political economy, Professor Dr. von Schäffle, wrote in the *Münchener Allgemeine Zeitung* on the 4th of February 1898 :

" The progress of our sea commerce has become so immense that Germany must be prepared for anything on the part of her rivals. Let us not deceive ourselves. The English, if they can summon up the necessary courage, will try at the first opportunity to give the deathblow to our commerce oversea and to our export industries. The Transvaal quarrel has made evident what we have to expect. Cecil Rhodes, Chamberlain, and their accomplices are, in this respect, only types of the thought and intentions of present-day England towards new Germany. Great Britain will move heaven and hell against the sea commerce of the new German Empire as soon as she can."

Another eminent scientist, the professor of political economy, Von Schulze-Gaevernitz, wrote in the *Nation*, the 5th of March 1898 :

"In order to strengthen the sensible and peaceable elements in England, and to confine commercial envy within harmless bounds, we require the defence of a fleet. . . . The British Cape to Cairo idea is opposed to French and German interests, but German vital interests would be affected by British control of the still undivided portion of the world, especially of China and of Turkey."

Then, referring to the rapid colonial expansion of Great Britain during the last decade, he significantly added: "But should in future the day of liquidation arrive, Germany must have the power to participate in it."

Professor Mommsen, probably the greatest historian of modern times, wrote, regarding England, in the *North American Review* for February 1900:

"The repetition of Jameson's Raid by the English Government (I won't say the English nation), dictated by banking and mining speculations, is the revelation of your moral and political corruption."

The former Under-Secretary of State, professor of political economy Von Mayr-Strasbourg, wrote in the *Münchener Allgemeine Zeitung*:

"Our national policy requires the firm backbone of a strong fleet in order to oppose with energy the brutal instincts of exporting countries, especially of those which export agricultural produce. Our commercial policy requires it in order to give to our home industries the certainty of the continued supply of raw material and of open markets for their exports."

Hans Delbrück, the distinguished professor of history at Berlin, wrote in the *North American Review* of January 1900:

"England insists upon being the only great commercial and colonial power in the world, and is only willing to allow other nations the favour of owning small fragments as enclaves wedged in helplessly between her possessions. This it is which we neither can nor intend to tolerate. . . . The good things of this world belong to all civilised nations in

common. As England is not expected to give way peaceably, and as her great naval power cannot be overwhelmed by a single State, the best remedy would be the alliance against her of all her rivals together, especially of Russia, France, and Germany. . . . Such is the state of public opinion in Germany. There is only one person in the whole country who thinks otherwise, and that is the Kaiser."

From the foregoing small but representative selection of opinions expressed by the *élite* of the German professors, which might easily be increased sufficiently to fill a volume, the nature of Germany's colonial ambitions and the cause of her fanatical hatred of Anglo-Saxondom should be sufficiently clear.

The last phrase of Professor Delbrück, "There is only one person in the country who thinks otherwise, and that is the Kaiser," seemed quite true at the time when it was written, for the combined agitation by the official classes, the Universities, the entire German press, and the Protestant clergy, had roused Germany to a frenzy of hatred; and though the "poor Boers" were constantly in the mouth of the multitude, the utterances of the leaders, like those cited, make it clear that the clashing of German colonial ambitions and Anglo-Saxon interests, not German sympathy with the Boers, was at the bottom of the anti-British propaganda.

Owing to the rule of democracy, Anglo-Saxon diplomacy works in the full glare of publicity, and cannot pursue a far-seeing, secret, or unscrupulous policy, but is forced to take short views and to act honestly; while German as well as Russian Cabinet policy was able to work with infinite patience and in absolute secrecy, because it was unhampered by popular control. An example will illustrate this point. Between 1860 and 1863 an expedition, sent out by the Prussian Government, and accompanied by the celebrated geographer, Freiherr von Richthofen, explored China, Japan, and Siam. After the most painstaking investigation of the Chinese coast and mainland, Freiherr von Richthofen came to the conclusion that Kiau-chow

was in every respect by far the most valuable harbour of China, and when, in 1897, more than thirty years after his survey, two German missionaries were murdered in China, Germany immediately occupied Kiau-chow, which port was certainly not selected by coincidence.

On the 5th of May 1898, a few days after the outbreak of the Spanish-American War, *Die Grenzboten*, the most influential political weekly, which was frequently inspired by the Government, wrote, probably not without official sanction :

"The number of Germans in the United States amounts to nearly twenty millions, but many of them have lost their native language or their German names. Nevertheless, German blood flows in their veins, and it is only required to gather them together under their former nationality in order to bring them back into the lap of their mother Germania. The German volunteers will, of course, have to pay the heaviest blood tax in the war, as they alone form the warlike element of the army. The promiscuous mob of Englishmen, half-breeds, Irish, and negroes is too incoherent and too unmilitary to show any soldierly qualities. Nevertheless, Germanism has to take a back seat in the army, and generals' positions are almost exclusively in the hands of Englishmen.

"We have to consider that more than three million Germans live as foreigners in the United States who are not personally interested in that country. A skilful German national policy should be able to manipulate that German multitude against the shameless war-speculators."

Had the issue of the Spanish-American War been unfavourable to the United States, or had the attempt at forming an anti-American coalition succeeded, the "skilful manipulation" from Berlin of the German vote "against the shameless war-speculators" might have been possible, and might have borne much fruit. Germany's miscalculation as to the issue of the war, and as to the strength and leanings of the German-Americans, seems to have caused great disappointment in Berlin. This disappointment appears to have been responsible for the reckless provoca-

tion which Admiral Dewey received from Admiral Diedrichs before Manila, and which might have resulted in hostilities between the American and German fleets, had it not been for the timely presence of the British squadron and the determined attitude of its admiral.

During the South African War the clashing of German colonial ambitions and Anglo-Saxon interests became particularly marked, because in Africa German colonial ambitions were clearly defined, and had become the ambitions of the nation and of the populace ; in the Spanish-American War they were vague and hazy, and exclusively the ambitions of German diplomacy, for to the German masses the Spanish-American War had little significance. Already in 1884, at the beginning of her colonial career, Germany had attempted to gain a footing in Santa Lucia Bay, with an eye to the possibility of joining hands with the Boer republics close by, and of gaining, with their help, supremacy in Africa, but Bismarck's attempt failed through the incapacity of his son, who conducted the negotiations in London.

Undaunted by her first failure, Germany continued to believe that her best chance of acquiring settlement colonies lay in South Africa, and worked patiently and in silence for the attainment of her ambition. The Jameson Raid gave her a rude awakening. She feared the absorption of the Boer republics by Great Britain before Germany and the Boers were ready to co-operate. In his anxiety to maintain his hold upon South Africa, the German Emperor sent his celebrated telegram to Mr. Kruger, thus prematurely revealing Germany's innermost ambitions. The existence of these ambitions was still further proved by Baron Marschall von Bieberstein's official declaration that "the continued independence of the Boer republics is a German interest."

By the Emperor's impetuousness, Germany's ultimate aims regarding South Africa were clearly disclosed to Great Britain, a mistake which Bismarck would never have committed, and the Kruger telegram and the attitude of the

semi-official press left the German nation with the erroneous impression that the British Government had been behind Jameson, and that the Emperor's veto had, once and for all, put an end to the aggressive plans of Great Britain. Thus misled, it was not unnatural that the Germans believed themselves to be the masters of the situation in South Africa, and that the German press constantly advocated the expulsion of Great Britain from that country. For instance, on the 4th of July 1895, a few months after the Jameson Raid, *Die Grenzboten* wrote :

" For us the Boer States, with the coasts that are their due, signify a great possibility. Their absorption into the British Empire would mean the blocking up of our last road towards an independent agricultural colony in a temperate clime. Will England obstruct our path ? If Germany shows determination, Never ! "

After surveying the globe, official Germany had evidently come to the conclusion that South Africa would be an ideal colony, more desirable even than South Brazil, and that the most natural way to acquire it would be to wrest it out of British hands with the help of the Boers. *Die Grenzboten* wrote on the 15th of April 1897 :

" The possession of South Africa offers greater advantages in every respect than the possession of Southern Brazil. If we look at the map our German colonies look very good positions for attack."

In a similar strain the *Koloniales Jahrbuch* for 1897 wrote :

" The importance of South Africa as a land which can receive an unlimited number of white immigrants must rouse us to the greatest exertions, in order to secure there supremacy to the Teuton race. The greater part of the population of South Africa is of Low German descent. We must constantly lay stress upon the Low German origin of the Boers, and we must, before all, stimulate their hatred against Anglo-Saxondom. . . . No doubt the Boers will, with characteristically German tenacity, retake their

former possessions from the English by combining slimness with force. In this attempt they can count upon the assistance of the German brother nation."

These quotations contain an unmistakable programme and a very interesting forecast.

As the idea that Germany was the heir-presumptive to South Africa was constantly discussed in the German press, that idea had sunk deeply into the German mind. The succession to that inheritance soon became with the masses an impending event to be looked forward to. It was only a question of time when it would come to pass. In German eyes South Africa had become indispensable to Germany, it was already considered as a national asset, and in innumerable lectures, books, and articles its resources and possibilities were discussed.

While dispatches regarding the suzerainty of the Transvaal were being exchanged between Great Britain and that country, the leading organs of the German press continued preaching the expulsion of the British from South Africa, an action calculated to strengthen the resistance of the Boers, and to make them look to Germany for protection. For instance, on the 16th of June 1898, when war between the Transvaal and Great Britain seemed unavoidable, *Die Grenzboten* wrote :

" The existence of the Boer States makes it, perhaps, possible to regain the lost colony, including Delagoa Bay. Here in the north of Cape Colony a well-considered German policy must be pursued, and the Emperor's telegram to Kruger has already demonstrated our firm will to return the Gladstonian ' hands off ' to the English. The possession of the natural harbour of Delagoa Bay is a vital condition for the Low German States in South Africa. Without Low Germanism in South Africa our colonies are worth nothing as settlements. Our future is founded upon the victory of Low Germanism, and upon the expulsion of the English from South Africa, where, even in Cape Colony, they are still in the minority. The prosperity of our South African colonies, which singly are worth as little as Cameroon and Togo, depends upon the possibility of connecting those two

colonies, whereby England will be confined to the south, and the dream of a great British colonial empire from the Cape to Cairo will vanish."

If we look at the South African question from the German point of view, and remember how German diplomacy had plotted and laboured for the acquisition of South Africa for fifteen years and more, how the telegram and the speeches of William II. and the attitude and propaganda of the German press had created the universal belief in Germany that Great Britain could not move in South Africa without Germany's consent, and that Germany's influence there was paramount, we can understand with what dismay and exasperation the outbreak of the South African War and the prospect of seeing the Boer States absorbed by Great Britain was greeted by the German people.

The disappointment felt in German official circles was no less keen, and, not unnaturally, the question suggested itself whether Great Britain's progress in South Africa could not be stopped by force. Remembering her failure to form a coalition against Great Britain in 1895, and against the United States in 1898, Germany found herself isolated and unable to save South Africa for herself. The large naval programme of 1898, providing for seventeen battleships, etc., coincided with the Spanish-American War. Similarly, the outbreak of the South African War coincided with the German Navy Bill of 1900, providing for a further huge increase. Smarting under the sense of her impotence against Great Britain, the Navy Bill of 1900 was brought forward, which was to provide a fleet of such strength that, according to the preamble of the Bill, "a war against the mightiest naval Power would involve risks threatening the supremacy of that Power." That fleet was to cost about £100,000,000. In spite of that staggering amount, the Navy Bill was rapidly passed, for its object to destroy the power of Great Britain was greeted with delight by the nation, and with hysterical jubilation by the masses. At last Great Britain was to be brought to her knees.

The powerful Social Democratic Party did not prove an effective obstacle to the execution of Germany's colonial ambitions. Although the representatives of Labour objected to the Navy Bill, they objected neither to the prospective humiliation of Great Britain nor to the acquisition of foreign markets by conquest. The following lines from the *Sozialistische Monatshefte* for December 1899 faithfully depicted the opinion of the German Labour Party :

"That Germany be armed to the teeth, possessing a strong fleet, is of the utmost importance to the working men. What damages our exports damages them also, and working men have the most pressing interest in securing prosperity for our export trade, be it even by force of arms. Owing to her development, Germany may perhaps be obliged to maintain her position sword in hand. Only he who is under the protection of his guns can dominate the markets, and in the fight for markets German working men may come before the alternative either of perishing or of forcing their entrance into markets sword in hand."

From this and many similar manifestations it is clear that no effective opposition against Germany's colonial ambitions came from the ranks of the Social Democratic Party.

Germany's military and naval leaders thought that Germany's chances in case of a war with England were not unfavourable. A fair indication of the spirit and the intentions existing among the highest German officers may be found in a remarkable article contributed to the *Deutsche Rundschau* of March 1900, by General C. von der Goltz, an article which was all the more remarkable as General von der Goltz was on active service. It should be added that von der Goltz was the reorganiser of the Turkish Army, and one of the most talented of German officers. He said :

". . . We must contradict the opinion, which has so frequently been expressed, that a war between Germany and Great Britain is impossible. Great Britain is forced to distribute her fleets over many seas in peace as well as in war, and her home squadron is surprisingly weak in comparison

with her fleets in the Mediterranean and in India, the Far East, Australia, the Red Sea, South Africa, the West Indies, and the Pacific. In that necessary distribution of her strength lies Great Britain's weakness. Germany is in a better position. Her navy is small, but it can be kept together in Europe. Our colonies want no protection, for a victory in Europe would give us our colonies back at the conclusion of peace. With Great Britain matters are different. If India, Australia, or Canada should be lost in a war, they would remain lost for ever. . . .

". . . For the moment our fleet has only one-fifth the fighting value of the British Fleet, and Great Britain's superiority over us is striking, but when the projected increase of our fleet has been effected, the outlook for us will be bright. The British home squadron, with which we should have to deal, amounts to 43 battleships and 35 large cruisers. Even if that fleet should be increased in the future, it would no longer be an irresistible opponent to us. Numbers decide as little on the sea as they do on land; numerical inferiority can be compensated for by greater efficiency. . . .

" As places are not wanting where England's defences are weak, it would be a mistake to consider a landing in England as a chimera. The distance is short enough if an admiral of daring succeeds in securing supremacy on the sea for a short time. . . .

" The material basis of our power is large enough to make it possible for us to destroy the present superiority of Great Britain, but Germany must prepare beforehand for what is to come, and must arm in time. Germany has arrived at one of the most critical moments in her history, and her fleet is too weak to fulfil the task for which it is intended. We must arm ourselves in time, with all our might, and prepare ourselves for what is to come, without losing a day, for it is not possible to improvise victories on the sea, where the excellence of the material and the greatest skill in handling it are of supreme importance."

When we consider the spirit of irreconcilable hostility against Anglo-Saxondom that pervaded the countless expansionist manifestations in Germany, emanating from official and semi-official quarters, from professorial and mercantile circles, from the clergy and the proletariat, we

cannot help being struck by the unanimity of hatred and by the unflinching determination of Germany to erect a German world empire upon the ruins of Anglo-Saxondom. Nowhere was the celebrated word of Sir Walter Raleigh, "Whosoever commands the sea commands the trade; whosoever commands the trade commands the riches of the world, and consequently the world itself," more frequently quoted and more thoroughly appreciated than in Germany.

Germany had become great by the sword. She wished to walk in the steps of her greatest rulers, Frederick II. and Bismarck, but she disdained the advice of those most successful expansionists. Frederick the Great's counsel, "Secrecy is the soul of foreign politics," was as little heeded by her recent rulers as Bismarck's recommendation "not to meddle in the affairs of foreign States unless one has also the power to accomplish one's intentions." By the folly of her leaders Germany's plans were prematurely and unmistakably revealed to the world, and if the Anglo-Saxon nations had been so blind as not to take the measures necessary to frustrate those plans, of which they had received such ample and such long-dated warning, they would have fully deserved the fate of Spain and Holland.

CHAPTER VIII

THE RESPONSIBILITY FOR ANGLO-GERMAN FRICTION—GERMAN EVIDENCE ON THE SUBJECT [1]

ANGLO-GERMAN relations, which used to be satisfactory and cordial, had during the years preceding the War become more and more strained and embittered. During the Morocco crisis of 1911 the tension had increased to the breaking-point. The two countries prepared for war and their fleets for instant action. British and German sailors waited impatiently for the signal. Had a British and a German warship unexpectedly encountered one another, mutual distrust might have led to the charging and training of guns; and if, through the loss of nerve on the part of an officer, through the misunderstanding of an order, or through an accident, a gun had gone off—and at such a moment of supreme tension guns are apt to go off in an unaccountable manner—a war to the death between England and Germany might have ensued. Hence Germans and Englishmen asked themselves: Why have Anglo-German relations become so strained and embittered? Is Sir Edward—now Viscount—Grey to blame? Can Anglo-German relations be improved? What can be done to improve them?

Let us first of all consider the pre-war situation from the German point of view, relying exclusively upon German evidence.

Before the War the world was told officially and semi-officially by German statesmen, writers, and lecturers that Germany was a peaceful nation, which ever since the Franco-German War of 1870–1871 had kept the peace, that she

[1] From the *Fortnightly Review*, March 1912.

could not in any way be blamed for the Anglo-German tension, that all was England's fault. Countless German Government officials, professors, and journalists asserted that Great Britain envied Germany for her economic success, and that she worked unceasingly, both openly and secretly, for Germany's downfall, in order to rid herself of an inconvenient competitor. They asserted that Great Britain pursued towards Germany that traditional policy of envy and plunder which caused her to attack and despoil one by one all the great industrial, commercial, and colonial nations of the past. In hundreds of books and newspapers and from thousands of platforms the Germans were informed that the leading principle of British statesmanship was the promotion of British trade by the destruction of Great Britain's commercial rivals, that Great Britain grudged Germany her "place in the sun," that she envied Germany her commerce and her shipping, that British diplomats had cribbed and confined Germany with a network of hostile alliances, and that they perfidiously hampered and opposed Germany's progress in all parts of the world.

The German description of British policy was a calumny and a fantastic distortion of history. Every one who is acquainted with British history is aware that during the last two centuries the principal aim of British policy has not been the pursuit of commercial aggrandisement and colonial expansion, but the maintenance of the balance of power on the Continent of Europe. Great Britain fought all her greatest wars not for trade and colonies—for "plunder," as the Germans say—but for the preservation of the balance of power in Europe. For that great principle she fought the Spaniards under Philip II., the French under Louis XIV., Louis XV., Napoleon I., and the Russians in the Crimea; and the eventual conquest of the Spanish and French colonies was, as Professor Seeley has shown, merely the accidental consequence, but not the cause, of her great wars against Spain and France. The great majority of England's wars were not wars of aggression, but wars of defence.

The maintenance of the balance of power on the Con-

tinent of Europe was and is one of the greatest of British interests. It is clear that only a nation which has destroyed the balance of power on the Continent, and which has become supreme on the Continent, can hope successfully to attack Great Britain. It is equally clear that no nation can maintain the mastery of the Continent of Europe as long as a strong and independent England exists on its flank. Hence a nation which strives for supremacy in Europe feels impelled to attack Great Britain earlier or later. History confirms this. All the rulers, from Julius Cæsar to Napoleon I. and to William II., who have striven to become supreme in Europe have made war upon Great Britain. National security is more important than a profitable commerce and extensive colonies. A little consideration shows that Great Britain's island position is secure only as long as the balance of power on the Continent is maintained intact; and the more evenly the balance of power on the Continent is adjusted, the greater is Great Britain's security from continental attack. Consequently the greatest and the most important task of British statesmanship has been in the past not the promotion of trade and the acquisition of colonies, but the maintenance of the balance of power in Europe. Great Britain has been actuated in her foreign policy not by greed, but by the instinct of self-preservation.

In the course of the last few decades British statesmanship has been given another task, which has become even more important than the maintenance of the balance of power on the Continent of Europe. A century ago, when Great Britain fought Napoleon I., the British islands were practically self-supporting. In the 'fifties of last century Great Britain raised at home nine-tenths of the bread and meat which her people required. Before the War of 1914–1918 nine-tenths of the bread-corn and one-half of the meat which the British people required came from abroad. Philip II., Louis XIV., Louis XV., Napoleon I. could hope to subdue England by the slow process of invasion and conquest; now Great Britain can more easily and more

rapidly be subdued by starvation. Occasionally the supply of wheat stored in Great Britain sufficed for less than a month. Even a short interruption of the grain imports would bring about a famine. No nation in the world possesses a more precarious food supply than Great Britain, and none is more vitally dependent upon the free and unhampered entrance of food-ships into her ports. As Great Britain has only sea frontiers, England can protect herself against the danger of being starved into surrender only if her fleet is strong enough to defend the freedom of the sea against any Power and against any possible combination of Powers. Hence the possession of an unchallengeable supremacy of her navy is now more important to Great Britain than it has been at any time of her history, and the maintenance of British naval supremacy has become perhaps even more important a principle of British statesmanship than the maintenance of the balance of power in Europe. The Germans themselves were aware that he who threatens Great Britain's naval supremacy threatens not only her trade and her colonies but her very life. In 1909 a little book for the use in schools, entitled *Die Flotte als notwendige Ergänzung unserer nationalen Wehrmacht*, written by Adolf Schroeder, was published in Germany. In it we read :

" Were it possible to cut off Great Britain's supply of food, *in less than six weeks would the inhabitants die of starvation.* Britons are fully aware of the danger, and all, from the noble lord to the labourer, are convinced that *it is the most important duty of the State to keep open and secure* the broad highway of the ocean on which British merchantmen import food and raw material and export British manufactures. However, the security of the import and export trade in the case of a country which is entirely surrounded by the sea can be guaranteed only by a navy which is stronger than that of any other State. But the Briton requires more. *He demands a fleet which, both ship for ship and by their combined number, should be superior to the combined fleets of the two most powerful nations which conceivably might make war upon his country.* That conviction is

deeply rooted in the minds of all Britons, and all parties agree in this principle which is *a question of the national existence.*"

The italics are in the original. The Conservative *Kreuz Zeitung* wrote on the 28th of January 1911 :

" England must protect her enormous and indispensable imports of food against every disturbance, especially in case of war. Therefore the English Government is compelled to maintain a Navy strong enough to open all trade routes and, if possible, to blockade all hostile squadrons in their ports, in order to protect the British Isles against the danger of starvation and of a panic affecting the prices of foodstuffs."

Captain Hartwig Schubert wrote in his pamphlet, *Die Deutsche Schlachtflotte eine Gefahr für Deutschland's Machtstellung*, published in 1911 :

" Great Britain imports approximately five times as much bread-corn and flour as Germany. Whilst England can receive food only by sea, Germany can obtain it by land across the frontiers of Denmark, Russia, Austria, Switzerland, France, Luxemburg, and Holland. It follows that Germany requires no navy for the protection of her food supply, whilst Great Britain can secure a sufficiency of foodstuffs only as long as she possesses a fleet which is strong enough to face any hostile combination of Powers."

No British statesman could have given clearer and fairer statements proving Great Britain's need of the possession of a paramount navy than the three given in the foregoing. Most thinking Germans agreed that Great Britain requires a fleet of unchallengeable power for the protection of her food supply. Therefore it must also have been clear to all Germans that a nation which challenges British naval supremacy threatens Great Britain's very existence. Captain Schubert (late of the German Army) wrote :

" In the Franco-German War France had a superior fleet. Germany's victories on land compelled the French to land their sailors and to employ them for the defence of their

country on land. In a future war with France and Russia we must strive to bring about the same result. A German naval victory in a war against France and Russia would be unnecessary to us in case we are victorious on land. It would be worthless to us should we be defeated on land, because our land armies would be weakened by the men on board our ships. Besides, if defeated on land, we could not follow up a naval victory by the landing of armies in the enemy's country, for we should then have no land troops to spare. It is therefore clear that the German Navy is built only for use against England."

Captain Schubert's arguments were faultless and unanswerable. His statement that the German Navy was built only for use against England cannot be disproved.

In an interview which Professor Hans Delbrück, one of the leading German professors, gave in December 1911 to the *Daily Mail*, he spoke of "Britain's long-standing and traditional political hostility to Germany." Germans are fond of asserting that Great Britain has "always" been hostile to Germany. This is one of their greatest grievances. However, that complaint also can be disproved out of German mouths. Herr Eduard Bernstein, one of the leading Socialist writers and a man of widely-recognised eminence, fairness, and honesty of purpose, published at the end of 1911 a pamphlet entitled *Die Englische Gefahr und das Deutsche Volk*, in which we read:

"All that has been written as to England's hostility towards Germany before the foundation of the German Empire in 1870 is merely idle and mischievous talk and invention. England and Prussia and England and Austria were sometimes friends and sometimes opposed to each other, but in their relations there was no fixed tendency and there could be none, because no important clashing interests existed between the British Empire and the two great German States. Even during the first years of the German Empire there was no friction worth mentioning between Great Britain and Germany.

"During the struggle for Protection (in 1879 and afterwards) German Free Traders were pilloried as 'English

agents.' The Protectionist literature of the period abounds with attacks upon England. . . . In consequence of the Protectionist movement the instinct of self-preservation impelled England to secure markets for the future, and when in 1883 Germany began acquiring colonies she met with British resistance. However, one must recognise that that resistance was not the result of British illwill towards the German nation, for that resistance was caused, or at least greatly increased, by Germany's introducing in economic matters the policy of the closed door. It is only fair to say that in many cases British resistance did not emanate from the British Government itself, but from the British colonies or from individual British colonists whose claims for protection the Government in London was bound at least formally to support. In several cases Germany recognised the existence of old and valid British claims. . . . When in 1888 the Emperor Frederick III. came to the throne the nationalist German press began a violent anti-British campaign, attacking the Empress Victoria, 'the Englishwoman.'

"On the 7th of February 1896 (shortly after the Jameson Raid) the Foreign Secretary, Freiherr von Marschall, declared in the Reichstag that the continued independence of the Boer Republics was a German interest. Now the publication of the correspondence of several of the Boer leaders has shown that the leading Boers aimed not only at the shaking off of England's paramountcy over the Boer States, but that they intended to drive England out of South Africa, and that they relied in this policy upon Germany's support. Meanwhile Germany had begun to increase her fleet in feverish haste. In 1898 a Navy Bill was passed providing for nineteen battleships, eight armourclads for coast defence, and forty-two cruisers at a cost of £20,000,000, and William II. declared in Hamburg: 'We are in bitter need of a strong German fleet.' Two years later, in 1900, came another Navy Bill which doubled the battle fleet provided by the Bill of 1898, and which increased the sum required for shipbuilding to £40,000,000. Can one wonder that the English were startled by our action? Whilst Secretary of State Admiral Hollmann had declared in the Reichstag, 'The German coasts require no protection, they protect themselves,' the Emperor had loudly proclaimed, 'The trident must be in our fist.'"

By the Navy Bill of 1898, the provisions of which were doubled by the Navy Bill of 1900, the building programme of the German Navy was firmly laid down up to the year 1917. However, the year 1905 brought a second, the year 1908 a third, and the year 1912 a fourth enlargement, and the moneys voted in respect of these five Navy Bills greatly exceeded in the aggregate the sum of £250,000,000. The introduction to the Navy Bill of 1900 stated: "Germany requires a fleet of such strength that a war with the mightiest naval Power would involve risks threatening the supremacy of that Power." Germany deliberately set to work to challenge Great Britain's naval supremacy, and she proclaimed in 1900 that intention officially from the housetops. The original Navy Bills of 1898 and 1900, and their amendments of 1905, 1908, and 1912, were carried after a passionate anti-British campaign which was undoubtedly engineered by the Government. It has been shown in the foregoing that the possession of an unchallengeable naval supremacy is a matter of life or death for Great Britain, and that most Germans who have given the matter a moment's thought agreed that Great Britain must have a navy which is stronger than that of any other Power, or of any probable combination of Powers. Consequently it is clear that by the naval policy which Germany had inaugurated in 1900 she deliberately challenged not only Great Britain's position in the world, but her very existence as an independent nation.

Most Germans who complained about British "intrigues" asserted that King Edward VII. was Germany's greatest enemy, and that he was responsible for hedging Germany about with a network of alliances and understandings. Yet a well-known and eminent German writer on foreign politics, the Councillor of Legation, Herr von Rath, wrote on the 3rd of November 1911 in *Der Tag*:

"To-day it cannot be denied that England strove in the first instance for a political rapprochement with Germany, and that King Edward VII. pursued this plan as soon as he

had come to the throne. The strongest sea Power gravitated towards the strongest land Power, and nobody can deny nowadays that Germany rejected at that time the repeated advances of British Conservative statesmen, such as Mr. Chamberlain, Lord Lansdowne, and the Duke of Devonshire."

As a matter of fact, Great Britain's attempts to be on the best and the most intimate terms with Germany began long before King Edward VII. had come to the throne. Formerly Great Britain had followed the policy of "splendid isolation." In the 'eighties of last century, when Bismarck's policy of alliances divided Europe into two camps, British statesmen began to recognise the desirability of entering upon more intimate relations with one of the two groups of nations. Englishmen and Germans are far more closely akin by race, national character, and religion than are Englishmen and Frenchmen or Englishmen and Russians. Most Englishmen instinctively desired to march side by side with their German cousins. Besides, at that time there was constant friction in the colonial sphere between France and Great Britain and between Russia and Great Britain. Desiring to enter upon more intimate relations with Germany, British diplomacy began to settle all outstanding differences between the two countries, so as to abolish all causes of friction and of dispute. With this object in view it concluded the Anglo-German Agreement of 1890, which defined the British and the German spheres of influence in East, West, and South-West Africa. This Agreement was followed by the Anglo-Congolese Agreement of 1894, and later by an Anglo-German understanding regarding the Portuguese colonies in the event of their coming into the market. When in 1897 Germany occupied Kiao-chow, Great Britain supported her, and renounced all intentions of connecting Wei-hai-wei by railway with the Shantung hinterland, thus giving to Germany the monopoly in the exploitation of that important and wealthy province. In 1899 Great Britain concluded with Germany the Samoa Agreement, according to which Great Britain retired altogether from Samoa, while Germany received

the two most important islands of that group. In 1900 Great Britain concluded with Germany an agreement defining Anglo-German interests in China, the so-called Yangtse Agreement. The mere enumeration of these various agreements shows that during the decade 1890–1900 British diplomacy consistently strove to abolish all differences with Germany in all parts of the world, with the object of bringing about an Anglo-German rapprochement. Unfortunately all attempts of British diplomacy to win Germany's goodwill and all the advances made by British statesmen were rejected by Germany with scorn. Great Britain, her statesmen, and even her rulers, were treated by practically the whole semi-official press of Germany with contempt, insults, and ridicule, and justified complaints arose in responsible quarters that German statesmen were taking unfair advantage of Great Britain by the employment of the most questionable diplomatic methods.

When British statesmen discovered that they had wasted ten years in fruitless attempts at reconciling Germany, and that Germany had treated every British advance as a sign of cowardice on the part of a hateful enemy, and especially when they saw that, almost within sight of the British coast, an enormous fleet was being constructed, which, it was officially proclaimed, was intended to challenge the supremacy of "the mightiest naval Power," they recognised that it was vain to hope any longer for Germany's political friendship, and they turned elsewhere. The Anglo-French and the Anglo-Russian ententes were brought about not by King Edward, but by Germany herself, by her anti-British policy. Germany herself forced Great Britain to enter into arrangements with Germany's opponents. If, before 1914, Germany was hedged around by a net-work of ententes and alliances, she should accuse not the late King Edward, but only her own leaders.

Many years ago William II. proclaimed, "Germany's future lies upon the sea." During more than twenty years Germany had striven to acquire colonies for her surplus population. The expansion of States is a natural move-

ment. Continental States, such as Germany, can expand on the land. Insular ones are compelled by nature to expand oversea. Oversea colonies are a necessity to an over-populated State such as Great Britain, but they are not so much a necessity to Germany. During a considerable number of years immigration into Germany has been far greater than emigration from Germany. At the census of 1907 it was found that no less than 1,342,292 foreigners were living in Germany. German agriculturists, mine-owners, and manufacturers complained constantly about a shortage of labour. Germany did not suffer from over-population. A nation can in safety embark upon a great transmaritime policy only if the motherland is secure, if it occupies an island like Great Britain or Japan, or if it possesses practically an insular position such as the United States.

The greater part of the German colonies was acquired by Bismarck. However, although in Bismarck's time Germany's position in Europe was exceedingly strong, Bismarck's principal care was to ensure Germany's security on the Continent of Europe, and he attached the greatest value to Great Britain's goodwill and support in view of the possibility of continental complications. Considering Germany's continental interests infinitely more important than her transoceanic ones, he absolutely refused to pursue a transmaritime and colonial policy in opposition to England, fearing that an anti-British policy would drive England into the arms of France and Russia. Even when diplomatic differences had arisen between the two countries, Bismarck wished to remain on cordial terms with Great Britain. On the 2nd of March 1884, for instance, he stated in the Reichstag with reference to an Anglo-German dispute:

"I shall do everything in my power in order *sine ira et studio*, and in the most conciliatory manner, to settle this matter in accordance with that quiet and friendly intercourse which has at all times existed between England and Germany, a quiet and friendly intercourse which is most natural because neither Power possesses vital interests

which conflict with the vital interests of the other Power. I can see only an error in the opinion that England envies us our modest attempts at colonising."

He laid down at greater length his guiding principles in his intercourse with Great Britain on the 10th of January 1885, when he stated in the Reichstag :

" The last speaker has told us that we must either abandon our colonial policy or increase our naval strength to such an extent that we need not fear any naval Power, or, to speak more clearly, that our navy should rival that of England herself. However, even if we should succeed in building up a navy as strong as that of England, we should still have to fear an alliance of England and France. Those Powers are stronger than any single Power in Europe is or ever can be. It follows that the policy indicated by the last speaker is one which can never be striven after.

" I would also ask the last speaker not to make any attempts either to disturb the peace between England and Germany or to diminish the confidence that peace between these two Powers will be maintained by hinting that some day we may find ourselves in an armed conflict with England. I absolutely deny that possibility. Such a possibility does not exist, and all the questions which are at present being discussed between England and Germany are not of sufficient importance to justify a breach of the peace on either side of the North Sea. Besides, I really do not know what disputes might arise between England and Germany. There never have been disputes between the two countries. From my diplomatic experience I cannot see any reasons which can make hostilities possible between them unless a Cabinet of inconceivable character should be in power in England, a Cabinet which neither exists nor which is ever likely to exist, and which criminally attacks us."

Four years later, on the 26th of January 1889, only a short time before his dismissal, he stated with reference to the Anglo-German Zanzibar dispute in the Reichstag :

" I absolutely refuse to act towards the Sultan of Zanzibar in opposition to England. As soon as we have arrived at an understanding with England, we shall take the necessary

measures in Zanzibar in agreement with England. I do not intend either actively to oppose England or even to take note of those steps which subordinate British individuals have taken against us. In Zanzibar and in Samoa we act in perfect harmony with the British Government. We are marching hand in hand, and I am firmly resolved that our relations shall preserve their present character. English colonial interests compete with ours in numerous places, and subordinate colonial officials are occasionally hostile to German interests. Nevertheless we are acting in perfect unison with the British Government, we are absolutely united, and I am firmly resolved to preserve Anglo-German harmony and to continue working in co-operation with that country.

"The preservation of Anglo-German goodwill is, after all, the most important thing. I see in England an old and traditional ally. No differences exist between England and Germany. If I speak of England as our ally, I am not using a diplomatic term. We have no alliance with England. However, I wish to remain in close contact with England also in colonial questions. The two nations have marched side by side during at least 150 years, and if I should discover that we might lose touch with England, I should act cautiously and endeavour to avoid losing England's goodwill."

Modern Germany erected to Bismarck countless statues. Bismarck's speeches, Bismarck's letters, and Bismarck's memoirs were printed in hundreds of thousands of copies, and they stand on the bookshelves of the people by the side of Schiller and Goethe. But modern Germany had forgotten, or she deliberately disregarded, Bismarck's policy and Bismarck's warnings. Through the shortsightedness of Bismarck's successors the bonds of the Triple Alliance were so much loosened that Germans themselves raised periodically the cry that they were isolated in a hostile world. Yet modern Germany needlessly increased the dangers which threatened her on the Continent still further by throwing Bismarck's warnings to the winds and antagonising Great Britain, who might have proved Germany's best and most valuable friend in her hour of need.

The reason that for years before the War Great Britain was no longer Germany's "old and traditional ally," as Bismarck called her, must be sought not in Great Britain's envy, but in the culpable mistakes of Germany's diplomacy. On the 8th of November 1911 the *Frankfurter Zeitung* published in the most prominent place an article from its London correspondent in which the causes of the Anglo-German differences in connection with the Morocco question were unsparingly exposed in the following words:

"On the 15th of May the German Emperor came to England in order to attend the unveiling of the national memorial to the late Queen. He was received by the people of London with the greatest cordiality. Five weeks later the German Crown Prince arrived in London to attend the Coronation, and he was greeted with the same universal goodwill. A week after King George's Coronation came the bomb of Agadir. Of course one may say: the fact that the Emperor was cordially received by the English people has nothing to do with diplomatic relations. Germany cannot regulate her political action by the visits of her Sovereign. Such arguments show a complete lack of understanding of the spirit of Western democracy. A foreign monarch comes to England. He drives during a week through London. He constantly takes off his grey top-hat to cheering crowds, and the man in the street says smilingly, 'Jolly fellow, isn't he?' Now the man in the street makes public opinion, and, after all, Mr. Lloyd George himself is a man in the street who has become a minister.

"When the German Emperor arrived in London, the impression became general in England that Germany would remain quiet. If, at that time, the German Morocco policy was already mapped out, then the Imperial visits to England were a mistake. They brought us with the English people the regrettable reputation of perfidiousness (*Untreue*). Now the reproach of perfidiousness has adhered to German policy for some time. That is known to everybody who is in contact with international diplomacy. It is the irony of fate that the German diplomatic apparatus, which is exclusively served by men belonging to the best families of the

aristocracy, does not at all enjoy the credit which is owed to gentlemen."

Editorially the *Frankfurter Zeitung* wrote on the 29th of December 1911 :

" The German Navy alone cannot have been the cause of the acute differences which exist between Great Britain and Germany. If we Germans strive for once to place ourselves without prejudice in the position of the British, we must confess that the distrust of Germany which prevails on the other side of the Channel is not without cause. If we Germans had had to hear certain utterances from the mouth of a foreign sovereign, we also would have been startled and would have thought it necessary to strengthen our defences. Now we can only say to the British that the monarchical utterances in question need not be taken too tragically, because we have learned by experience that big words are not followed by big deeds. We know now that the Kruger telegram, the Imperial call to arms against the Yellow Peril, the Emperor's speech at Damascus, his journey to Tangier and the dispatch of the *Panther*, were only dramatic gestures devoid of consequences. However, they have had the unfortunate effect of evoking hostility on the one side and high hopes on the other, which soon were converted into bitter disappointment, and people received the impression that German policy was either dangerous or unreliable. Of late things have improved because injudicious utterances from the highest quarter are no longer reported. Still the distrust of Germany remains, and we cannot be surprised at it. We tell the English unceasingly that the German nation is peaceful, and that it desires to live in harmony with England and all other nations. However, these assurances make no impression, for we are told : We are quite sure that the German people is peaceful, but the German people does not make German policy. German policy is made in a single, irresponsible, and incalculable quarter. Therefore the peaceful assurances of the German people have for us not a practical but merely a Platonic value. What can we reply to that argument ? "

In Bismarck's time German diplomacy enjoyed a twofold distinction : it pursued a wise, sane, and far-seeing policy,

and the diplomatic apparatus was faultlessly served by men of high ability. In the time of William II. German diplomacy failed in both respects, and the German people began to complain bitterly about the men in their diplomatic service. Towards the end of December 1911 Mr. L. Raschdau, a former German ambassador, published in several German papers an article on German diplomacy, in which he stated that the German ambassadorial service had become defective because the diplomatic career had been reserved to members of the German aristocracy. On this point the *Frankfurter Zeitung* wrote editorially on the 29th of December 1911 :

" The Emperor's advisers and assistants are not selected according to their talent and experience, but according to circumstances unconnected with their career and duties. One man is made an ambassador because he is an aristocrat and a man of wealth, another one because he has pleasing social talents, and the third is simply ' commanded ' to take up the post of Imperial Chancellor. The result of such a system, if one can call it a system, is naturally incapacity, amateurishness, and lack of success."

In the foregoing pages it has been shown exclusively by means of reliable German evidence that Germany was responsible for the unsatisfactory state of Anglo-German relations previous to 1914, that Anglo-German relations had become what they were because, as the German witnesses quoted admitted, Germany had deliberately pursued an anti-British policy during a considerable number of years. It has furthermore been shown that Germany's colonial and transmaritime policy, with its strong anti-British bias, was disapproved of by Prince Bismarck, and that many thinking Germans were profoundly dissatisfied not only with the direction of Germany's foreign policy, but also with the men who occupied high positions in the German diplomatic service.

Now we must ask ourselves : Why did Germany pursue towards Great Britain a policy which compromised her position in the world, which caused great disappointments

to her, and which in the end led to a national disaster? The answer is simple. Before the Boer War, when Germany embarked upon her transoceanic and anti-British policy, Great Britain's power was much under-estimated in Germany. During many decades German university professors, schoolmasters, and publicists had taught the doctrine that Englishmen were too selfish and too cowardly to defend their country, that England, like Carthage, was bound to fall through lack of patriotism among the people and their reliance upon hired soldiers. They had taught that the principal characteristics of the people in the British colonies also was selfishness, that they lacked patriotism, that they would cling to the motherland only as long as the connection was profitable to them, that the dissolution of the British Empire was inevitable, that Canada and the other great British dominions would earlier or later follow the example of the United States and secede. Roscher, Treitschke, Schmoller, and many other eminent German writers propounded these views. Thus Germany's colonial and anti-British policy was based upon a false estimate of the character and the latent strength of Great Britain and her daughter States, and that false estimate was not revised when the colonies supported Great Britain in the Boer War in splendid loyalty with troops and money, when Canada initiated the system of interimperial preferences and bore cheerfully Germany's fiscal hostility, when a number of imperial conferences and imperial defensive arrangements created the nucleus of an imperial army and navy and of an imperial organisation, when Australia and New Zealand introduced universal military service, and when Australia, New Zealand, and Canada began to build powerful squadrons of their own and voluntarily took a share in the Empire's burden of defence.

In their endeavour to challenge British naval supremacy the Germans were encouraged by a singular misconception. They had been told by numerous writers on naval and political subjects that, while the British yards could provide any number of warships, the British nation could not

furnish enough sailors for manning them. On the 28th of October 1908 the *Daily Telegraph* had published an interview with the German Emperor in which he had declared that, in opposition to the majority of the German nation, he was a sincere friend of England. The Emperor's Anglophil utterances aroused the fury of the German Nationalist press, and, referring to that interview, the *Allgemeine Evangelische Lutherische Kirchenzeitung*, a leading Protestant Church paper, wrote in November of the same year :

"The Emperor labours strenuously with the object of gaining the goodwill of the British nation. That is not very inspiring for us, but that policy is necessary as long as we have to avoid a war with England, for which we are as yet not strong enough. Only since a short time has the German nation learned to understand the necessity of having a powerful fleet. And we must continue building ships in competition with England till the moment arrives when England may still possess many more ships than we Germans have, but when the English can no longer find the men for navigating and fighting their fleet. Until that moment has arisen, it is madness to urge for war, and meanwhile the Emperor tries to make up for the indiscretions of the German press by his advances to England."

The *Kirchenzeitung* summed up in a few lines the policy which Germany had pursued towards Great Britain during more than a decade. Even in the best-informed circles of Germany the opinion was widely held that Great Britain could not find as many sailors as she required, probably because the British merchant marine was always short of British sailors and employed many thousands of Scandinavians, Lascars, etc. Only a short time before the War one of the most eminent and best-informed German professors told me that Great Britain experienced already the greatest difficulty in manning her fleet, and he looked at me with open-eyed astonishment when I told him that the British naval authorities could always obtain ten recruits for every single one they wanted.

Germany's anti-British policy was founded on a series of misconceptions and erroneous estimates. Herein lay the reason that her foreign policy was a gigantic mistake. The responsibility for the tension between England and Germany before the War lay not with the British Foreign Minister, but exclusively with the Germans themselves. *Quos Deus vult perdere, prius dementat.*

CHAPTER IX

THE RELATIONS BETWEEN GERMANY AND FRANCE

On the 1st and 2nd of September 1870 the great tragedy of Sedan was enacted. After a series of defeats, unparalleled in the world's history, France emerged from the ordeal of the "Terrible Year" crushed, humiliated, reduced, and impoverished—the very shadow of her former self. Since then France had played a very inconspicuous rôle on the stage of Europe. She had come to be considered by many Germans as a dying country, as a parochial concern.

So strongly was it assumed that *le feu sacré de la revanche* had died down that official and semi-official Germany thought the time had come for Franco-German co-operation. Guided by the German Emperor, official and semi-official Germany bestowed graceful compliments upon distinguished Frenchmen at every opportunity. French and German ships were seen side by side in Kiel Harbour at the occasion of the opening of the Baltic and North Sea Canal in 1895. In the Far East Russian, French, and German ships jointly demonstrated the Japanese out of Port Arthur, and M. E. Lockroy, France's ablest Minister of Marine, was allowed to minutely inspect the German Navy and the German Navy yards. France had, apparently, forgotten her defeats, the time for reconciliation seemed to have arrived. German writers began strongly to advocate a Franco-German political alliance and a Central-European Customs Union.

Later on Franco-German relations became somewhat overclouded. When, through the instrumentality of M.

[1] From the *Fortnightly Review*, September 1905.

Delcassé, France settled her differences with Great Britain, Italy, and Spain, and made an attempt to have again a policy of her own, the German Emperor intervened and forbade the execution of the Morocco bargain, which had been concluded between France and those Powers which could claim a special interest in Moroccan affairs. How serious and threatening the Morocco incident of 1905 was is apparent from the steps towards the mobilisation of her army which were taken by Germany at the time. As the German exports to Morocco amounted then, on an average, to a paltry £90,000 per annum, it was clear that the defence of Germany's "commercial interests" was merely a pretext for Germany's action in Morocco. Her aim in creating the Moroccan crisis was not to foster Germany's exports to Morocco, but to detach France from Great Britain, and to attach her to Germany.

French policy, although apparently most erratic and unstable of purpose, has, through centuries, constantly pursued the same aim. During centuries France has fought for two objects—for the preservation of the Balance of Power in Europe and for the possession of the Rhine frontier. To obtain these ends France has successively made war against the strongest Continental States which threatened to enslave the Continent and ultimately to engulf France. From the time, four centuries ago, when she opposed Charles V., the mightiest monarch of Christendom, who ruled over Austria, Germany, the Netherlands, and Spain, down to the present time, France has been the champion of liberty on the Continent of Europe. When Charles V. ruled almost the whole Continent, Christian France allied herself with Turkey, the abhorred Infidel Power, who was considered to stand outside the pale of the *comitas gentium*, rightly thinking self-preservation the first law of political ethics and the first duty to herself. History repeats itself. When Germany had crushed France and when Bismarck had succeeded in raising all the Powers of Western Europe against France and in isolating her, France turned to Russia for support, notwithstanding the incom-

patible differences which existed between the Western Republic and the Eastern autocracy, differences which made truly cordial relations impossible between them.

During four centuries France and Germany have fought one another for supremacy in Europe. As long as Austria was the strongest State in Germany, France supported Austria's German enemies against her. Thus it was that France, up to 1866, encouraged Prussia to aggrandise herself at Austria's cost, and that Bismarck, in crushing Austria, received Napoleon's sympathy and support.

Since Bismarck's advent to power, or during about half a century, France had been the dupe of Prusso-Germany's policy. Napoleon III. received no gratitude for supporting Prussia against Austria. On the contrary, even at the time when Napoleon was doing a priceless service to Bismarck by supporting Prussia against Austria, Bismarck contemplated ruining France, and building up Germany's unity on the ruins of France. A fortnight before the outbreak of the Austro-Prussian War of 1866, when Austro-Prussian relations were strained to breaking-point, Bismarck sent General Von Gabelenz to the Austrian Emperor in Vienna, and proposed to the Emperor that peace might be preserved among the Germanic nations by making a common onslaught on France, conquering Alsace, and creating a Greater Germany at the end of a victorious campaign. Thus the Prusso-Austrian differences were to be settled at the cost of France at the very moment when France was lending Bismarck her support in his anti-Austrian policy. Only through Austria's hesitation was France saved from destruction in 1866, but she became the victim of Bismarck's machinations four years later.

In order to keep France in good humour during the Austro-Prussian War, Bismarck verbally promised France the Rhine as a reward for her support, but when France wished to have this promise given in writing, Bismarck skilfully drew out negotiations and delayed and procrastinated during the critical period of the war, until France's support had become superfluous and events had brought

peace in sight. Before the conclusion of peace, France, who began to fear that Bismarck was playing her false, pressed for the territorial compensation which Bismarck had held in view, but her demands were met with derision, and the intimation that, in case of need, Bismarck would not hesitate to make peace at any price with Austria, and induce her to march together with Prussia against France. In that case Austria and Prussia would aggrandise themselves at the expense of France. As a considerable part of the French Army was fighting in Mexico at that time, Napoleon was unable to prevent the undue strengthening of Prussia, and it became clear that the historic struggle for supremacy between France and Germany would soon have to be renewed.

Since 1866 Bismarck had skilfully increased the bitterness which France, after having been deceived by Bismarck, naturally felt for Prussia, by inflicting a number of humiliations upon French diplomacy in the Luxemburg question, the Belgian question, etc., and by rousing the discontent of the excitable French masses against Prussia by means of bribed French newspapers. Bismarck required a Franco-German War, for only the enthusiasm created by such a war, which was likely to be immensely popular in Germany, where the remembrance of the first Napoleon was still kept alive, could make the unification of Germany possible. Since 1866 a Franco-Prussian War had become unavoidable, but French diplomacy was unskilful enough to walk into the Spanish trap which Bismarck skilfully had baited, and declared war against Prussia upon a pretext which, in the eyes of the world, put France in the wrong. The mistake of France's diplomacy was Bismarck's opportunity. On the ruins of France, and in accordance with Bismarck's programme, a united Germany was founded, whose main object it was proclaimed to be to resist for all time the wanton aggression of Germany's hereditary enemy. The unity of Germany was cemented with French blood, and Thiers spoke truly when he said to Bismarck at Versailles, "*C'est nous qui avons fait l'union de l'Allemagne.*"

By 1914 France had of course recovered from the enormous losses which the war had caused. Nevertheless, it had left indelible traces upon the country. The enormous wastage of national capital and the enormously increased National Debt of the country, together with the necessity for France to re-create her army on the largest scale, and to maintain it, notwithstanding her shrunken resources in men and money, had made necessary a most oppressive taxation, which could be met only by the most rigid economy on the part of all individual taxpayers. Hence the Franco-German War led to a falling-off in the birth-rate of France, which was much smaller after the war than it had been before. It cannot be doubted that the stationariness of the population of France was greatly, and perhaps chiefly, caused by the after-effects of that unfortunate war.

In view of the fact that the Franco-German War had inflicted decades of suffering upon all French families, it could hardly be expected that the masses of the French nation had become the friends and well-wishers of Germany. The small *rentiers* of France and the thrifty peasants, with all their love of peace and quiet, knew quite well that taxation in France would remain high as long as France was compelled to maintain her enormous army. Nevertheless, they were determined not to expose themselves to the possibility of another disastrous defeat. Hence high taxation was borne without grumbling in the silent hope that a time would arrive when, in consequence of a victory over Germany, France might again be able to lighten her oppressive armour.

The German newspapers spoke the truth when they asserted that the old spirit of *revanche* had died out in France. *Revanche* is not a policy but a sentiment, and France had learned, to her cost, how dangerous it is to be led by sentiment in matters political. It was not so much the aim of French policy to endeavour to weaken Germany as it was to strengthen France. France wished to live in peace and security with all her neighbours, Germany included, but at the same time she wished to be strong enough to

be able to hold her own in the world. Policy is, after all, based on force, and no policy can be successful which is not backed by sufficient military and naval strength. Therefore France had endeavoured to create and to maintain an army sufficiently strong to meet that of Germany, but she found her task from year to year more difficult, owing to the increasing discrepancy between her population and that of Germany, which is apparent from the following table :

	Population of Germany.	Population of France.
1872	41,230,000	36,103,000
1876	43,059,000	36,906,000
1881	45,428,000	37,672,000
1886	47,134,000	38,219,000
1891	49,762,000	38,343,000
1896	52,753,000	38,518,000
1901	56,862,000	38,962,000
1914 (estimated) . . .	67,000,000	39,600,000

In 1914 the time seemed not to be far distant when France would no longer be able to rival Germany in the number of her soldiers, that France would automatically sink to a secondary rank among the Great Powers of Europe. Time was fighting on Germany's side. Therefore it was to the interest of Germany to maintain peace with France as long as possible, while it was to the interest of France to utilise the earliest opportunity that might offer for crushing Germany.

Bismarck did not believe that the Peace of Frankfort would be a lasting one. He frequently foretold a renewal of the struggle, should opportunity favour France. For instance, he said in the Reichstag, on the 11th of January 1887 :

" Has there ever been a French minority which could venture publicly and unconditionally to say : We renounce regaining Alsace-Lorraine. We shall not make war for Alsace-Lorraine, and we accept the Peace of Frankfort in the same spirit in which we accepted the Peace of Paris in 1815 ? Is there a ministry in Paris which would have the courage to make such a declaration ? Why is there no such

ministry ? For the French have hitherto not lacked courage. No such ministry exists, because such a policy is opposed to public sentiment in France. France is like an engine which is filled with steam up to the point of explosion, and a spark, a clumsy movement of the hand, may suffice to cause an explosion, to bring on war. However, the fire is so carefully tended and nursed that it seems at first sight not likely that it will ever be used for causing a conflagration in the neighbouring country.

"If you study French history, you will find that the most important decisions have been taken in France not by the will of the people, but by the will of an energetic minority. Those people in France who contemplate war with Germany at present only prepare everything in order to be able to commence such a war with the maximum of force. Their task is to keep alive *le feu sacré de la revanche*, a task which Gambetta defined in the motto: '*Ne parlez jamais de la guerre, mais pensez-y toujours*,' and that is to-day still the attitude of France. French people do not speak of the possibility of an aggressive war against Germany, but only of the fear of being attacked by Germany.

"France will probably attack us as soon as she has reason to think that she is stronger than we are. As soon as France believes that she can defeat Germany, war with Germany is, I think, a certainty. The conviction that France is stronger than Germany may arise from the alliances which France may be able to conclude. I do not believe that such alliances will be concluded by France, and it is the task of German diplomacy either to prevent the conclusion of such alliances, or to counterbalance such alliances with counter-alliances."

Convinced that France would seek to revenge her defeat, Bismarck endeavoured to ruin her by severe conditions of peace. Although the Franco-German War had cost Germany only about £60,000,000, he exacted about £250,000,000 from the country, and was greatly disappointed that France easily paid that sum and recovered rapidly. Fearing France's revenge, Germany contemplated in 1875 an attack upon France, and in February of that year Herr von Radowitz was sent to Russia to sound the Czar and to find out whether Russia would remain neutral in the event

of the struggle between France and Germany being renewed. Happily for France, Germany's design miscarried, owing to the energetic opposition of Great Britain and Russia.

Finding himself foiled in his design to ruin France before she had recovered from her defeat, Bismarck strove to isolate France, being of opinion, as he said in his Memoirs, that France would certainly aid Russia if a collision should take place between that country and Germany. Therefore he wrote, on the 20th of December 1872, to Count Arnim, the German Ambassador in Paris : " We do not want to be disturbed by France, but if France does not intend to keep the peace we must prevent her finding allies." With this object in view, Bismarck skilfully isolated France by bringing her into collision with Italy, Spain, and Great Britain. As long as Bismarck was in power the foreign policy of France was directed from Berlin, and France had not a friend, not a champion, in the wide world. She was almost an outcast among the nations.

Bismarck carefully watched France's relations with foreign countries, and as soon as he thought that France was trying to pursue a policy of her own without consulting Berlin, and to improve her relations with a foreign country, he raised the spectre of war. In 1887, for instance, the Goblet Ministry was trying to settle the Egyptian question, and to arrive at an understanding with Great Britain. However, before France was able to come to the desired arrangement, Bismarck used the ridiculous Schnäbele incident on the Franco-German frontier for a violent war-agitation, compared with which the Morocco incident was child's-play. France dropped the contemplated arrangement with Great Britain, and on the 7th of May 1887 M. Goblet said at Havre :

" For fifteen years we have been asking the country each year for £40,000,000, and now, when the country has been smitten on the one cheek, we can only advise her to turn the other cheek to the smiter."

Soon after Bismarck had been dismissed by William II. France succeeded in concluding an alliance with Russia.

Its conclusion was taken very philosophically at Berlin, for such an event was considered to be inevitable in view of the friction which had taken place between Russia and Germany after William II. had come to the throne. Therefore German diplomacy concentrated its efforts upon keeping the Anglo-French differences alive, and tried to forestall France by previously coming to an understanding with England. At that time Germany's most valuable colonies, including Zanzibar, were exchanged against the rock of Heligoland, an exchange which was greeted with dismay by most Germans, for it was believed by them that that bargain was most unsatisfactory for Germany. Even in Great Britain people shook their heads at this exchange, the advantage of which to Germany could not be seen. Nevertheless, from the German point of view this exchange was a most excellent bargain, for France had been forestalled by it. Von Caprivi, the then Chancellor, did not even try to explain that Germany had received an adequate *quid pro quo* in giving up her best colonies, but simply stated in the Reichstag, in defending the exchange : " We meant, before all, to maintain our good understanding with Great Britain."

It was Bismarck's policy not only to isolate France by embroiling her with all her neighbours and by discrediting her everywhere, but also to weaken her financial and military power by encouraging her to waste her military and financial strength in unprofitable colonial adventures in every quarter of the world. France went to West Africa and to Tonkin at Bismarck's bidding, and she remained the tool of Germany until in the year 1898 M. Delcassé entered the French Foreign Office.

When M. Delcassé became Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs he found, with amazement, that the foreign policy of France was directed by Germany, and that, at the bidding of German statesmen, France had obediently embroiled herself with Italy over Tunis, with Spain over various questions, and with Great Britain over Egypt. Notwithstanding the fact that it was his first task to settle the thankless

Fashoda problem, M. Delcassé entered upon his duties with the firm determination to reconcile France with Italy and Spain, and especially with Great Britain, and no longer to oppose Great Britain in Germany's interests. In the beginning of November 1898, a few days after Colonel Marchand had been ordered back from Fashoda, M. Delcassé said in his study to a friend of mine : "I mean not to leave this fauteuil without having re-established good relations with Great Britain." Such a declaration required considerable moral courage at a time when Great Britain and France stood on the brink of war.

When Germany saw that France was slipping from her control, that France was trying to pursue a national policy, and that she succeeded in making friends with Great Britain, Italy, and Spain, she tried for a long time to regain control over the foreign policy of France by personal advances to individual Frenchmen, by flattering France, by urging that the interests of France and Germany were identical, and by persistently extolling the benefits and the necessity of a Franco-German alliance as the best guarantee for maintaining peace in Europe. However, notwithstanding Germany's advances, M. Delcassé remained passive and almost indifferent, and observed a cautious reserve towards Germany. Nevertheless, Germany continued her advances until the battle of Mukden had shown that the Russian Army was no longer a factor upon the support of which France could reckon in case of war with Germany. Then, and then only, came the Morocco crisis and Germany's threat of war !

At no time were Germany's advances to France more assiduous than when Germany was trying to raise a coalition against England. At the outbreak of the Boer War the whole German Press entreated France to join hands with Germany and to assist in humbling Great Britain to the dust. On 5th of October 1899, three days after the mobilisation of the Boer troops, an article appeared in *Die Grenzboten*, the leading journal of the semi-official press of Germany, in which it was said :

"All differences between France and Germany benefit only the nearly all-powerful Enemy of the World. As long as the French keep one eye fixed on Alsace-Lorraine, it is no good that they occasionally look at England with the other eye. Only when the strength of the German Fleet is commensurate with her sea interest will the French seek our friendship, instead of being humiliated by their hereditary enemy."

In this and numerous other articles France was entreated to crush England, her hereditary enemy, by joining a coalition of Continental Powers.

France was under no illusion as to Germany's feelings towards her. Silently she had borne a latent state of war for decades. The French were to be rewarded for their patient patriotism. Heroic sufferings had steeled the national character and created a race of strong and earnest men. Besides, decades of military endeavour had given France an army which was to be the instrument for re-creating the country and regaining what she had lost.

CHAPTER X

THE MOROCCO CRISIS OF 1911 [1]

On the 2nd of July 1911 the German papers published the following official announcement:

"The German firms interested in the south of Morocco have requested the Imperial Government, having regard to the dangers which threaten the important German interests in these parts in view of the possible spread of the disorders prevailing in other parts of Morocco, to take measures to protect the lives and property of Germans and German *protégés* in this region. The Imperial Government, with this object in view, thereupon decided to send His Majesty's ship *Panther*, which happened to be in the neighbourhood, to the harbour of Agadir, and apprised the Powers of the fact. The influential Moors of the district have been simultaneously informed that no sort of unfriendly intention towards Morocco or its inhabitants is associated with the appearance of the German warship in the harbour."

Thus ran the translation published in the *Times* of the 3rd of July of that year. Ostensibly the German Government sent the *Panther* to Agadir in the south of Morocco "to protect important German interests in these parts" and "to protect the life and property of Germans and German *protégés* in this region." Yet it was known to all who had studied Moroccan affairs that Germany had no important commercial interests in that country, and that no German lives were endangered in or near Agadir, which happens to be the best harbour on the Atlantic coast of

[1] From the *Fortnightly Review*, August 1911.

Morocco. However, the official communication carefully explained in its opening words that the warship was sent at the request of "the German firms interested in the south of Morocco." The onus of proof that German interests and German lives were actually threatened was therefore laid with skilful vagueness on unnamed, unenumerated, and unspecified German firms, which, for all one knew, had their seat in Germany, and which conceivably were previously asked by the Government to make a request for protection. By the wording of the *communiqué* the German Government had left open a loophole for escape. In case of need it could explain that "the German firms" had called for protection without sufficient cause, and that the ship would be withdrawn because, upon inquiry on the spot, it had been found that neither the property nor the lives of Germans and of German *protégés* in the south of Morocco were endangered.

In Bismarck's time German diplomacy was dramatic and vigorous. Under the direction of William II. it became melodramatic and futile. For a second time within a few years it interfered with menacing suddenness in Morocco, but once more the stage-managing had been defective, and the dispatch of the *Panther* was to prove as unprofitable, and as little creditable, to German diplomacy as was the Emperor's personal demonstration at Tangier on the 31st of March 1905, when he promised his support to the Sultan.

The Morocco crisis of 1905 almost led to war between France and Germany. Germany had actually begun mobilising her army when France bowed to the demonstration of force, giving Germany what is usually called a diplomatic victory. However, she lost nothing substantial by giving way, but Germany received in the following year a diplomatic defeat at Algeciras, whence she returned empty-handed, and she quietly withdrew for a time her loudly advertised claims upon Moroccan territory.

It must have been clear even to the most credulous, the most unsuspecting, and the most uncritical that in 1905 the German Emperor did not go to Tangier, and almost

make war upon France, for the love of the Sultan of Morocco, and that, in July 1911, Germany did not send the *Panther* to Agadir to protect German lives and property. German diplomacy had asserted from 1905 to 1911 that it was anxious to preserve the independence and the integrity of Morocco, and the open door for all nations, because of her important economic interests in that country. That was merely a diplomatic pretext, and it can scarcely be doubted that Germany desired to acquire Morocco, or at least the south of that country, and that she wished to defend its integrity and independence until she was ready and able to make it a colony of her own.

On the 19th of January 1912, in the course of a lawsuit for libel which the *Rheinisch-Westfälische Zeitung* brought against the *Grenzboten*, the editor of the former stated :

"I demand that Mr. Class, the president of the Pan-Germanic League, be called. At my wish he put himself in contact with the Foreign Secretary, Herr von Kiderlen-Wächter. The Foreign Secretary invited Mr. Class to meet him at the Hotel Pfälzer Hof in Mannheim, and there they have conferred for hours. The Foreign Secretary stated to Herr Class : 'I support the policy of partitioning Morocco. The Pan-Germanic demand is absolutely justified. You can rely upon it that we shall stick to Morocco, and that you will be greatly pleased with the German Morocco policy. I am as much a Pan-German as you are.' Some time afterwards Mr. Class called upon the Foreign Secretary, but, failing to find him in, met Mr. Zimmermann, the Under-Secretary. It was the day of the dispatch of the *Panther* to Agadir. Herr Zimmermann told Herr Class that he could give him some cheering news : 'You come just in time. At this moment the *Panther* appears before Agadir. We shall retain Agadir, and we intend to seize the whole district and not to give up anything. After all, we absolutely require settlement colonies for our excess of births. Take care that no claims for compensation are raised in the Press. We do not want compensations. We want Morocco. France wishes to offer us the Congo.'"

The foregoing extract, which is a careful translation, and which is taken from the report of the law-court proceedings

published in the *Tägliche Rundschau* of the 20th of January 1912, shows that, notwithstanding all official statements that Germany had never intended to seize Moroccan territory, statements which were made by the German Chancellor and the Foreign Secretary in December 1911, the German Government had actually intended to take a part of Morocco.

Germany's interests in Morocco, as her interests in Asia Minor, South Africa, and Southern Brazil, were not of yesterday. Many decades ago the most farseeing and patriotic Germans recognised that colonies in the temperate zone, able to receive the German surplus population, were the greatest need of their country. Animated by this conviction, many professors and other leaders of public opinion agitated for the creation of a large German fleet—the first ships of the German Navy were built in the 'forties of the last century with moneys raised by voluntary private subscriptions ; others created important and purely German settlements in Santa Catherina, in Rio Grande do Sul, in the Cape Colony, and in Natal ; others explored, with or without Government assistance, uncivilised countries which they believed to be suitable for German colonisation and which had not yet been appropriated by the European Powers. Morocco was one of these, and it was explored in the 'sixties of last century by the Germans, Gerhard Rohlfs and von Maltzan, in the 'seventies by Noll, von Fritsch, Rein, and Koch, in the 'eighties by Lenz and Quedenfeld, and Professor Theobald Fischer travelled through that country in 1888, 1899, and 1901. Professor Fischer was considered to be the greatest German authority on that country.

Prusso-Germany was the first country which introduced a system of compulsory and national education directed by the State. The education of the German citizen by the State did not end with the time when the child left school. It was continued during the rest of his or her life. Prominent among the great German State institutions for the education of the adult were the semi-official

Press and the semi-official literature in the form of books, the teachings of which were reinforced by the activity of a host of Government inspired professorial and non-professorial lecturers, writers, and clergymen, who were let loose whenever their assistance was required. The larger half of the German Press of all parties, the Socialist papers excepted, was constantly inspired by the Government. Thus public opinion was created and constantly educated, and the more serious and thoughtful minds were provided with information by weighty semi-official books crammed with facts and arguments which were written, or inspired, by the Government departments. They served the same purpose as the "handbooks for speakers" and "campaign books" which are issued by the British party organisations at election time. In 1904–1905 a large portion of the semi-official Press preached, in consequence of direct inspiration from the chief of the German Foreign Office, the doctrine that Germany required the south of Morocco, and in 1911 one read again in papers which stood under Government influence demands for territorial "compensation" in Morocco. The prevailing official view of the value of Morocco to Germany may best be gauged from the very lengthy paper, "Morocco and its Relations to the German National Economy," published in the semi-official German Naval Year Book, *Nauticus*, for 1909, and I would quote from it the following important passages in their proper sequence :

"Morocco is a kind of African peninsula, being isolated by the sea and separated from the African continent by vast mountains. The most important trade routes along the West Coast of Africa, from Europe to South America, and towards the future Panama Canal, pass its coast. The country occupies the corner of Africa, and the corner position of a continent is always a favourable world-strategical factor. By its geographical and world-strategical position Morocco is exceedingly favoured for commerce and war. Only lately, when the traffic on the trade routes through the Mediterranean along the northern shore, and through the Atlantic along the western shore, of

Morocco has become so active, the country has become important. It lies to-day in the centre of the world's traffic.

"Morocco is separated from the African continent by high mountains, which separate it at the same time from the desert. These give it a favourable climate by catching the moisture which the wind brings from the Atlantic. Morocco slopes from the mountain ranges in the interior towards the Atlantic. Therefore the mountains act as an enormous reservoir to the lower-lying lands. The province of Sus is perhaps the most richly endowed part of Morocco. One can scarcely form an exaggerated idea of the fruitfulness of a large part of the plains near the Atlantic coast. The rainfall is small, but owing to the abundance of water in the sub-soil, only a few feet below the ground, irrigation can easily and cheaply be provided which would make cotton-growing possible.

"Marakesh, like Milan and Munich, is, owing to its position, a natural railway centre. Although animals are raised in the most primitive fashion, and although the prohibition to export them kills all enterprise, Morocco possesses, according to a French official expert, 40,000,000 sheep, 11,000,000 goats, from 5,000,000 to 6,000,000 cattle, 4,000,000 donkeys and mules, and 600,000 horses. However, these estimates are probably too large. Morocco is rich in minerals, especially in iron, copper, antimony, and salt. Mining used to flourish especially in the province of Sus. Morocco has about 8,000,000 inhabitants, and is able to maintain perhaps 40,000,000 people. In that healthy country, which is nearly quite free from malaria, the living conditions for European emigrants are far more favourable than in Algeria. Morocco, situated within sight of Europe, and occupying an exceedingly important world-strategical position, possesses vast natural resources which have not yet been touched. Its conditions are mediæval, but in view of the proximity of the over-populated States of Europe which require expansion, its exclusiveness cannot be preserved much longer. Morocco may become the granary and the ranch of Europe, and may provide it with fruit, oil, cotton, and ore. At present it has not a single mile of road or of railroad, and not a single bridge. Its waterfalls will provide power. Morocco is an important field for industrial activity."

It will be noticed that the semi-official year book considered in the first place the great strategical value of Morocco, and only in the second place its great economic possibilities. It is also very interesting that it described the province of Sus as the richest part of Morocco for both agriculture and mining, and recognised in Marakesh its natural railway centre. Now, Agadir was not only the best harbour on the west coast, with 47 feet of water within 30 yards of the shore, but it was also not far from Marakesh, and was by far the best entrance gate to the province of Sus and to the Soudan. Owing to the depth and sheltered position of its harbour and to its geographical situation, Agadir was far more important than Mogador, which had 24,000 inhabitants. The latter had become a large port only because the Moroccan Government closed the port of Agadir in order to punish its citizens for a revolt. Monsieur de Segonzac, a leading French authority on Morocco, wrote in his book, *Voyage au Maroc*, published in 1903, the year before the German Government had first taken an active interest in Morocco :

"Agadir is believed to be the best harbour on the Moroccan coast. It is an open roadstead without obstacles, which is sheltered against the breakers and the wind from the open sea. I have been told that thirty metres from the coast the water is fifteen metres deep. On the day when the harbour of Agadir will be opened to European commerce Mogador will cease to exist."

The greatest German authority on Morocco, Professor Fischer, who had devoted more than thirty years to the study of that country, and who had explored it on three journeys, saw, like the semi-official German Naval Year Book, in the land of the Moors a world-strategical position of the very greatest importance. He was naturally less reserved in his utterances than the Year Book, which was written throughout in the ponderous, stodgy, and impersonal style of official Germany, and I would quote from some of his writings the following most interesting opinions :

"Morocco occupies to-day a position of the very greatest importance. The most important trade routes pass by its coast: through the Mediterranean, to the rapidly developing West Coast of Africa, to Central America with the Panama Canal, towards South America, which is rapidly becoming settled and which already is of the greatest importance for the food supply of Europe. The importance of the Moroccan harbours lies in their position, for thence many a vital nerve of the nations of Europe may be cut through.—(*Die Seehäfen von Marokko.*)

"Morocco lies on the most important route of the world's trade. It takes part in commanding that route, and its ports on the Atlantic can become important bases for peaceful and warlike enterprises on the West Coast of Africa and towards Central and South America.—(*Geog. Zeitschrift*, 1907.)

"In the hands of a European Power able to develop its rich resources, Morocco may become a source of strength of the first importance, able to cause a change in the balance of power in Europe. It is strange that Germany has no political interests in Morocco. Our position as a world Power and a commercial Power would be endangered should Morocco fall into the hands of France. It is Germany's task to maintain Morocco's independence. But should an alteration of the map become inevitable, Germany must have its part: El Haus and Sus. Our interests at the Straits of Gibraltar are guarded by the jealousies of France and Great Britain.—(*Geog. Zeitschrift*, 1903.)

"*After thirty years' occupation with Moroccan affairs, and after three journeys through that country, I have arrived at the conviction that the world-political position of Morocco is so great that that State which succeeds in taking it will, through its possession, receive such an enormous increase in power that all other States, especially Great Britain, Spain, and Germany, will feel it as an unbearable hardship.*—(*Die Seehäfen von Marokko.*)"

The italics were in the original.

Morocco looks small on the map, but it is, as the following figures show, a large country:

Morocco	219,000	square miles.
Algeria (limits of 1901)	184,474	,,
Tunis	45,779	,,
Germany in 1914	208,780	,,
United Kingdom	121,391	,,

Morocco was almost as large as Algeria and Tunis combined, and was larger than Imperial Germany. Its superior size and climate, its vast agricultural and mineral resources, and its superior geographical and strategical position make it infinitely more valuable than Algeria. Besides, it is a natural fortress. Its fruitful plains and uplands along the Atlantic, which evoked the enthusiasm of Pomponius Mela 1900 years ago, are sheltered towards the north and west by the sea, and towards the east and south by the enormous ranges of the Atlas Mountains, the peaks of which rise up to 13,000 feet, and by the Sahara. Thus thinly-populated Morocco is an ideal country both for European settlement and for defence. Its world-strategical position, upon which the German Navy Year Book and Professor Fischer rightly dwelt, was very great, and its possession would have been of particular value to Germany, especially if she should wish to strike at France, Great Britain, or the United States. In 1914 the German Fleet was tied to the North Sea through the lack of coaling stations abroad. Agadir, or some other port on the west coast of Morocco, which could be reached in about a week by ships steaming from Wilhelmshaven round the north of Scotland, would have been a very convenient half-way house on the way to the West Indies and Panama in case of a German-American war; it would have been the best possible base for cruisers, or liners converted into cruisers, told off to prey on British shipping, in case of an Anglo-German war; it would have been an ideal position in case of a Franco-German war, or of Franco-German friction, by enabling Germany to cause serious trouble in Algeria. Algeria had an army of occupation of 75,000 men, of whom 43,000 were Europeans. France intended, in case of a great European war, to bring over from Africa her European troops and some coloured troops as well, replacing the Algerian garrison with West African soldiers. The spirit of revolt was not yet dead in Algeria. The Germans in Morocco could have caused countless risings in the neighbouring Algeria in peace-time by encouraging the disaffected, and could possibly have

overthrown the French mobilisation scheme in Africa at the moment of the outbreak of war by bringing about a great revolt. As a matter of fact, a German settlement in Morocco would have made Algeria untenable for France. The assiduous advances which Germany made to the Moors soon after the Franco-German War were probably inspired by the wish of causing trouble to France in Algeria if the war should be renewed.

I concluded an article, which I contributed to the *Nineteenth Century and After* in August 1911, with the following emphatic warning:

"In view of the great strategical importance of Morocco, its independence is no doubt very desirable for the peace of the world. On the 31st of March 1905 the German Emperor solemnly proclaimed at Tangiers: 'For Germany the sovereignty of the Sultan of Morocco and the independence of his country are beyond doubt. I shall therefore always be ready to support these.' Great Britain can unreservedly endorse that unselfish policy, and will no doubt assist Germany in preserving Morocco's independence against all comers. If, however, German diplomacy should have changed its mind since 1905, and if it should have arrived at the conviction that Morocco is not fit for self-government, and that it should henceforth be governed by Europeans under some scheme of partition, it seems perhaps fairest that Spain should receive the northern half and France the southern half of the country; for the historical, economical, political, and geographical claims of these two nations to the possession of Morocco are infinitely stronger than are those of Germany, whose claim to the south of Morocco consists chiefly in the display and assertion of her armed force. Morocco is of little value to Germany, except as a means of terrorising and weakening France, as a means of threatening several of the most important British trade routes and Gibraltar, and as a means of setting Spain against France and Great Britain. In German hands Morocco would be a permanent danger to the peace of the world, and it cannot be doubted that the peaceful nations of the world ought to oppose Germany's occupation of that country. Even her own allies may not care to be embroiled with their neighbours over Morocco. Besides, it seems very doubtful

whether the enlargement of the German dominion in Africa would be desirable on humanitarian grounds. German colonisation has been a failure because the Germans do not know how to deal with the natives. German colonisation has been distinguished by the brutal misdeeds of countless officers and officials. The shameless plundering of the natives in German South-west Africa drove the Hereros into a rebellion which was suppressed by the extermination of the men, women, and children, of whom many thousands were driven into the waterless desert and condemned to slow death by thirst and starvation.

" Germany has been trying to acquire Southern Morocco, and perhaps the French Congo as well, by methods which remind one of those employed by Louis XIV. of France. But Louis XIV. observed at least some appearance of legality in robbing the German Empire and the Spanish Netherlands of valuable territories in time of peace, by obtaining edicts justifying his violent proceedings by his Chambres de Réunion. Germany has gone farther than Louis XIV. Germany demanded the best part of Morocco and part of the French Congo as ' compensation ' without telling us what she required to be compensated for. That would apparently be explained only after the transfer had been made. German diplomacy has done an ill-service to the Empire. The position and prestige of a State, as of an individual, depend very largely on its reputation for honesty, straightforwardness, reliability, and fair-dealing. As a friend and admirer of Germany, I regret that her diplomacy has laid Germany open to the gravest suspicions, and has destroyed the belief in her peacefulness and all that has been done during the last few years for improving Anglo-German relations.

" War has been brought within the limits of vision. It is to be hoped that Germany will turn away from the very dangerous course upon which she has embarked, a course which in a very short time may bring her into a collision not only with France, but with several Great Powers; and as the Triple Alliance is believed to be a purely defensive alliance relating only to Europe, Germany may find herself deserted by her allies in the hour of trouble. Let us hope that the Morocco crisis can be explained away as the mistake of a single man. Let us hope that Herr von Kiderlen-Waechter will be replaced without delay. That will solve and explain the crisis, and the Morocco incident will

soon be forgotten. Persistence on the dangerous and unprecedented course which Germany is steering at the present moment may imperil Germany's future, and may cost the Emperor his throne. The German nation is intensely loyal and patriotic, but it would never forgive a monarch who had driven the nation into a disastrous war without adequate reason."

My forecast came true more than seven years after it had been made.

Germany's Morocco policy failed, both in 1905 and in 1911, through the clumsiness of her diplomacy and because the Powers recognised Germany's aim. Thus her intervention in Morocco was merely a step towards her downfall.

CHAPTER XI

EDUCATION AND MIS-EDUCATION IN GERMANY [1]

During more than forty years the Emperor Frederick's winged word, "The Prussian schoolmaster has won the battle of Sadowa," had been dinned into the ears of Englishmen. They were so often told that Germany owed her great political, and especially her still greater economic, success to her excellent education, that they set about to copy the educational system of Germany, although it was probably quite unsuitable for them. England and America were flooded with a constantly growing stream of books in praise of German education, but up to 1914 I failed to discover a single book on the failure of German education, although such a book was very urgently required. I intend in the following pages to point out some of the shortcomings as well as some of the very important characteristics and factors of German education which have hitherto escaped observation.

According to the latest statistics, Germany had before 1914 some 60,000 elementary State schools, with about 150,000 teachers, who instructed some 10,000,000 children; she had more than 1,000 higher schools, where about 20,000 teachers instructed more than 300,000 pupils, while at the numerous universities, polytechnics, and other technical high schools, about 6,000 professors and lecturers instructed some 100,000 students. If we include the professional private tutors we find that the army of German educationalists numbered about 300,000. These figures are truly astounding in their magnitude, and if "most educated" be

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synonymous with "best educated," the Germans should be the best-educated nation in the world. In fact, there are practically no uneducated people in Germany. Of the 260,000 recruits who in 1905 joined the German Army, only 82 men coming from the frontier districts, where, for obvious reasons, control is sometimes impossible, were unable to read and write. It may therefore be asserted that in Germany proper no uneducated people exist.

The genesis of the national educational system and of the educational policy of Germany is a curious one. The German school is by its history not a social but a political institution. To make the revolution against the Roman Catholic Church successful, Luther found it necessary to oppose the powerful organisation of the Church which directed the mind of the German masses with a national and popular organisation powerful enough to oppose the Almighty Church, and able to agitate among the masses and to propagate the Protestant idea. The spiritual guidance and direction of the Church of Rome and its world-embracing organisation could be opposed only by a machine able to control the national mind of Germany in the Protestant interest, and to deprive the Roman Church of its supporters in the country. Hence Luther strenuously advocated the introduction of a national and Protestant education. Education was not to benefit the few, but to embrace all. Thus, through the revolt of Luther, and the necessity of strengthening struggling Protestantism against the Roman Catholic Church, the idea of a national, democratic, and compulsory education arose, and was taken up by the Protestant princes of Germany, who, as a rule, had become Protestant in order to spoliate the wealthy Roman Catholic Church. The assertion that a wave of idealistic sentiment and of religious zeal created Protestantism in Germany, that it was a pure and purely democratic movement, and that the spirit of benevolence and of democracy created the German school, is a fable, for schools and serfdom existed side by side in Germany up to the nineteenth century. In fact, in Germany, and especially in Prussia, school and

serfdom, education and tyranny, went hand in hand, and education was used by the Government as a means for keeping the people in a state of subjection and of mental servitude.

Up to the thirteenth century, Prussia was inhabited by heathen savages, the ancient Prussians, who were extirpated by the knights of the Teutonic Order, to whom that savage country had been granted, and when they had desolated it by fire and sword, Prussia was colonised not only from all parts of Germany but from all parts of Europe. Germans, Frenchmen, Dutchmen, Swiss, Poles, etc., were attracted by the early rulers of Prussia, partly to people the desolate land, partly to work for their feudal masters, and some sort of compulsory national education was evidently necessary to unify all these incongruous elements, and to obviate the danger of the country falling to pieces. Besides, a common language was absolutely necessary in matters of administration. However, matters educational remained in a very chaotic state, until Frederick William I., one of the greatest rulers, and certainly the ablest and the most energetic administrator, of Prussia, resolved to convert the loosely-jointed, ill-organised, and promiscuously-peopled provinces of Prussia into a unified, firmly-welded centralised State. He meant to Germanise the people. Frederick William was a ruler who did not brook delay. In 1713, the very year in which he came to the throne, he issued an edict which aimed at compulsory education in Prussia, and as rapidly as the scanty funds at his disposal allowed it, schools were built, teachers procured or trained, and education extended. In Lithuania alone, 1,105 new schools were erected, in order to convert the Slav inhabitants of that country into German-speaking Prussians, industrious, useful, and loyal citizens, and obedient soldiers.

Frederick William's successor, Frederick the Great, vastly enlarged the territory of Prussia, adding to the country by his conquest of Silesia large districts inhabited by Austrians, and by the partition of Poland, of which Prussia received a considerable part, extensive provinces

peopled with Poles. Modern Germany, Prusso-Germany, was a country which had sprung by conquest from the smallest beginning from which ever a great State has arisen, and the different nationalities which had been conquered and joined together could not be kneaded into a homogeneous mass, and into a nation, except by compulsory education. Germany would have borne an aspect similar to that borne by Austria-Hungary, had not the rulers of Prussia vigorously Germanised their country by means of the schools and of compulsory education. The first twenty-three years of Frederick the Great's rule were years of war, but in 1763, the year in which the Seven Years' War, the struggle with Austria, and the great Prussian War period ended, he introduced the celebrated "Generallandschulrecht," the law of compulsory and general education for the whole of his dominions and all the multifarious nationalities dwelling in them.

The educational organisation of Germany was an absolutist machine, though at first sight it bears a strongly democratic appearance. In the character of Frederick the Great the will of the autocrat and the mind of the philosopher and democrat were curiously mingled. Though he treated his subjects like beasts of burden, he frequently declared that a king should be the first servant of the State. In matters educational we find the same contradiction. While some of the edicts on education issued by the philosopher-king breathed the most enlightened Liberalism—an example will be given in the course of this chapter—a "Cabinet Ordre" of the 7th of September 1779, issued by the king-autocrat, laid down that "the people in the country are only to learn a little reading and writing, for if they are taught too much they will run to the towns in order to become clerks, etc." Frederick the Great and his successors did not wish to spread enlightenment among the masses by means of the schools, but intended to educate the people to be dutiful subjects to their king, hard-working peasants and labourers satisfied with their station, and reliable and patriotic soldiers, ready to sacrifice their lives for their

country. For these reasons, the Prusso-German educational establishment always bore a distinctly military character, and its first and principal object was to teach and to enforce discipline, to nationalise the people, and to create a strong sense of patriotism and of servility among them. That the elementary schools of Germany with their 10,000,000 children were a most powerful, perhaps the most powerful, tool in the hands of the German Government, may be seen from the guiding regulations laid down in 1872 by Dr. Falk, the Prussian Minister of Education, for in them we read :

" The object of the Prussian elementary school has always been to educate the growing generation to become pious, patriotic men and women who are able by means of the general education and training they receive to fill an honourable position in civil society. In whatever way the relations of Church and State have been conceived, and whatever theological tendency was paramount at any period, the religious and moral education of youth has at all times been considered the foremost purpose of the schools, and never have the administrative authorities of the State wavered in pursuing the high ideal to sow the seeds of patriotic, religious, and moral sentiment in the children, so that they will become citizens whose inner worth can secure the welfare and preservation of the State.

" But side by side with this exalted ideal, the requirements of practical life have not been left out of sight. Children must learn at school how to perform duties, they are to be habituated to work, to take pleasure in their work, so as to become efficient workers. This has been the aim of popular education in Prussia since the earliest times, and to this day it is plainly understood by all administrative officers and teachers, and by the majority of parents, that it is the business of the elementary school not merely to teach reading, writing, and arithmetic, but to teach the citizens cheerfully to serve their God, their native country, and themselves."

The Sunday schools in Great Britain had recently some 8,000,000 scholars, while the Sunday schools of Germany had only some 800,000 scholars. These two figures indicate at a glance the fundamental difference between English and

German education. While the leading feature in English and American schools is piety, the teaching of religion and the training of the character of the young, the leading feature of the German elementary schools was, and always has been, the teaching of a militant patriotism and militarism. Moral and religious education was treated as a matter of secondary importance. Singing played a very large part in German education, and especially in elementary education, largely because singing assists splendidly in marching. Battles may be won by outmarching the enemy. Hence the very first songs which a German child learned were military songs, such as :

I had a faithful comrade once,
No better could there be,
The drum was beat, the charge was led,
Together to the strife we sped,
And he kept step with me.
A bullet came, etc., etc.

Dawn of day, dawn of day !
To death thou showest me the way,
For when the bugles loudly blow,
Full soon shall I be lying low,
With many a comrade true.
Etc., etc.

I have given all I am and have,
My heart, my head, my hand,
To you for which I like and love,
My dear old Fatherland.
Etc., etc.

The Chinese child learns spelling from the Confucian classics, the German child learned spelling from tales illustrating German military valour. While the English schools strive to elevate the child's character by instilling the civic virtues, the German schools strove almost exclusively to teach discipline and to arouse and to develop the military inclinations, or rather the spirit of Jingoism, giving little consideration to the training of character and practically none to the development of the civic virtues. The birthday of the Emperor and the anniversary of the battle of

Sedan were the two great school festivals, not only in the elementary schools but in the higher schools as well, and they were celebrated with patriotic songs, recitations, speeches, etc. The "Hereditary Enemy" played a very large part in the elementary history books of Germany. No wonder, then, that the principal, and almost the only, game of German school-children consisted in playing at soldiers or at Frenchmen and Germans, or at Boers and Englishmen. In Bismarck's words:

"The mighty influence which the schools exercise in the education of the nation consists in this—that the German child, when handed over to the teacher, is like a blank sheet of paper, and all that is written upon it during the course of elementary education is written with indelible ink, and will last through life. The soul of a child is like wax. Therefore he who directs the school directs the country's future."

From the earliest time the Prussian Government raised in the young an aggressive military patriotism. The German elementary school was a branch establishment of the German barracks.

In view of the rapid growth of the Social Democratic Party in Germany, particular stress was, during the last few decades, constantly laid upon the duty of the schools to combat the Social Democratic movement. In an order of the 1st of May 1889 William II. said:

"I have for a long time been occupied with the thought of making use of the schools in their various grades for combating the spread of Socialistic and Communist ideas. . . . The school must endeavour to create in the young the conviction that the teachings of Social Democracy contravene not only the Divine command and Christian morals, but are moreover impracticable."

However, the strenuous exertions of all the German schools to fight Socialism, by depicting it as being wicked, unpatriotic, and opposed to the Divine command, were perfectly fruitless.

The aim of the German elementary schools was, according to Dr. Falk, firstly, to promote patriotism; secondly, to foster religion and morality; thirdly, to fit the young for practical life. The tree is known by its fruit, and education by its results. We have seen that the German elementary schools largely failed in their first and principal aim. Let us now investigate the results of their religious, moral, and practical education.

There were two great religions in Imperial Germany. The Roman Catholics, who formed one-third of the population, were pious, but their religiousness was not due to the influence of the State schools but to that of their Church, as may be seen from the fact that the Protestants of Germany, who form two-thirds of the population, were not at all religious. Protestantism was the State religion of Prussia, but all the endeavours of the Government to make the people religious were in vain. Church-going was not even a social obligation in the Protestant parts of Germany, where churches were few. Berlin was, according to the complaint of the Emperor William, the capital worst provided with churches. Besides, the few Protestant churches in existence stood almost empty, if we deduct the soldiers and officers who had to attend.

Religiousness and morality ought to manifest themselves in action, not merely in church-going. The fact that there were on an average every year about 180,000 illegitimate births in Germany, while there were only about 50,000 illegitimate births in Great Britain, and the fact that there were every year about 12,000 suicides in Germany, as compared with only 3,000 suicides in Great Britain, seem to prove that the German schools ill-succeeded in fulfilling their second aim and object. Both Christianity and morality preach toleration. Yet toleration was in Germany conspicuous by its absence. Roman Catholics were ill-treated by Protestants, and Jews by both.

The third aim of the elementary schools of Germany was to prepare the young for practical life. As regards teaching, the German elementary schools compared favour-

ably with the British elementary schools, not in their completeness, but in the wise limitation of their programmes. The German elementary schools taught chiefly homely and necessary subjects, the elements of knowledge, while the English elementary schools, having more ambitious aims, strove to give to the child of the people a knowledge more for show than for practical use, a smattering of everything, but often not a sufficient knowledge of the most necessary things, such as writing and spelling. The German child learned a few necessary things fairly well, the English child learned many things ill, most of which were unnecessary, if not positively harmful. The German elementary schools educated the young to be successful workers in their station, the English elementary schools endeavoured to convert the children of the poor into ladies and gentlemen able to discuss all the ologies. While German peasant children were satisfied to follow the occupation of their fathers, English country children learned to hate the country, sneer at the rural occupations, and desert the country for town, largely in consequence of the townified and totally unsuitable primary education which they received. It is a misfortune that the town often legislates for the country and determines its education.

The German child learned in the primary school to obey, perhaps too slavishly to obey; English Board School education, erring in the opposite direction, gave the child too much liberty, often allowed it to disobey, to be unruly. German school-children were made to be orderly, punctual, courteous, clean; English Board School children were only too often allowed to be dirty, untidy, and rude to their teachers, and their teachers had hardly sufficient power to correct them when admonition had failed. The German teacher was an autocrat with a stick, who, it must be admitted, occasionally abused his authority and ill-treated the children; the English teacher was only too often a meek man or woman of sorrows, who was ill-treated by the children. Discipline was the characteristic of the German school, lawlessness that of the English school. As regards

order, discipline, and the sane limitation of learning, I think that the German elementary schools compared favourably with the English schools, but the German masses were quite as ignorant and as narrow-minded as the English masses, perhaps more so.

Unfortunately, English Board Schools have assumed more and more the character of charity schools, where charity is somewhat indiscriminately distributed to all applicants. Hence most parents who can afford to do so send their children to private schools, and the Board Schools have become the preserve of the children of the poor, and centres and breeding-places of social dissatisfaction and revolt. In Germany, on the other hand, the children of the rich and poor had to mingle as freely in all the schools as in the army. The cause of the difference between the English and the German educational system is obvious. In Great Britain the children of the well-to-do used in the pre-Board School times to go to private schools, and the children of the poor to charity schools. As the Board Schools were unfortunately evolved out of the old charity schools, the elementary schools of the English nation were born with the pauper stigma attached to them. Hence they are still charity schools in the eyes of many people, and it is to be feared that a too open-handed, and therefore unwise, philanthropy is strengthening that impression. In Germany, on the other hand, where compulsory education for all was suddenly introduced, so to say on the same day, all children had from the first to go to the schools which the Government had provided, especially as the German Government distinctly discountenanced the creation of private schools which would have infringed upon the education monopoly of the State. Numerous large private schools and church and chapel schools similar to those existing in England are unknown in Germany. While there were in Germany before the War 60,000 elementary State schools with 10,000,000 children, there were only 643 private elementary schools with 41,000 children. In other words, in Germany only one child out of every 250 went to a private school.

England has class schools and mass schools; Germany had practically only one kind of school—national schools. In England education of a class type, or, rather, education differentiating absolutely between classes and masses, tends to keep classes and masses asunder. In Germany education of a democratic type caused classes and masses to commingle.

The English Board School child receives his tuition, his books, and, if necessary, his meals, his boots, and his clothes gratis, and the child is thus encouraged to become a clamorous, rapacious, and unblushing sponger, relying on doles, not on work, for a living. Besides, things which one can get for nothing are not appreciated. Consequently English parents accept gratuitous education grumblingly, and they take often little interest in the training of their children. The German parents, on the other hand, have, as a rule, to pay for the tuition of their children, for their books, etc., and the free gift of meals, boots, and clothes to school-children is very little known. Consequently, the thrifty German parents mean to get full value for their money, and take an interest in their children's education. An English child can fairly easily avoid going to school by the flimsiest of excuses, and parents often connive at the avoidance of school. Therefore school attendance is very irregular, and little work is done. In Germany, a rigorous supervision and drastic and immediate punishment of parents, masters, and others responsible for lack of attendance causes avoidance of school attendance to be rare.

Education, as service in the army, is democratic in Germany, in so far as it is compulsory and equal for all. The children of rich and poor sit on the same bench. William II. was educated at the ordinary intermediate school of Cassel, sitting in the same room with the sons of professional men, petty tradesmen, and the like. While this indiscriminate mixing of the classes and masses in the elementary and intermediate schools may, and probably does, lower the tone in the upper ranks of German society, it certainly tends to raise the masses. The unwashed sons of

German artisans feel uncomfortable in their grime when looking at their better-cared-for schoolfellows, and learn to wash themselves even without compulsion, for example is better than precept, while dirty Board School children feel quite comfortable, if exclusively surrounded by their more or less uncleanly mates. Besides, this mingling of the classes urges the children of the poor to become better off by hard work and thrift, and kindles ambition in them at their most important period of life, while the English School Board child is only too apt to herd with the herd, to learn to be improvident, and to rely more on the bounty of the rich and of the local authorities, who generously provide for all, than on his own exertions. The ideal of the English middle-class is to become gentlemen—that is, to live a life of ease without work, and the ideal of the poor to live a life of ease at the cost of the community, while the ideal of the German middle-class and lower-class is to become rich by work. Thus education provides a powerful stimulus for national activity in Germany, whilst class education in England acts as an incentive to work as little as possible.

The ambition of the children of the German poor often causes them to be the best scholars, and the spirit of emulation compels the children of the rich, who otherwise might be lazy, relying on their fathers' wealth and their assured prospects, to work much more energetically than they would do in schools where they need compete only with their social equals. Owing to the great educational opportunities given to the German poor and to the ambition awakened in them to get on, many of the leading scientists, medical men, lawyers, Government officials, etc., of Germany have risen from the very lowest social stratum.

The mingling of the classes in the lower and the higher schools of Germany is due partly to the influence of Luther already referred to but chiefly to that of Napoleon I. When both the professional army and the caste system of Prussia were defeated on the fields of Jena and Auerstädt, it became clear to Prussian patriots that the era of national armies

and of a national organisation of the State had arrived, that the time of class rule, of the "Klassenstaat," had gone by. The "Tugendbund," the Moral and Scientific League of Virtue, which was created after the disasters of 1806, strove to regenerate and to lift up the humiliated country by elevating the masses. Stein, Hardenberg, Fichte, Niebuhr, and the two Humboldts wished to bind rich and poor, classes and masses together for the defence of the country. With this object in view they strove to give to all equal educational opportunities and an equal intellectual and educational stake in the country. Napoleon's motto, *La carrière ouverte aux talents*, was adopted by Prussia. Notwithstanding the reactionary tendencies of later times, equality in education, which had sprung from the disastrous war of 1806–7, remained a characteristic of the Prusso-German schools. Hence we do not find in Germany a desire to debar the children of the lower classes from a liberal education.

The secondary schools of Imperial Germany were in the main cramming establishments of the worst type, and they were considered by parents and children as a great but unavoidable evil. Professional careers required, as a rule, nine years' preparatory study at the Gymnasium which German boys enter when nine years old, and between the ninth and the eighteenth year German boys studying at the Gymnasia were exclusively occupied with cramming. The Gymnasium is the classical school of Germany, in which Latin and Greek form the nucleus of tuition, and in those schools the dead languages, as well as the modern ones, were taught in the most pitiful manner. Nothing in literature is more beautiful, and nothing can be more elevating and more beneficial for the development of the intellect and of taste, than the reading of the Greek and Latin classics either in the original or in translation ; but the Greek and Latin classics were not read but "translated," slowly dissected, and every fragment carefully examined under the microscope, by the unfortunate scholar under the direction of dry-as-dust philologists. A brilliant speech of Cicero or

Demosthenes, which must be read in a few hours in order to be appreciated, was slowly chewed, re-chewed, and again re-chewed during three months. The modern languages were taught in the same idiotic fashion, and even the masterpieces of German literature were not read and enjoyed, but pedantically pulled to pieces line by line and word by word, as if it were the aim of the German intermediate schools to convert the German nation into a race of philologists. Other subjects were similarly treated. History, for instance, was learned from handbooks which, in the smallest possible compass, gave the maximum of facts and dates, and in these no attempt was made to show the organic development of States and the causes and consequences of historical events. The German school-books of history were merely compendia of facts and dates, and were about as interesting as a railway time-table. During nine years, the unfortunate German boys were compelled to commit to memory an immense quantity of unconnected, unpalatable, and mostly useless information, presented in the most repelling form.

It may be that nine years of continual cramming improves the memory of the pupils, but it seems more likely that the memory suffers by being overtaxed. On the other hand, the harm done by constant cramming, which is merely undertaken for the object of passing an examination, is incalculable. Since no attempt was made to develop the independent thinking power of the scholars, the unfortunate pupils became learned automatons, and though they had some knowledge of Latin and Greek and French and various sciences, they were usually not able to write German correctly. The German newspapers and books were atrociously written. Since the examination with which the nine years' torture ended had to be passed to enable the scholar to attend the university and to become a professional man, the insane tyranny of the Gymnasium had to be borne. When at last freedom dawned for the martyr, the first act of those, who after nine years' weary and almost useless labour had passed the concluding examination, often was to make a bonfire of their books. A German who had passed

the Abiturienten Examen endeavoured, as a rule, to forget as rapidly as possible all the useless stuff which he had to learn during nine mis-spent years.

In order to show that the foregoing statements are not exaggerated I would give two German opinions in support of them. In the *Frankfurter Zeitung* of the 14th of December 1906, an article entitled "Education to Manliness" was published, in which we read :

"Our schools do not form the character. That is the complaint which, more or less clearly formulated, may be found in all the books which advocate the reform of our education. Our German schools turn men into machines, educate them to submissiveness, to cowardice, to pettiness and pedantry, to much that is unlovely and pernicious, and they fail to form strong-minded, self-conscious men. And the State requires nothing more than men, manly men. In short, our German schools spoil the character of the child and his intelligence by systematically shackling his mind, by cramming his brain, and by filling it with dead matter. Thus the thinking power is killed, individuality is destroyed, and the mental horizon and the development of moral sentiment are narrowed and repressed."

In the preface of his book, *Deutsche Schulerziehung*, Professor W. Rein, one of the leading educational authorities of Germany, said :

"It cannot be denied that our schools have achieved much. However, it was thought that the principal object of schools was to distribute knowledge so as to prepare youth for the labour of active life. Our schools were and are still in the main devoted to instilling knowledge, and in that they have done much, but they have neglected the formation of character.

"In this respect the good English schools are no doubt ahead of the German schools, because the former strive not only to increase knowledge but also to raise men of character, firmness, and energy ; and the history of England shows clearly to all those who have eyes to see what strong and energetic men who know what they are doing are able to achieve. Only a few German schools exist where work-

shops, playing-fields, school-gardens, common walks, and excursions break the monotony of the study of dead books.

"We require educators, not merely teachers. A teacher requires nothing but knowledge. An educator requires more."

The authorities responsible for the programme of the German Gymnasium probably thought that that institution was most admirably adapted for preparing the young intelligence for successful professional or administrative careers, but they might have been enlightened by the broad-minded instructions of Frederick the Great, addressed to the professors of the Civil and Military Academy for Young Gentlemen, in which the King said :

"The masters shall studiously endeavour not only to store the memories of the pupils with useful knowledge, but above all to create in them a certain agility of mind, which shall render them capable of applying themselves not to one study alone but to any that may be found expedient, in particular to the cultivation of their reason and to the forming of their judgment. To this end, it is necessary that the masters should accustom their pupils to form just and clear ideas of things."

Frederick the Great wished the young intelligence of the nation to be liberally instructed in political matters, for he wrote in the same Mémoire :

"The preceptor will confine himself to giving his pupils an idea of the rights of citizens, the rights of the people, the rights of the monarch, and of that which is called Law. He will not fail to impress upon their minds that Law, being destitute of any actual sanctity for enforcing its observance, is a vain phantom that sovereigns do not fail to display in their instructions and manifestoes, though they often violate its principles in their own conduct."

The broad-minded precepts of Frederick the Great were utterly forgotten. A highly-educated young German, who had spent twelve years at school, had as a rule not sufficient knowledge of the political affairs of his country to be able

to read the newspaper with profit, and he had, as a rule, no knowledge whatever of his rights.

Germany had no less than 23 universities, at which almost 3,000 professors and lecturers taught about 66,000 students. The number of the university students in Germany has been increasing at a most remarkable rate. In 1870–1, there were 12,256 university students in Germany ; in 1911, 66,358 were counted in that country. In the short space of forty years the number of students in the German universities had more than quintupled. However, it may be doubted whether it is a matter for congratulation that the German universities have been turning out an ever-growing army of unemployed doctors, lawyers, theologians, and teachers, who, by the pressure of their competition, have lowered the status of all professions and formed a huge learned, and therefore the more dangerous, proletariat. Although the German universities were leading in various directions, they were scarcely superior to the high schools of Great Britain in direct utility. I venture to affirm that the average British doctor, lawyer, clergyman, and schoolmaster is distinctly superior to his German colleague. The superiority of the German universities, which was very great in the time when university teaching in Great Britain was at its lowest ebb, is a thing of the past. The chief effect of the activity of the German universities in creating a huge proletariat of unemployed professional men is that the output of books, mostly worthless, has enormously increased. During the last thirty years the number of new books published in Germany has in round figures increased from about 10,000 to 30,000 per year.

Although in 1914 Germany was no longer a model to Great Britain in elementary, intermediate, and university education, she was no doubt far ahead of England in technical education. Therefore the German technical high schools were far more popular with foreign students than the German universities. Before the War, of the students at the polytechnica, 20 per cent. were foreigners ; of the students at the forestry academies, 30 per cent. were foreigners ; of

the students at the mining academies, almost 40 per cent. were foreigners ; of the students at the universities, only 8 per cent. were foreigners. However, the efficiency of technical education in Germany has been very much exaggerated. German technical education, like German general education, was rather extensive than intensive, rather showy than practical and thorough, and in not a few instances its efforts were misdirected. For instance, enormous exertions were made to advance architecture and the building trade, and no expenses were spared, but the results achieved were the reverse of satisfactory. The design of the public and private buildings which during the last decade or two were erected in Germany was as a rule laboured, unpleasing, or ugly, and the inner arrangements were often unpractical. The new Reichstag is a case in point. The numerous pretentious but ugly monuments erected in Berlin and elsewhere also testify to the fact that schools may give knowledge but cannot give ability. There is a German proverb, *Je gelehrter desto verkehrter*, "The greatest fool is a learned fool." There is much truth in that saying.

Germany had a huge number of technical schools of every grade. There were technical schools for apprentices, for artisans, for foremen, for managers, for directors of industrial establishments, for merchants and bankers, etc., and every day additional technical schools were created. Besides, itinerant instructors visited the villages, which were too small to have technical schools of their own. In many instances technical education was compulsory. The thing was being overdone. Felisch wrote, "We pay for our greater theoretical knowledge with diminished practical ability," and Von Steinbeis complained, "Theoretical education has been given such a preponderance that even in our smallest workshops the pedantic spirit of the school penetrates the air, a spirit which is not exactly conducive to quick and efficient work, and which is absent in countries which have arrived at a higher stage of industrial development than Germany." Carl Roscher, speaking of the learned proletariat issuing from the Technical High Schools,

complained about the insufficient supply of practical workers of the better class, and was of opinion that, "compared with England and the United States, the education of our young engineers at the Technical High Schools costs too much money and too much time." In a lengthy report on German technical education, published in 1902 by the United States Commissioner of Labour, we read with regard to the German Technical High Schools, "The education here received often exceeds the real needs of many branches of industry. Hence there may result a loss of time which could have been devoted to obtaining practical skill."

Many similar opinions given by high authorities on technical education could be quoted, which show that Charlottenburg and the other Technical High Schools of Germany, at which an army of more than 12,000 students were trained, were not an unmixed blessing. It is not without cause that the best engineers in the world are the practically trained English and American engineers, although their theoretical knowledge may be small, if compared with that of their inferior German competitors. It can also not be admitted that the industrial success of Germany has been due to the general education of the masses of industrial workers. The fact that practically every man in Germany can read and write had little if anything to do with the progress of that country's industries. The Belgian industries were comparatively more flourishing than those of Germany; yet in Belgium 10 per cent. of the recruits were unable to write. It should also not be forgotten that Great Britain had the best workmen in the world at the time when her workers were practically uneducated.

German education had not a few excellent points, but in many respects it was exceedingly unsatisfactory. The chief practical value of the German schools consisted, in my opinion, not in the knowledge disseminated, but in the discipline instilled. English education, and especially English primary education, is apt to make men lazy and women flighty. German education, on the other hand, teaches the young to work, to obey, and before all to obey

the authorities. German education, both civil and military, had, by its teaching of discipline, created a docile, perhaps a too docile, population of willing workers, who were easily led. Bagehot wrote: "The natural impulse of the English people is to resist authority." In Germany no similar spirit of instinctive and unreasoning resistance has been noticeable. Therefore national organisation and national co-operation in matters political and economic could easily be established in that country. It cannot too often and too loudly be asserted that Imperial Germany became great and powerful not through her education, but through her discipline. National co-operation, the co-ordination of all the national energies, is a mighty force, but co-ordination is impossible without subordination. Unfortunately the spirit of subordination seems to be incompatible with the spirit of Democracy. However, while individualism may create disorder, exaggerated drill is apt to produce in a nation an abject docility and servility which may ruin it.

Germany owed her political and economic success certainly not to the book knowledge which her citizens received in her schools, for the German schools, like all other schools, merely turned out a mob of semi-educated mediocrities possessed of an overworked and tortured memory and of an under-developed or an undeveloped intelligence. Germany, with all her schools and universities, and with her army of 300,000 teachers, was a far less intelligent and far less cultured nation than the British nation. The general intelligence and culture of a nation may be measured by the Press, which reflects the national mind. Now I think that no educated German will contradict me if I state that the whole Press of Germany—dailies, weeklies, monthlies—was not only vastly inferior to the British Press, but was quite unworthy of the intelligence of a cultured nation.

The foregoing pages, which were written in 1906, show that German education has been much overvalued and much misunderstood in Great Britain, and it seems to be a dangerous experiment to model British education on the more unsatisfactory part of German education, the

dissemination of knowledge. After all, great national institutions, such as Parliament, civil service, army, and schools, cannot mechanically be copied from other nations, because such institutions are not dead things, but living organisms which have slowly grown up from a deep historical and national foundation. National education and national armies must before all be national. They must be in accordance not only with the peculiar requirements of the country, but also with the peculiar character and spirit of its inhabitants. Those who wish to introduce the German educational system into Great Britain can make it a success only if they begin by changing the character of Englishmen.

CHAPTER XII

THE FISCAL POLICY OF GERMANY AND ITS RESULTS [1]

THE close of the Napoleonic wars left Germany devastated, impoverished, and exhausted ; her commerce and her industries were destroyed. While the whole Continent had been ravaged and ruined by incessant wars and hostile invasions, British industries had flourished and prospered in internal peace. After the Napoleonic wars the Continent remained utterly exhausted for a long time ; its industries were shattered, its wealth had disappeared, and during the slow progress of its recuperation Great Britain conquered the commerce and industries of the world.

Towards the middle of the nineteenth century, Great Britain was the merchant, manufacturer, carrier, banker, and engineer of the world. She ruled supreme in the realm of business. Two-thirds of the world's shipping flew the British flag, two-thirds of the coal produced in the world was British ; Great Britain had more miles of railway than the whole Continent, and produced more cotton goods and more iron than all the countries of the world combined. Her coal mines were considered inexhaustible, and the coal possessed by other nations was believed to be of such inferior quality as to be almost useless for manufacturing purposes. She had practically the manufacturing monopoly of the world. The great German economist Friedrich List wrote in his *Zollvereinsblatt* : " England is a world in itself, a world which is superior to the whole rest of the world in power and wealth."

Many British economists and merchants thought that

[1] From the *Nineteenth Century and After*, August 1903.

England's economic position was overwhelmingly strong and unassailable, that it would be impossible for other nations to compete with her in neutral markets or to protect with tariffs their own manufactures against the invasion of the British industries. During the reign of these intoxicating ideas of Great Britain's irresistible economic power, Cobden proclaimed that "Great Britain is, and always will remain, the workshop of the world." Great Britain threw away her fiscal weapons, opened her doors wide to all nations, and introduced Free Trade.

While Great Britain was the undisputed mistress of the world's trade, industry, finance, and shipping, Germany was a poor agricultural country. She had been impoverished by her constant wars. She had neither colonies nor good coal, nor shipping, nor even a rich soil nor a climate favourable to agriculture. She was divided into a number of petty States which were jealous of one another, and which hampered one another's progress. Communications in the interior were bad, and her internal trade was obstructed and undeveloped. Besides, she was burdened by militarism, and she possessed only one good harbour. According to the forecast of the British free traders, Germany was predestined to remain a poor agricultural country, exactly as Great Britain was predestined to remain a rich industrial nation.

At that time arose in Germany Friedrich List, a writer on political economy and a convinced believer in Protection. He had travelled and seen the world, and had lived a long time in England and the United States. Consequently he spoke with greater practical knowledge on international affairs than the majority of political economists. His principal work, *The National System of Political Economy*, was published in 1840, and created some stir at the time. Like Cobden's doctrine of Free Trade, List's system of national Protection was hailed with enthusiasm by the business men of his country. It was viewed by the German Governments with suspicion and dislike. Embittered and disappointed by the lack of official appreciation and by the

persecution of the German Governments, List shot himself in 1846. After his death his system rapidly became as authoritative for German economic policy as the system of Adam Smith was for Great Britain. It became the text-book of the German statesmen. Consequently it will be interesting to consider some of List's more important views.

At the time when Friedrich List wrote, Great Britain was wealthy and powerful, while Germany was poor and weak. List endeavoured to show how Great Britain had become wealthy, and how Germany also might acquire wealth, profiting from Great Britain's example. After investigating the economic history of England, he summed up the result of his inquiry as follows:

"The English, by a system of restrictions, privileges, and encouragements, have succeeded in transplanting on to their native soil the wealth, the talents, and the spirit of enterprise of foreigners. This policy was pursued with greater or lesser, with speedier or more tardy, success just in proportion as the measures adopted were more or less judiciously adapted to the object in view, and applied and pursued with more or less energy and perseverance.

"It is true that for the increase in her power and in her productive capacity England is indebted not solely to her commercial restrictions, to her protective laws, and to her commercial treaties, but in a large measure also to her conquests in science and in the arts.

"How comes it that in these days one million of English operatives can perform the work of hundreds of millions? It comes from the great demand for manufactured goods which by her wise and energetic policy England has created in foreign lands, and especially in her Colonies; from the wise and powerful protection extended to her home industries; from the great rewards which by means of her patent laws she has offered to every new discovery; and from the extraordinary facility for inland transport afforded by her public roads, canals, and railways.

"England has for a long time monopolised the inventive genius of every nation. It is no more than fair that England, now that she has attained the culminating point of her

industrial growth and progress, should restore again to the nations of Continental Europe a portion of those productive forces which she originally derived from them."

From these facts List drew the logical conclusion and applied it to Germany. He said :

"Modern Germany, lacking a system of vigorous and united commercial policy, exposed in her home markets to competition with a foreign manufacturing power in every way superior to her own, while excluded at the same time from foreign markets by arbitrary and often capricious restrictions, is very far indeed from making that progress in industry to which she is entitled by the degree of her culture. She cannot even maintain her previously acquired position, and is made a convenience of by that very nation, until at last the German States have resolved to secure their home markets for their own industries by the adoption of a united vigorous system of commercial policy.

"We venture to assert that on the development of the German protective system depend the existence, the independence, and the future of German nationality. Only in the soil of general prosperity does the national spirit strike its roots and produce fine blossoms and rich fruits. Only from the unity of material interests does unity of purpose arise, and from both of these national power."

The position of disunited Germany in 1840 strangely resembled the position of the scattered British Empire of 1903, and if we insert in the last two paragraphs quoted the word "British Empire" for "Germany" List's words might easily be attributed to Mr. Joseph Chamberlain.

By a curious coincidence List wrote in Germany when Cobden and his disciples preached their gospel in Great Britain. The British free traders, who, with their universal theory and their cosmopolitan views, ignored the existence of nations, naturally did not like to see a pronouncedly national system of political economy arise. List's book was vigorously attacked by Free Traders. The *Edinburgh Review* devoted, in July 1842, an article of no less than forty-two pages to his book, in which we find expressions of contempt such as "a pretended system," "his poor miscon-

ception of the doctrines which he tries to brand with the nickname of cosmopolitan economy," "his treatise is unworthy of notice," "unworthy of grave criticism," etc. The writer of that article, however, did not confine himself to abuse, but "proved" to his own satisfaction that, whereas England was, and ever would remain, the workshop of the world, Germany was, and ever would remain, a poor agricultural country, and that all attempts to build up industries in Germany under the shelter of Protection were misdirected and would prove a failure. The writer said :

"The manufactures in which our author exults are an evil to Germany. The labour and capital which that country has expended upon them have been forced from more profitable employments."

The *Edinburgh Review* sapiently concluded :

"In Continental countries they naturally reason thus : 'England has protected her manufactures—England is rich ; if we protect our manufactures we shall be as rich as she is.' They forget that England has unrivalled natural capacities for manufacturing and commercial industry, and that no country with capacities distinctly inferior can ascend to an equal prosperity by any policy whatever."

We have now heard the voice of the English and of the German prophet of the 'forties of the last century. Since then Germany has had almost uninterrupted Protection, and Great Britain almost uninterrupted Free Trade. Germany, which was then a country without experience in industry, finance, commerce, and shipping, without capital, without colonies, without good coal, with only one good harbour, a country weighed down by militarism, convulsed by three great wars and a revolution, and, according to Free Trade doctrines, "kept back" by Protection, became nevertheless so wealthy and powerful that before the War she competed with England in all foreign markets and even in the home market, that she had some of the swiftest ships on the ocean, that she was paramount in some of the most important industries, and that she could even afford to

emulate Great Britain's fleet after having created for herself the strongest army in the world.

Germany's progress under Protection was steady, continuous, and rapid. Between 1850 and 1900 Germany's production of iron, her consumption of cotton, and her savings banks deposits have grown gigantically. In 1914 her population had about four times the amount of savings in the savings banks which was to be found in the British savings banks. Sixty years ago the average wages of British workmen were, according to List, four times as high as the average wages of the German workmen. Before the War German wages and British wages were equally high in many instances. Hence German wages have under Protection risen fourfold in many trades. From a poor debtor country, Germany had become a rich creditor country. Formerly she had to borrow money in foreign countries and on onerous terms. In 1914 German capital invested abroad amounted probably to about £2,000,000,000.

In view of her triumphant economic progress, the economic policy and views of leading Germans should be of great interest.

Free Trade has never had much influence in Germany, because Free Trade never flourishes in a struggling country. Free Trade is an excellent policy for industries of irresistible strength. Those industries which need not fear competition, which feel assured of a free market abroad and at home, always favour Free Trade, while struggling industries always favour Protection. In France the Gironde, with its matchless wines, is in favour of Free Trade. In the United States the cotton belt and the wheat districts are for Free Trade, while the industrial parts are for Protection. In Germany, where neither nature nor exertion had given to any industry an overwhelming power, the idea of Free Trade had never taken hold of the country or of any part of it. Jhering, the greatest German jurist of his time, expressed very happily the ideas of the leading circles in Germany on Free Trade when he wittily said : "It is a matter of course that the wolves demand freedom of action

for themselves, but if the sheep raise the same demand it only proves that they are sheep." The demand for Free Trade arose in Great Britain from the cotton industry, and List was not slow in pointing out the real cause of that demand. In his weekly paper, the *Zollvereinsblatt*, he drew attention to the fact that England was then practically the only cotton manufacturer in the world, that the British cotton industry was by far the most powerful exporting industry in the world, and that the demand of the British cotton manufacturers for Free Trade was as natural as for the other countries was resistance to that demand.

A certain number of Free Traders existed in Germany, such as Prince-Smith, Wiss, Ascher, Michaelis, Wirth, Hübner, Soetbeer, Braun, Bamberger, Böhmert, Emminghaus, Lammers, Meyer, Eras, Wolff. These men were mostly professors, journalists, and authors. They were therefore never considered in their country as the spokesmen of the productive industries. It is interesting to note that the chief representative of Free Trade in Germany was Prince-Smith, an Englishman, and by profession an author. In merchant and banking circles, especially in Hamburg, Free Trade found naturally more support, for the purely distributive business of the merchant and the banker is greatly hampered by irksome and often vexatious customs regulations. Besides, it is immaterial to merchants and bankers whether they trade in foreign goods and bills or in domestic ones, and unless patriotism is stronger than business instinct these two classes always incline towards Free Trade. In consideration of these circumstances their pleadings were ignored, and the German Government made up its mind to look chiefly after the interests of the productive industries, which were considered to be the only basis of a nation's wealth.

Bismarck, when referring in the Reichstag to the German Free Traders, said : "They do not sow, neither do they spin—nevertheless they are clothed and fed." He delighted in describing them as people who pore all day long in their study over books and papers, and who are perfectly un-

acquainted with business life. His practical mind observed that the men who in later years directed the commercial policy of Great Britain were clergymen, like Adam Smith, Malthus, and the elder Mill, that Ricardo was a stockbroker, that Cobden went bankrupt, that Bright was a cotton manufacturer, and therefore personally interested in the establishment of Free Trade, and that Villiers was a lawyer. In private conversation his derision of these men knew no bounds. Nevertheless his standing instructions were that his unflattering remarks on these men and on "Professor" Gladstone should not get into the papers.

According to Bismarck's opinion Free Trade in England was a most excellent thing—for Germany—and he did not like to see that happy state of affairs altered. Therefore he wished neither to see the Free Traders of Great Britain, whose rule was such a blessing to his country, attacked by the German press nor Great Britain's belief in the panacea of Free Trade shaken. Nevertheless when the German Free Traders became too loud in their praise of British Free Trade, of which they had no practical knowledge, he had a pamphlet written on the Cobden Club by Lothar Bucher, his confidential assistant, in which he declared, "The Manchester Free Trade agitation is the most colossal and the most audacious campaign of political and economic deception which the world has ever seen."

While some of the minor political economists of Germany were Free Traders, Wilhelm Roscher, a leading economist, considered Free Trade as impracticable and unattainable. He wrote :

"When the feeling that all mankind constitutes one family has abolished all political boundaries, and when universal righteousness and love have killed all national ambitions and jealousies, differences between nations will become of rare occurrence. However, arguments presupposing such a state of affairs are not admissible before it has been clearly proved that such ideal conditions exist. It is so improbable that such an ideal state will ever be created, and universal 'philanthropy' is something so suspicious, the

people are so unable to develop except when they constitute a nation, that I should look at the disappearance of national jealousies with concern. Nothing contributed more to the subjection of Greece by Macedon and Rome than the cosmopolitanism of Greek philosophers."

Professor von Treitschke, the historian, condemned Free Trade from the historian's point of view. He wrote in his *Politik* :

" We have found it to be an erroneous idea that Protection is only necessary for young industries. Old industries, too, require protection against foreign competition. In this respect ancient Italy teaches us a terrible lesson. If protective tariffs against Asiatic and African bread stuffs had been introduced in time, the old Italian peasantry would have been preserved and the social conditions of Italy would have remained healthy. But Roman traders could import cheap grain from Africa without hindrance, the rural industries decayed, the rural population disappeared, and the Campagna, which surrounds the capital, became a vast desert."

Professor Mommsen expressed the same view in his *Römische Geschichte.*

One of the younger political economists, Mr. Victor Leo, said in *The Tendencies of the World's Commerce* :

" Protective tariffs must continue, and a moderate increase of them cannot be considered as a misfortune. In practice it is not possible simply to drop entire industries because similar industries can produce more cheaply somewhere else. From the point of view of the *world* economist it is correct to insist on a division of labour which gives to every nation those industries for which it is most adapted ; from the point of view of the *national* economist the disadvantages resulting from such a policy would be greater than the advantage to the consumer of being able to buy the article in question at a cheaper price."

The belief that Free Trade presupposes a universal brotherhood among the nations, and is therefore impracticable, was general in Germany. Therefore we read in the

article "Free Trade" in *Brockhaus's Encyclopedia*, which faithfully reflects the mind of the nation:

"As long as mankind is divided into autonomous States possessing individual institutions, no State must expose itself to the danger, which is not only an economic but also a political and social danger, that home production should lose its independence by over-powerful foreign competition. . . . A weaker State, if it wishes to preserve an independent existence, is absolutely justified in safeguarding its imperfect means of production against foreign competition by Protection."

In spite of the almost universal opposition to Free Trade, Protection was not elevated to a dogma in Germany. It was considered merely as a policy, which was well adapted to the requirements of the time, but which, like every policy, was subject to reconsideration in altered circumstances. Professor Schmoller, the distinguished lecturer at Berlin University, stated:

"Protection and Free Trade are for me not principles, but remedies for the political and economic organism which are prescribed according to the state of the nation. A doctor who would say that he prescribed on principle to every patient *restringentia* or *laxantia* would be considered insane. However, that is the idea both of the extreme Free Trader and of the extreme Protectionist."

Professor Biermer wrote, using a similar metaphor:

"Protection and Free Trade, rightly considered, are not questions of principle, but only remedies of political and economic therapeutics which, according to the state of the patient, have to be prescribed sometimes in big and sometimes in small doses."

Professor Roscher wrote:

"The greater the extent of a territory protected by tariffs, the sooner will active competition spring up within its frontiers. Foreign markets are always uncertain. Hence all customs unions between related States are to be recommended, not only as financially, but also as economically advantageous."

The uncertainty of foreign markets and the danger of becoming dependent for one's very existence on foreign markets and on foreign goodwill became a matter of the greatest concern to the statesmen and political economists of Germany. Therefore there arose a feverish anxiety in political circles to acquire colonial possessions and to found a Central European Customs Union, while the political economists loudly warned the country against Germany becoming economically dependent on foreign nations. Professor Oldenberg said :

" When our home industries work for exportation and live on foreign countries by exchanging their produce for foreign food, the huge industrial structure of Germany branches sideways into the air and is made to rest on pillars of trade which are erected on foreign ground. But those pillars, which support our very existence, will remain standing only for so long as it pleases the owner of the ground. Some day, when he wishes to use his own land, he cuts off the pillars of our existence from under us and thus breaks down the building which we have reared on them."

Another economist, Mr. Paul Voigt, wrote :

" The loss of our export trade would bring starvation to the masses of German workers, and compel them to emigrate and to beg before the doors of foreign nations for work and for food. The collapse of our export trade would be the most terrible catastrophe in German history and would rank with the Thirty Years' War as a calamity. It would wipe out the German nation from the great nations of the world and might end its political existence."

The cotton famine in Lancashire, the constantly growing dependence of Great Britain on foreign food and raw material, the numerous " corners " in grain and cotton under which England had to suffer, made a deep and lasting impression in Germany.

Before 1879 there had been a period of moderate Free Trade in Germany, and in consequence German industries were acutely suffering. At last Bismarck intervened and inaugurated in that year a strongly protective policy.

Since then Germany's prosperity has grown by leaps and bounds. Up to the early 'eighties Germany was only known as the provider of inferior goods, which were usually clumsy imitations of English goods. Soon afterwards Germany conquered the markets of the world with products of high excellence.

There were always many Free Traders in the German Reichstag, as that assembly was largely composed of professional men and of men belonging to the leisured class who were consumers, who could easily understand the "consumers' argument." Consequently, Bismarck's demand for Protection met with considerable opposition from the parliamentarians and from bankers and merchants. Agriculture and the manufacturing industries enthusiastically supported him. It must be interesting for Englishmen of all classes to follow Bismarck's arguments in favour of Protection. In his speech of the 2nd of May 1879, in which he introduced his protective policy, he said:

"I do not mean to discuss Protection and Free Trade in the abstract. . . . We have opened wide the doors of our State to the imports of foreign countries, and we have become the dumping-ground for the over-production of all those countries. Germany being swamped by the surplus production of foreign nations, prices have been depressed, and the development of all our industries and our entire economic position has suffered in consequence. If the danger of Protection were as great as we are told by enthusiastic free traders, France would have been impoverished long ago, for she has had Protection since the time of Colbert, and she should have been ruined long ago, owing to the theories which have guided her economic policy.

"After my opinion, we are slowly bleeding to death owing to insufficient Protection. This process has been arrested for a time by the five milliards which we have received from France after the war; otherwise we should have been compelled already five years ago to take those steps which we are taking to-day.

"We demand a moderate Protection for German labour. Let us close our doors and erect some barriers in order to reserve to German industries at least the home market, in

which German good nature is at present being exploited by the foreigner. The problem of a large export trade is always an extremely delicate one. No more new countries will be discovered; the world has been circumnavigated, and we can no longer find abroad new purchasers of importance to whom we can send our goods.

"In questions such as these I view scientific theories with the same doubt with which I regard the theories applied to other organic formations. Medical science, as contrasted with anatomy, has made little progress with regard to those parts which the eye cannot reach, and to-day the riddle of organic changes in the human body is as great as it was formerly. With regard to the organism of the State, it is the same thing. The dicta of abstract science do not influence me in the slightest. I base my opinion on the practical experience of the time in which we are living. I see that those countries which possess Protection are prospering, and that those countries which possess Free Trade are decaying. Mighty England, that powerful athlete, stepped out into the open market after she had strengthened her sinews, and said, Who will fight me? I am prepared to meet everybody. But England herself is slowly returning to Protection, and in some years she will take it up in order to save for herself at least the home market."

On the 14th of June 1882 Bismarck, in another speech on Protection and Free Trade, said:

"I believe the whole theory of Free Trade to be wrong. . . . England has abolished Protection after she had benefited by it to the fullest extent. That country used to have the strongest protective tariffs until it had become so powerful under their protection that it could step out of those barriers like a gigantic athlete and challenge the world. Free Trade is the weapon of the strongest nation, and England has become the strongest nation owing to her capital, her iron, her coal, and her harbours, and owing to her favourable geographical position. Nevertheless she protected herself against foreign competition with exorbitant protective tariffs until her industries have become so powerful."

It is very interesting to observe that Prince Bismarck predicted in 1882 that Great Britain would have to go

back to Protection, "in order to secure for herself *at least the home market*," and that the demands for Protection which were advanced by List in 1840, and by Bismarck in 1879, were based on the same arguments which were used by Mr. Chamberlain.

German Free Traders of course predicted that Protection would bring disaster to the German industries and especially to the German export trade. These objections were very effectively dealt with by the German political economists. Professor Schmoller, for instance, said in 1879 :

"Exports will certainly suffer in one or the other branch, but that is a point of minor consideration. At present the conditions of our export business are so bad that they can hardly become worse. Our export trade can only become better if we have commercial treaties and an autonomous tariff."

The Society for Social Policy in Berlin adopted the following resolution :

"Considering that our endeavours to conclude commercial treaties, which will open new markets to German industries, must prove unsuccessful in view of the present position of the world, and

"Considering that it will be necessary to increase some important duties in order to place the finances of the Empire on a firm basis,

"The Society for Social Policy declares itself in favour of a moderate fiscal reform in a commercio-political and protectionist direction by a tariff which is especially directed against those countries which are particularly harmful to German production."

The beneficial effect of the protective tariff on German industries was immediate. On the 16th of March 1881 Mr. von Kardorff stated in the German Diet that 85,901 men were occupied in the German iron and steel industries in January 1879, and 98,224 men in January 1881. Mr. Loewe, another member of the Diet, reported on the same date that in the important districts of Bochum and Dort-

mund wages had risen from 5 to 15 per cent., and that the men who some years ago had been only partly occupied were now fully occupied. Some had formerly been working only three or four days a week. Other deputies gave similar reports. This rising tendency of wages continued almost uninterruptedly from 1879 down to 1914. How rapidly the wealth of Germany had grown since 1879 and how wealthy Germany had become is well known.

CHAPTER XIII

THE RURAL INDUSTRIES OF GERMANY [1]

UNTIL the War had opened their eyes most Englishmen believed that a European State could not possess at the same time flourishing manufacturing and prosperous rural industries. Yet Germany possessed both highly-developed manufacturing industries and an exceedingly flourishing agriculture. Therefore, it is worth while to study the agricultural prosperity of Germany and its causes; for if Germany could make her rural industries pay, Great Britain, which is far more favoured by Nature, should certainly be able to do likewise.

Compared with Great Britain, Germany possesses a poor soil, an unfavourable geographical position and structure, and an unfavourable climate, her winter being long and very severe. Her transport facilities for agricultural produce by land and water were formerly quite insufficient, and even now her agricultural produce has to be carried for hundreds of miles inland to the markets, while British fields are everywhere in easy reach of the sea. In East Prussia and Pomerania, for instance, there are agricultural districts which lie twenty miles from the nearest railway station. The rural labour of Germany also was, and probably is still, inferior to that of Great Britain. A century ago, the German peasants were serfs—serfdom lingered in places until the middle of the nineteenth century—and until 1914 the independence of the peasantry was, in many parts of Germany, more theoretical than real. Therefore Germany's rural population was, and in certain parts of Germany is

[1] From the *Contemporary Review*, November 1905.

still, obstinately and stupidly conservative. When Frederick the Great distributed clover seed to the peasantry, they refused to sow it. When ordered to sow the seed, they boiled it first in order to prevent it sprouting. When given seed potatoes, they boiled the seed potatoes before putting them in the ground.

Owing to the poverty of the soil, the inclemency of the climate, long distances, the difficulties of transport, and the backwardness and poverty of her rural population, agriculture in Germany was extremely primitive when it was highly successful and prosperous in England. Some decades ago, prices for corn and meat were exceedingly low in Germany, cattle were kept chiefly for ploughing and for manure, and were largely fed on straw. Agricultural Germany used to bear an aspect similar to that of agricultural Russia of to-day. However, during forty or fifty years, the rural industries of Germany have continually progressed, and they have progressed even during those decades when Great Britain suffered from an unparalleled agricultural depression.

Between 1875 and 1908, 3,200,000 acres which were under cereals, and 1,000,000 acres which were under green crops, went out of cultivation in Great Britain. But, notwithstanding the great increase of pastures, the number of live stock in Great Britain had, during that time, increased by only 10 per cent. If we now turn from this dismal picture of decay to Germany, we find that during the most trying period of British agriculture, the rural industries of Germany showed the following record :

AGRICULTURAL AREA OF GERMANY

Hectares (1 hectare is equal to 2½ acres)

	Corn crops.	*Green crops.*	*Gardens.*	*Grass lands.*
1883	15,723,970	6,700,600	415,950	3,336,830
1893	15,992,120	7,018,120	472,620	2,760,350
1900	16,050,990	7,437,790	482,790	2,285,740
1913	16,250,900	7,891,000	536,600	1,380,700

From the foregoing figures we see that, during a period when, in Great Britain, an enormous area which was under

the plough was abandoned to grass, the area under grass in Germany has shrunk by almost two thirds, because it has been taken under the plough and has been converted into fields. And while the acreage of fields on which cereals and vegetables are grown has been considerably increased, agricultural processes have been so greatly improved that each acre of agricultural land produces now very much more than it used to do. This appears from the following table :

YIELD PER HECTARE OF GROUND IN KILOGRAMMES

	Wheat.	*Rye.*	*Barley.*	*Oats.*	*Potatoes.*	*Hay.*
1893	1670	1490	1480	1070	13,410	2230
1895	1640	1320	1680	1550	12,390	3700
1897	1700	1370	1560	1430	11,010	4280
1899	1910	1480	1820	1720	12,290	4040
1901	1580	1400	1790	1600	14,670	3760
1903	1970	1650	1950	1840	13,250	4450
1905	1920	1560	1790	1570	14,570	4410
1907	1990	1610	2060	2090	13,810	4170
1909	2050	1850	2120	2120	14,050	3710
1910	1990	1700	1850	1840	13,190	4740
1911	2060	1770	1990	1780	10,350	3370
1912	2260	1850	2190	1940	15,030	4680
1913	2360	1910	2240	2190	15,860	4930

From the foregoing tables it appears that while the agricultural area of Germany has been considerably extended the produce per acre has been universally and enormously increased. At the same time the live stock of Germany has astonishingly multiplied, notwithstanding the great shrinkage of grass lands. The following figures give a record of the fluctuation in the numbers of live stock since 1873 :

LIVE STOCK OF GERMANY

	Horses.	*Cattle.*	*Sheep.*	*Pigs.*
1873	3,352,231	15,776,702	24,999,406	7,124,088
1883	3,522,525	15,786,764	19,189,715	9,206,195
1892	3,836,256	13,555,694	13,589,612	12,174,288
1897	4,038,485	18,490,772	10,866,772	14,274,557
1900	4,184,099	19,001,106	9,672,143	16,758,436
1907	4,337,263	20,589,856	7,681,072	22,080,008
1913	4,523,059	20,994,344	5,520,837	25,659,140

From the foregoing table we see that, while British live stock, notwithstanding the enormous increase of the area under grass, has increased by only about 10 per cent., the horses of Germany have increased by about 33 per cent., the cattle by about 33 per cent., and the pigs by no less than 250 per cent., in spite of the decrease of pasture land. It is true that at the same time the number of sheep has declined by more than 19,000,000, largely owing to the shrinkage of pasture land which was turned into fields ; but this shrinkage is not so serious as it seems. In Germany two pigs represent about the same value as do five sheep. Consequently, the 19,000,000 pigs which had been added represented more than double the value of the 19,000,000 sheep which had been lost.

The total area of Imperial Germany was about 70 per cent. greater than that of Great Britain, and as the population of Germany was about 50 per cent. larger, Great Britain was not much more densely populated than Germany. Hence both countries could be fairly compared in size and population with regard to agriculture. Now, both per square mile of territory and per thousand of population, there were more horses and far more cattle in Germany than in Great Britain. Besides, there were five times more pigs. Only in sheep Great Britain had a great advantage over Germany, but this was not an advantage for which German agriculturists were envious. Sheep require to be kept in the open, on grass land. Hence, only waste lands in the interior of Australia and of Argentina, but not valuable agricultural land in populous parts of Europe and in the immediate vicinity of their natural markets, were considered in Germany proper for rearing sheep. The soil of Germany was thought to be too valuable to serve as prairie land.

How severely the value of agricultural land had fallen in Great Britain before the War is well known. In Germany agricultural land had not fallen, but had considerably increased in value with the increase in its productive power.

If a German agriculturist fails, his lands are sold by public auction. Consequently the statistics of forced sales

give a good indication of the position of Germany's agriculture. The number of forced sales declined since 1886 as follows, in Prussia :

FORCED SALES IN PRUSSIA

1886–7	2979 holdings
1889–90	2014 ,,
1892–3	2299 ,,
1895–6	1834 ,,
1898–9	1210 ,,
1903	1047 ,,
1907	737 ,,
1909	668 ,,

On an average not one holding out of every two thousand was yearly sold by public auction, and it should be noted that, on an average, nine-tenths of these sales took place in Eastern Germany, where peculiar agricultural conditions prevailed, which will be described in the course of this chapter, and that the larger part of the holdings sold consisted of large farms and estates from one hundred and twenty-five acres upwards. Forced sales were exceedingly rare in the middle and west of Germany, and especially in the case of small and medium-sized farms.

How exceedingly profitable agriculture was in Germany may be seen by comparing it with that of Great Britain. If we make such a comparison, we find not only that there was proportionately far more live stock in Germany than in this country, but also that the area under corn-crops, potatoes, etc., was six times as great as in Great Britain, and that the rural industries of Germany afforded a very good livelihood to a population which was many times greater than that of this country.

We shall now inquire why Germany, with a poor soil, an unfavourable climate, bad geographical conditions, and a somewhat intractable peasantry, possessed a prosperous and vigorously expanding agriculture, while the agriculture of Great Britain, which possesses a better soil, better climate, a better geographical position, a more open-minded and progressive rural population, better markets, and which

had a far better start, and far more capital, was rapidly decaying.

If before the War a man took a railway trip through the British Islands, and looked frequently out of the window, he noticed chiefly grass fields, which covered 60 per cent. of the agricultural area of the United Kingdom, but he rarely saw cereals growing. If he took a railway journey through Germany, he would see chiefly cereals, which, in that country, take up more than 60 per cent. of the agricultural ground. The proportion of grass lands in Germany was no greater than the proportion of oat-fields in Great Britain. In other words, pastures were met with as rarely in Germany as oat-fields in Great Britain.

The following most important table shows how agricultural land was owned in Germany. It gives a bird's-eye view of the distribution of agricultural land in that country.

AGRICULTURAL HOLDINGS IN GERMANY IN 1907

Size of Holdings.	Number of Holdings.	Acreage Hectares (1 Hectare = 2½ Acres).	Percentage of Agricultural Area.
Less than 5 acres	3,378,509	1,731,317	5·4
5 to 12½ acres	1,006,277	3,304,872	10·4
12½ to 50 acres	1,065,539	10,421,565	32·7
50 to 125 acres	225,697	6,821,301	21·4
125 to 250 acres	36,494	2,500,805	7·9
250 to 1250 acres	20,068	4,503,159	14·2
1250 and more acres	3,498	2,551,854	8·0
Total	5,736,082	31,834,873	100·0

In the whole of Germany there were, in 1907, 5,736,082 agricultural properties, and the average size of the properties was about fifteen acres. It is remarkable that there were no less than 3,378,509 individual holdings of an average size of three acres and under. On the other hand, it should be observed that by far the greater part of the agricultural area of Germany, namely, 84 per cent. of the total, was owned by agriculturists who cultivated more than 12½ acres. Consequently, it is apparent that German agricultural land

was chiefly exploited by farmer-peasants, who possessed substantial properties.

The difference in the size of the individual holdings appears to bring with it a striking difference in the way in which these were cultivated. Imperial Germany could be divided into two agricultural spheres—the Eastern part and the Central and Western part. The east of Germany is flat, sandy, and somewhat thinly populated. It is insufficiently opened by waterways and railways, and land was chiefly in the hands of aristocratic owners, who possessed large, and sometimes huge, estates. In the middle and the west of Germany the country is broken, the soil is more fruitful, the population is denser, manufactures prevail, markets are near at hand, waterways and railways are plentiful, and land was chiefly held by small farmers and peasants who, as a rule, worked on freehold land.

In Prussia of the properties below five acres, 73·4 per cent. were freehold ; of those from five acres to fifty acres, 87·3 per cent. were freehold ; of those from fifty to two hundred and fifty acres, 93 per cent. were freehold ; of those above two hundred and fifty acres, 81·8 per cent. were freehold. It therefore appears that the proportion of freeholders was smallest among the very small and among the very large proprietors. Of the properties of medium size which covered the greater part of agricultural Germany, the proportion of freehold land was largest, and more than 90 per cent. of the ground of medium-sized agricultural establishments consisted of freehold properties.

The small agriculturists of Germany produced, on the whole, larger harvests per acre than did the large landowners, who cultivated their fields with hired labour. Largely owing to this difference, the middle and the west of Germany were chiefly devoted to intensive culture. In the east of Germany, where the large landowners were, we find poor fields, less thorough cultivation, and smaller crops. East Germany thus resembled Great Britain not only in this, that the land was in the hands of a few large owners, who liked to enjoy themselves in town, and who

left the supervision of their estates to their paid underlings ; but a further resemblance to Great Britain could be found in the fact that, in those districts, the raising of live stock was more developed than the cultivation of the soil. Nevertheless, the small landowners in the middle and the west of Germany were not only more efficient in agriculture, but also in stock-raising, for the small agriculturists raised on their holdings far more horses, cattle, and pigs per acre than did the large proprietors in the east. Some years ago the German live stock was distributed as follows between large and small agriculturists :

AVERAGE QUANTITY OF LIVE STOCK KEPT ON 250 ACRES OF GROUND

On properties from 5 to 50 acres.	*On properties from 50 acres and more.*
16 horses	11 horses
147 cattle	37 cattle
242 pigs	20 pigs

In Germany one head of cattle was considered to be equal in value to two-thirds of a horse, or to four pigs. If we now reduce the live stock kept on the farms of the two types given to "pig-units," if such a word may be used, we find that the owners of fifty and more acres raised only 227 pig-units on the same quantity of ground on which smaller farmers raised 915 pig-units. In other words, on an area of the same size small agriculturists raised a little more than four times as much live stock as was raised by the larger landowners.

The following somewhat more detailed figures give a most interesting picture of the greatly varying density of the live-stock population on farms of different sizes. They show that small holdings were most favourable for raising pigs, that middle-sized properties were most suitable for raising cattle and horses, and that large properties were least suitable for raising live stock, except for comparatively valueless sheep. In Germany one pig is estimated to be equal in value to two and a half sheep, as has already been mentioned.

AVERAGE NUMBER OF ANIMALS PER 250 ACRES ON PROPERTIES OF VARIOUS SIZES IN 1907

Size of Holding.	*Horses.*	*Cattle.*	*Pigs.*	*Sheep.*
Below 1¼ acres . . .	1·5	31·7	319·0	29·0
1¼ to 5 acres. . . .	3·3	59·7	128·6	12·6
5 to 12½ acres . . .	5·6	73·2	71·3	8·3
12½ to 50 acres . . .	9·6	57·2	47·5	10·5
50 to 250 acres . . .	9·5	42·0	29·0	18·4
250 to 500 acres . . .	6·6	17·3	14·0	44·0
500 and more acres . .	6·4	22·0	13·3	50·3

From the foregoing tables it appears that the large holdings of Germany were unfavourable to the thorough pursuit of agriculture and to efficiency in cattle-raising as well. But here, as in other things, *les extrèmes se touchent.* If holdings become too small, animals can neither be raised nor be employed in the field, spade work becomes necessary, and human labour has to take the place of animal labour or machine labour.

ANIMALS KEPT IN JUNE 1907 ON AGRICULTURAL PROPERTIES ONLY

On Properties of	*Horses.*	*Cattle.*	*Pigs.*	*Sheep and Lambs.*
Less than 5 acres .	71,369	1,315,572	4,383,244	415,750
5 to 12½ acres . .	241,636	3,155,323	3,107,008	359,943
12½ to 50 acres. .	1,323,290	7,873,092	6,334,238	1,448,535
50 to 250 acres. .	1,202,176	5,305,871	3,655,156	2,326,268
250 acres and more.	652,536	2,327,291	1,386,272	4,371,103
Total	3,491,007	19,977,149	18,865,918	8,921,599

In 1907 the peasants who farmed less than fifty acres possessed one-half of all the horses, two-thirds of all the cattle, and three-fourths of all the pigs.

Evidently the very small peasant cannot always avail himself of animal labour on his tiny holding, owing to poverty, lack of accommodation, or lack of fodder. Therefore we find that the men who owned less than five acres used, on an average, one-third of the horse power which was employed on properties of larger size. The very small cultivator made, however, a greater use of cattle for pulling the plough than did the owner of a medium-sized farm. His only cow had not infrequently to labour in the field.

The large landowner, on the other hand, appears not to have made the fullest use of animal power, for we find that he employed a smaller number of horses and cattle for work than did the smaller cultivator.

It might be expected that the large German landowners, who used less animal power for cultivation than the small farmers, would be easily first in the use of labour-saving, steam-driven machinery. This appears not to have been the case, for we find that the smallest number of steam-driven agricultural machines was used in the province of East Prussia, where huge estates were common, while the largest number was employed in the province of Saxony, where middle-sized and small holdings prevailed. The fact that labour-saving machinery was more used on medium-sized than on large properties is clearly brought out in the following figures, which relate to those two provinces :

AGRICULTURAL STEAM MACHINERY USED IN 1907

	Steam Ploughs.	Drills.	Seed-casting Machines.	Steam Threshing Machines.
Saxony .	439	46,898	46,898	17,569
East Prussia .	80	4,639	4,639	3,928

The difference in the quantity of machinery used in purely agricultural East Prussia, with its huge estates, and in chiefly industrial Saxony, with its small agriculturists and independent peasants, is startling ; and this difference in the manner of cultivation goes far to explain why the German agrarians east of the Elbe loudly complained about agricultural depression, while the peasants west of the Elbe were, on the whole, prosperous and contented.

If we now look into the indebtedness of the agricultural soil in Germany, we find the following astonishing variations in the various districts :

ESTIMATED INDEBTEDNESS OF THE AGRICULTURAL SOIL

East Germany

District Königsberg	50·90 per cent.
,, Gumbinnen	48·58 ,,
,, Dantzig	55·11 ,,
,, Marienwerder	55·68 ,,

Central Germany

District	Magdeburg	22·82 per cent.
,,	Merseburg	27·82 ,,
,,	Erfurt	23·40 ,,

West Germany

,,	Cologne	17·94 ,,
,,	Treves	15·83 ,,
,,	Aix-la-Chapelle	13·32 ,,

The foregoing table is based on carefully compiled official estimates. The thoroughly representative figures used were taken from the official hand-book of the Agrarian Party. From this table it appears that the agricultural indebtedness of the soil was dangerously large in the east of Germany, medium-sized in the centre of the country, and small in the west of the country. This curious difference arose from the fact that in the east of Germany huge estates preponderated, while in the centre middle-sized properties and in the west small holdings prevailed. The large German landowner in Pomerania and East Prussia could easily borrow from banks and other institutions at a reasonable rate of interest, and he did so freely and somewhat indiscreetly. Hence, his estates were encumbered with debts up to the hilt. The medium-sized and somewhat obscure agriculturists in Middle Germany could not so easily raise money on their land. Lastly, the small cultivators who prevail in the Rhenish Province, where, owing to the use of the Code Napoleon and the French law of succession, the land had been divided and subdivided in equal parts among the children so often that individual holdings had become very small, found it often absolutely impossible to raise money on their freehold properties at any price.

In Great Britain very small landowners and peasants would find no difficulty in raising money on their land, for local usurers would prosper on the ignorance, the improvidence, or the inexperience of the small cultivators to whom they would lend money at 30, 50, or more per cent. But the paternal Government of Germany was sensible enough

not to allow usurers to prey upon the ignorant or foolish producers. Usury was as good as non-existent, owing to most stringent usury laws. Consequently, if the German cultivator could not raise money at low rates (up to 6 per cent.) and on fair security, he could not borrow money at all. This disability was, no doubt, very inconvenient to some improvident individuals, but from the point of view of a truly national economy it seems a lesser evil to suppress the usurers altogether than to allow them to become prosperous by relentlessly exploiting the poor, the weak, and the foolish.

From the facts and figures which have so far been given, it is clear that the rural industries of Germany were highly prosperous, but it is equally clear that the prosperity of the German agriculturists was variable, and that it stood in a somewhat close relation to the size of their holdings. The larger properties were somewhat unproductive, and were uneconomically exploited, largely because their owners were not qualified, or not willing, to manage their estates themselves. That large estates should yield disappointing results is only natural. Hired labourers will work as little as possible for their wages, and managers and overseers will act in a similar manner. But even if these paid agents are conscientious, their supervision will, in any case, cause a considerable extra expense which burdens the land.

Many large landowners in Germany wished to shine in Parliament or in society, or simply to enjoy themselves, finding the country too dull. Such men—and they were very numerous among the large landed proprietors—desired to spend much money, which they could easily raise on their estates. Hence, the large estates of Germany were not only the most wastefully exploited properties, but they were at the same time those which were most heavily burdened with mortgages.

While the large estates suffered from superfluity of land and the extravagance of their owners, who, in their turn, suffered from superfluity of leisure, the very small peasants' properties suffered from lack of capital and from lack of

labour-saving animal and machine power. For these reasons, inefficient cultivation was common on both the largest and the smallest agricultural properties. Therefore land passed from the hands of very small peasants and of very large landowners into the hands of townsmen, and in the end the former freeholders were replaced by agricultural leaseholders and labourers. For these reasons, we find that men who worked less than five acres had only 73·4 per cent. of freehold land, and that the men who cultivated more than two hundred and fifty acres had 81·8 per cent. of freehold land, while the agriculturists who possessed medium properties had more than 90 per cent. of freehold land.

On properties measuring from five to two hundred and fifty acres were found the substantial peasants and peasant-farmers who were the backbone of Germany's agriculture. Nine-tenths of their fields were freehold land. Their land belonged to them and to their descendants for ever. These peasant proprietors usually cultivated their holdings with the assistance of their families. The men did the hard work in the fields, the women looked after the cattle and the children, helped at harvest-time, when the rural schools closed in order to enable the small peasants to get the assistance of their youngsters in picking up potatoes, gathering sheaves, picking fruit, etc. Each member of the peasant's family worked with love and earnestness, not for a daily wage, but for himself, with the sense and pride of property, and of absolute ownership. Where holdings were so large that outside assistance was required, farm servants or labourers were hired who, as a rule, lived with the peasants. They formed part of the peasant's family, and worked under the constant supervision of the owner. Consequently, an agricultural labourer was certain to do far more work on a peasant's farm in Westphalia under the eye of the owner of the farm, than on a big estate in Pomerania under the supervision of paid stewards and inspectors. The well-to-do peasant was thrifty, robust, healthy, and contented, while the small peasant, who had

but a few acres, worked himself to death, owing to lack of land, lack of capital, and lack of labour-saving animal and machine power. Co-operation of course helped the small peasants very greatly in their struggle. A further account of German agriculture is contained in my book *Great and Greater Britain* (John Murray, London).

Some distinguished British politicians and statesmen have recommended dividing the agricultural land of Great Britain. Their policy has been summed up in the cry "Three acres and a cow." Three acres and a cow may perhaps be a good electioneering cry, but it is not a good policy. Although life with three acres and a cow may appear very idyllic to the townsman, who takes his arm-chair as a coign of vantage, it is the reverse of idyllic from the countryman's point of view. If the policy of "three acres and a cow" should ever be carried out in Great Britain, it would lead, no doubt, to a resettlement of the people on the land. But it seems hardly desirable that the proletariat of the congested towns should, by an ill-considered policy and at a huge cost to the nation, be dumped into the country and be transformed into an equally wretched and miserable country proletariat. Besides, such an artificially created proletariat could not be made to stop. A cloud of usurers would descend on the country, and the British stage-peasants, after having eaten their cow, would as rapidly as possible raise enough money on their three acres to buy a ticket for Canada, and the British country districts would be left more desolate and more unproductive than before. Such an experiment would certainly end in failure. What Great Britain requires for the salvation of her agriculture is, in the first place, the gradual creation of a substantial peasant class, who work with their own hands on freehold agricultural properties of moderate size.

In every business a certain fixity of conditions is required to make it attractive. Where that fixity is lacking, a calculation of risks and chances is impossible, and business is turned into speculation. If the peasant has no land of his own, but has to pay rent, his heart is not in his work.

His improvements may eventually benefit the landlord. His rent may in bad seasons be so high as to ruin him, and in good seasons so low as to allow him to idle or to sublet his land. Hence agriculture under a tenant system lacks stability and security. The peasant or farmer will be turned into a speculator.

Politicians insufficiently acquainted with the real conditions of agriculture may, of course, devise an elaborate system for the fair and automatic adjustment of rents, and for securing to the cultivators at the end of their tenure the fruit of their labour, by suitable enactments. But such a system, which may look excellent on paper, would hardly work in practice. In the first place, it would be too complicated. In the second place, a huge and costly official machinery would have to be created, and the peasant would have to pay for mediating and adjusting service which would be productive of much costly litigation. Therefore a freehold peasantry must be created, and it can be created out of the greatly reduced army of rural labourers. Only then will Great Britain have again a sturdy, prosperous, and contented yeomanry as of old.

The creation of peasant freeholders should be accompanied by legislation abolishing the necessity of enclosing agricultural properties with hedges, fences, etc. Hedges give, no doubt, a peculiar charm to the landscape, but they constitute a very onerous burden for agriculturists. The expense of planting a hedge and of keeping it in order is very great. Besides, the agricultural ground which is wasted through hedges is not only the strip on which it grows ; for, as it is difficult to go close to the hedge with plough and harrow, two huge additional strips on both sides of every hedge around every enclosed field remain unproductive. Thus hedges and fences cause an enormous unnecessary expense and waste, which would be much increased if, through the creation of small holdings, hedges should be multiplied. In Great Britain, as in most other European countries, boundary stones at the corners of fields, together with carefully-kept local registers of rural pro-

perties, should suffice to show the limits of individual holdings, and should make the wasteful and primitive method of enclosing unnecessary. The fall of the hedges would diminish the picturesqueness of the country, but it would immediately enhance the value of our agricultural soil by many millions of pounds, and the men who now clip hedges may turn their hands from useless to productive labour.

In most countries of Europe the peasants were formerly landless serfs, who had to be liberated and to be enabled to acquire land by gradual payments spread over a number of years. Germany did so a century ago, and Great Britain will have to do likewise, for the continuance of the impossible tenant system means the extinction of agriculture. If England wishes to possess again flourishing rural industries she must begin at the base, and must first of all abolish her present system of land tenure, and replace it by the freehold system. She must begin by giving agriculture a stable, safe, and permanent basis. If the cultivator has ground of his own, he will love and cherish it. Otherwise, he will desert the country and either emigrate or come to the towns. Landowners will find it in their interests to sell gradually their land, instead of letting it to cultivators under a system which greatly benefits a host of unproductive and useless middlemen, whom landlords and tenants have to keep at a large expense to themselves.

British farmers complain of the insufficient number of rural labourers, and the lack of agricultural workers is so great that at harvest time swarms of town loafers migrate from the slums to the country, and these men are employed by the farmers, notwithstanding their utter unsuitability. In Germany, the army of agricultural labourers has not been shrinking, but it has increased, partly by the immigration of Russians, Austrians, Poles, etc. At the census of 1882 there were 5,763,970 rural labourers, male and female, in Germany. At the census of 1895, 5,445,924 agricultural hands were counted. At the census of 1907, 7,054,900 rural labourers of both sexes were counted. Of these almost

a million were foreigners who came into Germany for the harvest and went back to their homes across the frontier when winter came.

The increase in the number of rural labourers in Germany, in spite of the fact that machine power has largely supplanted men power and animal power, is very remarkable, and it is worth inquiring why the country population has remained almost stationary.

Two classes of agricultural workers have to be considered : farm servants, who are engaged for a term, and day labourers. The huge army of farm servants, male and female, is composed of the sons and daughters of small peasants, who send their children into service, partly in order that they should earn a living, partly in order that they should learn improved methods. The male farm servants expect to come, in course of time, into the freehold property of their parents, and therefore refuse to sacrifice a certain livelihood in the country to an uncertain one in the towns ; while the female farm servants naturally wish to work near their home and their friends. The day labourers also are partly the children of small peasants, and they refuse to leave the country in which they have a substantial stake ; partly are they small peasant proprietors, with properties of their own, which are so small that they have to accept some outside work in order to make a living. The following most interesting table gives a clear picture of the different status of agricultural day labourers in the east and in the west of Germany.

	Agricultural day labourers with land.	Agricultural day labourers without land.
Eastern Germany		
East Prussia . . .	12,935	154,777
Westphalia . . .	13,578	117,927
Pomerania . . .	14,475	111,457
Western Germany		
Rhenish Province . .	28,866	38,411
Hesse-Nassau . . .	12,172	15,744
Westphalia . . .	15,828	16,425

From the foregoing figures we see that the landless labourers, the agricultural proletariat, formed in the east of Germany, as they do in Great Britain, the overwhelming majority of agricultural hands, for in that part of Germany hardly one labourer out of ten had land of his own. On the other hand, in the Western Provinces, the day labourers who owned land and those who did not own land were about equal in numbers. In the Eastern Provinces, where huge estates owned by noblemen were to be found, the day labourers were considered merely as two-legged cattle, and were only too often treated as such. Therefore the whole interest of these landless labourers lay in their daily wages, and they left the country for the town in order "to better themselves," without hesitation. Therefore, it came that in the east of Germany the cry of lack of labour was just as loud as in Great Britain. The lack of rural labour both in east of Germany and Great Britain sprang evidently from the same cause—the landlessness of the labourers.

Many British landowners have been wise enough to give to their day labourers a stake in the country in the shape of a cottage and a plot of ground, and their labourers stay in consequence ; but the great proprietors in the east of Germany, instead of acting likewise, had the incredible heartlessness to clamour for legislation restricting the freedom of migration for rural labourers. In the west of Germany, where middle-sized, small, and very small farms were mixed, the scarcity of rural labour was much less in evidence. Happily for the employers of agricultural labour in Germany, the rural wages paid in Austria-Hungary and Russia were so low that every year an army of from 200,000 to 400,000 rural labourers flocked from Poland and Galicia into Germany. These temporary immigrants supplied the needful labour at the most critical time of the year, exactly as do the Italian labourers, who yearly migrate in hundred thousands into France, Switzerland, the United States, and Argentina for the harvest.

British agriculture must create a large number of peasant proprietors and peasant labourers, or employ in constantly

growing numbers slum-dwellers, who, of course, may be reinforced by immigrants from abroad. If British freeholders should not be created in large numbers as rapidly as possible, the agricultural work may have to be done by foreigners. The British population will almost exclusively live in the towns, and the national physique will still further deteriorate.

The possession of freehold land is not only most important to the farmer as an inducement to do his best, but it is also of great importance inasmuch as it attaches the rural workers to the soil.

In the manufacturing industries and in trade, young men are chiefly wanted. In advertisements it is frequently stated that men above forty or fifty years need not apply. Old men are almost useless for manual labour in towns, but they can find plenty of work in the country. According to a census which was taken on the 14th of June 1895, the proportion of agricultural labourers above fifty years in Germany was 15·80 per cent., while the proportion of industrial labourers above fifty years was only 9·30 per cent.; the proportion of agricultural labourers above sixty years was 7·31 per cent., whilst the proportion of industrial labourers above sixty years was only 2·93 per cent.; the proportion of agricultural labourers above seventy years was 1·94 per cent., whilst the proportion of industrial labourers above seventy years was only 0·53. From these figures it appears that the chance for old men to find employment in agriculture was in Germany from two to four times as great as their chance to find occupation in trade and in the manufacturing industries. In Great Britain, where town life and town work is more of a rush and scramble than in Germany, the chance of finding occupation for men above forty or fifty years should be from three to six times greater in agriculture than in the manufacturing industries and in trade. The nation might usefully employ on the land many thousands of old men who live now in the workhouse, and millions which are yearly spent in poor relief might be saved.

In the beginning of this chapter it has been explained that Germany's agriculture was very primitive at a time when the rural industries of Great Britain were advanced and most flourishing. When British agriculture was at the height of its success, the spirit of scientific inquiry and experiment arose, and the ambition to make improvements of every kind was very strong. Hence, French and German agriculturists and economists flocked to England to study and to copy her highly-advanced agricultural methods, which served as a model to all nations.

On the model of British agriculture the present prosperity of the agriculture of Germany and France was founded. Between 1798 and 1804, Albrecht Thaer published his celebrated work, *Introduction to the Knowledge of English Agriculture*, in three volumes, which was followed by a work in four volumes, entitled *The Fundamental Principles of Agriculture*, which was also based on his study of England's rural industries. These books became the German agriculturist's Bible. Honours were showered upon Thaer during his lifetime, and life-sized statues in marble and in bronze of the man who introduced British agricultural methods into Germany may now be found in Celle, in Leipzig, and in Berlin. Later on, Wilhelm Hamm's book, *The Agricultural Implements and Machines of England*, which was published in 1845 in Brunswick, exerted almost as great an influence as did Thaer's writings in Anglicising German agricultural methods.

Great Britain was the pioneer in the empiric methods of cultivation, in the introduction of improved machinery, and in making scientific agricultural experiments. Through the munificence of Sir John Lawes the experimental station of Rothamsted was founded in 1840, and eleven years later Germany followed his example by opening an experimental station at Möckern, near Leipzig. But while Great Britain opened her second experimental station more than thirty years after the creation of the Rothamsted establishment, Germany opened station after station in rapid succession. In 1856, two experimental stations were opened at Bonn

and at Breslau ; in 1857, three experimental stations arose in Göttingen, Dahme, and Munich ; in 1858, another institution was created in Insterburg ; and recently there existed no less than seventy experimental stations in Germany, where, by constant research and practical investigation, scientific agriculture was advanced, seeds and manures were tested, etc.

Great Britain was the first and the foremost nation in applying science to agriculture. Private enterprise was the pioneer, and has done wonders, but the isolated efforts, made by some munificent, unselfish, and patriotic individuals, have, on the whole, proved as ineffective as isolated efforts at making improvements are always apt to prove. On the other side of the Channel, the German Governments took up the ideas which they received from England. They exploited and applied them throughout Germany by means of the Government machinery, and encouraged scientific agricultural investigation with liberal grants. At the present moment, even Japan is probably far ahead of England in applying science to agriculture.

While Germany imitated this country in many respects, she struck out a line of her own by the work of Justus von Liebig. That great chemist published in 1840 his celebrated work, *Organic Chemistry applied to Agriculture and Physiology*, which proved revolutionary. If Liebig had lived in Great Britain, his work would have benefited only the far-seeing few, for the officials would have remained indifferent to his discoveries, even if they had understood their value. They would have left their exploitation and fruition to unaided private initiative. But the German Government took care that his brilliant discoveries should prove beneficial to the whole nation. Chemical investigation and tuition was promoted and spread by the liberal aid of the Governments which opened chemical laboratories and created chairs of Chemistry throughout Germany. Thus the chemical industry of Germany became the foremost in the world, and it proved of incalculable help to Germany's agriculture. The greatest chemists were, and

are still, Frenchmen and Englishmen. Nevertheless, Germany had the foremost chemical industry, because she had an enormous number of working chemists, and an organisation which favoured the exploitation of chemical and other inventions throughout the whole of the empire.

When the German chemists produced sugar from beet-roots, the West Indian planters laughed at the chemical sugar; but soon the German sugar industry stood supreme in the world, perhaps less because of the bounties which the Government granted than because of the improvements which the German chemists gradually effected both in agriculture and in the utilisation of the roots. How marvellously the German sugar industry improved with the assistance of the chemist may be seen from the substantial increase in the percentual yield of sugar. How great and how continuous this improvement has been, and how greatly the production of sugar has increased, may be seen from the following figures:

	Percentage of Raw Sugar extracted from Beet.	Production of Sugar in Germany.
1875–6 . . .	8·60 per cent.	358,048 tons.
1880–1 . . .	9·04 ,,	573,030 ,,
1885–6 . . .	11·85 ,,	838,105 ,,
1890–1 . . .	12·54 ,,	1,336,221 ,,
1895–6 . . .	14·02 ,,	1,637,057 ,,
1900–1 . . .	14·93 ,,	1,979,000 ,,
1905–6 . . .	15·27 ,,	2,400,771 ,,
1908–9 . . .	17·60 ,,	2,079,221 ,,
1909–10 . . .	15·80 ,,	2,037,397 ,,
1913–4 . . .	16·00 ,,	2,715,870 ,,

Without the marvellous improvements in the percentage of sugar extracted, the sugar production of Germany would certainly not have grown sevenfold since the year 1875–6 and have become by far the largest in the world. Recently the German raw sugar factories employed about 100,000 men during part of the year, while about 650,000 men were occupied with growing the roots, which represented a value of about £12,500,000. The sugar extracted was worth about £20,000,000 per annum, of which half was exported, and probably about £15,000,000 per annum was spent

in wages in the sugar industry. The tops of the roots were locally used for fodder, and the residue of the roots, from which the sugar had been extracted, was dried and sold for fodder which could be preserved through the whole year, and which represented a value of about £2,000,000. Thus the German chemists have, with the liberal assistance of the Government, artificially created this enormous and most valuable additional crop.

Evidently the policy of non-interference in business matters is not without its disadvantages, but discretion and knowledge is needed on the part of a Government which wishes to interfere in matters of business. If Great Britain wishes to apply science to industry and make it more than a fashionable and popular cry, the higher education must be reformed root and branch, and State aid must be forthcoming without stint. But not only must money be spent like water, it must be spent in the right direction, for England has fallen behind-hand in the organised pursuit, and especially in the organised application, of science. The cleverest chemists are of little service if, for lack of rank and file, their inventions are exploited abroad.

British education is, unfortunately, more ornamental than useful. Prussia alone had seven agricultural High Schools, where about 2,500 pupils were trained by 200 teachers. Before the War these High Schools were attended by 1,889 German students, and by no less than 524 foreigners. Evidently, these courses were very popular not only with German agriculturists, who, by the by, were very foolish not to keep their knowledge for themselves. The State aided these High Schools with grants of £37,000 per annum. Besides there were 200 ambulant lecturers provided by the State, who taught scientific agriculture. Furthermore, there were in Prussia 350 other agricultural schools, with 2,000 teachers and 25,000 pupils, and facilities were provided in every direction for spreading the scientific knowledge of agriculture far and wide. Many teachers in rural elementary schools voluntarily studied agriculture in the High Schools, in order to be able to teach some useful and

valuable things to the country children and their parents. The Prussian Ministry of Agriculture spent yearly about £200,000 on agricultural education in all its branches, and the sum-total spent by all the German Governments and local authorities in this direction amounted to about £500,000.

The general education in the rural districts of Great Britain is unfortunately too townified, and the little boys and girls are taught subjects at the schools which not only are useless, but which unfit the children for rural life. The boy who leaves the elementary schools has only too often been estranged from the country, and has been taught to turn up his nose at agriculture ; the girl aspires to a situation in town and the possession of a piano. Unfortunately, the mistakes which are made in primary education can never be rectified.

Co-operation for agricultural purposes first sprang up in England, but, owing to the indifference of the State, it did not spread. The lack of co-operation among British agriculturists is due not only to the indifference of the State and the insularity of the people, but also to the fact that every rural property is enclosed by a fence or a hedge in England and by stone walls in Ireland and Scotland. Not only are these hedges unnecessary and exceedingly wasteful, but they form a most effective barrier to progress, inter-communication, and co-operation. A farmer does not like to look over another man's fence, and he does not like his neighbour to look into his fields.

In Germany, in France, in Austria-Hungary, in Switzerland, and in other countries farmers do not work behind the screen of a hedge. They constantly observe one another, freely talk to one another, and a community of interest is established. Thus the co-operative movement could more easily develop in Germany than in England, especially as its extension was actively assisted by the Government, which saw in it a powerful factor for the advancement of agriculture.

Aided by the State and by the communities, co-operation

among the German agriculturists developed with ever-increasing rapidity. In 1890 there were in Germany 3,000 co-operative agricultural societies. In 1908 there were no less than 22,000 societies in existence. Of these, 16,092 were credit societies, 1,845 were societies for co-operative buying and selling, 2,980 were co-operative dairy societies and societies which deal with milk, and more than 1,000 associations were devoted to various purposes. How vast the number of these societies is in Germany may be seen from the fact that there is now on an average one co-operative society for every three hundred individual holdings.

There are numerous associations for building dykes against floods, for developing irrigation, for draining fields, drying swamps, acquiring bulls and stallions for breeding purposes, for milling and storing grain, for effecting insurance, etc., and in consequence small and poor farmers may have the use of steam ploughs, threshing machines, etc., at most moderate rates. Thus a comparatively small quantity of expensive agricultural machinery is made to do service to large numbers of peasants, much capital is saved, and small cultivators receive all the advantages which otherwise are only within the reach of wealthy landowners.

The State and local bodies assist in the formation of such associations, and often provide funds. Two or three small and poor local bodies agree to buy on joint account certain expensive machinery and hire it out by the day, while the State or individual provinces undertake larger works for the benefit of agriculture, such as the draining of the extensive marshes near the coasts of the Baltic and of the North Sea.

Perhaps the most important co-operative enterprise created by the State is the Preussische Centralgenossenschaftskasse, the Central Bank of Co-operative Associations. This huge bank, which was created in 1895, was meant to be the banker of the co-operative societies. It accepts deposits, grants loans, etc., and the State started it on its

career with a capital of £2,500,000 in cash. How great the service of that bank has been may be gauged from the fact that its turnover amounted to no less than £560,795,300 in 1908, and that it served as a bank to no less than 1,213,194 producers. The rate of interest charged by that institution is extremely low, and fluctuates, as a rule, between 3 per cent. and 4 per cent.

While agricultural co-operation in Germany is a powerful factor in the economic life of the nation, it figures in this country chiefly in the speeches of politicians, who very often have a somewhat hazy idea of the meaning of co-operation.

Apart from the co-operative associations, the rural industries of Germany possess numerous huge and powerful societies for improving the breed of horses and cattle, promoting the keeping of fowls, for growing hops and fruit, for keeping bees, etc. Many of these societies receive considerable subventions from the State.

The whole of the agricultural population of Germany is organised in some enormous political associations, Farmers' Associations and Peasants' Societies, which have about a million members. Through these associations the agricultural interest of Germany exercised some considerable influence in the Imperial Parliament, and in the various local Parliaments, while in England, the classical land of political organisation, agriculture is politically inarticulate, and therefore neglected—an unknown factor, a plaything, and a victim to the political parties and to local authorities, without a friend, without an advocate, and without a champion, especially as "the man in the street" is unfortunately a townsman. Had it not been for the powerful combinations of all the agriculturists, and for the determined agitation of their representatives in Parliament, the rural industries of Germany would certainly not have obtained the strong fiscal protection which they have enjoyed.

In Germany the consumer buys much agricultural produce directly from the producer. There are huge markets in all German towns, even in the very largest, and there

the peasants from the surrounding districts will be found offering their produce for sale. The charges made for the use of these markets is either purely nominal or *nil*. In Great Britain, where similar markets are known only in out-of-the-way places, the working man cannot buy agricultural products from the farmer, but has to purchase them from a shopman, who receives his goods from a wholesale dealer. Therefore it is not the British farmer only who has to maintain a host of unproductive middlemen ; the British consumer also has to maintain an army of unnecessary middlemen, which does not exist in Germany. In Germany, no thrifty housewife would dream of buying her vegetables, her fruit, her poultry, her eggs, her butter, etc., at a shop. She goes to the market for her supply. The turnover of the average greengrocer is very small, and as the goods are easily perishable, the shopman has to charge sometimes two, three, or four times the price which the producer receives. Therefore vegetables and fruit which are luxuries in England are the poor man's food in Germany.

In the biggest towns of Great Britain, and at the seaports where foreign agricultural produce arrives in huge quantities, and has to be sold quickly, food is cheap, and is often cheaper than it is in the country. In Germany, on the other hand, where duties on imported food are levied on arrival at the harbours, food is much cheaper in the country districts where it is raised. Hamburg, the German Liverpool, is the most expensive town in Germany. Families in reduced circumstances in Germany migrate to the country for cheapness, while people living in the country districts of Great Britain find it often cheaper to get their agricultural produce from London. The British towns have grown out of all proportion, not only because the chances of finding employment for labour and relief for the destitute are greater, and because there are no peasant proprietors in the country, but also because food is cheaper in town than in the village.

That agricultural products are cheaper in London than they are in the country is most unnatural and most un-

fortunate. This artificial cheapness is an additional cause of the ruin of agriculture. If we look at wholesale prices, food is so cheap in Great Britain that agriculture, which in selling its produce receives only the wholesale price, suffers; but if we look at the retail prices, we find the same products extremely dear, owing to the exactions of the middleman. The middlemen have spoiled the market for the rural industries. The rural industries should strive to bring producers and consumers together, and to eliminate those crowds of unproductive and unnecessary go-betweens who batten on the rural industries.

British agriculture suffers also from outrageously high transport charges. In Germany agricultural produce has to travel enormous distances by rail, and is carried cheaply. In Great Britain, where, owing to the size and happy configuration of the country, agricultural products need travel only trifling distances overland, railway carriage is often prohibitive to farmers. The railways are even allowed to exact far more from the British farmer than they charge to the State-protected and prosperous foreign agriculturists. Therefore it comes that American, Australian, and Continental fruit can be sold in London at a profit, while English fruit often rots on the trees not far from town. Foreign producers receive a greater bounty from the British railway companies in the shape of preferential railway rates than from their own Governments in the shape of fiscal protection.

In the congested towns, millions of poor are crying for cheap food, and in the country districts hundreds of thousands of farmers are crying for town prices for their vegetables, their meat, their fruit, etc. Yet the bitter cry of country and town remains unheard. Consumers and producers cannot meet because the railway companies stand between the two and exact a ruinous toll in the form of railway rates which are without a parallel in the world.

We have of late heard much of the deterioration of the national physique, and it cannot be doubted that the sturdy English race of former times is becoming almost extinct, and is being replaced by a puny, stunted, sickly, sterile,

narrow-chested, weak-boned, short-sighted, and rotten-toothed race. England's magnificent physique, which used to be the envy of all foreign nations, is rapidly disappearing, notwithstanding the fact that, according to the statistics, no nation in Europe consumes more meat per head of population than does Great Britain. But at the same time, no nation in Europe leads a more unnatural and a more artificial life. Out of one hundred Britons, no less than sixteen are Londoners, and almost four-fifths of the population live in towns. In Germany only three men out of one hundred live in Berlin.

Not only do four-fifths of the people live in unnatural surroundings, they are also unnaturally fed. Town mothers rarely have a sufficiency of good milk. Milk is a luxury, and pure milk is almost unobtainable. Hence, the poor town babies are brought up on artificially coloured, chemically treated, impure, and often adulterated cows' milk, on patent foods, etc., while country babies are usually brought up on their mothers' milk. Later on the town children, who had never a proper start and a fair chance, are to a large extent fed on tinned, chilled, frozen, chemically prepared, and adulterated agricultural products, which are imported from abroad. That a race which is brought up in such a manner is not a strong one cannot be wondered at. On the other hand in Ireland, where there is proportionately a huge agricultural population, by far the finest specimens of British manhood are to be found, although the Irish country population was until recently poor and chronically under-fed. The striking difference between the under-fed but country-bred Irishmen and the over-fed, town-bred Englishmen should give food for reflection.

German economists, statisticians, and generals have from time to time drawn attention to the physical deterioration of the population in the large German towns, and have made comparisons from which it is apparent that the birth-rate in the German towns is rapidly falling, and that townsmen in Germany are physically deteriorating and becoming sterile. Therefore Bismarck refused to allow Germany to

become a purely industrial State like England. He fostered the rural industries of Germany directly and indirectly, so as to preserve the strength and health of the nation, which, after all, is its most valuable asset.

The foregoing short sketch shows why Germany, which has a poor soil, an unfavourable climate, and an unfortunate geographical position and structure, and a somewhat dull-minded country population, possessed before the War a powerful, flourishing, and expanding agriculture, while Great Britain, which has the most fruitful soil in Northern Europe, a mild and equable climate, a most favourable geographical position and structure, an enterprising and energetic population, and a great agricultural past, had rural industries which had been decaying for decades. This chapter shows that the ills from which England's rural industries are suffering are not incurable. However, they can only be cured by a man of action and of determination, who is backed by a Government which is willing to lead.

Before all, the powerful agricultural interest must strive to gain power by combination. It must form a solid phalanx, and must assert its claims with energy in Parliament and before the local authorities, which only too often tax and worry agriculturists out of existence. If the agricultural interest remains politically formless, shapeless, voiceless, and inert, it will continue neglected. If it is united in mind and in purpose, the great political leader will be forthcoming who will make the cause of agriculture his own, and who is prepared to create conditions which will make the rural industries powerful and prosperous. England's latent agricultural resources are probably unparalleled in Europe. Great Britain may again become the envy and the model of all European nations by the unrivalled excellence and prosperity of her agriculture. But much hard work will have to be done to achieve such a result, which is worthy of a great statesman's ambition, for he who re-creates England's agriculture will regenerate the race.

CHAPTER XIV

THE RAILWAYS AND THE RAILWAY POLICY OF GERMANY [1]

At the beginning of the railway era, Great Britain pursued a vigorous national policy, while the Governments of divided Germany were cosmopolitan in theory and parochial in practice ; Great Britain was Protectionist, but Germany followed hazy ideas of Free Trade and Individualism ; Great Britain was truly a United Kingdom, in Germany Particularism was *in excelsis*, and German unity existed only in the minds of some German idealists ; Great Britain was progressive, active, and hustling, while Germany was backward, conservative, impractical, and indolent. Industry in Germany was incredibly behindhand. The country was peopled by peasants and professors. Berlin had 200,000 inhabitants, and large provincial towns did not exist.

When in 1825 Great Britain opened the celebrated Stockton-Darlington Railway, and started railway building with energy, Germany philosophised, gazed, and wondered. Only ten years later, Germany timidly followed England's lead by opening, on the 7th of December 1835, the Nuremberg-Fürth Railway, which was less than four miles in length. Only in 1838, when in this country 540 miles of railway were open to traffic, Prussia opened her first line from Potsdam to Zehlendorf, which was about thirteen miles long.

But in the same year which saw the birth of her first railway, Prussia passed a wise and far-seeing law, the law of the 3rd of November 1838, by which the State gave the greatest liberty to enterprising individuals to build railways,

[1] From the *Contemporary Review*, October 1905.

but reserved to the State an adequate control over their construction and management and over fares, freight rates, etc. It laid down that the State was entitled to take over private railways after thirty years at a valuation based on the actual capital outlay, and provided that fares and freights had to be proportionately lowered whenever the net profit of railway companies should exceed 10 per cent. on the capital actually invested. Great care was taken to safeguard Prussia's national interests and to protect them against the railway companies. This law remained for a long time a dead letter. The State did not expropriate private railways.

In the beginning of the railway era, the economic views of the German Government were tinged by philosophy, philanthropy, and romantic cosmopolitanism. They were guided by abstract principles, beautiful theories, and sentimental reasons, not by practical, cold-blooded business considerations. Germany was still a land of dreamers and visionaries. Hence the voice of that great economic reformer, Friedrich List, who passionately pleaded for a "national" economic policy, was a voice crying in the wilderness. He was hounded out of Germany by the advocates of official indolence and indifference, scientifically called "Non-interference," and, disappointed, abused, persecuted, and impoverished, he shot himself in 1846. Truly, no prophet is honoured in his own country during his lifetime. Now the nation has erected a monument to the man who was the intellectual originator of Bismarck's protective policy and of his railway policy.

List's *magnum opus*, *The National System of Political Economy*, appeared in 1840 ; but already in 1833, two years before the miniature railway from Nuremberg to Fürth was opened, that far-seeing man wrote, *On a Saxon Railway System as the Basis of a German Railway System*, and in 1838, the year when Prussia built her first railway, he published *The National Transport System*. List was greatly in advance of his time. Although his strenuous recommendations to organise railway transport and to develop industries in

Germany on a national basis with the assistance of the State were little heeded by the doctrinaire politicians of his time, List had at least the satisfaction that, owing to his agitation, the Saxon Government assisted the building of the first Saxon railway from Leipzig to Dresden, which had the respectable length of almost seventy miles. Saxony allowed the railway to issue 500,000 thalers, or about £75,000, in bank-notes.

Railways were to Germany a British invention, and Germany imported with the invention not only British railway materials, locomotives, etc., but also the British idea that the State should by no means interfere with industrial freedom or engage in business pursuits. Guided by axioms which were suggested to British professors of political economy by the late Mr. Cobden and his satellites, Brunswick, which in 1838 built the first State railway in Germany, the line Brunswick-Wolfenbüttel, sold it in 1869 to a private company, from which it was purchased by the Prussian State in 1880.

The railway systems of Great Britain and of Germany are fundamentally different. While in England all the railways are private companies, more than nine-tenths of the German railways are owned, managed, and directed by the various German Governments. In Germany, as in England, the railway interest, the majority of the professors of political economy, the Liberal Party, and a large proportion of the officials were in favour of unrestricted private ownership, and to them Great Britain served as an ideal and a model. Hence it is worth while to take note of the weighty considerations which caused the German States to buy, at a gigantic figure and at more than their then market value, practically the whole of the country's railways and to incur the enormous and onerous responsibilities of managing and extending them.

Up to the 'seventies the German States had not pursued a settled and well-planned railway policy, but had acted in accordance with the requirements of the moment. When private enterprise came forward, railways were built by

limited companies ; but in cases when important strategical or commercial railway lines were not undertaken by private builders, the Government either assisted private companies or built the lines itself. In consequence of the different policies which had been followed in the different German States, the organisation of Railway Germany was as confused as was that of Political Germany. There existed independent private companies over which the State had some control and railways which were run and completely controlled by the State. Freights were dear, rates were uncertain, railway business was exceedingly complicated and involved, and in many instances railway charges were fixed on the principle, "Charge what the traffic will bear." Where there was competition, freights were cheap ; where there was no competition, the people had to suffer at the hands of the railways, which demanded the uttermost farthing ; where there were feuds between railway companies, direct travel and the speedy dispatch of goods were often impeded by the trickery of the contending railways. Owing to the arbitrariness and the exactions of the railways, and the uncertainty of the constantly fluctuating rates, business suffered severely.

The year 1879 was a memorable one for Germany. It witnessed both the birth of Protection and the rise of the magnificent system of the German State Railways. In 1876 Bismarck had tried to initiate both these measures for developing the foreign trade of the country and for regulating its railway traffic. In the same year in which Prince Bismarck penned the sentence "*Nothing but reprisals*[1] against their products will avail against those States which increase their duties to the harm of German exports," and took steps to introduce a protective tariff, he also tried to protect the German producer against the exactions of the German railway companies by proposing to transfer the railways from the hands of private owners and of the individual States to the German Empire. However, in 1876 both attempts failed. Germany was not yet ripe for Pro-

[1] The italics are in the German original.

tection, and several of the minor States of Germany were unwilling to hand over their railways to the Empire. When recommending the transfer of the railways of Germany to the Imperial Government, Bismarck said on the 26th of April 1876 :

". . . Germany is divided into sixty-three railway provinces, or rather territories, which are endowed with all territorial and feudal rights and privileges, including the right of making war ; and the railway boards avail themselves of these privileges, and even make wars against one another, which cost much money, for the sake of power and as a kind of sport.

" In my opinion, the railways are intended rather to serve the requirements of trade than to earn a profit for their owners. The profits which the individual States derive from the railways owned by them, or which are distributed to shareholders in the shape of dividends in the case of private companies, are rightly considered a national taxation which the State would be entitled to impose, but which is paid not to the State but to the shareholders in private concerns. It should be our aim to see that that taxation is not oppressive, but that it stands in due relation to the requirements and the means of the railway users, that it is financially just. . . ."

On the 1st of January Bismarck issued the following interesting opinion as to the right of the State to withdraw the privileges which it had previously granted to the private railway companies. Bismarck wrote :

" Railways were meant to be, and are, instruments for conveying the national traffic, and they were given their far-reaching privileges and they were constructed in order to serve the public and general interest. Therefore their character as profit-earning instruments may be taken into consideration only in so far as that character is compatible with the general welfare, which has to be considered first and foremost. Hence the right of constructing and exploiting railways can be considered only as temporary, and their eventual purchase by the Government is a matter of course."

In the same year Bismarck issued an interesting document in which he summed up the evils caused by the private ownership of railways, as follows :

" 1. Unnecessarily high working expenses and correspondingly high charges in consequence of the multiplicity of railway boards, managers, offices, and the unnecessary duplication of lines, stations, material, rolling-stock, etc.

" 2. Chaos of freight charges, there being 1,400 different tariffs which are constantly changing, which are unclear, and which make trade an uncertain and speculative venture.

" 3. Because direct travel of passengers and goods over the whole railway system of the country is often impeded with the object of harming competing railway systems, and consequently much damage is done to trade and industry."

The steps which Bismarck took in 1876 in order to introduce Protection and to bring the German railways under the direct and absolute control of the Imperial Government were somewhat half-hearted. Possibly they were meant to be merely preparatory ; but in 1879 Bismarck opened his campaign in favour of Protection and for the acquisition of the Prussian railways by the Prussian State in real earnest and with his usual skill and energy. It was a very difficult matter to make these two enormous measures acceptable to the Governments of the individual States and to a majority in the German Parliament, but his arguments proved convincing both to the high officials of the allied States and to the elected representatives of the people. It is worth while to take note of Bismarck's principal arguments in favour of his anti-individualistic policy ; for in that year Germany broke for good with British traditions, and refused to follow any longer the *laissez-faire* policy of England.

Bismarck opened his railway campaign by writing on the 3rd of January the following letter to Messrs. Hofmann, Friedenthal, and Maybach, who were the Prussian Ministers for trade, home affairs, and railways :

" I intend to raise the question whether it be not necessary to regulate the railway tariffs by imperial law. . . . The fact

that such far-reaching public interests as the transport business of railways is left to private companies and to individual railway boards which are free from any supervision by the State, and the fact that these companies are entitled to make their own interest their sole guide, finds no analogy in the economic history of modern times except in the way in which formerly a country's finances were farmed out to certain individuals. In view of this fact, I intend, after due investigation, to bring forward the question whether it is not possible to introduce, by means of imperial legislation, a uniform tariff on all the railways of Germany."

After having thus prepared his colleagues, he addressed a long letter to the German States, represented in the German Federal Council, of which the following abstract gives the chief points of interest:

"The regulation of freights on railways, which are public roads, is of far-reaching importance for the economic interests of the nation, and nobody must be damaged or be artificially limited in their use. The Government will no longer be able to abstain from promoting the public interest by creating those conditions which are necessary for the requirements of our national industries. The railways are public roads for traffic, but can be used only by one corporation. By granting to these corporations certain privileges, such as that of expropriation, of police and of raising capital, the State has ceded to the railways part of its power. This part of its power was ceded to the railways not in the interest of the proprietors of the railways, but in that of the general public. Therefore it follows that the management of a railway cannot be left entirely to the discretion of the railway companies themselves. Their management must be regulated in accordance with the requirements of the public and with an eye to the public welfare.

"Therefore it follows that railway charges must not be fixed solely in order to obtain the largest possible profit. The State must not only consider the interest of the shareholders in determining railway freights, but it has also to see that the well-being of the population as a whole is fostered and promoted, and that thus the vitality of the nation will be strengthened.

"At any rate it means a damage to the interest of the community if a railway corporation takes no notice of these larger considerations. Hence the arguments which can be raised against the system of private railways as such are strengthened. Railways must not be allowed, by arbitrarily fixed tariffs, to develop industries in certain parts and to destroy other industries in other parts of the country. Even the most far-seeing railway directors cannot realise the consequences which a policy of discriminating tariffs may have later on, although such a policy may prove beneficial in the immediate future, and several railway boards have already begun to understand that it is not their vocation to act the part of Providence, to alter the natural conditions of demand and supply, and to dominate trade and industry, but that it is their duty to serve them.

"Starting from these considerations, it is clear that railway tariffs should correspond with the requirements of production and consumption, and should not be subject to violent fluctuation. They should, therefore—

"1. Be clear, and be drawn up in such a manner as to enable everybody to easily calculate the freight for goods sent.

"2. They should secure to all citizens in all parts of the country equality of railway charges.

"3. They should eliminate the disadvantages which at present weigh down the small producers.

"4. They should secure the abolishment of unnecessary, and therefore wasteful, services, and ensure the honesty of railway officials.

"These requirements are not fulfilled by the present tariff system."

After describing in detail the vast number of different tariffs and the confusion and injustice resulting from them, as well as the impossibility for traders to make a clear business calculation of railway charges, Prince Bismarck continues:

"Preferential tariffs are an injustice by the damage they do to those who are not preferentially treated, and the tendency of railways to differentiate not only locally but also to give cheaper freight to senders of large quantities may damage the national prosperity to a very great

extent. In order to secure large masses of goods, railways will go down below their normal rates, and will even work without a profit, and will thus favour the foreign producer at the cost of our home industries.

"The railways which have received from the State the monopoly of public transportation have the duty to treat all railway users alike ; but differential tariffs of this kind destroy the equal rights which all citizens should enjoy. Through the changes effected by the tariffs, the economic interests of the country become dependent upon the railway companies, and our home industries, and the possibilities which they have for selling their products, are subjected to constant changes which cannot take place without inflicting great damage upon individual interests.

"Those who argue that competition among railways cheapens freights overlook the fact that railways recoup themselves for their loss on competitive traffic by charging proportionately higher rates on non-competitive traffic ; and as railway competition brings cheap freights principally to the largest towns, railway competition leads to an unhealthy centralisation of trade and industry which economically and politically gives cause for concern.

"In order to avoid mutually ruinous competition, railways frequently combine and agree to direct the flow of traffic in certain fixed proportions over the various lines belonging to the combine. Hence goods are diverted from the shortest and most natural route and travel over artificially arranged roundabout routes, a proceeding which is opposed to the rational and economical dispatch of goods, and which increases the costs of transport.

"These unnatural conditions would be abolished if the railways were obliged to charge standard rates and to send freight on normal routes, if unnecessary competition was abolished, and if the artificially diverted streams of traffic would again be brought back to their natural routes.

"The foregoing statement shows that an improvement can only be effected by insisting upon the principle that the railways are meant for the service of the nation. In railway matters changes are taking place which have already been observed in the general development of nations. New economic factors have arisen, and have grown up without State interference, but soon the interest in these institutions has become so great and so general that their further direc-

tion can no longer safely be left to the egotism and arbitrariness of irresponsible individuals, but must be brought into harmony with the general interests of the country."

Addressing Parliament, Prince Bismarck said :

". . . Did formerly anybody trouble whether the introduction of railways ruined the coaching industry and the innkeeper ? The railway monopoly is to my mind far more unjust than was that of the coaching industry, for the railway monopoly actually means the farming out of a province to a railway company. This monopoly arose naturally when all other means of transport had been killed by the railways. Every one who had goods to send or to receive fell into the hands of the railways, and these acted in exactly the same manner as did the Fermiers Généraux who impoverished France before the Revolution, for they also were given a large part of the country, and were allowed to exploit it at their will. The object of the railways is to squeeze out of the country the largest possible dividends. This is an extraordinary abuse of the tax-paying and traffic-requiring community which favours those capitalists who were given the traffic monopoly that accrued to the railways. . . ."

Following the lead given by his great chief, the Minister of Railways, Maybach, declared on the 8th of November 1879, before Parliament :

". . . As regards the tariff policy of railways, I am of opinion that railway charges should be fixed in accordance with the requirements of the country ; and if it be necessary to give the second place either to the national interest or to the railway interest, I am inclined to give the second place to the railway interest. The system of private railways has been imported from England, but it does not suit Prussia. Prussia requires State railways. It is our aim to take the railways out of the hands of speculators, and to make them truly national for the defence of the country and for the development of its prosperity."

Privately Bismarck remarked, in 1879, that it would be his ideal that all goods imported from abroad should be

transported over the German railways at somewhat higher rates than those of home production, for he could not allow that the fiscal Protection which he had introduced in 1879 should be neutralised by preferential freight rates given to the foreigner. As a matter of fact, he expected that the preferential tariffs given on the German railways for German industrial and agricultural products would be more effective in protecting the home industries, and increasing their strength and prosperity, than would be the moderate fiscal Protection which he had introduced.

When the foregoing weighty arguments had prepared the ground, a Bill for taking over the railways was brought out on the 29th of October 1879, and the Mémoire accompanying it laid down the following general principles :

"Among the various forms in which railways have been developed in civilised countries, the system of State railways pure and simple is the only one which is able to fulfil in the most satisfactory manner all the tasks of a national railway policy, by creating uniformity throughout the country and equality for all, and by promoting equally the welfare of all interested in railways. Only in the case of State railways is it possible to utilise to the full and in the most thorough manner the enormous capital invested in railways ; only in the case of State railways is it possible to give direct and effective protection to the public interest which is the Government's duty ; lastly only in the case of State railways is it possible to establish a simple, cheap, and rational railway tariff, to effectually suppress harmful differentiation, and to create a just, diligent, and able administration which is solely guided by considerations of the general good. Therefore the State railway system must be considered as the final development in the evolution of the railway system."

In his economic policy, Bismarck left the traditional course which statesmen had followed hitherto. With great boldness he broke with the doctrines of Free Trade, non-Interference, and Individualism, which were almost universally accepted. He deliberately returned to the economic policy of Oliver Cromwell and Colbert, and

revived, or rather re-created, the mercantile system, to the horror of all professors of political economy. The world has gradually been going back to the Mercantile system, owing to Bismarck's economic reform of 1879, although the professors of political economy have not yet discovered this curious phenomenon.

According to economic theories which still enjoy great prestige in England, State interference in economic matters is a sure road to national ruin. Many text-books "prove" that a State or municipal corporation is, *per se*, not fit to engage in industrial pursuits. However, it does not follow that governmental and municipal enterprise in matters economic is bound to be a failure, because British Government departments and municipalities which engage in industrial pursuits are usually red-tape bound, amateurish, and ignorant of business.

Immediately after 1879, Prussia rapidly bought up all the more important lines, and within a few years the State more than trebled its railway property.

MILEAGE OF RAILWAYS OF PRUSSIA

	State Railways.	*Private Railways.*	*Total.*
1879	6,323·6 kils.	13,650·1 kils.	19,973·7 kils.
1880	11,455·3 ,,	8,893·1 ,,	20,348·4 ,,
1881	11,584·6 ,,	9,159·2 ,,	20,743·8 ,,
1882	14,825·6 ,,	6,329·8 ,,	21,155·4 ,,
1883	15,301·1 ,,	6,604·2 ,,	21,905·3 ,,
1884	19,766·9 ,,	3,002·6 ,,	22,769·5 ,,
1885	21,138·4 ,,	2,496·6 ,,	23,635·0 ,,

In five years the State turned from a small railway manager and owner to a railway monopolist. The Prussian Government did not go to sleep once it had acquired the railways, but extended them most energetically, as follows :

MILEAGE OF PRUSSIAN STATE RAILWAYS

1885	21,138 kils.
1895–6	25,214 ,,
1900	27,513 ,,
1909	33,217 ,,
1913	35,301 ,,

The activity and progressiveness of a railway system are apparent not only by its length and growth, but also by its equipment. The magnificent palatial railway stations of Germany are well known. But it is not so well known how rapidly the rolling-stock has increased since the year when almost the whole of the railways were brought into the possession of the State.

	Locomotives.	*Passenger Cars.*	*Freight and Luggage Cars.*
1879	7,152	10,828	148,491
1884–5	8,367	13,063	174,157
1889–90 . . .	9,425	15,177	194,705
1894–5 . . .	10,991	18,391	231,266
1900–1 . . .	13,267	24,225	303,364
1907	17,177	32,755	377,549
1909	19,171	37,243	411,945

During the thirty years following the creation of the State railways, the rolling-stock of the country practically trebled. Improved material was introduced everywhere; travelling was made infinitely more safe, more comfortable, and more rapid on the State railways than it ever was on the old private lines, and owing to the introduction of more powerful engines, larger freight cars, etc., haulage became far more economical and efficient. Before the War goods trains in Germany conveyed, as a rule, more than twice the weight which they carried in England; but an exact comparison cannot be made, because the British railways do not publish ton-mile statistics, which would glaringly show their inefficiency. While the most common truck in Great Britain holds about ten tons, that mostly used in Germany carries fifteen tons. The German goods trains haul a smaller dead-weight, and are therefore much more economical than are English toy trains pulled by toy engines, and composed of insufficiently loaded toy trucks.

How rapidly the freight and passenger business on the German railways has expanded since they came into the possession of the State may be seen from the following statistics:

	Passenger Kilometres	*Ton Kilometres*
1879	3,797,172,000	8,644,625,000
1884–5	5,083,700,000	12,414,712,000
1889–90	6,903,526,000	16,142,648,000
1894–5	8,763,723,000	18,162,727,000
1900	14,310,204,000	27,434,536,000
1908	21,331,413,729	38,187,612,343
1910	25,221,995,000	42,538,085,000

The following have been the profits earned on the total capital of all the railways of Prussia:

1869	6·5 per cent.
1874	4·4 ,,
1879	4·9 ,,
1884–5	4·9 ,,
1889–90	6·2 ,,
1894–5	5·6 ,,
1900	7·0 ,,
1905	7·4 ,,
1908	6·3 ,,
1910	6·5 ,,

Under private management the railway profits were stagnant or retrogressive. They became rapidly progressive after the railways had in 1879 been taken over by the State. A profit of 6 to 7 per cent. on the whole railway capital is a result of which an English railway director might perhaps dream, but would not think, for the net receipts of all the British railways have fluctuated for so many years between 3 and 4 per cent. that 4 per cent. appears now an ideally high return on the total British railway capital. As Prussia borrowed the money with which she bought the railways by means of loans, returning about 3½ per cent., the State made every year on its railways an immense profit, which flowed into its exchequer.

The railway-using public desires that the conveyance of passengers and goods should be quick, convenient, punctual, equitable, and cheap. These five requirements are well fulfilled by the German State railways. Although before the War a few show trains on British lines were faster than the show trains on German lines, the average speed of

passenger trains was, according to a high German authority, considerably greater in Germany than in Great Britain. The German lines were no doubt more convenient than the British lines, owing to the unity and uniformity of their traffic arrangements, trains, time-tables, etc. Tickets issued from one town to another were, as a rule, available on the different lines connecting the two towns.

In Great Britain it requires years of travel and of careful observation to learn one's way across the country, and its numerous lines, and to avoid the many pitfalls which are everywhere placed in the way of the inexperienced. In Germany, such pitfalls do not exist, and the greatest simpleton will travel as cheaply, as comfortably, and as rapidly all over the country as the most cunning commercial traveller. On many British lines, and especially on those south of London, trains appear to be late on principle. In Germany, railway trains used to arrive, in nineteen times out of twenty, to the minute, because the Government punished severely those responsible for delay.

On British railways people are not equitably and not equally treated. Individuals who can "influence freight" are often able to extort favours from certain railways, and the amount of freight charged is largely a matter of negotiation and of influence. The British merchant cannot tell beforehand what the freight will come to unless he inquires. The British railways charge on freight "what the traffic will bear"—that is, they put on the screw till the victim shrieks or goes bankrupt. They are, no doubt, to a great extent guilty of the ruin of agriculture and of certain industries. A reliable guide to the freight charges does not exist, and it could not be compiled, for the freight charges per mile, for the identical goods and even on the same line, vary in almost every town. Therefore a complete freight tariff for Great Britain would probably be bulkier than the *Encyclopædia Britannica*. Besides, freights fluctuate constantly. Consequently, the British trader who has to send goods by railway works in absolute uncertainty, and when he sends his goods carriage forward, the chance is that the

railway company levies an extortionate toll at the other end, and the trader loses his customer. This is particularly often the case when goods are sent abroad, for the foreign customer believes himself to be swindled when seeing the high railway charge, and feels inclined to give his business to a German exporter, whose freight charge is moderate and not a matter of speculation.

The German State railways have largely contributed to the prosperity of the German industries; the British railways have largely contributed to the stagnation and decline of the British industries. In Great Britain trade policy is made by the railways, which, without consulting the traders, prescribe the course of trade, stimulating it here and stifling it there. But the greatest injustice under which the British producer suffers is that the British railways are allowed to convey foreign produce more cheaply than the British. Thus they directly subsidise the foreigner to the harm of the native producer. They support foreign industries on the principle, "On British produce we charge what we can, on foreign produce what we may; British produce has to come to us, foreign produce has to be attracted." Unfortunately, redress for those who are injured is very difficult, very costly, and almost impossible.

The German freight tariff is of the greatest simplicity. There are only a few classes of goods, and every trader possesses a little book by means of which the office-boy can calculate in a moment the exact amount of the freight charges for any weight between any two stations. Freight charges in Germany are as uniform, as generally known, and as simple as are postal charges. They are not determined by negotiation, or by influence, and the goods of the foreigner which compete with German goods are not carried at a lower, but at a higher, rate than the native produce. But foreign raw material is carried cheaply. Thus Bismarck's ideal mentioned in the foregoing has been fulfilled.

While the British railways raise fares and freights at every opportunity, the fares and freight charges of the German

State railways have steadily been going down, as the following figures show :

RECEIPTS OF THE GERMAN RAILWAYS (per ton kilometre)

	Goods by fast train. pfennigs.	*Goods by ordinary train. pfennigs.*
1893 . . .	24·47	3·79
1896 . . .	24·09	3·79
1899 . . .	21·75	3·57
1902 . . .	17·01	3·52
1909 . . .	16·52	3·51
1913 . . .	17·97	3·58

RECEIPTS OF THE GERMAN RAILWAYS (per passenger kilometre)

	1st Class. *pfennigs.*	2nd Class. *pfennigs.*	3rd Class. *pfennigs.*	4th Class. *pfennigs.*
1893 . . .	7·87	4·96	2·94	1·99
1896 . . .	7·94	4·71	2·76	1·98
1899 . . .	7·75	4·66	2·69	1·96
1902 . . .	7·33	4·48	2·67	1·89
1909 . . .	7·48	4·06	2·54	1·85

In Great Britain the maximum charge for third-class travelling was before the War 1*d.* per mile, and in nine cases out of ten the full maximum rate was charged. In Germany the lowest class is the fourth class, where the average charge was ⅜*d.* per mile, while the charge for third class was about ½*d.* per mile. But travelling first class was much dearer than in England. In Germany, the poor man travelled cheaply, while in England the rich man travelled cheaply.

Unfortunately, the German statistics of passenger charges and freight charges per mile cannot be compared with similar British statistics, because comprehensive British statistics are not issued by the British railway companies, for reasons best known to themselves. The British railways publish neither these statistics nor their freight charges. In 1884 Sir Henry Calcraft and Sir Robert Giffen, assistant secretaries of the Railway and Statistical Departments, regretted that " It is impossible to show what is the receipt per ton per mile." In 1886 Mr. J. S. Jeans read a paper on Railway Traffic before the Statistical Society, in which he said :

"The average transport charges may be ascertained for every European country except our own, as regards both goods and passenger traffic. In Great Britain the railways, whether by accident or by design, have hitherto contrived to make it impossible for the public to discover the average charges for the transport of either the one or the other, for any one railway or for the country as a whole."

The demand has frequently been raised by the public that the railways should publish their charges and their earnings per ton mile and per passenger mile, etc. But although the railways have, through their advocates in the press, written and argued a great deal, they continue to work in that congenial obscurity which they find, apparently, most conducive to the conduct of their business.

The German States pursued a truly national railway policy. Railways were built where they were wanted by the population or by the State, even if they did not pay; for the German State monopolist considered himself as the servant of the nation and as the trustee of its interests, and not the nation as the milch-cow of the railway department. Hence, the German States have encouraged the building of canals and have in no way interfered with the building of electrical trams, while the railways in the classical country of Freedom and Non-interference have nefariously closed the canals and have obstructed the building of electrical tramways.

If we compare the capital of the German and the British railways, we find that the British railway capital per mile is almost two-and-a-half times as large as is the German railway capital. The inflated capital of the British railways hangs like a millstone round their necks, and here we have one of the chief reasons why fares and freights are high in this country and low in Germany, and why railway profits are large in Germany and small in Great Britain.

British railway capital was not always as unwieldy as it

is now, but has gradually become so, as the following figures prove :

CAPITAL OF BRITISH RAILWAYS

	Miles of Railway Open.	*Total Capital.*	*Capital per Mile.*
1861 . . .	10,865	£362,327,000	£33,335
1871 . . .	15,367	552,680,000	35,944
1881 . . .	18,175	745,528,000	41,019
1891 . . .	20,191	919,425,000	45,542
1901 . . .	22,078	1,195,564,000	54,152
1910 . . .	23,387	1,318,500,000	56,377

No doubt a large part of this colossal sum of now about £60,000 per mile has been spent properly, but perhaps an equally large part represents promoter's plunder, water, and, before all, "improvements" for necessary renewals, repairs, etc., which are, whenever possible, feloniously charged to capital account, instead of being paid out of earnings.

The German State railways have pursued a more conservative financial policy, as the following table shows. When they were in private hands, they also increased their capital year by year, though their financial excesses were comparatively small.

CAPITAL OF GERMAN RAILWAYS

1871	Marks	220,300 per kilometre.
1873	,,	242,300 ,,
1875	,,	249,200 ,,
1877–8	,,	265,000 ,,
1882–3	,,	265,400 ,,
1887–8	,,	255,100 ,,
1892–3	,,	253,200 ,,
1902	,,	258,800 ,,
1909	,,	288,700 ,,

The British railways were heavily handicapped from the beginning by the extortions of the landowner, the promoter, and the lawyer. The German railways also suffered at the promoter's hands, but they got at least their ground cheaply. Of the Prussian railway capital only 9·87 per cent. was

spent on account of land. Hence, land accounts on an average for a capital outlay of only about £2,000 per mile on the German railways, while the British railways had to buy land at fancy prices. The law expenses also were low in Germany, while they were extortionate in England. The law costs in respect of the London, Brighton, and South Coast Railway are said to have come to £4,806 per mile, and those of the Manchester-Birmingham Railway to £5,190 per mile. Apparently, it often cost British railways much more to acquire their title than it cost German railways to acquire their land. These are some of the disadvantages of unrestrained individualism, which is favoured by the policy of *laissez-faire*. *Laissez-faire* means, unfortunately, only too often, *laissez-méfaire*.

Three hundred years ago, Lord Bacon wrote: "There are three things which make a nation great and prosperous: a fertile soil, busy workshops, and easy conveyance for men and commodities from one place to another." Colbert, the father of the Mercantile System, left a beautiful saying: "The most precious thing which a State possesses is the labour of its people." All parties should combine to protect the labour of the British people, and to promote actively the industrial welfare of the nation. The policy of Non-interference has had its day. Who restricts labour destroys life; who increases production makes a nation great and prosperous. That is the lesson of the German railways and of Bismarck's railway policy.

When, on the 24th of February 1881, Prince Bismarck was told by the leader of the Radical Party that his economic policy was unsound, unscientific, opposed to economic principles and traditions, the Prince did not quote political economists to support his policy, but retorted: "For me there has always been one single aim and one single principle by which I have been guided: *Salus publica*." May that also be the guiding-star of all those politicians who have the economic regeneration of Great Britain at heart.

State railways have been a great success in Germany,

but whether they would be a success in a democracy, such as Great Britain, is an open question. They might become a prey to party politics. Party leaders bent upon obtaining votes might easily diminish their financial result and even destroy their efficiency.

CHAPTER XV

WATERWAYS AND CANALS [1]

Up to 1914 England's most active and most dangerous industrial rival was Germany. British merchants and manufacturers often asserted, not without reason, that the German industries were so exceedingly successful largely because they enjoyed cheap transport facilities.

The natural conditions for cheap transport in Great Britain and Germany are totally different, but they are not by any means in favour of Germany. A glance at a map of Europe will prove this assertion to be true. The greatest industrial and exporting centres of Imperial Germany were the following: The Rhenish-Westphalian centre, with the towns of Dortmund, Gelsenkirchen, Ruhrort, Barmen, Elberfeld, Essen, Bochum, Düsseldorf, Cologne, Aix-la-Chapelle, etc.; the Alsatian centre, with Mulhouse, Gebweiler, Dornach, Colmar, etc.; the various centres situated in the Palatinate, Hesse, Baden, Würtemberg, and Bavaria, with the towns of Höchst, Ludwigshafen, Carlsruhe, Mannheim, Offenbach, Frankfort, Reutlingen, Bamberg, Nuremberg, etc.; the centre in the Saxonies, with Chemnitz, Glauchau, Zwickau, Plauen, Greiz, Gera, Dresden, Leipzig, etc.; and the Berlin district. In the north of Germany, near the sea border, there were practically no industrial towns. Bremen, Hamburg, Kiel, Lübeck, Stettin, Dantzig, Königsberg, did some manufacturing, but they could hardly be called manufacturing towns. The manufacturing districts were to be found in Central, and especially in Southern, Germany, far from the sea. If we draw a straight line from

[1] From the *Contemporary Review*, December 1914.

the Rhenish-Westphalian centre, which was chiefly devoted to the coal and iron industries, to its nearest harbour, Antwerp, the distance, according to the towns chosen, came to 100 to 150 miles. Berlin was separated by 90 miles of land from the sea. All the manufacturing towns belonging to the other centres were separated from their nearest harbour or from the sea border by a distance of from 200 to 350 miles. The German industries as a whole were carried on at an average distance of more than 200 miles from their harbours.

If we now look at a map of Great Britain, we find that its industrial towns are in most instances situated either on the sea or a few miles inland. They are carried on as a rule not further than 10, 20, or 30 miles from the sea border, and the maximum distance which need be considered, and which is altogether exceptional, is 60 miles in a straight line. Consequently the raw materials imported from abroad by sea and used in manufacturing, such as cotton, wool, ores, metals, wood, etc., and the articles for the consumption of the industrial workers, the prices of which indirectly affect the cost of manufacturing, such as wheat, flour, meat, petroleum, etc., had to travel a distance which in Germany was from eight to ten times as long as in Great Britain. The industrial products exported, also, had in Germany to be transported inland eight or ten times the distance which they had to travel in Great Britain.

While Inverness, Aberdeen, Dundee, Perth, Glasgow, Edinburgh, Greenock, Newcastle-on-Tyne, Sunderland, Middlesbrough, Stockton-on-Tees, Bristol, Cardiff, Swansea, Manchester, Preston, Barrow-in-Furness, London, Belfast, etc., can manufacture on the very sea border, their German competitors, the shipbuilding industry of course excepted, had to labour more than 100 miles inland. But even the German shipbuilding industry was at a great disadvantage, for it also had to rely on the far-away industrial Hinterland for a large part of its supplies, notably coal and iron. The natural advantages of Great Britain were so immensely

in its favour that the German industries would have been incapable of competing with the British industries had the enormous advantages which their geographical position offers been fully utilised.

Germany was very heavily handicapped by nature in the race for industrial success, and the position of most Continental countries was similarly unfavourable. The manufacturing industries of France, Italy, Austria-Hungary, and Russia, also, are carried on far inland. Lyons lies 160 miles from the sea; the distance between Milan and Genoa is only 80 miles, but Italy has no coal; the manufacturing towns of Bohemia are 300 miles distant from their harbour, and Lodz in Russian Poland is separated by 170 miles from the coast. One might almost say that in Europe the industries are situated in the centre of the Continent, with the exception of Great Britain, where they are placed on, or close to, the sea border. Therefore Great Britain might again acquire and maintain the industrial monopoly, or at least industrial predominance, in Europe should she avail herself of her most favoured position.

As industrial Germany was thus heavily handicapped, its industries required for their success a practical, business-like education, the application of science to industry, thrift, and a comprehensive and efficient system of cheap transport whereby to bridge over the long distances which separate the numerous interdependent industrial centres from one another and which part these centres from the sea.

In the Middle Ages the foreign trade of Germany relied chiefly on her waterways. The Valley of the Rhine was the highway over which for more than 1,000 years the commerce flowed between the Orient and Great Britain, going *viâ* Italy, Switzerland, and the towns of Flanders and Holland. Before the age of steam and of machinery, the German industries flourished in the towns on the Rhine, Elbe, and Danube, and their tributary streams. Their prosperity was founded on cheap water transport. Nature and tradition pointed to the waterways for Germany's

prosperity, and modern Germany resolved to extend the use of her historic waterways to the uttermost, notwithstanding the example of Great Britain.

When the railways were introduced, Great Britain ceased to extend her system of waterways. Her canals, which had been the foremost in Europe, and which used to be the admiration and envy of foreign nations, were declared to be useless by the promoters of railways and their friends, and the nation weakly and foolishly allowed its canals to fall into decay at the bidding of those interested in railways. One of the greatest German authorities on inland navigation wrote in a most important book on *Inland Navigation in Europe and North America*, compiled by order of the Minister of Public Works, which was published in 1899 :

"The artificial waterways of England are the oldest in Europe. . . . Next to Sweden and Finland, Great Britain possesses the closest net of water-courses in Europe, and she is exceedingly favoured by nature for inland transport by water owing to the climatic conditions prevailing, the plenty and equal distribution of rain, and the mild winters usual in that country, as well as owing to the formation of the coast with its numerous inlets of the sea, which deeply penetrates from all sides into the land.

"With the arrival of railways, the building of canals ceased almost completely in 1830. The railways were placed in a position in which they could easily destroy the canals. Through traffic on the most important canal routes had to pass through a number of different and independent canal systems. As soon as a railway succeeded in obtaining the control of an indispensable part of the canal route by purchase, lease, or traffic agreement, it took to destroying the traffic on the adjoining canals, either by enforcing maximum rates or by numerous other expedients. After having been damaged in this manner, canals were bought up cheaply by the railways, which used them for traffic which could not conveniently be handled by the railroads or they stopped the canal traffic altogether. The numerous independent canal companies possessed no central organisation, and when, in 1844, an organisation for combined defensive action was created, important parts of the canal system

were already in the possession, or under the influence, of the railways, and it was too late to oppose their further encroachments. In 1871 canal property had on an average fallen to one-third of its former value. Only in 1873 were the railways prohibited to close for traffic canals in their possession, or to allow them to fall into disrepair."

Germany had copied Great Britain in many ways, but she had not by any means copied her blindly. She refused to adopt Free Trade, notwithstanding the vigorous agitation of the Cobden Club and its professorial sympathisers in Germany. She declined to hand over the whole of her productive industries to the tender mercies of her transport industries, relying on the dogma of free competition, preached by the champions of Free Trade. She declined to let her agriculture be ruined. She firmly refused to let her canal system decay in the interest and at the bidding of the railways. Germany tried to develop all her industries harmoniously, and not to allow one or the other to become great and prosperous at the expense of the others.

Recognising the importance of cheap transport and of an alternative transport system, Germany steadily extended, enlarged, and improved her natural and artificial waterways, and kept on extending and improving them.

Since 1871 England has done practically nothing for inland navigation, for the Manchester Ship Canal is a sea canal. During the same period, Germany built about 1,000 miles of inland canals and immensely improved all her navigable rivers. The German-Austrian canals lately proposed or begun have a length of more than 1,500 miles, while their probable cost should exceed £50,000,000. The Rhine-Elbe Canal Bill of 1901, for instance, proposed the spending of £19,450,000 within fifteen years. The very cautious and very thrifty Government of Germany was willing to sink immense sums in canals, although they would prove exceedingly able competitors to the State railways. The monopolist State was deliberately creating a most powerful competition to itself.

Germany possesses a number of big rivers, but these were,

until a very recent period, in a state of neglect. They were natural water-courses with a natural, unevenly deep and partly shallow bed, which did not allow of the use of big ships, and the soft natural banks prevented ships going at a considerable speed, because the heavy waves created by their rapid progress would have washed them down into the river. For this reason ships had to travel at a very low speed in Germany exactly as they have to proceed on British rivers, and even on those which are emphatically industrial rivers.

The larger a ship or barge is, the cheaper is the cost of transport, for the same number of men who are required to look after a small barge can handle a large one. Besides, the dead weight of the hull, the proportion of living room to stowage room, etc., is of course far greater in a small than in a large vessel. For the same reason for which ocean steamers are increasing in size from year to year, the ships and barges used in inland navigation are growing continually bigger in those countries where inland navigation is fostered. Again, the quicker a cargo boat travels, the more economical it is, for time is money. In order to make it possible to use large and swift cargo boats on her rivers, Germany set to work to regulate her natural rivers.

With this object in view, the natural earthbanks of rivers and canals were replaced by solid masonry walls, the river beds were narrowed and deepened, the rocks which in many parts—for instance in the Rhine at Bingen—were a danger to navigation were blasted away, and provisions were made to prevent the ice forming during severe winters and closing streams and canals to navigation. Numerous well-equipped harbours and quays were built by all towns within reach of inland navigation, and gradually all the more important German waterways were greatly perfected and improved. Cologne, which in a straight line is situated about 150 miles from the sea, was made a seaport, trading regularly with England, Scandinavia, and Russia. High up the Rhine and 300 miles inland lies Strasbourg, which formerly could be reached only by the smallest river craft, but

now boats carrying 600 tons are going to and from that town.

The tributary streams of the Rhine also were very greatly improved. The Main, for instance, was a shallow stream with a depth of only $2\frac{3}{4}$ feet. This depth was gradually increased to $8\frac{1}{4}$ feet for a distance of twenty miles up-stream, and at a cost of £400,000, in order to provide the industries of Frankfort with cheap transport. Up to Frankfort, the bed of the river Main is as deep as that of the Rhine, and the same steamers which can travel on the Rhine can now go up to Frankfort.

The towns at or near the Rhine vied with one another in tapping that stream. Crefeld and Carlsruhe, which are situated some distance away from the Rhine, dug canals to that river, and many old-world sleepy towns on the Rhine, which used to subsist on the wine-trade and on tourist traffic, equipped the water's edge with the most perfect and most up-to-date installations for warehousing and for loading and unloading goods directly from train to steamer or barge, and from boat to train. Formerly, sacks of wheat weighing 2 cwt. each were carried on the shoulder by sturdy men from small grain boats to old-fashioned sheds, where they were stacked. Now huge ships filled with wheat in bulk are unloaded by suction in a few hours, and the grain is automatically weighed whilst being whisked from steamer to store, or is put into sacks at an incredibly high speed by machinery and dropped into railway trucks. Electricity is largely made use of for working the machinery of these harbours, and some of these are very likely the best-equipped inland harbours in the world.

Formerly the greatest attraction for travellers on the Rhine was its romantic scenery and its ruined castles. Now its greatest interest lies in this, that it is perhaps the most perfect waterway in the world for the promotion of industry. Its shores are no longer so remarkable for their romantic views as for their countless smoking factory chimneys. However, this bustling activity is not by any means restricted to the Rhine. Everywhere in Germany

water transport has been developed with the utmost energy. On all the rivers and all the canals commercial and industrial activity has marvellously developed, and the promotion of water transport has become a passion with the German business community.

On the British canals and rivers, which are, as a rule, only shallow ditches filled with water, tiny barges loaded with from 30 to 50 tons may be seen which are laboriously hauled by horses at a speed of about three miles an hour. On the German rivers and canals, trains of barges of 300, 500, or 1,000 tons each, which are hauled by steamers, may at every hour and on every day be seen proceeding at a very considerable speed.

Water transport possesses great advantages over transport by land. A large iron barge of a loading capacity of 2,000 tons, and of the type which is used on the Rhine, costs only about £5,000, or about £2 10*s.* per ton of load room. A German railway wagon of ten tons' capacity costs about £125, or £12 10*s.* per ton of load room, and is therefore, as a vessel for carrying freight, five times more costly than a barge. As regards the cost of moving freight by land and water, water transport possesses an immense advantage over land transport. On a horizontal road, and at a speed of about three miles per hour, a horse can pull about two tons ; on a horizontal railway it can pull about 15 tons ; on a canal it can pull from 60 to 100 tons. Therefore, from four to six times the energy is required in hauling goods by rail, and thirty to fifty times as much force is expended in hauling it by road, whatever the motive force may be. Therefore, the cost of propulsion by water, whether the motive force be horse traction, steam, or electricity, is only a fraction of the cost of propulsion by road or rail. Furthermore, the construction of railways is exceedingly costly. On an average at least £20,000 to £30,000 per mile are required to build a railway in a country such as Great Britain or Germany, while a canal can often be built at considerably smaller cost. A further circumstance in favour of water traffic lies in this—that far more

traffic can pass over a broad canal than can be sent over railway. It is therefore clear that transport by water is, and must always remain, so very much cheaper than land transport, be it by road or by rail, that railways cannot possibly compete with properly organised, properly managed, properly planned, and properly equipped waterways. Hence it is economically wasteful not to extend and develop the natural and artificial waterways which a country possesses, and it is absolutely suicidal and criminal to let them fall into neglect and decay.

Canals and rivers are most suitable for the transport of bulky goods which are not easily perishable, and which need not be delivered in the shortest possible time. Therefore canals and rivers are particularly suitable for transporting cotton, ore, metal, coal, wood, petroleum, grain, manure, chemicals, fodder, wool, potatoes, cement, stone, leather, salt, sugar, vegetables, fruit, machinery, and those manufactured goods which are dispatched in fairly big parcels or which are packed in strong boxes and bales.

If it were not for the existence of the German waterways, the German industries would certainly not have flourished so much. The iron industry was completely dependent upon it for the imported iron ore, and that of Lorraine, had to be carried over huge distances to the Ruhr coal district to be smelted. Certain valuable products and by-products of the German mines and ironworks, and the more bulky products of the chemical industries of Germany could, according to Major Kurs, a leading authority on inland navigation, be sold in Germany and abroad only owing to the cheapness of transport by water. In many cases the profit was cut so fine that an increase of the freight charges by about one-fiftieth of a penny per ton per mile would have killed important industries. Germany's industrial success was no doubt due to a large extent to the immense assistance which she received from her waterways.

In consequence of the energetic steps which were taken for improving the navigable channel of the Rhine, the

volume of transport flowing over that river increased, according to the official statistics, in the following remarkable manner :

Through Traffic of Goods Passing Emmerich (German-Dutch Frontier)

	Up-stream.	*Down-stream.*
1889	2,799,800 tons	2,593,000 tons
1894	4,771,500 ,,	3,142,000 ,,
1897	6,929,100 ,,	3,480,200 ,,
1900	9,036,400 ,,	4,129,700 ,,
1903	10,027,900 ,,	7,211,900 ,,
1906	13,402,400 ,,	7,678,300 ,,
1909	14,881,300 ,,	9,964,700 ,,
1913	19,823,047 ,,	17,638,484 ,,

An almost equally rapid increase in the traffic took place on all the other rivers and canals. Owing to the marvellous expansion of the traffic, the tonnage of the ships used in German inland navigation increased in the following manner :

Tonnage of the German Inland Fleet

	Number of Ships.	*Tonnage.*
1882	18,715	1,658,266 tons
1887	20,930	2,100,705 ,,
1892	22,848	2,760,553 ,,
1897	22,564	3,370,447 ,,
1902	24,839	4,873,502 ,,
1907	26,235	5,914,020 ,,
1912	29,533	7,394,567 ,,

We have often heard of the marvellous progress of the German merchant marine, but it would appear that the progress of the German inland fleet has been much more rapid. While the German inland shipping increased between 1882 and 1912 from 1,658,266 tons to 7,394,567 tons, the German merchant marine increased between 1881 and 1913 only from 1,181,525 tons to 3,153,724 tons.

The full significance of this enormous increase in the tonnage of inland shipping is brought out only if we take note of the change in the character of Germany's inland fleet, which is apparent from the following table :

CLASSIFICATION OF SHIPS OF THE GERMAN INLAND FLEET

	Ships of less than 100 tons.	*Ships of 100–150 tons.*	*Ships of 150–250 tons.*	*Ships of 250–600 tons.*	*Ships of 600 and more tons.*
1887 . . .	11,281	5,460	1,757	1,271	220
1892 . . .	11,430	6,326	2,343	1,822	457
1897 . . .	10,390	4,405	3,754	2,746	650
1902 . . .	10,764	1,705	5,732	4,087	1,661
1907 . . .	10,930	1,859	6,301	4,987	2,112
1912 . . .	11,843	2,264	6,316	6,027	3,073

The ships and barges of less than 150 tons decreased in number during the last twenty years. The whole of the immense increase in inland tonnage took place in ships of large and of the largest size. This increase is particularly striking in the case of ships of 600 tons and more, which increased almost fifteen-fold. The decrease of the boats measuring less than 150 tons should be particularly interesting to Great Britain, inasmuch as a ship or a barge of 150 tons, which is too small for German inland transport, and is considered to be ripe for the shipbreaker, is a very large vessel in British inland navigation, in which ships of 30 or 50 tons abound.

How enormous the influence of the size of ships is on the cost of transport may be seen from the following table, which was supplied by one of the leading German authorities on inland navigation :

COST OF TRANSPORT PER TON PER KILOMETRE ON CANALS, IN SHIPS OF VARIOUS SIZES, DURING A TEN MONTHS' SHIPPING SEASON

150	200	300	400	450	600	1000	1500	tons.
0·79	0·63	0·48	0·41	0·38	0·30	0·23	0·21	pfg.

One pfennig being about one-eighth of a penny, these rates are roughly equal to the incredibly low charge of from one-seventh to one-twenty-fourth of a penny per ton per mile ! If British industries should secure rates approximating those given above for their transport requirements, a new era would dawn for them.

The foregoing table shows how exceedingly uneconomical the toy barges are which ply upon British canals and rivers.

The cost of transport in boats of 150 tons is about four times as great as in boats of 1,500 tons. Nevertheless, even boats of 150 tons are hardly to be found on British canals and rivers, where barges of smaller size, such as 30 and 50 tons for instance, are still transporting goods at a leisurely speed and excessive costs, exactly as they did in the era of the mail coaches and turnpikes a hundred years ago.

The cost of transport per ton per kilometre for barges of a smaller size than 150 tons cannot be given, for such barges are no longer of importance on the German waterways, and the rates for such small boats are not supplied by the German source from which the foregoing figures are taken. The average size of the large boats plying on the German waterways is from 200 to 400 tons on the minor waterways, on the Elbe it is 1,000 tons and more, and on the Rhine barges from 2,000 to 2,350 tons may be seen.

The exceedingly low costs of transport given in the foregoing for ships of various sizes apply of course only to new and perfectly-equipped water-courses. They presuppose a well-filled ship. But as the ideal state of the perfectly-equipped water-course and the well-filled ship is at present rather the exception than the rule in Germany, for there are still many ships which can only be described as misfits, it is worth while to take note of the average cost of transport on the German rivers, and to allow for the fact that a large portion of the tonnage is during part of the year only partly employed or unemployed. One of the foremost German authorities has furnished the following table of the actual costs of water transport, which is most interesting, because it gives a fair idea of the real, not the ideal, business conditions :

Cost of Transport on Principal German Rivers

Average Cost of Transport per Ton per Kilometre

On the Rhine.	
Full load during one-third of year. Three-quarter load during one-third of year. Half load during one-third of year.	0·46 pfennig.

On the Elbe.	
Full load during two-fifths of year.	0·60 pfennig.
Three-quarter load during one-fifth of year.	
Half load during one-fifth of year.	
Quarter load during one-fifth of year.	
On the Oder.	
Full load during one-quarter of year.	0·92 pfennig.
Three-quarter load during one-quarter of year.	
Half load during one-quarter of year.	
Quarter load during one-quarter of year.	
On the Vistula.	
Full load during one-quarter of year.	1·38 pfennig.
Three-quarter load during one-quarter of year.	
Half load during one-quarter of year.	
Quarter load during one-quarter of year.	

The Oder and Vistula flow through chiefly agricultural provinces in the east of Germany where freight is less plentiful and less regular, and where the equipment for economic transport is less advanced than in Central and West Germany. Therefore the cost of transport is comparatively high on these rivers, being equal to about one-sixth of a penny per ton per mile on the Oder, and one-fourth of a penny per ton per mile on the Vistula. On the Elbe the cost of transport is about one-eighth of a penny per ton per mile, and on the Rhine it is as low as one-eleventh of a penny per ton per mile. As in the foregoing table full allowance appears to have been made for slack time and for the time when navigation has to stop in consequence of frost, these figures should give a fair indication of the actual cost of transport.

The costs of transport from place to place are not merely the costs of water carriage. We can obtain a real insight into the costs of transport only if we compare all the costs of water transport with all the costs of transport by railway. In the following table, three typical cases are given in which all the costs of water transport and of transport partly by water and partly by rail are compared with all the costs of transport by rail. The costs of water transport are calculated on the basis of 600 ton vessels, a size which may be considered

a fair average on the up-to-date waterways of Germany. The costs of railway carriage are those of the Prussian State railways, the transport costs and freight charges of which are exceedingly low, as is generally known.

ALL COSTS FOR SENDING COAL

	By Canal.	*By Railway.*
From Herne (Westphalia) to Hanover.		
Distance 260 kilometres . . .	3·43 Mks.	5·80 Mks.
From Herne to Schönebeck on the Elbe.		
Distance 444 kilometres, the mine lying 7 kilometres away from Herne Harbour	7·00 Mks.	9·00 Mks.
From Herne to Mannheim on the Rhine.		
Distance 393 kilometres . . .	3·88 Mks.	8·30 Mks.

From the foregoing figures it appears that if all incidental expenses are duly considered, the costs of carrying coal between two of the places mentioned are roughly from 50 to 115 per cent. higher by railway than by canal only, or by canal and river, or by railway and canal. As the transport costs on the Prussian State railways are exceedingly moderate—they are probably the lowest in Europe—this result is surely very remarkable.

Owing to the greater cheapness of transport by water, huge and increasing quantities of freight are naturally being diverted from the German railways to the waterways, especially as it has been found that well-equipped waterways of sufficient size can deal more satisfactorily and more rapidly with large quantities of goods than can the best-equipped railways. Railway stations are always apt to become congested, and they cannot so easily be enlarged in order to keep pace with the growing traffic requirements of the time as quays along the banks of rivers and canals. Besides, the number of goods trains which can be dispatched over a railway is limited in consequence of the exigency of the general traffic, which must not be disturbed, while on a river or canal of sufficiently generous size a practically unlimited number of cargo boats can be sent at all times and in either direction. Lastly, a goods train can carry only a moderate load—300 tons is an exceedingly satis-

factory performance for a British train—while a train of barges can easily transport several thousand tons of freight. For these reasons a far larger quantity of goods can be sent over a fair-sized waterway than can be sent over a railway of similar length, and on a river or a well-equipped canal enormous masses of goods can easily, quickly, and without delay be forwarded, which would cause congestion, confusion, and ultimately a complete breakdown on the best-equipped and best-managed railway. The progressive use of the waterways in Germany and their ability to handle considerably larger quantities of freight than the railways may be seen from the following figures :

Transport of Goods on the German Waterways

	Arrivals.	*Departures.*
1875	11,000,000 tons	9,800,000 tons
1885	14,500,000 ,,	13,100,000 ,,
1895	25,800,000 ,,	20,900,000 ,,
1905	56,400,000 ,,	47,000,000 ,,

Transport of Goods on the German Railways

	Arrivals.	*Departures.*
1875	83,500,000 tons	83,500,000 tons
1885	100,000,000 ,,	100,000,000 ,,
1895	164,000,000 ,,	167,000,000 ,,
1905	291,000,000 ,,	297,700,000 ,,

These figures show that between 1875 to 1905 the quantity of freight handled by the German railways has increased by a little less than 250 per cent., whilst the quantity of freight dispatched over the German waterways has increased by considerably more than 400 per cent.

If we now look at the record of ton kilometres, and at the quantity of freight carried per kilometre on both railways and waterways, we find the following figures :

Freight Record on German Railways

	Ton kilometres.	*Tons of freight dispatched per kilometre.*
1875	10,900,000,000	410,000 tons
1885	16,600,000,000	450,000 ,,
1895	26,500,000,000	590,000 ,,
1905	51,200,000,000	820,000 ,,

Freight Record of German Waterways

	Ton kilometres.	*Tons of freight dispatched per kilometre.*
1875	2,900,000,000	290,000 tons
1885	4,800,000,000	480,000 ,,
1895	7,500,000,000	750,000 ,,
1905	15,000,000,000	1,500,000 ,,

From the foregoing figures it appears that the quantity of goods which have been dispatched over each kilometre of railway has increased during the thirty years under review from 410,000 to 820,000 tons, or by only 100 per cent., while during the same period the quantity of goods dispatched over each kilometre of waterway has increased from 290,000 tons to 1,500,000 tons, or by no less than 417 per cent. Water carriage in Germany has expanded more than four times as quickly as railway carriage. In 1875 the goods traffic was 410,000 tons per kilometre of railway, and only 290,000 tons per kilometre of waterway. At that time the railways were still supreme. In 1905 this position had been completely reversed, for the railways dealt in that year with 820,000 tons of freight per kilometre, whilst the waterways handled no less than 1,500,000 tons per kilometre. Evidently the waterways are in the ascendant, and if later figures were available, it would probably be seen that the waterways have considerably improved upon their record of 1905.

The effect of the extension and improvement of the German waterways, both natural and artificial, may be gauged from the significant fact that the most prosperous industrial centres in Germany, though they lie far inland, are situated close to the waterways of which they make the most extensive use. The most prosperous part of industrial Germany is the Rhenish-Westphalian district, with the towns of Düsseldorf, Essen, Dortmund, etc. This is the stronghold of the German iron and steel industry. The industrial success of the Rhenish-Westphalian district would have been impossible had it not been for the cheap carriage of goods afforded by the Rhine. The following

figures clearly show what water traffic has meant for the chief industrial centre of Germany:

WATER TRAFFIC OF HOCHFELD-DUISBURG-RUHRORT (RHENISH-WESTPHALIAN DISTRICT)

1875	2,900,000 tons
1880	3,500,000 ,,
1885	4,500,000 ,,
1890	6,200,000 ,,
1894	8,200,000 ,,
1896	9,700,000 ,,
1900	13,000,000 ,,
1909	17,000,000 ,,
1913	28,830,000 ,,

The traffic of that most important inland harbour, which is unknown to most Englishmen, has grown prodigiously since 1875. It stands now among the very foremost harbours of the world, and only those who have thoroughly examined that enormous inland harbour can form an idea of its vastness, the excellence of the harbour appliances, and its activity. The Port of London appears asleep if compared with that inland port, the name of which is hardly known outside Germany.

The enormous activity of the German waterways has greatly benefited Holland, for three-quarters of the through trade of Holland is German water-borne trade. Holland lives largely on German trade, and Germany resents that the trade on her chief stream has to pass through a foreign country to which it has to pay a heavy tribute. The unceasing agitation of the Pan-Germanic League against Holland, and its advocacy of the incorporation of Holland into Germany, sprang to a great extent from the resentment that the mouth of the Rhine is situated in a non-German country. This feeling was not confined to the Pan-Germans. It was one of the principal causes which determined the Government to construct at immense expense the Rhine-Ems Canal with the object of giving to the Rhine an outlet at Emden, which was converted into a well-equipped port. It was intended to divert the export and import traffic of Germany from Rotterdam to Emden, to impoverish Holland,

and to bring her to her knees by economic pressure. On the 11th of August 1899, the Dortmund-Ems Canal was opened. The year book *Nauticus*, which was officially inspired, wrote in the same year :

"In our time our dependence on foreign countries has frequently been felt by the circumstance *that the mouth of the Rhine is in the hands of a foreign country, and that that country in consequence draws away the chief profit of our export industry.* This state of dependence will be ended by the Dortmund-Ems Canal, which gives to the Rhine, at least *for the Province of Westphalia, a German outlet in Emden.*" [1]

Roads and canals are open to all. Hence, free competition ensures on roads and canals a cheap and effective service on the part of the numerous carriers who make use of them. When the British railways were in their infancy it was expected by many sagacious men that the iron road also would be a common road for the use of all on which competing carriers would travel with conveyances of their own. Their anticipations were not realised. The owners of the iron roads, unlike the owners of roads and canals, became the only carriers on them, and thus a monopoly arose somewhat unexpectedly. The productive industries were given over to the mercy of the railways, and these hastened to close as quickly as possible the only alternative inland trade routes, by acquiring and obstructing the canals or by "repairing" them out of existence.

Great Britain possesses no adequate waterways for her industries not so much because Nature has been unkind, as because men have been short-sighted and neglectful. While Germany has vigorously developed her waterways hundreds of miles inland, Great Britain has not even adequately regulated the Thames. London, with its incomparable position, might become the finest *entrepôt* in the world by making a barrage east of the town, and converting the stream for many miles below London into a gigantic lake of still water where, undisturbed by the tides, ships could

[1] The italics are in the German original.

load and unload from train to ship and from ship to train, and where they could store their goods in gigantic modern warehouses. Instead of such a harbour, we find a mediæval river with mediæval docks, where goods have to be "lightered," exactly as in the time of Charles I., and even in the heart of industrial and commercial London, the Thames, which ought to be the best-equipped commercial river in the world, presents its ancient and unlovely mud banks at low tide exactly as it did 1,000 years ago.

The policy of the German Government with regard to waterways was laid down in an official publication some time ago as follows :

"Any means whereby the distances which separate the economic centres of the country from one another can be diminished, must be welcomed and be considered as a progress, for it increases our strength in our industrial competition with foreign countries. Every one who desires to send or to receive goods wishes for cheap freights. Hence the aim of a healthy transport policy should be to diminish as far as possible the economically unproductive costs of transport. A country such as Germany, which is happy enough to produce on her own soil by far the larger part of the raw material and food which it requires, occupies the most independent and the most favourable position if, owing to cheap inland transportation, its economic centres are placed as near as possible to one another. When this has been achieved, Germany will be able to dispense with many foreign products, and it will occupy a position of superiority in comparison with all those States which do not possess similarly perfect means of transport.

"Many circumstances which in former times gave superiority to certain countries, such as the greater skill of their workmen, superior machinery, cheaper wages, greater natural fertility of the soil : all these advantages are gradually being levelled down by time and progress. *But what will remain is the advantage of a well-planned system of transportation which makes the best possible use of local resources and local advantages.*[1] It is to this that England owes to a large extent her unique position for commercial exchange with other countries."

[1] The italics are in the German original.

These words are well worth reading, re-reading, and remembering. England's "unique position for commercial exchange," as the German document calls it, still remains, while her equally unique position for industrial pursuits has been spoilt and partly lost through the insufficiency, the inefficiency, and the expensiveness of British inland transport. It is for the nation and its Government to decide whether they will allow Great Britain's industrial supremacy, which nature has put into her reach and which she once possessed, to be finally lost or to be regained.

Germany owed much of her industrial success to her wise policy of protection. But with her protection was not merely a fiscal, but a general and comprehensive policy. She protected her population, not only against tariff attacks from without, but also against the far more dangerous attacks upon their prosperity from within. She protected and fostered her industries, not only by her tariff, but also by a practical national education, by equitable and cheap laws, and before all by the provision of adequate, efficient, and cheap means of transport.

CHAPTER XVI

THE SHIPBUILDING AND SHIPPING INDUSTRIES OF GERMANY [1]

THE fact that Germany had before the War an exceedingly prosperous shipbuilding and shipping industry must appear exceedingly strange to those who are convinced that a prosperous shipping trade can be erected only on the basis of Free Trade. Therefore it is of interest to investigate why Germany, the classical land of protected industries, possessed before the War a very flourishing mercantile marine and shipbuilding industry.

Coal and iron, which are the principal materials used in shipbuilding, are found in Germany not close to the sea coast, but far inland in the middle and in the south of the country. How enormous is the distance between the principal coal and iron centres of Germany and the most important shipbuilding towns may be seen from the following figures which have been furnished by Messrs. von Halle and Schwarz, the well-known authorities on German shipbuilding :

Distances between—	Essen. Miles.	Aix-la-Chapelle. Miles.	Saarbrücken. Miles.	Kattowitz. Miles.
Wilhelmshaven . .	198	258	417	647
Bremen . . .	165	237	402	581
Geestemünde . .	204	277	437	620
Hamburg . . .	243	318	482	534
Kiel . . .	318	390	555	568
Lübeck . . .	283	357	523	514
Danzig . . .	640	716	798	380
Memel . . .	872	950	1,028	568

From the foregoing table it appears that the average distance which the heavy German raw material had to

[1] From the *Fortnightly Review*, March 1906.

travel overland before being worked into ships was approximately 400 miles, a distance which is greater than that which separates London from Glasgow. It should be added that by far the largest part of the German iron ore came from Lorraine and Luxemburg. Consequently the column giving the distances between Saarbrücken and the various shipbuilding towns, distances which range from 400 to 1,000 miles, is the most important.

From the table of the distances we can form an idea of the difficulties under which the German shipbuilder had to work. We can easiest realise them by imagining that the shipbuilders on the Clyde had to draw their raw material from Portsmouth, Land's End, or London, overland through the whole length of England. Great Britain is wonderfully favoured by Nature, by her geographical structure, and by the fact that coal, iron, populous towns, and harbours lie in immediate proximity of each other, not only for the pursuit of shipbuilding, but for that of all manufacturing industries. It should be added that most of the material used in German shipbuilding was of German origin, that the German iron travelled almost exclusively by rail over hundreds of miles to the shipbuilding yards, and that the State railways wisely conceded very low freights in order to foster shipbuilding.

During the middle of the last century German shipbuilding was rather flourishing. Numerous shipyards on the Elbe, the Weser, and along the North Sea coast were building wooden sailing ships for which the raw material was cheap and near at hand. In those days Germany supplied England with much shipbuilding timber. Prussia, always desirous to foster private industry by judicious official encouragement, opened in 1836 a technical high school of shipbuilding near Stettin, and the numerous fine fast clippers, which between 1850 and 1860 carried vast numbers of German emigrants to the United States, owed their excellence to that pioneer institution.

When in the 'sixties iron-built steamships began to displace wooden sailing ships, the German shipyards declined. Great Britain, who was then practically the only industrial

country in the world, easily obtained the monopoly in iron shipbuilding. During the 'sixties and 'seventies practically all the German merchant steamships were built in England. Competition with England seemed out of the question on account of Germany's unfavourable geographical position. Private enterprise in Germany shrank from undertaking an apparently hopeless task, and Germany would have remained an inland power, had not the Government again shown the way and encouraged the creation of a shipbuilding industry by a deliberate fostering policy. In 1870, a little before the outbreak of the Franco-German War, the Prussian Government established at Kiel and Wilhelmshaven repairing yards for the few British-built warships of Prussia. The victorious war and the unification of Germany encouraged the Prusso-German Government to build experimentally an armoured cruiser, the *Preussen*. The ship was a success, but although it was far more expensive than it would have been if it had been ordered in England, which then was the cheapest market for ships of war, the German Government decided to continue building its own warships, firmly expecting that eventually a powerful and profitable German shipbuilding industry would arise out of these small, costly, and apparently hopeless beginnings.

On the 1st of January 1872 General von Stosch became the head of the German Admiralty. He proved a very capable and far-seeing organiser and administrator. He resolved to create a powerful shipbuilding industry. The creation of the German Navy proved a mighty stimulus to the German shipyards and to the German iron industry, especially as Von Stosch laid down the principle that all German warships should be built in German yards exclusively of German material.

When, in 1879, Bismarck resolved to abandon Free Trade, he found that the German shipyards on the sea coast had since 1853 been able to import all their raw material free of duty, while the shipyards on the great rivers inland were not similarly favoured. The latter found the prices of foreign raw material too high owing to the duties charged. The

important shipbuilding industry on the rivers had decayed. The very large river traffic on the Rhine was in Dutch hands. They used Dutch ships. In introducing general agricultural and industrial protection, Bismarck wisely made an exception in favour of the shipbuilding industry. The German shipyards were exempted from all duties on the materials used. Thus they were given complete Free Trade. From a fiscal point of view, their business was carried on outside the German frontier. Therefore the German shipbuilding industry was treated like a foreign country by the German iron industry, which relieved itself of unduly large stocks by dumping iron and steel not only in England but in the German shipyards as well.

Having given protection to all the German industries, except the shipbuilding industry, Bismarck converted the private railways of Prussia into State railways and arranged that the heavy raw material used in German shipbuilding should be hauled over the State railways at rates barely covering the cost of transportation. Thus he bridged the huge distances which separated the German seaports from their industrial bases, and made it possible for the shipbuilding industry to expand. Though not protected by fiscal measures it was no less fostered by these preferential traffic arrangements.

For some considerable time the German shipping companies did not feel inclined to desert the British shipbuilders, who had hitherto furnished them with excellent ships. They did not trust the German shipbuilders, whose ability was doubted. Up to 1879 the German yards were not able to compete with English shipbuilders as regards price and rapidity of delivery. German materials were far more costly, and the working plant of the German shipyards was quite inadequate. Only when, in 1879, the import duties on shipbuilding materials had been abolished, and when at the same time the German iron and steel industries had been so much strengthened by Protection as to allow of their creating branch industries devoted to shipbuilding, could the building of merchant vessels on an adequate scale be inaugurated.

Germany hesitatingly commenced experimenting with high-pressure boilers, and replaced the boilers of the old Lloyd steamers with triple expansion engines of German make. As these new boilers proved unsatisfactory, German steamship owners felt disinclined to order steamers in Germany. Only gradually were the difficulties overcome which threatened to overwhelm the industry. Only in 1882 the Hamburg-American Line began to show some little confidence in the ability of German shipbuilders by ordering the *Rugia* from the Vulcan Company in Stettin, and the *Rhaetia* from the Reiherstieg yard in Hamburg. Thus the building of large vessels in Germany began.

Only fifteen years after the launch of the *Preussen* and five years after the introduction of Free Trade for foreign shipbuilding material and of preferential railway rates for German shipbuilding material, the shipowners began to order their ships from German builders. They did so not from choice, but because they were induced, one might almost say compelled. In 1884 Bismarck introduced a Bill by which subsidies were to be given to the North German Lloyd under the express stipulation that the ships to be built were to be constructed in German shipyards by German workmen and, as far as possible, of German material. That action proved the salvation of the great German shipbuilding industry. Events have vindicated Bismarck's far-seeing policy, which was loudly condemned in British and in German Free Trade circles.

The Government-subsidised North German Lloyd gave the first important order to German builders by ordering, under the Act of 1884, six liners from the Vulcan Shipbuilding Company. These vessels were found satisfactory in every respect, but the Vulcan Company had to buy dearly its experience, for it lost heavily upon this pioneer transaction. With perseverance the Vulcan Company continued competing for the construction of fast steamers without overmuch regard to financial risks, and it succeeded in 1888 in securing the contract for the fast steamer *Augusta Victoria* from the Hamburg-American Line notwithstanding

severe British competition. With the construction of that steamer the great German shipbuilding yard struck out a line of its own by introducing twin-screw propulsion for transatlantic liners. Two years later the Vulcan built the twin-screw steamer *Fürst Bismarck*, and the success achieved by these two twin-screw ocean flyers, which at the time were the fastest liners afloat, led in 1895 to the building of the *Kaiser Wilhelm der Grosse*. That enormous vessel was built within eighteen months, and its speed exceeded that of any ship afloat. The *Kaiser Wilhelm der Grosse* was followed by the three great liners, *Deutschland*, *Kronprinz Wilhelm*, and *Kaiser Wilhelm II.*, all of which left far behind them the foremost British liners. Thus the Vulcan had brilliantly outstripped English competition in shipbuilding, which, until then, had been considered invincible.

The following figures show the astonishing development of the German shipbuilding industry since 1879, the year when Protection was introduced into Germany, and since 1884, the year in which the Steamships' Subsidies Bill was passed :

Iron and Steel Shipping Built in Germany

1880	23,986	register	tons
1885	24,554	,,	,,
1890	100,597	,,	,,
1895	122,712	,,	,,
1900	235,171	,,	,,
1909	326,318	,,	,,
1913	458,755	,,	,,

In 1885 German shipbuilding was practically non-existent. In 1906 Sir Charles Maclaren, presiding at the yearly meeting of Palmer's Shipbuilding and Iron Company held at Newcastle, said that Germany was now building a greater tonnage than all the other Continental countries put together. Germany's progress in shipbuilding has been truly marvellous. It has been doubly marvellous in view of her most disadvantageous geographical position and her lack of experience.

By wise, far-seeing, determined State action were the

German shipbuilding and shipping industries thus artificially established, fostered, and developed. The astonishing success of the German shipbuilding industry was due partly to its excellent management and organisation, partly to the application of science and experience to industry, partly to the courage and perseverance of its directors, partly to the harmonious co-ordination and co-operation of the various economic factors which in more individualistic countries, such as Great Britain, are not co-ordinated.

The strong man can stand alone ; the weak must stand together to protect themselves against the strong. The industrial weakness of Germany proved the cause of its strength, for the weakness of the individual German industries which competed hopelessly against England in the past led to the formation of combinations for mutual support, and then to the formation of gigantic cartels.

In Germany the leading idea in the formation of industrial combinations was not to secure an undue advantage to a few wirepullers by the unscrupulous use of a monopoly, but to secure a legitimate advantage to a number of domestic producers by uniting their productive forces. The German trusts and limited companies devoted themselves rather to promoting industry than to exploiting the public, not because German business men are more virtuous than are British or American business men, but because the State kept a very sharp eye on company promoters, directors, and managers, and unsparingly punished with hard labour those who contravened the very strict Company Law which was devised to protect the public and to teach the promoter that honesty is the best policy.

The introduction of Protection in 1879 led to the formation of numerous combinations in the German iron industry. They strove to eliminate unnecessary competition, to regulate prices, to buy and sell collectively, to eliminate unnecessary middlemen, etc. According to Dr. Voelcker there were in 1903 forty-four conventions, trusts, and syndicates in the German iron industry. The multitude of these combinations deprived co-operation in the German iron industry of much

of its usefulness. The contrast between these numerous combinations in the iron industry and the gigantic German coal trust which embraced practically the whole coal-mining industry of Germany was too glaring to be allowed to remain. In the beginning of 1904 a steel trust, embracing all Germany, was founded.

At the time when the huge German steel trust was formed, the German shipbuilders had been in the habit of buying their material, not from the individual makers in retail fashion, but through the representatives of the various combinations. Therefore the central management of these combinations was able to effect very great economies in the production of metal wares used in shipbuilding by introducing a wisely-organised specialisation and division of labour among the numerous works belonging to the combine. For instance, the different plates used in German shipbuilding, about 150 in number, required special rollers, and in endeavouring to produce every kind, or at least many kinds, of steel plates, the various rolling-mills had not only to incur an enormous capital expenditure in laying down a huge plant, but the working expenses of the rolling-mills were necessarily made unduly heavy because a large part of their plant was unoccupied during part of the year. This unnecessary and exceedingly wasteful multiplication of plant was done away with by specialisation based on mutual agreement which gave to every work a proportionate number of specialities. Thus individual mills were enabled to produce with a smaller and constantly occupied plant larger quantities of uniform ship steel at a cheaper price than hitherto and at a larger profit to themselves. In this way judicious industrial combination may benefit both consumers and producers. Trusts are by no means an unmixed evil as many believe.

Not only the German steel producers, but the German shipbuilders also formed a large combination. The Society of German Shipyards at Berlin comprised no less than forty-two individual yards. Thus the whole of the German shipbuilding industry was in a position to meet the whole

of the German steel industry in one room, and the two combinations could, through their representatives, amicably arrange matters between themselves to their mutual satisfaction. Thus, suicidal petty rivalry and endless wrangling between innumerable small concerns and a host of agents and other useless but expensive middlemen were abolished. The iron and the shipbuilding industries were united and could meet one another not in a spirit of commercial rivalry, of envy, and of secret or open hostility, but in friendly and loyal co-operation.

Owing to co-operation and to systematic specialisation and division of labour, the saving of unnecessary labour was still further developed. The shipyards were taught by the steel-makers to save trouble and expense to the steel industry by adapting their requirements to the condition of the steel-works. On the other hand the steel-makers were taught by the shipbuilders how best to cater for the shipyards, and how best to adapt themselves to their requirements. The two great industries worked hand in hand like a single concern, and friction, expense, and correspondence between buyer and seller were reduced to a minimum. A shipbuilder who required steel plates or columns of a certain kind had formerly to make inquiries at a large number of works before being able to place his order, and when he had made the most careful inquiry and studied the market, he could not be quite sure that he would receive exactly what he wanted at the cheapest price and in the shortest time from the work which he had selected. His task was henceforth easier. He could obtain all the information which he required at the central office of the steel combination, which distributed all orders in such a way as to ensure that they were most economically and most rapidly executed according to standard specifications. Through this arrangement buying ceased to be a science. The convenience of being able to place orders rapidly on the most favourable terms and without much inquiry caused German shipbuilders to order their material in Germany, even if they were offered the identical goods at a lower price

by well-known British makers. British steel almost ceased to be used in German shipbuilding. Its elimination was all the more remarkable as the German shipbuilding industries worked under Free Trade conditions. However, much of the steel consumed by the German shipbuilders was "dumped" steel, sold at, or under, cost price by German makers, and was carried at a merely nominal charge, possibly at a loss, by the German State railways to the sea coast. The German shipbuilding industry enjoyed thus the advantages of both Protection and of Free Trade.

Since the creation of the German Empire the fleet of German merchant steamships has increased as follows:

1871	81,994 tons
1881	215,758 ,,
1891	723,652 ,,
1901	1,347,875 ,,
1910	2,349,557 ,,
1913	3,153,724 ,,

Before the War the tonnage of the two largest German shipping companies approached 2,000,000, and the ships possessed by the Nord Deutsche Lloyd and the Hamburg-Amerikanische Packetfahrt Aktien Gesellschaft were among the finest in the world.

Bismarck's policy of fostering and promoting the German shipping trade was energetically continued by William II., partly by personal encouragement, partly by legislative and administrative action. The German Government not only assisted the German shipping and shipbuilding industries, but endeavoured to damage their foreign competitors. The German shipping companies did an enormous business in shipping emigrants. They carried every year from 200,000 to 300,000 emigrants. Germany herself had practically no emigration, as only about 20,000 emigrants left Germany every year. Consequently the German shipping companies endeavoured to attract emigrants from Austria-Hungary and Russia to the German ports. In order to "induce" Austrian and Russian emigrants to patronise the German steamship lines, arrangements were made by the German

Government at the Austrian and Russian frontiers. So-called control stations for emigrants were erected through which all foreign emigrants had to pass ostensiby in order to be medically examined, but if these emigrants were not in the possession of tickets issued by one of the German steamship lines they were forbidden to proceed. Emigrants in the possession of tickets issued by the Cunard Company or some other British line were ruthlessly turned back. Thus the German companies secured the bulk of the valuable emigrant traffic from Austria-Hungary and Russia.

The foregoing pages show that the German Government shaped its economic policy not in accordance with the rigid views of professors of political economy and of other more or less scientific doctrinaires. It followed neither a rigid policy of Protection nor an uncompromising doctrine of Free Trade, but applied Protection and Free Trade according to the requirements of individual cases. It did not condemn trusts as being bad in themselves. Its economic policy was not "scientific," but practical and businesslike. German statesmen adapted their action to circumstances, and they were guided by the views of practical business men whom they consulted. These are the reasons which enabled Germany to develop a great, prosperous, and successful shipping and shipbuilding industry, notwithstanding the greatest obstacles.

CHAPTER XVII

THE CHEMICAL INDUSTRIES [1]

THE chemical industry was the youngest, the most vigorous, and the most successful industry of Germany. While all other German industries were fostered by the most skilfully-framed protective tariff, the German chemical industry achieved its commanding and world-wide success practically without fiscal aid.

The German chemical industry was so successful that it obtained almost a world-monopoly in some of the most important branches of chemical production. Many universally used chemical preparations were exclusively of German manufacture. Before 1914 about four-fifths of the dyes consumed in the world were made in Germany. The chemical industry was one of Germany's most important industries. It took a leading place among the great exporting industries of the country.

The meteoric development of the German chemical industry may be gauged from the following table :

IMPORTS INTO AND EXPORTS FROM GERMANY OF COAL-TAR DYES

	Imports. Marks.	Exports. Marks.
1880 . . .	7,523,000	53,537,000
1885 . . .	4,205,000	47,782,000
1890 . . .	4,087,000	58,162,000
1895 . . .	4,206,000	81,590,000
1900 . . .	4,975,000	109,172,000
1905 . . .	6,363,000	165,795,000
1910 . . .	6,765,000	193,840,000
1912 . . .	6,537,000	209,166,000

[1] From the *Contemporary Review*, May 1904.

Germany's exports of other chemicals developed at a similarly rapid rate.

The chemical industry was for various reasons of national importance to Germany. Though it employed much unskilled labour, it was so prosperous that it paid very good wages, considering the character of the work done. Hence strikes were extremely rare. The following table conveys a clear idea of the interest of German labour in the chemical industry :

Employment and Wages in Chemical Industries

	Hands employed.	Total wages.	Wages per head per annum.
1882 . . .	71,777	?	?
1894 . . .	110,348	£4,981,000	£44·5
1895 . . .	114,587	5,173,000	44·14
1896 . . .	124,219	5,686,000	45·8
1897 . . .	129,827	6,045,000	46·2
1898 . . .	135,350	6,482,000	47·8
1899 . . .	143,119	6,978,000	48·15
1900 . . .	153,011	7,746,000	50·12
1902 . . .	165,889	7,983,000	48·12
1906 . . .	202,177	10,545,000	52·20
1909 . . .	219,601	12,688,000	57·80
1913 . . .	282,228	18,378,000	65·20

The constant growth of the German chemical industry allowed not only of a yearly and considerable increase of the labour employed, but also of a yearly increase of the average wages.

The national importance of the German chemical industry lay not only in the employment which it gave to the wage-earning masses, but also in the great direct and indirect benefits which other industries derived from it. Chemical research was no longer confined to purely chemical ends, for the chemists had most successfully applied their science to agriculture and to the manufacturing industries. Many German industries owed their greatness to the assistance of trained chemists. Chemical research was applied with excellent effect to other industries—for instance, metallurgy, the glass industry, agriculture. Hence many prominent manufacturers, bankers, and landowners sent their sons to the Universities and technical High

Schools to study chemistry, so that they should be able to avail themselves of the assistance of that science in practical life.

The enormous national importance of a prosperous chemical industry lies not only in the invaluable assistance which that industry can give to nearly all other industries, but also in the unthought-of resources which it will create almost out of nothing. A century ago Great Britain's wealthy sugar colonies were the envy of the world, and sugar-planters laughed at the idea of producing sugar from beet. However, the German chemists ruined the West Indian sugar-planters, and produced the "tropical product" on a scale never dreamt of. Since 1890 Germany produced artificial musk at Mulhouse, natural vanilla was replaced by chemical vanilline, Japanese camphor by synthetic camphor, and sugar by saccharine, and vegetable dyes gave place to dyes made from tar. How natural indigo has been crushed out of existence by the synthetic indigo produced by German chemists may be seen from the following figures :

	Acreage under Indigo in India.	Value of Exports of Indigo. Tens of Rupees.
1894–5	1,705,977 acres	4,745,915
1895–6	1,569,869 ,,	5,354,511
1896–7	1,583,808 ,,	4,370,757
1897–8	1,366,513 ,,	3,057,402
1898–9	1,013,627 ,,	2,970,478
1899–1900	1,046,434 ,,	£1,795,007
1900–1	977,349 ,,	£1,423,987
1901–2	792,179 ,,	£1,234,837
1905–6	400,552 ,,	£390,918
1909–10	295,706 ,,	£234,544

Indigo Imported to Great Britain

1895	£1,392,534
1896	1,533,722
1897	1,470,574
1898	890,803
1899	986,090
1900	542,089
1901	788,820
1902	498,043
1907	151,297
1909	139,335

Before the War Germany's exports of synthetic indigo exceeded £2,500,000.

The facts and figures given make it clear that many a "natural monopoly" which is at present possessed by countries which control the tropics may be taken away from them by the discoveries of the chemists. There is no bound to the possibilities of chemistry, though prejudice always asserts for a time that the natural product is superior to the chemical one. The producers of natural indigo assert that the natural dye is superior to the artificial, while chemists maintain that both are equally good. At any rate, the artificial product is by far the cheaper, and the fatal effect of its production on the natural dye is visible from the figures given. The effect of the discovery of making artificial indigo may be seen from the following figures :

	Imports of Indigo into Germany.	Exports of Indigo from Germany.
1895	£1,075,000	£410,000
1896	1,055,000	320,000
1897	635,000	240,000
1898	415,000	380,000
1899	415,000	390,000
1900	205,000	465,000
1901	215,000	635,000
1902	185,000	925,000
1903	90,000	1,035,000
1904	67,000	1,083,000
1909	30,000	1,974,000
1913	19,000	2,666,000

A few years ago Germany was dependent for the indigo she used on India. In 1913 she almost monopolised the indigo market. Obviously the natural resources of a naturally wealthy country may be taken away from it without bloodshed by the able chemists of another country. The possession of a strong chemical industry is therefore of the utmost economic importance to all progressive countries, and it is also of very great importance in time of war.

Prince Bismarck remarked in 1894 :

"Peace is being maintained less owing to the peaceful disposition of all Governments than owing to the ability

of chemists in inventing new kinds of powder. . . . It sounds almost like irony, but it is the truth that the chemist is keeping the swords in their scabbards, and that he decides by his inventions whether there will be peace or war."

The commanding position of Germany's chemical industry was in no way due to nature's bounty. On the contrary, Germany was largely dependent on foreign nations for many chemical raw products, which she turned into manufactures. As a rule she imported five times as much chemical raw products as she exported, and her dependence on foreign raw products was rapidly increasing. Germany's success was not due to the fortuitous possession of the first matter.

The great success of Germany's chemical industry may be traced to the simultaneous action of the following causes :

1. The natural disposition and aptitude of the individual German for close, patient, persevering, and painstaking work and study.

2. The munificent and enlightened assistance and encouragement given by the German Governments to the study of chemistry in all its branches regardless of expense and of immediate profitable returns.

3. The spirit of combination and the absence of jealousy among chemical scientists and manufacturers, whereby scientific co-operation on the largest scale was made possible.

That these three factors have combined in making the German chemical industry great is known to all who are acquainted with that industry, for chemical talent of the highest order flourishes rather in France and Great Britain than in Germany. The German chemists owed their successes rather to methodical combination and united plodding than to the inventive genius of individuals, for many of the most important chemical inventions were made outside Germany, but they were most successfully exploited in Germany.

In the beginning of the nineteenth century Great Britain

and France were the leading nations in the chemical industries and in chemical research. The production of aniline dyes from coal tar was discovered in 1855 by Mr. W. H. Perkin. Notwithstanding the English discovery, nearly the whole of the aniline dyes used up to 1914 were made in Germany, and by the irony of fate they were largely made from English coal tar. A small and timely export duty on coal tar would probably have had the effect of transferring a large part of the chemical industry from Germany to England.

A great chemical inventor is of little practical use to a country unless his inventions are utilised to the fullest extent by a large body of chemical manufacturers and chemists. Otherwise his great discoveries will only benefit that country where an apparatus exists for making use of them.

The individual German has a great natural aptitude for patient sedentary work. At an age when English boys will romp or pursue various outdoor sports, German boys will be found poring over books and making fretwork. Owing to this disposition towards concentration and close application, Germans may be found in all countries as watchmakers, opticians, etc. A leaning towards chemistry had been prevalent in Germany already in the Dark Ages. Albertus Magnus, of Cologne, was the greatest chemist of the thirteenth century, and Theophrastus Bombastus von Hohenheim (better known under the name of Paracelsus) the greatest chemist of the sixteenth century. In the Middle Ages the capitals and university towns of the various German States were the favourite haunts of alchemists, who spread the desire for chemical learning. Many of them were swindlers, but many were guided by the spirit of research, and not a few valuable discoveries were made by them. Brandt, for instance, discovered phosphorus; Kunkel, ruby glass, etc.

The German pharmacists never were, and are not now, merely shopkeepers who sell pills and patent medicines and the productions of "manufacturing chemists." Patent

medicines do not exist in Germany, being forbidden on account of the great harm that is often done to the community by unscrupulous manufacturing quacks. The German pharmacists were, and are, manufacturing and analytical chemists on a small scale, and in their daily work they have made many valuable discoveries. Besides, chemistry is with many German pharmacists a hobby. Many boys become pharmacists through inclination towards investigation and research. Many important chemical works in Germany have had their beginning in tiny pharmacists' laboratories, and many leading chemists have come from them.

When Justus von Liebig, the greatest German chemist, was at school, the importance of chemistry was not understood. At the German Universities there existed neither adequate facilities for its study, nor were there any public laboratories. Liebig's greatest service to his country lay not so much in his fruitful investigations and discoveries—which, by the way, chiefly benefited Great Britain and France, for these countries then possessed the most largely developed chemical industries—as in the organisation of chemical study and research on a broad national basis. Owing to his exertions the first University laboratory, that of Giessen, was created in 1825; and he strove less to advance chemical science by his personal research than to train a large number of pupils, in order to spread his methods far and wide. His example was faithfully copied by his numerous assistants. Many of the most prominent German chemists living were initiated into that science by the pupils of Liebig. Thus the spirit of Liebig is still active, and the seed which he has planted has brought forth the magnificent harvest garnered by the German chemical industry.

The German Governments were won over to the cause of chemistry by Liebig's agitation and by his numerous popular writings. Therefore assistance came speedily forward from all quarters of Germany. The laboratory of the University of Marburg was opened in 1840, that of the

University of Leipzig in 1843, and from that time onward laboratory followed laboratory, and the various German Governments spent money without stint for the advancement of chemistry. They did not listen to the doctrines of *laissez-faire*. They neither waited for individual enterprise and private munificence to come forward, nor did they inquire too closely whether an immediate profit could be secured by encouraging chemistry with substantial grants. They were convinced that the encouragement of chemistry might be beneficial to the nation, and considered it their duty to spend a little of the money of the nation on a promising experiment. The consequence of this enlightened policy was that Germany had a huge army of trained chemists, while England and other nations had only a few.

In former times a chemical factory was frequently founded on some excellent receipt, the secret of which was most jealously guarded by its owner. But nowadays it is impossible to maintain a monopoly either by keeping a process secret or by the protection of patents. Chemical science has so greatly advanced that the same ultimate end may be arrived at by a great variety of processes. Consequently neither a secret process nor any number of patents will ensure the continued success of a chemical factory which scientifically stands still. A chemical factory can maintain its position only if it remains, by constant research and constant improvement, in the very forefront of scientific excellence. Success can be won and maintained only by the strenuous and constant research of chemists of ability, by constant progress and the introduction of improved methods. This is all the more necessary as the prices of chemicals have been falling for many years, and will apparently continue to fall.

Formerly it was possible to make industrially valuable discoveries in a somewhat haphazard fashion by individual and unconnected experiments, and the results arrived at could be utilised through several generations. But through the teaching of Liebig and his disciples a new era has begun. Individual planless effort has made way for teamwork,

for systematic, strictly logical, and exhausive research of many chemists under leaders of standing ; and the problem to be solved is patiently pursued in every direction by the combined forces of chemistry until the final aim is arrived at. Every success, every progress, every discovery, should become common property, and should be the starting-point for further and greater successes. In the laboratories of the German Universities and of the great chemical works thousands of highly-trained chemists co-operate as systematically as workmen do in a factory, and the work that is dropped by one chemist who falls out on the way is carried on by another. Thus the army of German chemists have continued their advance, and the astonishing success of the German chemical industry has been brought about.

Combination is the watchword not only in the laboratories, but also in the counting-houses of the chemical factories. In no German industry is there a larger proportion of mammoth enterprises. The great individual works were combined in groups for the regulation of prices. Germany abounded in combinations (Kartelle), and these were particularly numerous in the chemical industry. According to an inquiry made in the beginning of 1905 there were then in Germany 385 industrial combinations, 46 of which belonged to the great chemical group. These proved a blessing to the chemical industry of Germany, but, by dumping, they did much damage to the foreign chemical industries, which they stifled. Thus they assisted in creating the world-monopoly of the German chemical industry.

Of late much has been said and written as to the advantages of education and on the application of science to industry. However, many, perhaps most, people who recommended education and the application of science to industry have only a dim idea how education and science may help industry. British education suffers from two very great evils, which are unfortunately recognised by only very few people. In the first place higher education is more ornamental than useful, more literary than practical, and does not fit men for the battle of life. In the second place

it is too often considered almost solely as a means to pass an examination, and tends therefore rather to exercise the memory than to strengthen the intelligence, the judgment, and the critical faculties. In other words, the influence of the crammer upon education is more noticeable than that of the practical man. Education is more for show than for use.

In the application of science to industry the crying necessity of combination is insufficiently recognised. A British chemist is apt to be an island. The average work accomplished by the average British chemist is probably greater than that of his German competitor, for the Englishman puts more energy into his work, is more alert, and works more quickly. Yet, though some of the greatest chemists living are Englishmen, the British chemical industries suffer owing to the lack of organised and co-ordinated effort. In science co-operation is after all as necessary as in agriculture and industry. The scientific and the industrial part of the nation and its statesmen and politicians can learn much from the rise of the chemical industry of Germany.

CHAPTER XVIII

GERMAN INDUSTRIAL CONDITIONS PREVIOUS TO THE WAR [1]

WHETHER the workers of a nation are prosperous or not depends, in the first place, on the productivity of the national industries, for it is obvious that only a people which produces much will be able to consume much. The prosperity of the workers depends largely upon the adequate expansion of the national industries, for every year adds to the existing population fresh numbers who have to be housed, clothed, and fed, while the progress of civilisation and of luxury creates constantly new wants among the citizens. As great, but stagnant, industries cannot provide for a rapidly increasing population with rapidly increasing wants, the masses of the people can be prosperous only if the national industries are so vigorously expanding that they are able to provide the additional employment and commodities which are constantly called for.

Germany introduced Protection in 1879. Let us compare German and British industrial conditions, taking as starting-point 1880, wherever the figures for that year are available.

The great productive industries are four in number—mining, manufacturing, agriculture, trade. Germany, like Great Britain, mines principally coal and iron ore. The production of these has progressed as follows in the two countries, according to the Statistical Abstract for Foreign Countries (Cd. 5446), published in autumn 1911 :

[1] From the *Fortnightly Review*, August 1910.

PRODUCTION OF COAL AND LIGNITE

	In Germany. Tons.	*In Great Britain.* Tons.
1880	59,118,000	146,969,000
1890	89,291,000	181,614,000
1900	149,788,000	225,181,000
1909	217,433,000	263,774,000

PRODUCTION OF IRON ORE

	In Germany. Tons.	*In Great Britain.* Tons.
1880	7,239,000	18,026,000
1890	11,406,000	13,781,000
1900	18,964,000	14,028,000
1909	25,505,000	14,980,000

In 1880 Great Britain produced 150 per cent. *more* coal and 160 per cent. *more* iron ore than Germany. Things have changed since then. In 1909 Great Britain produced 60 per cent. *less* iron ore than Germany, and her superiority in the production of coal had shrunk to a paltry 20 per cent., and threatens to be a thing of the past in a few years. On balance, Great Britain exported 60,000,000 tons of coal a year, while Germany exported only 10,000,000 tons. Hence it appears that Germany had overtaken Great Britain in the consumption of coal. In value Germany's mining production had, according to the Statistical Abstract for Foreign Countries, increased as follows:

	£
1880	18,775,000
1890	36,282,000
1900	63,162,000
1909	97,393,000

In value Germany's mining production had grown five-fold during the twenty-nine years under review.

As the manufacturing industries are based on the use of coal, iron, and steam, the manufacturing eminence and progress of a country can best be measured by the national consumption of coal and iron, and by the power of its steam

engines. As regards the consumption of coal and iron, Germany and Great Britain compare as follows:

CONSUMPTION OF COAL AND LIGNITE

	In Germany. Tons.	*In Great Britain.* Tons.
1880	57,008,000	129,078,000
1890	90,798,000	152,876,000
1900	149,804,000	179,083,000
1907	208,195,000	195,466,000
1909	206,321,000	198,080,000

PRODUCTION OF PIG IRON

	In Germany. Tons.	*In Great Britain.* Tons.
1880	2,713,000	7,749,233
1890	4,651,000	7,904,214
1900	8,507;000	8,959,691
1907	12,875,000	10,114,000
1909	12,645,000	9,532,000

CONSUMPTION OF PIG IRON

	In Germany. Tons.	*In Great Britain.* Tons.
1880	2,713,000	6,176,673
1890	4,940,000	6,824,925
1900	9,106,000	7,705,201
1907	13,016,000	8,273,000
1909	12,308,000	8,501,000

In 1880 Great Britain consumed 72,000,000 tons of coal *more* than Germany. In 1909 she consumed 8,000,000 tons of coal *less* than Germany. In 1880 Great Britain produced 5,000,000 tons of pig iron *more* than Germany. In 1909 she produced 3,100,000 tons *less* than Germany. In 1880 Great Britain consumed 3,500,000 tons of iron *more* than Germany. In 1909 she consumed 3,800,000 tons *less* than Germany. As the German people use much wood for fuel, and require besides less coal for their closed stoves than Englishmen do for their open fires, the difference in Germany's favour is far greater than appears from the foregoing figures.

Whilst, since the introduction of Protection, Germany's coal consumption has quadrupled, and her iron consumption

has quintupled, the power of her engines has increased even more rapidly, as the figures for Prussia and Bavaria show :

HORSE POWER OF STATIONARY STEAM ENGINES

In Prussia.		*In Bavaria.*	
1879	887,780	1879	70,678
1895	2,358,175	1889	124,680
1909	5,768,010	1908	428,253
1910	5,837,782	1910	?

Since the introduction of Protection the engine-power of Germany has grown no less than sevenfold. Unfortunately, economic science, as distinguished from barren economic theory, has been very greatly neglected in this country. Hence no statistics of steam engines similar to those published in Germany are available for Great Britain, and we are spared a comparison which probably would be exceedingly humiliating. The figures given show that the engine-power of Germany has increased enormously since the introduction of Protection, and as her new machines are better, and therefore more productive, than her old ones, and do not stand idle, we are justified in assuming that the industrial production of Germany has grown at least sixfold during thirty years of Protection.

If we now turn to agriculture, we find that the German harvest has increased as follows :

THE GERMAN HARVEST

	Rye.	*Tons.* Wheat.	Oats.
1880	4,952,525	2,345,278	4,228,128
1890	5,868,078	2,830,921	4,913,544
1900	8,550,659	3,841,165	7,091,930
1908	10,736,874	3,767,767	7,694,833
1910	10,511,160	3,861,479	7,900,376

THE GERMAN HARVEST

	Potatoes.	*Tons.* Sugar.	Hay.
1880	19,466,242	415,000	19,563,388
1890	23,320,983	1,261,000	18,859,888
1900	40,585,317	1,795,000	23,116,276
1908	46,342,726	2,139,000	27,076,097
1910	43,468,397	2,037,397	28,250,115

During the thirty years under review, when the productivity of her mines and the output of her manufacturing industries have grown about sevenfold, the rural industries of Germany have not decayed or stood still. On the contrary, her soil produced in 1910 twice the quantity of bread corn, oats, and potatoes, and five times the quantity of sugar, which it produced before the introduction of Protection. During the same period British agriculture has rapidly decayed, "owing to industrial prosperity," as the Free Traders tell us, and all British crops, from wheat to hops, have shrunk most lamentably, and have caused millions of British acres to be deserted by the plough and to revert to grass.

The increase of Germany's meat production is no less surprising than that of her crops. Her meat production has more than kept pace with the increase of her population, as the following table indicates :

	Population of Germany.	Cattle in Germany.	Pigs in Germany.
1873 . . .	41,564,000	15,776,702	7,124,088
1883 . . .	46,016,000	15,786,764	9,206,195
1892 . . .	50,266,000	17,555,834	12,174,442
1897 . . .	53,569,000	18,490,772	14,274,557
1900 . . .	56,046,000	18,939,692	16,807,014
1904 . . .	57,475,000	19,331,568	18,920,666
1907 . . .	62,083,000	20,630,544	22,146,532

It will be noticed that between 1873 and 1907 the population of Germany has increased by 50 per cent. During the same period the number of her cattle has increased by 33 per cent., and that of her pigs by no less than 200 per cent. Pork is the favourite meat of the German workers, whilst mutton is little esteemed by them. In beef and pork combined Germany now produces, per head of population, twice as much meat as she did thirty years ago. Her meat production has so greatly increased that Germany, notwithstanding the greatly increased meat consumption of her people, has become practically entirely independent of foreign meat supplies during the very time when British meat production has remained stationary, and Englishmen have become dangerously dependent on foreign supplies

for the greater part of the meat they eat. A comparison of British and German live stock is humiliating. In 1907 Great Britain possessed only 11,630,142 cattle and 3,967,163 pigs.

It is worth noting that, according to the international statistics published in the Year-Book of the United States Department of Agriculture for 1908, Germany produces one-third of the world's potato crop. It is estimated that this enormous crop is used as follows :

	12,000,000	tons for human food.
	17,600,000	,, for fodder.
	2,500,000	,, for making spirit.
	1,400,000	,, for making starch.
	5,200,000	,, for seed.
	5,000,000	,, for loss and waste.
Total	43,700,000	

The British potato crop amounted in 1907 to 5,223,973 tons. The whole of the United Kingdom produced, therefore, merely as much potatoes as Germany used every year for seed alone. According to the American statistics, Germany produces one-sixth of the world's sugar. She raises yearly from 12,000,000 tons to 15,000,000 tons of sugar beet, which furnish 2,000,000 tons of sugar and 10,000,000 tons of fodder, which, like the bulk of the potato harvest, is converted into pig meat. Germany's 22,000,000 pigs are merely a by-product of her intensive agriculture.

As all trade is exchange, the greatness of a nation's trade cannot fairly be measured by its foreign trade alone, as Free Traders do, especially as the home trade is far more important than is the foreign trade, both in Great Britain and in Germany. Free Traders never tire of assuring us that Protection makes production dear, that it thus hampers the sale of domestic manufactures in foreign markets, and "destroys" the export trade. Since 1879 the exportation of German manufactures has increased as follows :

	£
1880	83,500,000
1890	107,440,000
1900	149,100,000
1910	239,800,000

The foregoing figures prove that Germany's foreign trade also is exceedingly prosperous and rapidly expanding. During the period 1880–1910, when Germany's manufactured exports have increased by no less than 200 per cent., the manufactured exports of Great Britain have increased by only 70 per cent.

The statistics given prove that in all the productive industries, in mining, manufacture, agriculture, and commerce, Germany's progress is stupendous, that Germany has overtaken Great Britain in industrial production, although England is still supreme in cotton and shipping; and it stands to reason that the German people must have fully participated in this enormous expansion of national wealth production and consequent prosperity.

Whether the masses of the people, of whom the majority are wage-earners, are prosperous or not depends on three factors—employment, wages, cost of living. Each of these three factors will be separately considered.

Previous to the War unemployment appears to have been many times larger in Great Britain than in Germany. According to the statistics of unemployment among Trade Unionists, published by the British Board of Trade, there were, as a rule, from three to four unemployed workers in Great Britain to every single unemployed worker in Germany. It is a well-known fact that working men leave their country chiefly through lack of employment. A comparison of the emigration statistics of the two countries shows that there were, as a rule, from ten to twelve British emigrants to every single German emigrant. The harrowing tale of the British emigration statistics, and of the British statistics of unemployment among Trade Unionists, is amply confirmed by a comparison of the British decennial censuses with the German industrial censuses of 1892, 1895, and 1907. Unfortunately, the British censuses and the German industrial censuses are not strictly comparable. They have been taken in different years, and different classifications have been adopted in the two countries. Still, the existing figures suffice to show how employment has changed in

certain important and comparable industries of the two countries during a considerable space of time.

EMPLOYMENT IN CERTAIN TRADES IN GERMANY

	Metal and Machinery Trades.	Textile Trades.	Building Trades.	Agriculture.
1882 . .	815,802	910,089	533,511	8,236,496
1895 . .	1,247,258	945,191	1,353,637	8,292,692
1907 . .	2,093,147	1,057,243	1,905,987	9,883,257

EMPLOYMENT IN CERTAIN TRADES IN THE UNITED KINGDOM

	Metals and Machinery.	Textile.	Building Construction.	Agriculture.
1881 . .	978,102	1,430,985	926,135	2,574,031
1891 . .	1,145,386	1,519,861	955,573	2,420,926
1901 . .	1,475,410	1,462,001	1,335,820	2,262,454

A comparison of the two tables is most interesting. It shows that during the period covered by the last three censuses the German metal and machinery trades have provided employment for 1,280,000 additional workers, whilst the British metal and machinery trades have provided work for only 497,000 additional workers ; that the workers in the building trade have increased by 1,370,000 in Germany, and by only 410,000 in the United Kingdom ; that the workers in the textile trades have increased by 150,000 in Germany and by only 31,000 in the United Kingdom ; that agriculture provides work for 1,600,000 additional workers in Germany, and for 312,000 fewer workers in the United Kingdom. Further figures, which I refrain from giving through lack of space, confirm the tale of vastly increased employment in Germany, and of slowly and inadequately increasing, stagnant, or shrinking employment in Great Britain.

The British population increased by only 400,000 a year, whilst the German population increased by no less than 900,000 a year. Notwithstanding the relatively small increase in population, between 200,000 and 300,000 people emigrated on balance every year from the United Kingdom, while Germany, with her immense increase in population, had an

emigration of from 20,000 to 30,000 only. On balance she had no emigration, but received instead from 50,000 to 100,000 people a year from abroad, immigration exceeding emigration by these numbers. People fled from England by the hundred thousand, as from a stricken land, through lack of work, while they migrated into Germany by the hundred thousand, being attracted thereto by regular employment and good wages. In some districts of Germany the amount spent in wages had trebled and quadrupled within twenty years. According to the report of the Dortmund Mining Society for 1906, the wages paid to the Dortmund coal-miners have increased from £3,859,423 in 1886 to £18,942,579 in 1906. In 1910 they amounted to £23,114,778 according to the *Statistisches Jahrbuch*. Those paid to the coal-miners of Upper Silesia have increased from £981,995 in 1886 to £4,110,626 in 1906, and to £5,603,633 in 1910. Those paid to the coal-miners in the Saar district have increased from £999,840 in 1886 to £2,745,099 in 1906, and to £2,939,405 in 1910. We cannot wonder that a very large percentage of the coal-miners in Germany are foreigners—Russians, Poles, Austrians, Italians, etc.

The price of labour, like the price of all commodities, is regulated by the law of demand and supply. Hence it is only natural that the great demand for labour of every kind which prevails in Germany has raised general wages very greatly in that country, while the insufficient demand for labour in Great Britain not only drove hundreds of thousands of Englishmen every year out of the country, but depressed general British wages below the German level.

While in a few trades the nominal wages of the skilled workers—that is, wages which leave out of account loss through unemployment and short time—were higher in Great Britain than in Germany, the general level of wages, and especially of real wages, was certainly lower, especially as the wages of the numerically far more important unskilled workers were considerably higher in Germany than in Great Britain. In Great Britain skilled workers received approximately twice the wages of the unskilled workers

owing to the strength of the firmly-established Trade Unions, which artificially restrict the supply of labour. In Germany the Trade Unions were of very recent date, and as they had not yet succeeded in securing abnormally high wages for their members, the difference in the wages of skilled and unskilled workers was very slight. How small this difference is may be seen from a report, *Household Budgets in Families of Small Means*, which was published by the German Statistical Office in 1909. From that publication we learn that the following average wages—not nominal wages, but real wages actually earned in the course of a whole year, which allow for short time and unemployment—were received in the cases investigated :

	£	*s.*	*d.*		*s.*	*d.*	
Skilled workers . . .	78	9	5	per year or	30	2	per week.
Unskilled workers . . .	65	3	0	,, or	25	1	,,
Dockers	79	12	11	,, or	30	7	,,
Road workers . . .	60	14	11	,, or	23	4	,,
General labourers . . .	67	5	8	,, or	25	11	,,

While on an average British skilled workers in full employ earned before the War from 30*s.* to 35*s.* per week, British unskilled workers earned only from 18*s.* to 22*s.* per week. Possibly the average level of wages among skilled Unionist workers was slightly higher in Great Britain than in Germany, owing to the strength of the British Trade Unions. On the other hand, the average level of wages among unskilled workers was certainly considerably higher in Germany than in Great Britain, owing to the greater demand for, and the consequent scarcity of, labour.

That the wages of many German workers, especially of non-Unionists, who form the vast majority, were higher than the corresponding British wages, has been stated by many competent authorities. The report of the Chamber of Commerce of Elberfeld of 1908 stated : "Wages in Germany are, in numerous instances, higher than wages in England." The report of the Berlin Chamber of Commerce of 1908 complained that the ready-made clothes trade was leaving Berlin for London "because wages are lower in

London than in Berlin." The report of the British Consul in Frankfurt of 1908 said :

"When recently some important chemical works were meditating the establishment of a factory in the United Kingdom, the directorate of the German company decided, after minute inquiries, so to prepare the plans of the new factory that various branches of their German manufacture could later be transferred to the United Kingdom, because the workman's wages are, at the present moment, considerably lower in England than in Germany."

The report of 1909 of the British Consul in Frankfurt, who, by the by, was a Free Trader, stated :

"A report from a prominent firm in the colour-printing trade runs as follows : 'While years back the wages paid to printers in Germany were considerably less than those paid in the United Kingdom, we should say that to-day little, if any, difference exists between the earnings of the average printer in the two countries ; while, with regard to the specially skilled colour printer, we should say that, if anything, the German to-day is in receipt of a higher wage than the same calibre man in the United Kingdom. The net result is, that whereas years ago fairly good colour printed work might be procured from Germany at a saving when compared with British work of the same quality, this difference has entirely vanished to-day, with the very natural result that a considerable amount of the work which used to go to Germany is now placed with British firms.' A report from a prominent brewing concern in the North, one of the partners of which has given special attention to the question of comparative wages, assures me that he has no doubt whatsoever that, on the whole, the German workmen in the brewing business are decidedly better paid than the British. In the paper industry a similar impression prevails."

It cannot be doubted that, if we take into account the many millions of unskilled workers who receive a higher wage in Germany than in Great Britain, the general level of wages was considerably higher in Germany than in Great Britain.

How greatly German wages in certain trades have risen since 1879 may be seen from the following interesting figures, furnished by an official German statistician, Mr. Kuczynski, in 1909:

DAILY AVERAGE WAGES IN MARKS

	Dortmund Miners.	Rostock Bricklayers.	Berlin Bricklayers.	Berlin Carpenters.
1879 . . .	2·55	3·20	—	2·50
1884 . . .	3·08	3·20	3·75	—
1889 . . .	3·42	4·00	5·50	3·87
1894 . . .	3·73	4·20	5·25	4·83
1899 . . .	4·84	4·40	5·40	4·83
1904 . . .	4·78	4·70	6·30	6·28
1907 . . .	5·98	5·30	6·75	—

	Hamburg Bricklayers.	Elberfeld Bricklayers.	Workers at Krupp's.
1879	—	3·00	3·02
1884	5·00	3·00	3·55
1889	6·00	3·50	3·83
1894	6·00	3·80	4·06
1899	6·00	4·51	4·72
1904	6·30	4·60	4·88
1907	7·20	5·41	5·35

If the cost of food had risen more than wages, the consumption of food, and especially of the more expensive kinds of food, should have declined in Germany. That this is not the case appears from the White Books published by the German Ministry of Finance in 1908, from which I extract the following:

AVERAGE CONSUMPTION PER HEAD OF POPULATION

	In Kilogrammes.			
	Rye.	Wheat.	Barley.	Potatoes.
1879 . . .	125·1	50·6	40·6	281·2
1889 . . .	106·4	56·2	50·6	423·1
1899 . . .	144·6	89·8	69·5	581·1
1906 . . .	143·5	94·4	82·5	592·6

The consumption of beer per head increased from 85 litres per head in 1879–83 to 118 litres per head in 1904–7. As regards meat, there are available only statistics regarding

the consumption of beef and pork in Saxony, which show the following:

CONSUMPTION OF MEAT, EXCLUSIVE OF VEAL, MUTTON, POULTRY, AND GAME, IN SAXONY

	In Kilogrammes.		
	Beef.	Pork.	Total.
1880	11·1	18·1	29·2
1890	14·0	20·6	34·6
1900	15·2	27·9	43·1
1907	14·4	27·9	42·3

During the period of Protection the consumption of beef and pork has grown by 50 per cent., not only in Saxony but throughout Germany, and the German Ministry of Finance published in its White Books of 1908 an estimate showing that the German population consumed 55 kilogrammes of meat of all kinds per head per year, as compared with only 52·2 kilogrammes per head per year for the British population.

The foregoing pages show that employment was considerably better in Germany than in Great Britain; that general wages were considerably higher in the former country than in the latter; that the cost of living was considerably lower to the workers in Germany than to the workers in England. From these three facts we must conclude that the German working man was considerably better off than the British working man, and much corroborative evidence can be adduced in support of this conclusion.

An eminent Free Trader, Lord Brassey, wrote in his book, *The New Fiscal Policy*, "For the masses of our population no test of progress can be more conclusive than the deposits in the Post Office and Trustee Savings Banks." Let us apply Lord Brassey's test to Great Britain and Germany, and compare their progress since the introduction of Protection:

	Savings Banks Deposits in Germany.	Savings Banks Deposits in Great Britain.
	£	£
1880	130,690,000	77,721,084
1890	256,865,000	111,285,359
1900	441,929,000	187,005,562
1911	900,000,000	227,902,840

The foregoing table shows that during the period of Protection, 1880–1911, the German people have placed £770,000,000, and the British people have placed only £139,000,000, into the Savings Banks, whilst between 1900 and 1911 the German people placed £459,000,000, and the British people only £41,000,000, into the Savings Banks. During these eleven years the German Savings Banks Deposits have grown more than eleven times as quickly as the British Savings Banks Deposits. It is worth noting that more than £700,000,000 of the German Savings Banks Deposits consisted of small sums which were put into these banks by people belonging to the working class.

British workers put their savings, not only into the Savings Banks, but into Building, Friendly, Co-operative Societies, and Trade Unions as well. According to the second Fiscal Blue Book (Cd. 2337) these savings were as follows :

	£
Building Societies	62,000,000
Friendly Societies	43,000,000
Co-operative Societies	40,000,000
Trade Unions	5,000,000
Total	150,000,000

According to the White Books published by the German Ministry of Finance, the savings in the German Co-operative Societies alone were, in 1906–7, as follows :

	£
Deposits in Allgemeiner Verband	45,800,000
,, Verband Darmstadt	68,650,000
,, ,, Neuwied	18,170,000
,, ,, Bavaria	9,730,000
,, ,, Baden	2,765,000
,, ,, Wurtemberg	4,150,000
,, ,, Trier	1,715,000
,, ,, Hanover	4,895,000
,, ,, Posen	6,150,000
,, ,, Berlin	3,490,000
Total	165,515,000

It will be noticed that the savings in the German Co-operative Societies alone exceeded those of all the British popular societies combined. According to Heiligenstadt (*Jahrbuch für Gesetzgebung* 1901), the savings placed into the Prussian Co-operative Societies should be £7,500,000, and into all the German Co-operative Societies, £11,250,000 per year. In the State Insurance Societies there were more than £100,000,000 to the credit of the workers, and many hundreds of millions of pounds were invested by the workers in freehold land and houses.

Workers who are poor cannot afford to join a trade union. The German Social-Democratic Trade Unions alone show the following record :

	Number of members.	Yearly Income.	Accumulated Funds.	Average contribution per member per year.
		£	£	*s.* *d.*
1891 . . .	277,659	55,829	21,292	4 2
1893 . . .	223,530	111,218	30,352	9 11
1898 . . .	493,742	275,434	218,665	11 2
1903 . . .	887,698	820,999	648,686	18 8
1908 . . .	1,831,731	2,427,220	2,041,989	26 6
1910 . . .	2,128,021	3,216,110	2,628,700	24 10

The Social-Democratic and the Non-Socialist Trade Unions combined had more than 4,000,000 members.

In nineteen years the number of German trade unionists has grown eightfold, and their contributions nearly sixty-fold. The average contribution per member has risen from 4*s.* 2*d.* per year to 24*s.* 10*d.* per year, or to 6*d.* a week. Could ill-employed and badly-paid workers who, as we are told, suffer severely from the dearness of food, spare 6*d.* a week for unions which in Germany serve mainly, not for purposes of insurance—that is done by the State Insurance Societies—but for purposes of agitation ? In some of the German unions the contributions are considerably higher than 24*s.* 10*d.* a year or 6*d.* a week. In 1908 55,482 compositors contributed to their unions 80*s.* per head per year ; 16,648 lithographers contributed 60*s.* per head per year ; 146,337 wood-workers contributed 35*s.* per head per year ; 360,099 metal-workers contributed 33*s.* per head per year.

CHAPTER XIX

THE RISE, GROWTH, AND CHARACTER OF THE SOCIAL DEMOCRATIC PARTY [1]

ALMOST every country possesses a more or less turbulent party which, as a rule, is in a small minority. In Germany alone, of all countries in and out of Europe, it has happened that by far the strongest political party has again and again been branded officially and semi-officially as the enemy of Society and of the country, "Die Umsturzpartei," the party of subversion. For instance, at the Sedan banquet on the 2nd of September 1895, the Emperor William II. declared in a speech that the members of that vast party which had polled 1,786,000 votes in 1893 were "a band of fellows not worthy to bear the name of Germans," and on the 8th of September, in a letter to the Chancellor, he called the Social Democrats "enemies to the divine order of things, without a fatherland."

It would seem worth while to look into the history, views, composition, and aims of that interesting party. As the full history of the Social Democratic Party in Germany would be as bulky as that of the British Liberal Party, it will, of course, be impossible to give more than a mere sketch of it in these pages. It may, however, be found that a sketch brings out the essential points and light and shade more clearly and more strongly than would a lengthy and detailed account.

The creation of the Social Democratic Party in Germany, like the inauguration of many other political movements in that country, was due not to the practical politician but

[1] From the *Nineteenth Century and After*, May 1903.

to the bookish doctrinaire. Roughly speaking, it may be said that that party has been created by the writings of the well-known Socialist authors, Karl Marx, Friedrich Engels, and Ferdinand Lassalle. It suffices to mention these names in order to understand that German Social Democracy was at first animated by the spirit of the learned and well-meaning, but somewhat nebulous and very unpractical, idealists who had read many books, and who sincerely wished to lead democracy from its misery and suffering straight into a millennium of their own creation.

The fate of the followers of Marx, Engels, and Lassalle varied greatly. Some of them dissented and founded comparatively unimportant political schools and groups of their own. Some became anarchists like Johann Most. Some lost themselves in theoretical speculations and became respectable professors ; but the vast majority of Lassalle's followers developed into the German Social Democratic Party. That party became, by gradual evolution, the political representative of German labour under the able guidance of talented working men. Its great leader was the turner, August Bebel, and among the most prominent members of the party were workmen such as Mr. Grillenberger, a locksmith ; Mr. Auer, a saddler ; Messrs. Molkenbuhr and Meister, cigar-workers ; Mr. Bernstein, the son of an engine-driver ; Mr. von Vollmar, formerly a post-office official. Working men such as those mentioned managed, led, and controlled a party which before the War embraced more than 4,000,000 men, and they maintained perfect order and absolute discipline among that vast number.

From its small beginnings up to the time of its present greatness, German Social Democracy has been democratic in the fullest sense of the word. Some working men of a similar stamp to those mentioned, together with Wilhelm Liebknecht, a poor journalist, created the party, organised it, and led it. These leaders were always under the constant and strict control of the members of the party. Individual members often inquired, sometimes in an uncomfortably democratic spirit, not only into the expenditure of the

meagre party fund, which for a long time did not run into three figures, and of which every halfpenny had to be accounted for, but even cross-examined the party leader, the aged Liebknecht, as to his household expenses, and censured him for taking a salary as editor-in-chief of the *Vorwärts*, the great Social Democratic Party organ, and keeping a servant.

The idea of equality, which is often found in small democratic societies, but which is usually lost when the society expands into a party, especially if that party is of enormous size, has been strictly preserved by the Social Democrats in Germany. The conservation of its original character was all the easier as the party had neither a great nobleman nor a distinguished professor for a figure-head, nor even wealthy brewers and bankers for contributors to the party fund, who might have influenced the party policy as they do in other countries. Thus the Social Democratic Party was, and has remained, essentially a Labour Party ; it has preserved its truly democratic, one might almost say its proletarian, character. However, it has been sensible enough not to write consistency on its banners, and has quietly dropped one by one many of the Utopian views and doctrines which it had taken over from the bookish doctrinaires who had been its originators.

The Constitution of the German Empire gave universal suffrage to its citizens, and the number of Social Democratic votes, which had amounted to only 124,700 in 1871, rose rapidly to 342,000 in 1874, and to 493,300 in 1877. Bismarck had been watching the rapid development of Social Democracy with growing uneasiness and dislike, and was casting about for a convenient pretext to strike at it when, on the 11th of May 1878, Hödel, an individual of illegitimate birth, besotted by drink, and degraded by vice and consequent disease, fired a pistol at the Emperor William.

Long before his attempt on the Emperor, Hödel had been expelled from the Social Democratic Party, to which he had once belonged, on account of his character and his anarchist leanings, and he had joined the " Christian Socia-

list Working Men's Party" of Mr. Stöcker, the court preacher. Consequently it was not possible, by any stretch of imagination, to lay the responsibility for his deed at the doors of the Social Democratic Party. Nevertheless, Bismarck endeavoured to turn this attempt to account in the same way in which, in 1874, he had laid the moral responsibility for Kullmann's murderous attempt on himself upon the Clerical Party against which he was then fighting. He at once brought forward a Bill for the suppression of Social Democracy, but it was rejected by 251 votes against 57.

By one of those fortuitous coincidences which have always played so conspicuous a part in Bismarck's career, a second attempt on the Emperor's life was made by Nobiling, only three weeks after that of Hödel, and this time the aged monarch was very seriously wounded. At one moment the doctors feared for his life, but in the end the copious bleeding was a blessing in disguise, for it rejuvenated the Emperor in mind and body.

The two murderous attempts, following one another so closely, naturally infuriated the population of Germany, and, though Nobiling also was no Social Democrat, Bismarck succeeded this time in turning the feelings of the people against Social Democracy. He immediately dissolved the Reichstag and fanned the universal indignation at the crime to fever heat by his powerful press organisation. In the numerous journals throughout the land which were influenced from the Chancellory in Berlin, it was constantly declared that these repeated outrages were the dastardly work of Social Democracy. At the same time a reign of terrorism against Social Democracy was initiated by the German police. Countless political meetings of the Social Democrats were forbidden, a large number of Social Democratic newspapers were suppressed, and the law courts inflicted in one month no less than 500 years of imprisonment for *lèse-majesté*.

During the enormous excitement prevailing and in the seething turmoil caused by those two attempts, by the critical state of the Emperor, by the passionate campaign

of the semi-official press against the Social Democratic Party, and by the relentless persecutions waged against its members, the new elections took place, and, naturally enough, their result was a majority in favour of exceptional legislation against Social Democracy. Bismarck brought his famous Socialist Bill before Parliament without delay, and it was quickly passed, and was published on the 21st of October in the *Reichsanzeiger*.

Then the reign of terror, of which the Social Democrats had already received a foretaste, began in earnest. Within eight months the authorities dissolved 222 working men's unions and other associations, and suppressed 127 periodical and 278 other publications, by virtue of the discretionary powers given to them by the Socialist Law. Innumerable *bona fide* co-operative societies were compelled by the police to close their doors without any trial and without the possibility of appeal. Numerous Social Democrats were summarily expelled from Germany at a few days' notice, through the discretion which the new Act had vested in the police. Many were placed under police supervision. Others were not allowed to change their domicile. Thousands of Social Democrats were thus reduced to beggary, many were thrown into prison, many fled to Switzerland, England, or the United States.

The first effect upon Social Democracy of the new law was staggering. The entire party organisation, the entire party press, and the right of the members of the party to free speech, had been destroyed by the Government, and for the moment the party had become a disorganised and terrified mob. Everywhere in Germany scenes of tyranny were enacted by the police. In Frankfort-on-the-Main, a Social Democrat was buried, and, for some trifling reason, the police attacked the mourners in the very churchyard with drawn swords, and thirty to forty of the men were wounded. In 1886 a collision took place between some Social Democrats and some policemen in plain clothes, who, according to Social Democratic evidence, were not known to be policemen. With incredible severity, eleven

of the Social Democrats were punished for sedition, some with no less than ten and a half years' penal servitude, some with twelve and a half years of imprisonment. For the moment the Social Democratic Party was staggered by the rapidly succeeding blows. The election of 1878 reduced the number of Social Democratic votes from 493,300 to 437,100, and in the next election, that of 1881, it sank even as low as 312,000.

Prosecutions were not brought merely against Social Democrats who were considered lawbreakers by the local authorities and the police. On the contrary, the German Government directed the law with particular severity against the intellectual leaders of the party in Parliament, in the vain hope of extirpating it. Bebel and Liebknecht, the heads of the party and its leaders in the Reichstag, were dragged again and again before the law courts by the public prosecutor, often only in the attempt to construct, by diligent cross-examination, a punishable offence out of some inoffensive words which they had uttered, and time after time the prosecution collapsed ignominiously, and both men were found not guilty; time after time they were condemned to lengthy terms of imprisonment for *lèse-majesté*, high treason, and intended high treason.

Liebknecht received his last conviction of four months of imprisonment for *lèse-majesté* as a broken man of nearly seventy years, and even his burial in August 1900 was marked by that petty and annoying police interference under which he had suffered so much during his life. No less than 2,000 wreaths and other floral tributes had been sent by Liebknecht's admirers, yet, in the immense funeral procession, in which about 45,000 people took part, not one wreath, not one banner was to be seen, for the police had forbidden their inclusion. Though hundreds of thousands of Social Democrats attended the funeral in the procession and in the streets of Berlin, and in spite of the provocative orders of the police, no breach of the peace occurred, no arrest took place, an eloquent testimonial to the orderliness and discipline of the party of subversion.

Bismarck soon recognised that his policy of force and violence promised to be unsuccessful. Therefore he tried not only to vanquish Social Democracy by breaking up the party organisation, confiscating its books and documents, destroying the party press, and taking from Social Democrats the right of free speech, but he tried at the same time to reconcile the German working men with the Government by instituting State Insurance for workers against old age and disablement. Thus he hoped to entice them away from their leaders, and to make them look to the State for help. However, his Workmen's Insurance Laws failed to fulfil the chief object which they were to serve.

According to the Social Democratic leaders the Imperial Insurance scheme kept not one vote from Social Democracy, especially as it did not satisfy the workers by its performance. They complained that the benefits which they derived under the Insurance scheme were purely nominal, that the premiums paid came chiefly out of their own pockets, that the contributions made by the employers were insufficient, and that the cost of management was excessive. Consequently it failed to appease German democracy and was scorned by it as a bribe.

Gradually the terror of prosecution wore off. Social Democratic political meetings were held in secret. Party literature printed in Switzerland was smuggled over the frontier and surreptitiously distributed. By and by the party pulled itself together, and found that determination and perseverance which are born from adversity, and which are bound to lead individuals and parties possessing these qualities to greatness. The campaign of oppression and the creation of martyrs had done its work. As Bismarck had created the greatness of the Clerical Party by the "Kulturkampf," by the prosecution of Roman Catholicism, even so he created the greatness of the Social Democratic Party. Social Democracy began again to take heart, and, from 1881 onwards, we find a marvellous increase in the Social Democratic votes recorded, notwithstanding, or rather because of, all the measures taken against it by the Govern-

ment. The astonishing progress of the party since 1881 is apparent from the following table :

Election.	Social Democratic Votes polled.	Total Votes polled.	Percentage of Social Democratic Votes.
1881 . .	312,000	5,097,800	6·12 per cent.
1884 . .	550,000	5,663,000	9·68 ,,
1887 . .	763,100	7,540,900	10·11 ,,
1890 . .	1,427,300	7,228,500	19·74 ,,
1893 . .	1,786,700	7,674,000	23·30 ,,
1898 . .	2,107,076	7,752,700	27·18 ,,
1903 . .	3,010,771	9,495,586	31·71 ,,
1907 . .	3,259,000	11,262,800	28·94 ,,
1912 . .	4,250,329	12,206,808	34·82 ,,

When Bismarck saw Social Democracy increasing, notwithstanding all his efforts at repression, he tried another method. It happened very frequently in Germany that three, four, or more candidates, representing as many parties, stood for one seat. If in such a case none of the candidates obtained a majority over the combined votes given to all the other candidates, a second poll had to take place between the two candidates who had received the largest number of votes, whilst the other candidates had to withdraw. In order to destroy the chances of Social Democratic candidates in the very frequent second polls, Bismarck and his press used constantly to brand the Social Democratic Party as the State-subverting Party, and to enjoin "the parties of law and order," as he called the other parties, to stand shoulder to shoulder against the common enemy of Society and of the Fatherland.

Many years had passed since Bismarck's dismissal. Yet official Germany did not discover a new method for the treatment of Social Democracy. It merely copied Bismarck's example. Until yesterday the Social Democratic Party was still loudly denounced by every good German patriot as the party of subversion, which had to be shunned and combated. Hence the election managers of the numerous parties and factions did until recently, in case of a second poll, usually give the votes of their party

to the candidate of any other party in order not to incur the odium in official circles of having helped a Social Democrat into the Reichstag. But voices of protest began to be heard against the official fiction that Social Democracy was a pest, the enemy of the Country, of Society, of Monarchy, of the Family, and of the Church. In December 1902 Professor Mommsen wrote in the *Nation*:

"There must be an end of the superstition, as false as it is perfidious, that the nation is divided into parties of law and order on the one hand, and a party of revolution on the other, and that it is the prime political duty of citizens belonging to the former categories to shun the Labour Party as if it were in quarantine for the plague, and to combat it as the enemy of the State."

In March 1890 Bismarck was dismissed by the Emperor William, and a few months later the exceptional law against Social Democracy was withdrawn. The net result of that law had been that 1,500 Social Democrats had been condemned to about 1,000 years of imprisonment, and that the Social Democratic vote had risen from 437,158 to 1,427,298. The effect of the Socialist Law, with all its persecution, was the reverse of what Bismarck had expected, for it had made that party great. If less drastic means had been employed by Bismarck, if less contempt and contumely had been showered upon Social Democracy by the official classes and society, and if instead consideration for the legitimate wishes and confidence in the common sense of the working men's party had been shown by the Government, Social Democracy would not have attained its formidable strength.

Among the various causes which led to the rupture between the present Emperor and Prince Bismarck, a prominent place may be assigned to the difference in their views with regard to the treatment of Social Democracy. When William the Second came to the throne he clearly saw the failure of Bismarck's policy of oppression, and, probably influenced by the liberal views of his English

mother, resolved to kill Social Democracy with kindness. This idea dictated his well-known retort to Bismarck, "Leave the Social Democrats to me; I can manage them quite alone!" Even before Bismarck's dismissal William II. demonstrated to the world his extremely liberal view regarding the German workmen with that astonishing impetuousness and with that complete disregard of the views of his experienced official advisers to which the world had to become accustomed. On the 4th of February 1890 an Imperial rescript was published, which lacked the necessary counter-signature of the Imperial Chancellor whereby the responsibility for that document would have been fixed upon the Government. It declared it to be the duty of the State ". . . to regulate the time, the hours, and the nature of labour in such a way as to ensure the preservation of health, to fulfil the demands of morality, and to secure the economic requirements of the workers, to establish their equality before the law, and to facilitate the free and peaceful expression of their wishes and grievances." A second rescript called together an International Conference for the Protection of Workers.

These Imperial manifestations were greeted with jubilation by German democracy; but the extremely liberal spirit which these documents breathed vanished suddenly, and gave way to autocratic and anti-democratic pronouncements. While the words of the Imperial rescripts were still fresh in every mind, and while German democracy still hoped to receive greater consideration at the hands of the Government, messages like the following, addressed to democracy, fell from the Imperial lips:

"We Hohenzollerns take Our crown from God alone, and to God alone We are responsible in the fulfilment of Our duties.

"The soldier and the army, not Parliamentary majorities and resolutions, have welded together the German Empire.

"*Suprema lex regis voluntas.*

"Only One is master in the country. That am I. Who opposes Me I shall crush to pieces.

" *Sic volo, sic jubeo.*

" All of you shall have only one will, and that is My will; there is only one law, and that is My law.

" Parliamentary opposition of Prussian nobility to their King is a monstrosity.

" For Me every Social Democrat is synonymous with enemy of the nation, and of the Fatherland.

" On to the battle, for Religion, Morality, and Order, and against the parties of subversion. Forward with God! Dishonourable is he who forsakes his King!"

The Emperor did not confine himself to making in public pronouncements highly offensive and hostile to German democracy, such as those mentioned, but set himself the task of actively combating Social Democracy. Consciously or unconsciously, he gradually dropped into Bismarck's ways and copied, or rather exaggerated, Bismarck's methods, Bismarck's tactics, and Bismarck's mistakes. When, on the 13th of October 1895, a manufacturer named Schwartz was murdered in Mülhausen by a workman who had been repeatedly convicted of theft, William II. telegraphed to his widow, " Again a sacrifice to the revolutionary movement engendered by the Socialists," imitating Bismarck's attempt at foisting the guilt for an individual crime upon a Parliamentary party which then comprised 2,000,000 members.

The Socialistic Law of 1878 had been a complete failure. Nevertheless, the Government tried to introduce, under a different title, a near relative of that law, which breathed the same spirit of intolerance and violence; for in 1894 a Bill, which became known under the name " Umsturz Vorlage " (Subversion Bill), was brought out by the Government. This Bill made it punishable " to attack publicly by insulting utterances Religion, the Monarchy, Family, or Property in a matter likely to provoke a breach of the peace, or to bring the institutions of the State into contempt." That Bill, which, with its flexible provisions, would have allowed of the most arbitrary interpretations, and would have virtually given a free hand to the police and to public

prosecutors and judges anxious to show their zeal by the relentless persecution of Social Democracy, was thrown out by the Reichstag. Notwithstanding its failure another Bill of similar character, but intended for Prussia alone, was laid before the Prussian Diet on the 10th of May 1897, empowering the police to dissolve all meetings "which do not conform with the law, or endanger public security, especially the security of the State or of the public peace." This Bill also was rejected.

Shortly after his second failure, William II. made another and still more startling attempt to suppress Social Democracy. On the 5th of September 1898, he declared at a banquet in Oeynhausen, ". . . A Bill is in preparation, and will be submitted to Parliament, by which every one who tries to hinder a willing German worker from doing his work, or who incites him to strike, will be punished with penal servitude." Naturally this announcement, which promised that strikers and their leaders would in future be treated as felons, created an enormous sensation. After a delay of nine months, which betrayed its hesitation, the Government brought out a Bill, which, however, had been considerably toned down with regard to its promised provisions. Still it was draconic enough, for it made threats against non-strikers, incitement to strike, and picketing punishable with imprisonment up to one year. Its *pièce de résistance* was the following paragraph :

"If, through a strike, the security of the Empire or of one of the single States has been endangered, or if the danger of loss of human lives or of property has been brought about, penal servitude up to three years is to be inflicted on the men, and penal servitude up to five years on the leaders."

This Bill, like that of 1894, possessed an unpleasant elasticity which could make it an instrument of tyranny in the hands of servile judges. Hence the "Penal Servitude Bill," which had so rashly and so loudly been announced *urbi et orbi* by the Emperor, shared the ignominious fate of the two Bills mentioned.

In their desire to stifle the voice of the people and to please the Emperor many Conservatives recommended a *coup d'état*. For instance, Count Mirbach stated at the meeting of his party, on the 1st of January 1895, that universal suffrage was a derision of all authority, and recommended the abolition of the secret ballot. The same gentleman stated in the Prussian Upper House, on the 28th of March 1895, "The country would greet with jubilation a decision of the German Princes to create a new Reichstag on the basis of a new Election Law." In the same place Count Frankenberg stated two days later, "We hope to obtain a new Election Law for the German Empire, for with the present Election Law it is impossible to exist." Freiherr von Zedlitz, Freiherr von Stumm, and Von Kardorff uttered similar sentiments. At the meeting of the Conservative Party on the 8th of March 1897, Freiherr von Stumm said, "The right to vote should be taken away from the Social Democrats, and no Social Democrat should be permitted to sit in the Diet," and Count Limburg-Stirum likewise advocated their exclusion. The official handbook of the Conservative Party, most Conservative and many Liberal papers, warmly applauded these views.

The aims of the Social Democrats in Germany were similar to those of the workers in other countries. They wished to better themselves politically, economically, and socially. Politically, German democracy was not free. Universal suffrage existed for the Imperial Reichstag, but the German Parliament had far less power than had the English Parliament under Charles I. The facts that the Emperor could, at will, dissolve Parliament, according to Article 12 of the Constitution; that he could nominate and dismiss officials, according to Article 18; and that the Government was responsible only to the Emperor, proved the helplessness of the German Parliament before the Emperor and his officials, who were nominated and dismissed, promoted and decorated by him, and by him alone. Parliament in Germany had no control whatever over, and hardly any influence upon, the policy and ad-

ministration of the Empire. Its sole duty was to vote funds and laws.

In the single States, German democracy fared still worse. The election for the Prussian Diet, to give an instance, took place upon the following system. The whole body of the electors was divided into three classes according to the amount of taxes paid. Each class contributed an equal amount and had the same voting power. The practical working of this curious system may be illustrated by the case of Berlin. The voters of Berlin belonging to those three classes were in 1895 distributed in the following way:

Voters of the first class	1,469
,, ,, second class	9,372
,, ,, third class	289,973
Total of voters in Berlin . .	300,814

The figures given prove that the three classes system was the capitalistic system *par excellence*, for each of the rich men voting in the first class in Berlin possessed two hundred votes, each of the well-to-do men in the second class had thirty votes, and the combined first and second classes, or $3\frac{1}{2}$ per cent. of the electorate, formed a solid two-thirds majority over the remaining $96\frac{1}{2}$ per cent. of the electorate. There were, besides, some further complications in that intricate system which it would lead too far to describe. That franchise was worthless to democracy. A similar kind of franchise prevailed in other German States.

Socially also German democracy had much to complain of. Except in the large centres, the position of the German working man was a very humble one. Further grievances were the all-pervading militarism, the exceptional and unassailable position of the official classes, the prerogatives of the privileged classes, and the widespread immorality which had undermined and debased the position of women in Germany previous to the War. Nothing can better illustrate the latter grievance of Social Democracy than reference to the daily papers. For instance, in a pre-war

number of the Berlin *Lokalanzeiger* under my notice, there were the following advertisements :

" Seventy-four marriage advertisements (some doubtful).
" Forty-nine advertisements of lady masseuses (all doubtful).
" Nine demands for small loans, usually of £5, by ' modest widows ' and other single ladies (all doubtful).
" Six acquaintances desired by ladies (all doubtful).
" Five widows' balls, ' gentlemen invited, admission free ' (all doubtful).
" Thirty apartments and rooms ' without restrictions ' by the day (all doubtful).
" Forty-seven maternity homes, ' discretion assured ; no report home ' (all doubtful).
" Sixteen babies to be adopted.
" Sixteen specialists for contagious disease."

These advertisements, found in one daily journal of a similar standing to that of the London *Daily Telegraph*, and similar in kind and extent of circulation, explain better the state of morality in Germany, and the attitude of the German Social Democratic working men, than would a lengthy dissertation illustrated with voluminous statistics. This state of affairs explains the importance with which the question of morality and of the position of women was treated in the political programme of German Social Democracy.

In order to become acquainted, not only with the actual wishes of Social Democracy, but also with the tone in which those wishes were expressed, and with the manner in which they were formulated, we cannot do better than turn to the *Official Handbook for Social Democratic Voters*. The passages selected proved to German officialdom that Social Democracy was the enemy of the Country, of Society, of Monarchy, of the Family, and of the Church. They clearly show the fundamental ideas of that party and the spirit by which it was animated. The *Handbook* says :

" The aim of Social Democracy is not to divide all property, but to combine it and use it for the development

and improvement of mankind, in order to give to all a life worthy of man. Work shall become a duty for all men able to work. The word of the Bible, 'He that does not work neither shall he eat,' shall become a true word.

"Marriage, in contradiction to religious teachings, is in innumerable cases a financial transaction pure and simple. Woman has value in the eyes of men only when she has a fortune, and the more money she has the higher rises her value. Therefore marriage has become a business, and thousands meet in the marriage market, for instance, by advertisements in newspapers, in which a husband or a wife is sought in the same way in which a house or a pig is offered for sale. Consequently unhappy marriages have never been more numerous than at the present time, a state of affairs which is in contradiction to the real nature of marriage. Social Democracy desires that marriages be concluded solely from mutual love and esteem, which is only possible if man and woman are free and independent, if each has a free existence and an individual personality, and is therefore not compelled to buy the other or to be bought. This state of freedom and equality is only possible in the socialistic society.

"Who desires to belong to a Church shall not be hindered, but he shall pay only for the expenses of his Church together with his co-religionists.

"The schools and the whole educational system shall be separated from the Church and religious societies, because education is a civil matter.

"The God of Christians is not a German, French, Russian, or English god, but a God of all men, an international God. God is the God of love and of peace, and therefore it borders upon blasphemy that the priests of different Christian nations invoke this God of love to give victory to their nation in the general slaughter. It is equally blasphemous if the priest of one nation prays the God of all nations for a victory over another nation. In striving to found a brotherhood of nations and the peaceful co-operation of nations in the service of civilisation, Social Democracy acts in a most Christian spirit, and tries to realise what the Christian priests of all nations, together with the Christian monarchs, hitherto would not, or could not, realise. By combining the workers of all nations, Social Democracy tries to effect a federation of nations in which every State

enjoys equal rights, and in which the peculiarities of the inner character of every nation may peacefully develop."

Ideas such as those quoted were instrumental in framing the programme of the party, which was idealistic as well as utilitarian. The ten demands of the programme were :

(1) One vote for every adult man and woman ; a holiday to be election day ; payment of members.
(2) The Government to be responsible to Parliament ; local self-government ; referendum.
(3) Introduction of the militia system.
(4) Freedom of speech and freedom of the press.
(5) Equality of man and woman before the law.
(6) Disestablishment of the Churches.
(7) Undenominational schools, with compulsory attendance and gratuitous tuition.
(8) Gratuitousness of legal proceeding.
(9) Gratuitous medical attendance and burial.
(10) Progressive Income Tax and Succession Duty.

Had the Social Democrats been as black as they were painted, the leaders could not have kept the millions of their followers in perfect order. Again, if the Social Democratic politicians were selfish or mercenary, as has been asserted, they would not have died poor. Liebknecht once said, and his case is typical for the leaders of Social Democracy, " I have never sought my personal advantage. If I am poor after unprecedented persecutions, I do not account it a disgrace. I am proud of it, for it is an eloquent testimony to my political honour." The *Kölnische Zeitung*, commenting on these words, justly observed, " It would be unjust to deny Social Domocracy the recognition of the high personal integrity of its leaders." While the gravest scandals have discredited more than one German party and its leaders, the Social Democratic Party had, up to the War, stood immaculate—an eloquent vindication of the moral force of democracy, which force had been so thoroughly misunderstood in Germany.

The lack of understanding and of sympathy with Social

Democracy and its aims was not restricted to official circles in Germany. Typical of these views hostile to Social Democracy is the following pronouncement by Professor H. Delbrück, the distinguished historian, which appeared in the *Preussische Jahrbücher* for December 1895:

"The duty of the Government is not to educate Social Democracy to decent behaviour, but to suppress it, or, if that should be impossible, at least to repress it, or, if that be impossible, at least to hinder its further growth. . . . What is necessary is that the sentiment should be awakened among all classes of the population that Social Democracy is a poison which can be resisted only by the strongest and united moral opposition."

German democracy in the shape of the Social Democratic Party could not only raise the claim of moral force and numerical strength, of discipline and integrity, but could also be proud of the consummate political ability of its leaders and of the spirited support which these leaders received from the members of the party. No better and no juster testimonial, with regard to these qualities, can be given than the pronouncement of the German historian, Professor Mommsen:

"It is unfortunately true that at the present time the Social Democracy is the only great party which has any claim to political respect. It is not necessary to refer to talent. Everybody in Germany knows that with brains like those of Bebel it would be possible to furnish forth a dozen noblemen from east of the Elbe in a fashion that would make them shine among their peers.

"The devotion, the self-sacrificing spirit of the Social Democratic masses, impresses even those who are far from sharing their aims. Our Liberals might well take a lesson from the discipline of the party."

While other German parties split into factions or decayed owing to the unruliness of their undisciplined members or to the apathetic support of the voters, or to the skilful action of the Government, the Social Democratic Party in Germany

was until recently constantly strong and undivided, notwithstanding the many and serious difficulties which it encountered. It was, no doubt, by far the best-led, the best-managed, and the most homogeneous party in Germany, and was the only party which, from an English point of view, could be considered a party. Similarly, there was in Germany no political journal more ably conducted than the Social Democratic Party organ, the *Vorwärts*.

The Social Democratic Party did not possess in the Reichstag that numerical strength which one might expect from the numerical strength of its supporters. This great under-representation sprang partly from the fact that, in the frequently occurring second polls, the other parties usually combined against the Social Democratic candidate as before related ; partly it was due to the fact that German towns were until 1914 represented by the same number of deputies as in 1871, notwithstanding the immense increase in their population. No redistribution had been effected, because the Government did not wish to strengthen the Liberal and Social Democratic parties which had their hold on the towns, and Parliament had no means of enforcing a redistribution. How enormous was the disproportion between votes and representatives in the Reichstag, and how this disporportion favoured the two Conservative parties and the Clerical Party, may be seen from the following table :

Result of the General Election of 1907

	Votes.	Members in Imperial Diet.	Average Number of Votes per Member.
Social Democrats	3,259,000	43	75,790
Centre (Roman Catholic Party)	2,179,800	104	20,959
National Liberals	1,637,000	55	29,764
Conservatives	1,060,200	62	17,132
Freisinnige (People's) Party	736,000	27	27,259
Free Conservatives	471,900	24	19,662
Poles	453,900	20	22,695
Seven factions	1,465,000	61	24,016
Total	11,262,800	396	28,441

The consequence of the disproportion of votes to members in the different parties was that the Social Democrats, who commanded 28·94 per cent. of the votes, had only 10·9 per cent. of the seats in the Reichstag of 1907, whilst the Conservative Party, with only 9·4 per cent. of the votes, had 18·24 per cent. of the seats, and the conservatively-inclined Centre Party, with 19·33 per cent. of the votes, had no less than 26·26 per cent. of the seats. Based upon the same proportion of votes to members which obtains with the Centre Party and with the two Conservative Parties, the representatives of the Social Democratic Party in the Imperial Diet should have numbered more than 150, and not 43.

Whilst Social Democracy was flourishing and increasing, the various Liberal parties in Germany had been decaying for many years. The reason for that phenomenon was that the Liberal Party had striven to represent only such Liberalism as was approved of by the Government. Liberalism shunned the Social Democratic Party and its leaders like poison, in accordance with the official *mot d'ordre*. Consequently the liberally-inclined German workman, small trader, clerk, teacher, etc., whom that approved Court Liberalism—which in reality was Conservatism in disguise—did not suit, abandoned that pseudo-Liberalism and gave his vote to the Social Democratic candidate.

CHAPTER XX

THE PARLIAMENTARY POSITION IN GERMANY BEFORE THE WAR

Among the causes which prompted the German Government in 1914 to embark upon a war of aggression was, no doubt, the increasing difficulty of the parliamentary position, of domestic politics.

Three phenomena in German pre-war politics seemed almost inexplicable to the average Englishmen and American : the fact that Germany possessed not two large Parties, but a large number of comparatively small and independent political Parties and Groups ; the fact that Germany, which was essentially a liberal-minded country, should have lacked a powerful Liberal Party ; the fact that more than one-third of the German citizens, who were very prosperous, who received the advantages of a thoughtful paternal Government, such as State Insurance against sickness, accident, invalidity, and old age, and who enjoyed universal manhood suffrage, should have been found in the Socialist camp in a country which was supposed to be a model to all other countries as regards education and efficient administration. Those three phenomena deserve inquiring into.

Imperial Germany was a democratic country only in outward appearance. It is true that she possessed universal manhood suffrage, that plural voting was practically unknown, and that the principle of one man one vote was strictly carried out. As far as the voting went, Germany was the most democratic country in the world. But here the democratic character of Germany's political institutions ended. Germany's Constitution was neither gradually

evolved by a people struggling to be free, as was the British Constitution, nor was it devised in free discussion by a number of eminent democratic statesmen and politicians of different views as was the Constitution of the United States. Germany was an enlarged Prussia. The German Constitution was drawn up by a single man, by Prince Bismarck, a Prussian, and he aimed at creating an instrument which, though democratic in appearance, would not be an efficient obstacle to the absolute rule traditional in Prussia. Before all he desired to have a Constitution for Germany which would make it easy and convenient for him to administer the country according to his will. While giving to the people universal manhood suffrage, he took good care that their representatives in the Reichstag should be powerless. The national government and administration were to remain in the hands of an all-powerful bureaucracy.

Bismarck came to power at a moment when the internal position of Prussia had become so desperate, when the conflict between the King and his Parliament had become so hopeless, that William I., who then was only King of Prussia, could no longer find a ministry willing to carry on the government of the country. The King had become so despondent that he had actually drawn up an Act of Abdication, and was about to retire into private life. Bismarck induced William I. to entrust him with the government of the country, and to tear up the Act of Abdication. Having been given full power, Bismarck governed Prussia with a hand of iron. He collected illegally the taxes in opposition to a hostile and protesting Parliament, and he conducted three successful wars which made little Prussia the most powerful State in Europe, and which made William I. Emperor of a united Germany. William I. was loyalty personified. He, who had been about to abdicate and leave the country, owed his great position to Bismarck. His gratitude to Prince Bismarck was great. Bismarck felt certain that he could absolutely rely upon the Emperor, that the Emperor was likely to act always in accordance with his own views. Therefore, in drawing up the German

Constitution, Bismarck could most easily secure all influence and authority to himself by placing all power nominally into the old Emperor's hands.

According to the Bismarckian Constitution, Germany had no responsible ministers, but only one responsible minister, the Imperial Chancellor, to whom all the Secretaries of State were responsible. The Chancellor, who thus undertook responsibility for the conduct of all the departments of State, was responsible not to Parliament, but only to the Emperor. In Germany, ministers and other high dignitaries were taken not from the parliamentary Parties, as in other parliamentary countries, but from the ranks of the bureaucracy, the army, and the courtiers. Hence Government and Parliament, and Government and people, were out of touch. The ministers were the Emperor's servants. They were appointed and dismissed by the Emperor, and they stood outside and above the Reichstag and the Parties. No vote of lack of confidence could, therefore, shake the position of a minister as long as he continued to enjoy the support of the monarch. When Emperor and Chancellor agreed, Parliament was powerless, especially as it was doubtful whether the German Reichstag was, according to the Constitution, entitled to withhold supplies by refusing the granting of taxes which had previously been established for an indefinite number of years. In Germany, in Prussia, and in all the minor German States, the ministers were chosen and dismissed by the sovereign, and they were responsible not to Parliament, but only to the sovereign. Therefore the people represented in Parliament could not rid themselves of an incapable or unpopular minister by voting against him, by withholding supplies, or by not voting his salary. On the other hand, a Reichstag which had become obnoxious to the Emperor or to his Chancellor could be dissolved by the Government, for, according to the Constitution, the Emperor was entitled to dissolve it. An inconvenient Reichstag was simply sent home in the hope that the next Reichstag would be of a different character, and the powerful Government apparatus

was set in motion to influence the people at Election time in the desired way. Hence in Germany, and also in the individual States composing it, all real power was in the hands of the hereditary ruler, who was often far more strongly influenced by the views of his courtiers and his aristocratic entourage than by the views of the people, especially as the views of the people were only too often distorted by a venal press. In Germany parliamentarism was therefore merely a form. The people were practically powerless to interfere in matters of Government and administration or to influence appointments which, especially if the ruler was incapable and headstrong, often went rather by favour than by merit. The *Handbuch für Sozialdemokratische Wähler* wrote quite correctly:

"A Constitution was given by Bismarck to Germany which provided for a democratic parliament based on universal manhood suffrage, but which, owing to the fact that it left unclear the question whether the Reichstag is entitled to withhold supplies, placed all actual power into the hands of the Federal Government, or rather into those of the Prussian Government which serves as its centre. The King of Prussia and the Prime Minister of the Prussian Cabinet, who acts at the same time as Chancellor of the German Empire, hold in their hands all real power. Bismarck made a Constitution which would suit himself.

"Prussia rules in Germany, and Germany is ruled by the aristocrats and plutocrats who are all powerful in the undemocratic and non-representative Prussian parliament who possess a decisive influence upon the Court and the army. . . . Opinions differ as to the Reichstag's power of withholding supplies. However, so much is certain that taxes and other sources of the national income which have once been voted cannot be discontinued in consequence of the veto of the Reichstag."

The Imperial Constitution had laid down the principle that there was to be one member of the Reichstag for every 100,000 inhabitants. Germany had in 1871 a little less than 40,000,000 inhabitants, and in accordance with the

population of the time the new Imperial Reichstag was composed of 397 members. The Germans were a liberal-minded people. The middle classes in the towns had agitated during many decades for democratic and parliamentary government, and they had received with delight the gift of universal manhood suffrage, which seemed to promise the advent of parliamentary government. Liberalism was *in excelsis*, and not unnaturally it became the controlling element in the new Reichstag. At the first Election in the German Empire, that of 1871, the Liberal Groups elected 203 members, and had therefore the absolute majority in the House. At the second Election, that of 1874, they were represented by 212 members, and commanded an increased majority. Bismarck had meant to give to Germany only the semblance of parliamentary government. He did not wish to see his policy circumscribed by a Party which possessed the majority in the Reichstag. Therefore he endeavoured to break up the great Liberal Party, and he succeeded. Through Bismarck's activity the Liberal Party was divided and subdivided into a number of quarrelling and powerless factions.

In all countries Liberalism has found its adherents chiefly in the large towns, and especially among the working men in shop and factory. The German Liberal Party, the Party which strove for real parliamentary government, and which, therefore, was dangerous to the Government, could be rendered impotent by separating the middle class of the towns, which furnished the leaders, from the working men in the towns, who were their natural followers. When the Social Democratic Party arose, Bismarck saw his opportunity of crippling German Liberalism. Two attempts on the life of the Emperor William I. gave him the opportunity of accusing the Social Democrats of that crime, and of branding them as a Party of traitors, of assassins, and of enemies to the established order. He instituted a campaign of persecution. He raised the red spectre. He declared that the Social Democrats were the enemies of religion, the nation, and the fatherland, and that it was the duty of all

good citizens to combine in fighting "the Party of revolution and of subversion."

Imperial Germany had a considerable number of parties and political groups, and these were apt to undergo kaleidoscopic changes—between 1871 and 1912 there have been 11 Conservative Parties, 14 Liberal Parties, 2 Clerical Parties, 9 Nationalist and Particularist Parties, and 5 Socialist Parties—but in reality Germany, like every other country, had only two great Parties, a Conservative Party and a Liberal Party. Each of these two great Parties was, through the lack of Party discipline and through Governmental machinations, subdivided into a number of Groups. The Clerical Centre Party, which represented chiefly the Roman Catholic country districts of Germany, was naturally Conservative in character. The Conservative and the Centre Parties would probably have formed one great Party had not Bismarck divided them by his persecution of Roman Catholicism, the Kulturkampf, which made the Roman Catholic section a close union for mutual defence, and which divided the Conservative Party into a Roman Catholic and into a Protestant Group, which for a long time fought one another. The old Liberal Party of Germany had been broken up into a number of more and of less advanced sections, and the Social Democratic Party was, rightly considered, not a revolutionary Party, and not even a Socialist Party, but only the most advanced and the most dissatisfied wing of the old Liberal Party of Germany. Formerly the German working men voted for the Liberal candidates, and they would probably have continued to do so had it not been for Bismarck's policy.

The Social Democratic Party was created by a number of enthusiastic working men and of friends of the working men. It was in the beginning merely a small working-men's Party, which was led by working men and by a few unpractical political enthusiasts, doctrinaires, and philanthropists. Bismarck's persecution of the Social Democrats had a threefold effect. In the first place it converted the workmen leaders of the Party into martyrs, and caused the

workmen to join in thousands the Social Democratic Party. In the second place, it embittered the Social Democratic leaders, drove them to extreme views, caused them to make violent speeches, and gave colour to their doctrine of the Class War. In the third place, it caused the Liberal leaders and the Liberal Party to become suspicious of working men inclined towards Socialism, and of every measure which might be interpreted and denounced by the Government as helpful to Social Democracy. Thus a gulf was dug between Liberalism and Labour. Labour was driven out of the Liberal Party through the Government's policy. The German Social Democratic Party was in reality a Liberal Party which was largely recruited from the working men, and which was led by Social Democratic spokesmen who propounded somewhat out-of-date doctrines and Party programmes.

Germany was until recently, as she had been in 1871, an absolutely ruled country with a democratic franchise. A German comic paper, the *Simplicissimus*, printed just before the Election of 1912 a cartoon in which a gentleman of aristocratic appearance was addressing a number of people. Underneath were the words: "Gentlemen, you have now to fulfil that most important duty of German citizens of voting for the Reichstag. When you have done so, it will again be the Emperor's turn during the next five years."

At the General Election of 1912 the Conservative Parties proper and the Central Party polled together 4,500,000 votes, while the Liberal and Socialist Parties polled together no less than 7,500,000 votes. One may therefore say that there was a majority of 3,000,000 votes against the Government, that the Conservative Parties which supported the Government were in a small minority. These figures make it clear that it was of the utmost importance to the German Government to prevent a true representation of the people in the Reichstag, and to prevent the representatives of the 7,500,000 voters, who were opposed to Conservatism, acting in union. It was of the utmost importance for the Government that the Liberal Party should remain irreconcilably

divided against itself, that they should continue to form a capitalistic section and a Socialistic section, and that these two sections should make war upon one another in accordance with Bismarck's policy up to 1914. Bismarck had four successors, but every one of them saw the danger which threatened Germany's established form of uncontrolled and pseudo-popular Government from a reunion of the great Liberal Party of 1871 through a reconciliation of the Liberal sections with the Social Democratic section. Hence every one of Bismarck's successors entreated all good citizens to combine against "the Party of subversion and of revolution." Before the General Election of 1907 it was Prince Bülow, and before that of 1912 it was Herr von Bethmann Hollweg, who painted to the electors in lurid colours the danger of the "Red Peril."

Germany had a peculiar form of election. A candidate was elected only when he received an absolute majority of all the votes given. If, owing to the number of candidates standing for the Reichstag, none of them received an absolute majority, a second poll was held between those two candidates who had received the largest number of votes and therefore headed the poll. If, as was frequently the case, there were three candidates—let us say a Conservative, a Liberal, and a Social Democratic candidate—who fairly evenly divided the poll between them, a second poll had to take place. If now the "State-supporting Parties" could be induced to vote against the Social Democrat and for the Conservative candidate, the Liberal Party strengthened the Conservative Party and the Government to its own harm. Therefore the Government found it particularly important at Election times to bring out the Red Peril, and especially at the moment when the arrangements for the second polls had to be made. That was always the time when the German Government found it most desirable to keep wide open the division between the capitalistic and the Social Democratic wing of the Liberal Party by persuading all good citizens to vote against the Red Peril. The importance of the second poll may be gauged from the fact that in 1912

out of the 397 members of the Reichstag only 206 were elected at the first poll. It was, therefore, not unnatural that on the 13th of January 1912, the day following the first poll, which had shown a great decrease in the votes given to the Conservative Parties and an enormous increase in those given to the Liberal Parties, the *North German Gazette* published a Government appeal which stated :

" At the second polls Social Democracy cannot conquer by its own strength. Every mandate which it wins it will owe to the non-Socialist citizens of Germany. The non-Socialst Parties themselves will have to bear the blame if the red flood rises still higher. . . . What non-Socialist Party can make common cause with an enemy who proudly shrieks his furious hatred in the face of them all and of the whole existing order of the State ? And what is the attitude of Social Democracy to our national demands and tasks ? At home the Socialists strive to isolate the working classes from all the other classes of the people. The Class War is the element in which they live. Social Revolution, with the abolition of private property, is their goal. Whilst they foment hatred and practise terrorism at home, they worship the phantom of universal brotherhood among nations abroad. Therefore they are the hope of the foreign nations which envy and oppose the German Empire.

" Our peace and prosperity can be preserved only if we maintain ourselves as a strong and united nation able to face the world. Among the immediate tasks of the new Reichstag will be the task of increasing our armed strength. A Party which calls itself international and which dares to entertain the thought of a general strike in case of a mobilisation is by its very nature incapable of fulfilling these important tasks."

Hypocritical and hysterical appeals against the Social Democats such as the foregoing emanated not only from German officials and from the politicians belonging to the Conservative Parties. The Emperor himself had branded the Social Democrats in various speeches as " a band of fellows not worthy to bear the names of Germans," " enemies to the Divine order of things without a fatherland," etc. It was of course ridiculous to describe a Party which embraced

more than 4,250,000 grown-up men and considerably more than one-third of the German population as "not worthy to bear the name of Germans," "enemies to the Divine order of things without a fatherland." It was, however, equally ridiculous to believe that the 4,250,329 people who in 1912 gave their votes to Social Democratic candidates would subscribe to the orthodox Socialist doctrines. As a matter of fact, the Socialist Party had in 1911 only 837,000 subscribing members, of whom 108,000 were women. Deducting the women, we find that of the 4,250,329 Social Democratic voters only 729,000, or about one-sixth, were avowed Socialists. We may therefore, perhaps, conclude that the remaining five-sixths were men who voted for Social Democratic candidates without being convinced Socialists.

The reason that millions of Germans belonging to all classes of society—bankers, merchants, doctors, school teachers, and a very large number of Government officials—voted for Social Democratic candidates lay in this, that the Social Democrats were the only Party which determinedly and unceasingly opposed the German Government, and fought continually for real parliamentary government. All the other Parties, the capitalistic Liberal Parties included, opposed the Government only here and there in the hope of becoming the Government Party and benefiting by the Government's bounty. The German Government was not averse from rewarding political services withofficial positions, rapid promotion in the Government employ, titles, decorations, and even with financial favours. Therefore all opponents to the Government were meek andmild in their criticism of the Government's policy and of the German institutions, and they accepted uncomplainingly the subordinate position given to the people and its representatives. I give one example out of many. The German Emperor's indiscretion in publishing in the *Daily Telegraph* n 1908, without the Chancellor's consent, an interview which was very damaging to Germany's foreign policy, created enormous excitement throughout the country, and ledto what was called a "constitutional crisis." All the Party leaders

made violent speeches against the Emperor's usurpation of political action in violation of the German Constitution, which expressly lays down that every political act of the Emperor must be approved of and countersigned by the Imperial Chancellor. However, only the Social Democrats took political steps devised to make the German Government responsible to Parliament by moving various amendments to the German Constitution, the principal of which ran as follows : " The Imperial Chancellor is responsible for his official actions. His responsibility covers all political actions of the Emperor. The Imperial Chancellor must be dismissed if the Reichstag demands it." It is scarcely necessary to say that the other Parties opposed the Social Democratic proposals, which would have introduced the beginning of parliamentary government.

The German Government tried to prevent the Liberal Party becoming too powerful in the Reichstag, not only by endeavouring unceasingly to keep it divided against itself, but also by securing the over-representation in the Reichstag of the Conservative and the under-representation of the Liberal section of the community. Since 1871, and especially since 1879, when Protection was introduced into Germany, the population of the industrial and commercial centres had grown enormously, while that of the country districts had remained almost stationary. The towns in Germany, as the towns in all countries, were the strongholds of Liberalism, Radicalism, and Socialism. Now, although the population of the German towns had grown enormously, no redistribution of the electoral districts had been effected. In 1914 the Reichstag had still 397 members as in 1871. Berlin had still only six representatives in the Reichstag, although, according to its population, it should have had more than twenty. However, by giving Berlin fourteen additional representatives, the Government would merely have added fourteen members to the Liberal and Social Democratic Parties. Therefore Berlin had to be satisfied with six members. A similar state of affairs prevailed in all the large towns.

German parliamentary government—if one can speak of parliamentary government in Germany under the Imperial regime—was based on minority rule. By refusing the readjustment of electoral districts, the German Government tried to establish minority rule in permanence and to secure the predominance of the Conservative and reactionary Parties.

Parliamentary misrepresentation of the people was the ideal of the Prussian aristocrats and bureaucrats, who hated popular government, and who had had experience of the advantages which the Prussian franchise gave to the privileged classes.

The Imperial German Government, which was merely the Prussian Government writ large, had no particular liking for parliamentarism, and it did everything in its power to hinder its development. The humiliating way in which the payment of the Reichstag members was arranged was characteristic of the Government's attitude towards them. Since 1906 every member of the Reichstag was paid £150 per year, but from this sum £1 was deducted for every day on which a member had either not attended at all or had not attended a division. In order to prove that he had actually attended the sitting, every member had, like an office boy, to put down his name in an attendance book provided for the purpose of control.

From year to year it was becoming more difficult for the Government to continue governing the country with a Reichstag elected under a manhood franchise and with a Reichstag majority representing only a small minority of the people. The German population was increasing by about 800,000 per year, and that increase took place practically exclusively in the towns, the strongholds of Liberalism and of Social Democracy. Through this natural growth of the population the Liberal and Social Democratic Parties were likely to receive every year an accession of about 200,000 voters. Year by year the minority rule became more absurd and indefensible. Difficulties in domestic politics no doubt contributed to the war of 1914.

While the Liberal and Social Democratic Parties drew their strength chiefly from the towns, the Conservative and Centre Parties drew theirs chiefly from the country. The German towns, the seats of Germany's wealth, industry, and intelligence, were getting more and more impatient of being ruled and taxed by the country, or rather by the country squires, the "Junkers" and their Clerical allies. They were getting more and more impatient of being governed and shepherded and ordered about by bureaucrats over whom they had no control. They were getting more and more impatient of the constant and irksome restraints which were imposed upon them by a paternal, honest, and hard-working, but clumsily and constantly interfering, police and officialdom. They had at last discovered that, however they voted at Election time, they could not influence in the slightest Germany's legislation and administration. They had discovered that they could not, with their votes, give effective expression to their desire for the redress of their grievances or compel the institution of those reforms which they desired, that parliamentary government was a sham.

In concluding this chapter, which first appeared in the fourth edition of this book, and which was published in July 1912, I stated :

"Possibly the Government may try to escape from the critical domestic position towards which it is drifting by engaging in a great war, which, if it be victorious, would give new prestige and a fresh lease of power to the German autocracy."

This forecast was to come true two years after it had been published.

CHAPTER XXI

WHY AND HOW GERMANY BROUGHT ABOUT THE GREAT WAR [1]

During the first half of 1914 peace in Europe seemed firmly and permanently established. Although the situation in Ireland was causing much anxiety, the people thought of their holidays, and as foreign affairs were quite uneventful and uninteresting the newspapers and periodicals filled the space usually devoted to foreign politics with the discussion of schemes for abolishing war and restricting national armaments. In August five of the six European Great Powers, with more than 400,000,000 people, were at war. More than 20,000,000 soldiers had been mobilised and were dealing out death and destruction. The greatest war the world has seen, and perhaps the greatest the world will ever see, had begun. People were asking: Why did the German Emperor make war? What was its real cause? What will be its issue and its consequences?

Many people in England were surprised and amazed that the German Emperor, who was considered to be the strongest defender of the world's peace, should recklessly have plunged all Europe into war; that he should rashly have jeopardised the existence of his country and of his dynasty on account of Austria's quarrel with Serbia; that the Triple Alliance, which only recently had been renewed, and which was proclaimed to be an absolutely reliable partnership, should have broken down before the first shot was fired; that Germany, which was supposed to be the best governed and administered country in the world, and which under Bismarck had always known how to isolate

[1] From the *Nineteenth Century and After*, September 1914.

her enemies and secure for herself the support of the leading Powers, should, in company with Austria-Hungary and Turkey, have gone to war with six powerful nations—France, Russia, Great Britain, Belgium, Serbia, and Japan—whose ranks seemed likely to increase to eight if, as appeared probable, Italy and Roumania should range themselves on the side of Germany's opponents ; that the German Navy should have remained absolutely inactive during the first critical weeks of the war, when its value and influence would have been greatest, and that the celebrated German Army should have begun the campaign by a series of palpable mistakes. However, the readers of the earlier editions of this book and of the *Nineteenth Century and After* could scarcely be surprised, for I had frequently and emphatically foretold the War during more than a decade. Year after year I warned the British and the German peoples with all my strength of the coming catastrophe. Year by year I watched with increasing concern the mistakes of Germany's foreign and domestic policy, which were bound to lead to disaster. In the preface to the fourth edition of this book, published in the autumn of 1912, I wrote :

" During the last few years Germany's failures, to which I had drawn attention in previous editions, have become more salient and more frequent. During twenty years the German Foreign Office has serenely marched from failure to failure. The Morocco fiasco is merely the last of a large number of mistaken and unsuccessful enterprises.

" By her policy towards Great Britain, Germany has brought into being the Triple Entente and that isolation about which she has so frequently complained, and she is accelerating the unification of the British Empire, which she wishes to prevent and has tried to prevent. The failure of her domestic policy is proclaimed by the constant increase of the Social Democratic Party, which polled more than 4,250,000 votes at the Election of 1912. Germany's prosperity is admittedly phenomenal. Still, a careful observer cannot help noticing that her economic progress is slackening. Germany's future seems no longer as bright as it used to appear."

Although intimate friends of the Emperor often assured me that he was a prince of peace, I never ceased to describe him as immoderately ambitious, reckless, and dangerous to the peace of the world, and I indicated almost the exact moment when he would strike. In an article "England, Germany, and the Baltic," which was given first place in the *Nineteenth Century* in July 1907, I pointed out the enormous strategical importance of the Baltic and North Sea Canal, which was being greatly enlarged so as to make it available to the largest German Dreadnoughts and which would practically double the striking power of the German Fleet. In one of the concluding paragraphs I said with all the emphasis which I could bring to bear :

"It is expected that eight years will be required to finish the Baltic and North Sea Canal. Therefore during the next eight years Germany will be unable to avail herself of the great advantages furnished by the Baltic and North Sea Canal, except for her smaller and older ships. Her magnificent new ships will for about eight years be restricted to one of the German seas. Consequently Germany will, during the next eight years, do all in her power to avoid a conflict with a first-class naval Power. During the next eight years Germany has every reason to keep the peace. Only when the enlargement of the Baltic and North Sea Canal has been accomplished will she be ready for a great naval war."

The article, and especially its conclusion, attracted a great deal of attention, both in England and abroad. By accelerating the work, the Kiel Canal was finished not in eight years, but in seven. Its completion was celebrated on the 24th of June 1914, five weeks before the outbreak of the War, and by the irony of fate English warships took a prominent part in the festivities.

To those who had given the matter some consideration it was clear that if Germany should embark upon a world war the Netherlands might become its principal theatre. In an article, "The Absorption of Holland by Germany," I wrote in the *Nineteenth Century* in July 1906 :

"During four centuries the Netherlands have been the centre of gravity to the European Great Powers. The sceptre of Europe lies buried not on the banks of the Bosphorus, but at the mouths of the Rhine and the Scheldt. Therefore the Netherlands have during four centuries been the battlefield on which the struggle for the mastery of Europe and of the world has been decided. In the Netherlands the mighty armies with which Philip II., Louis XIV., Louis XV., and Napoleon I. strove to subdue Europe and to conquer the world were broken to pieces, and in the Netherlands Germany may find either her Gembloux, her Breda, or her Waterloo."

When William II. came to the throne Germany dominated Europe. Her position was impregnable and unassailable. The Triple Alliance was absolutely reliable and Germany's possible antagonists were isolated, for Bismarck had with marvellous skill created a strong antagonism between France and Italy, by giving Tunis, which was claimed by Italy, to France. Besides, he had estranged France and England by inciting France to encroach upon England's Colonial domain and to pursue an anti-British policy, and he had increased the differences between England and Russia by encouraging Russia to press upon England in Asia. As both France and Russia were antagonistic to England, Germany could always count upon Great Britain's support, or at least upon her benevolent neutrality, in case of that war on two fronts which Bismarck dreaded so much.

The great value which the Iron Chancellor attached to good and cordial relations with England was apparent from many of his public utterances. On the 10th of July 1885, for instance, on the occasion of some colonial dispute between England and Germany, he stated in the Reichstag:

"I would ask the last speaker not to make any attempt to disturb the good relations between England and Germany, or to diminish the confidence that peace between these two Powers will be maintained by hinting that some day we may find ourselves in an armed conflict with England. I abso-

lutely deny that possibility. It does not exist, and all the questions which are at present being discussed between England and Germany are not of sufficient importance to justify a breach of the peace on either side of the North Sea. Besides, I really do not know what dispute could arise between England and Germany."

Four years later, on the 26th of January 1889, Bismarck stated in the Reichstag with reference to Anglo-German differences regarding Zanzibar:

"The preservation of Anglo-German goodwill is, after all, the most important thing for us. I see in England an old and traditional ally. No differences exist between England and Germany. If I speak of England as our ally, I am not using a diplomatic term. We have no alliance with England. However, I wish to remain in close contact with England also in colonial questions. The two nations have marched side by side during at least a hundred and fifty years, and if I should discover that we might lose touch with England, I should act with caution and endeavour to avoid losing England's goodwill."

Bismarck desired that Germany's relations with Great Britain should be most cordial, because he counted upon British support in case of a war with France and Russia combined. He dreaded England's hostility not only because Germany was vulnerable at sea, but also because he knew that Germany and Austria-Hungary could reckon upon the loyal support of allied Italy only as long as Great Britain was either friendly or observed a benevolent neutrality. As Italy has very extensive coasts, as most of her large towns can be shelled from the sea, as her most important strategic and commercial railways run close to the seashore, and can easily be destroyed by the warships of a superior naval Power, and as she is economically as dependent upon her sea trade as is Great Britain, it was clear that England's hostility to Germany and Austria-Hungary would automatically lead to Italy deserting her allies in case of war. Italy's desertion was foretold long before the War by those acquainted with the true position,

as I, for instance, did in the chapter of this book which deals with the Triple Alliance and which was published in the *Fortnightly Review* in 1912.

Under Bismarck's guidance Germany had grown great by three victorious wars. Having created Germany's unity and firmly established the State, Bismarck desired to establish its permanence and security by pursuing a peaceful, prudent, moderate, and conciliatory foreign policy, rightly fearing that a policy of dash and adventure, of interference, provocation, and bluster, would raise dangerous enemies to the new State. In one of the concluding chapters of his Memoirs, his political testament, that great statesman laid down on large lines the policy which Germany ought to pursue in the future, in the following phrases :

" In the future not only sufficient military equipment, but also a correct political eye, will be required to guide the German ship of State through the currents of coalition to which, in consequence of our geographical position and our previous history, we are exposed.

" We ought to do all we can to weaken the bad feeling among the nations, which has been called forth through our growth to the position of a real Great Power, by honourable and peaceful use of our influence, and so convince the world that a German hegemony in Europe is more useful and less partisan, and also less harmful for the freedom of other nations, than would be the hegemony of France, Russia, or England.

" In order to produce this confidence, it is above everything necessary that we should act honourably and openly, and be easily reconciled in case of friction or untoward events."

In 1888 William II. came to the throne. Believing that he possessed the genius and the universality of Frederick the Great, and being confirmed in that opinion by the flatterers surrounding him, the young Emperor declared in his overweening self-confidence that he was divinely inspired, that he had received his crown from God, and that he was responsible only to God.

Intoxicated by the exuberance of his own verbosity and

by the adulation of his entourage, and animated by a boundless confidence in himself, William II., like another Frederick the Great, took the control of all the great departments of State out of the hands of his responsible Ministers and assumed their direction. Soon after his accession he dismissed Prince Bismarck, who refused to carry out the hasty, crude, and ill-considered views of the new Emperor. After Bismarck's dismissal the young Emperor declared, with the admiring applause of his flattering courtiers, that he would steer the ship of State over a new course, his own course, that he would lead the nation to a great and glorious future, that henceforth he would be his own Chancellor. Pursuing a purely personal policy, and allowing himself to be swayed by the impulses of the moment, he threw caution to the wind, and irritated and exasperated, by his restless and interfering policy, not only the continental Powers, both large and small, but also Great Britain, Germany's "old and traditional ally," and the United States.

From his retirement Bismarck looked upon the Emperor's activity with anxiety and dismay. He feared that William II. would endanger Germany's future. Obviously referring to William II. and to the flattering courtiers surrounding him, and comparing him with his grandfather, the Emperor William I., the founder of the German Empire, Bismarck wrote in his Memoirs:

"The Emperor William I. was completely free from vanity of this kind; on the other hand he had in a high degree a peculiar fear of the legitimate criticism of his contemporaries and of posterity.

"No one would have dared to flatter him openly to his face. In his feeling of royal dignity he would have thought 'If any one has the right of praising me to my face, he has also the right of blaming me to my face.' He would not admit either.

"What I fear is, that by following the road in which we are walking our future will be sacrificed to the impulses of the moment. Former rulers looked more to the capacity than the obedience of their advisers; if obedience alone is the qualification, then demands will be made on the general

ability of the monarch, which even a Frederick the Great could not satisfy, although in his time politics, both in war and peace, were less difficult than they are to-day."

William II. disregarded Bismarck's wise advice that Germany should follow a frank and conciliatory policy, and that she should endeavour to avoid friction with other nations; and, in addition, he made the fatal mistake of challenging Great Britain's naval supremacy. Thus he converted Germany's "old and traditional ally" into a dangerous opponent.

Clearly recognising that Germany's naval policy would, in case of a great European conflict, compel England to support Germany's opponents, the writer of this book repeatedly urged the danger of Germany's naval and anti-British policy upon Prince Bülow, Admiral von Tirpitz, and other leading Germans, but he preached to deaf ears.

In the summer of 1911 the second Morocco crisis broke out in consequence of the dispatch of the *Panther* to Agadir. It nearly led to war between France and Germany. Both in England and in Germany war was expected, and Mr. Lloyd George plainly announced in his Mansion House speech that if Germany should attack France, Great Britain would aid France in her defence. The tension between Great Britain and Germany reached the breaking point. In December 1911, when the Morocco question had been settled, I happened to see one of the leading German diplomats at the German Foreign Office. In the course of a long conversation I pointed out once more that Germany's trans-maritime policy not only endangered her security, but was bound to lead to the break-up of the Triple Alliance; that she rashly risked her very existence; that Germany's safety on the Continent depended on good relations with Great Britain; that she would act wisely in ceasing to antagonise France; that she should not increase her fleet beyond the provisions of her gigantic naval programme; that she should stop the anti-British agitation of the German navy party; that if Germany continued on the course on

which she had embarked a collision between Great Britain and Germany was inevitable. I added that an Anglo-German war might lead not merely to Germany's defeat, but to her downfall; and that my action was undertaken rather in the interest of Germany than in that of Great Britain, for if the two countries should unhappily go to war Germany would risk very much, while Great Britain would risk but little. The eminent personage before whom I put these considerations treated me with studied discourtesy. The leaders of Germany's foreign policy seemed struck with blindness.

A few weeks after this conversation the German Navy programme received another enormous expansion. The whole German Fleet was to be put on a permanent war footing in time of peace. More ships were to be laid down, and once more a virulent and extremely malicious anti-British agitation was engineered in the German Press by the Press Bureau of the German Admiralty. Shortly after my return I wrote an article on "Anglo-German Differences and Sir Edward Grey," which appeared in the *Fortnightly Review*, and which was addressed to the German Foreign Office. In that article I gave the following warning:

"Great Britain has little cause to plead for Germany's goodwill, for she suffers little through the existing Anglo-German tension, while isolated Germany suffers much and risks more. While Great Britain's position throughout the world is secure, that of Germany is very precarious because of her exposed frontiers. As matters stand at present Germany has far more need of Great Britain's support than Great Britain has of Germany's. It is true that Germany possesses still the strongest army in Europe, but it is not strong enough to face a great European combination. She is no longer a danger to the peace of the world, owing to her isolation and to the estrangement of Great Britain. The minds of her statesmen must rather be preoccupied with the problem of defending Germany than with ambitious wars of aggression. Under these circumstances it is madness for Germany's rulers to continue proclaiming that Germany requires more Dreadnoughts, and still more

Dreadnoughts, and ever more Dreadnoughts against Great Britain.

"Germany's prospects are dark and threatening. She is not rich enough and not strong enough to maintain at the same time the strongest army and a navy able to challenge the strongest navy. Every nation which has tried to become supreme on land and sea has failed."

When it became clear that Germany was determined to continue her dangerous anti-British policy, I stated in an article published in the *Nineteenth Century* in June 1912, and entitled "The Failure of Post-Bismarckian Germany":

"A nation can safely embark upon a bold and costly trans-maritime policy only if it is secure on land, if it either occupies an island, like Great Britain and Japan, or if it occupies an isolated position and cannot be invaded by its neighbours, like the United States. Germany has three great land Powers for neighbours. Two of them, France and Russia, are not friendly to Germany, and she cannot rely with absolute certainty upon the support of her third neighbour, Austria-Hungary, a fact of which Bismarck warned her in his Memoirs. Under these circumstances it is obvious that Germany's greatest need is not expansion oversea, but defence on land; that her greatest interests lie not on the sea, but on *terra firma*."

It was obvious to many that, owing to the unwise policy of William II., the Triple Alliance had become a sham, that Germany could no longer rely on Italy's support in the hour of need. I wrote in the *Nineteenth Century* in June 1912:

"In matters of foreign policy praise or blame must be meted out according to results. At the time of Bismarck's dismissal the Triple Alliance was a solid and reliable partnership, and as France on one side of Germany, Russia on another, and Great Britain on a third were isolated, Germany's position in the world was absolutely secure. She dominated the Continent.

"By pursuing an anti-British policy, Germany has not only driven Great Britain from Germany's side and has driven her into the arms of France and Russia, but she

has at the same time greatly weakened the formerly reliable Triple Alliance. Few Germans believe that Germany can count on Italy's support in the hour of need. Thus Germany has simultaneously created the Triple Entente and weakened, if not destroyed, the Triple Alliance. It is true the Triple Alliance exists still—on paper. However, Italy would not think of supporting Germany in a war against France, and still less in a war against Great Britain or against Great Britain and France combined.

"Few intelligent Germans reckon upon Italy's support. Most think that in a great European war Italy will either remain neutral or will be found on the side of Germany's enemies."

In Bismarck's time, and at the beginning of the reign of William II., Germany's position was absolutely secure. Not only were Germany's enemies isolated, but the Triple Alliance was in reality a Quintuple Alliance in disguise. The loyalty of Italy was then undoubted, and Germany could firmly reckon upon the support of Turkey and of Roumania in case of need. Turkey and Roumania could have afforded invaluable assistance to the Triple Alliance in case of a war with Russia. By allowing Turkey to be attacked and despoiled in quick succession, first by Italy and then by the Balkan States, Germany seriously changed the balance of power in Europe to her disadvantage; and Roumania, recognising that the central European group of Powers was no longer the stronger one of the two, not unnaturally turned towards the Powers of the Triple Entente for support, especially as she desired to acquire those vast territories of Austria-Hungary which border upon Roumania, and which were inhabited by three million Roumanians. Through the foolish policy of the Emperor, Turkey had been crippled and Roumania had been estranged. Commenting on Germany's impolicy, I wrote in an article "The Changing of the Balance of Power," published in the *Nineteenth Century Review* in June 1913:

"In view of the fact that Germany had driven Great Britain into the arms of France and Russia, and had exposed

herself to the possibility of being simultaneously involved in a great war by land and sea, it was of course of the utmost importance to her that her position on land should be absolutely impregnable. In these circumstances it was clearly the first and most urgent duty of German statesmanship to take care that Austria-Hungary and Italy should be as strong as possible, and that Roumania and Turkey—and especially Turkey, the support of which should be invaluable in case of complications with Great Britain—should be firmly attached to Germany or to the Triple Alliance. But with the same incredible short-sightedness and levity with which Germany had embarked upon an anti-British course, she allowed Turkey to be attacked first by Italy and then by the Balkan States, and to be utterly defeated. If Germany had possessed a policy, if her diplomacy had been guided by a statesman, or merely by a man possessed of common sense, she would have known that the support of Turkey would be more valuable to her in the hour of need than that of Italy. She would, therefore, either have attached Turkey to the Triple Alliance by treaty, as General von Bernhardi had suggested, or she would have replied to Italy's ultimatum to Turkey by an ultimatum of her own addressed to Italy, which very likely would have prevented the war."

Year by year it became clearer that the German Emperor's unceasing, unnecessary, and exasperating activity in all quarters of the globe had made Germany's policy universally disliked and suspected, that Germany had come to take that place among the nations which France occupied in the time of Napoleon III., that Germany had become the disturber of the world's peace, and was in danger of being treated as such by the generality of nations. In an article entitled "German Designs in Africa," published in the *Nineteenth Century and After* in August 1911, I wrote:

"War has been brought within the limits of vision. It is to be hoped that Germany will turn away from the very dangerous course upon which she has embarked, a course which in a very short time may bring her into a collision not only with France, but with several Great Powers; and as the Triple Alliance is believed to be a purely defensive

alliance relating only to Europe, Germany may find herself deserted by her allies in the hour of trouble. Let us hope that the Morocco crisis can be explained away as the mistake of a single man. Let us hope that Herr von Kiderlen-Waechter will be replaced without delay. That will solve and explain the crisis, and the Morocco incident will soon be forgotten. Persistence on the dangerous and unprecedented course which Germany is steering at the present moment may imperil Germany's future, and may cost the Emperor his throne. The German nation is intensely loyal and patriotic, but it would never forgive a monarch who had driven the nation into a disastrous war without adequate reason."

Germany had become a danger to the peace of the world. Time after time she had dragged the nations to the very brink of a world-war. By his ceaseless, neurotic activity, William II. was likely to raise a great coalition against Germany. He was likely to be confronted in the hour of trial by a Europe in arms, as was Napoleon I. a century ago. In my article "The Failure of Post-Bismarckian Germany," published in the *Nineteenth Century and After* in June 1912, I wrote:

"Bismarck was constantly haunted by the thought of the formation of a great European coalition against Germany. This will be seen from his Memoirs, and from many of his letters and conversations. Bismarck's worst fear may be realised before long. Germany's post-Bismarckian diplomacy is doing its best to destroy the work of the great Chancellor. It has already destroyed Germany's security on the Continent. Yet there is no sign that the 'new course' will be abandoned."

The forecasts made came true in every particular. Germany, which was the undisputed leader of the strongest group of Powers in Europe, which dominated a Quintuple Alliance, and which kept the other Powers in a state of isolation and mutual distrust, had in August 1914 scarcely a single real friend, and she was at war with nearly all Europe.

It has been asserted that Germany went to war in order to acquire the hegemony of Europe. That assertion is not correct. Germany possessed the hegemony of Europe in the time of Bismarck. She lost it through the mistaken policy of William II., and she was trying to regain by force what she has lost through her own folly.

Until 1914 the German Army was considered to be by far the best army in the world. However, those who had studied military matters closely and without prejudice were aware that the influence of William II. had been as fatal to the German Army as it had been to Germany's diplomacy. In the first place, since the time when the German Emperor embarked upon naval competition with Great Britain, the army was relatively neglected. It was starved of money and men for the sake of the navy. In the second place, William II. insisted upon being not only his own Chancellor and Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, but also his own Commander-in-Chief of the army and navy, and his own Chief of the Staff of both services. At the time when the Emperor made the nephew of the Great Moltke Chief of the Staff, appointing him to the same position which his uncle had filled with such wonderful success, the rumour was current in well-informed circles in Berlin that von Moltke had asked not to be given that most responsible position, because he thought that he did not possess the necessary high qualifications, but that the Emperor had replied, "Never mind, Moltke. You can safely take the post. What you don't know I do, and I can do the work for you." At a time when nobody dared to question the pre-eminence and excellence of the German Army, I wrote in the *Nineteenth Century Review*, in an article entitled "The Failure of Post-Bismarckian Germany," published in June 1912:

"Guided by the maxim 'Germany's future lies upon the water,' the leaders of the 'new course' have been so anxious to strengthen the navy that the German Army has been neglected both quantitatively and qualitatively. Germany's expenditure on the navy has been comparatively

extravagant, and that on her army scarcely sufficient. Not only quantitatively but qualitatively as well has the German Army suffered during the 'new course.' German generals complain that promotions are made less by merit and more by favour than in former times. Similar complaints are heard in most Government offices. They complain that the officers are no longer as good as they used to be. Owing to the rise in wages the German Army can no longer obtain a sufficient number of good non-commissioned officers. The German war material also is scarcely up to date. The military outfit of France is superior to that of Germany. According to Lieutenant-Colonel Beyel, of the French artillery, and many other experts, the German artillery is inferior to the French. The tactics of the German Army have become antiquated. According to various German writers Germany has failed to learn the lessons of the Boer War and of the Russo-Japanese War. Major Hoppenstedt published in 1910 a book, *Sind wir Kriegsfertig?* in which he showed that the German Army is too much occupied with barracks-square drill and too little with warlike training. Many officers attribute the neglect of the army to the influence of the Emperor, who is severely criticised. William I. was a soldier by nature. The army was his principal interest. He did not understand the navy. He tolerated no flatterers, and knew no favouritism. He worked incessantly on the improvement of the army. William II. has made the navy his hobby and attends to the army perfunctorily, and many say that it is little better managed than his Foreign Office."

After the Morocco crisis of 1911 Germany hastily tried to improve her somewhat neglected army by greatly increasing the establishment, improving arms and appliances, strengthening fortresses, etc. Her military expenditure rose from £47,200,000 in 1912 to £50,400,000 in 1913, and to no less than £83,500,000 in 1914, and a special "war levy" of £50,000,000 was voted by the Reichstag for bringing the army up to date. However, armies and navies are largely spiritual things of slow organic growth. They cannot be improvised, nor can they be rapidly improved if they have been neglected for a long time, even if money is poured out

like water. Besides, monetary expenditure, however lavish, cannot alter the spirit of an army and its supreme direction. Money neither gives foresight nor does it destroy conceit in the leaders. It neither replaces officers appointed by favour by men of merit, nor does it improve a defective organisation and faulty tactics.

Modesty, concentration, thoroughness, and hard work command success in diplomacy and war. While modesty and thoroughness were the great characteristics of William I. and of his time, the reign of William II. had become notorious for luxury, ostentation, arrogance, favouritism, amateurishness, self-praise, self-advertisement, and conceit. During the reign of William II. the old Prussian virtues of frugality, modesty, and thoroughness disappeared. German idealism died, and Berlin became a centre of coarse materialism, of luxury, and of immorality. Encouraged by the most exalted circles, all Germany gave itself over to self-admiration and self-praise. In the Emperor's speeches and in innumerable articles, lectures, pamphlets, and books, the Germans were told that they were, to quote the Emperor, "the salt of the earth," the wisest, ablest, strongest, and most valiant nation in the world, and that they were, therefore, entitled to rule the universe. Foreign nations, especially the English, were looked upon with undisguised contempt. Being convinced of their irresistible might and their great destiny, many Germans thought that Germany should become supreme in the world by the free and unscrupulous use of her irresistible strength. Although Bismarck had eloquently warned the nation against *Machtpolitik*, against pursuing a policy based on force, against the policy which had caused the downfall of Napoleonic France, the idea of *Machtpolitik* became the guiding principle of the German nation, and the word *Machtpolitik* was in every one's mouth. Unfortunately Bismarck had not practised in the earlier years of his career what he preached in the later. In three great wars he had given to little Prussia the hegemony of Europe. Young Germany hoped, by another series of successful wars,

to conquer the hegemony of the world. By sheer force and audacity the world was to be made German.

The Government, following the fatal precedents set by Bismarck, continued to rely on force in its foreign and domestic policy. By force Germany was to conquer for herself "a place in the sun." By force were the Poles, Danes, and Frenchmen in the conquered provinces to be denationalised. By force were Socialism and popular dissatisfaction to be crushed. By force was the German people to be governed against its will, and by force were the rudimentary parliamentary institutions of Germany to be abolished if parliament should cease to obey the will of the ruling class. Patriotic Germans in their thousands had been converted to the gospel of force, and they endeavoured to aid the policy of the Government by creating enormous organisations which advocated solving all German problems by that means. The Navy League, with more than a million members, demanded that Germany should have the strongest fleet, the Army League that she should have the strongest army, the Air League that she should rule the air. The Ostmarkenverein and Nordmarkenverein agitated in favour of denationalising the Poles and Danes dwelling in the conquered provinces by force. A Government-aided league made war on Socialism, and the Pan-Germanic League, founded three years after the Emperor's accession, advocated Germany's conquest of Belgium, Holland, Denmark, the Baltic provinces of Russia, etc. It advocated the Germanisation of Europe and of the world. An enormous literature arose in which "the war of the future" was vividly and patriotically described. In hundreds of romances the German people, and especially the younger generation, were told how Germany would conquer France and Russia, defeat the English Fleet, raise India in rebellion, invade England, deprive her of her colonies, punish the United States for their arrogance, and tear up the Monroe doctrine. Scarcely in any of these romances, or in any serious books, was the possibility of a German defeat contemplated. Countless admirals, generals, university

professors, lecturers, authors, and journalists unceasingly preached the need of power, but none the need of wisdom, of caution, and of fairness. To discuss even the possibility of disaster or to advocate moderation was considered unpatriotic.

The Germans were a most docile nation. They were what their rulers had made them. They might be arrogant to foreigners, but they were always most obedient and respectful to their rulers. That lay in their training. They took from their rulers their policy and their opinions. Since the advent of William II. an evil spirit had taken possession of Germany. A quarter of a century of stirring Imperial oratory, of Jingoist self-admiration, self-praise, and brag had totally corrupted both the sterling character and the mind of the German nation.

During the early part of the Emperor's reign the advocates of Germany's expansion believed in him. They trusted that he, like his ancestors, would be a "Mehrer des Reiches." William II. had no doubt the ambition to increase the territory and the glory of his country, but he had not the ability. When, time after time, the Emperor failed in his attempts to acquire new territories, when one diplomatic failure followed the other in quick succession, when at last it became generally recognised that he habitually threatened but did not act, Germany's leading men sarcastically referred to him as the Friedenskaiser, the Theaterkaiser, and began openly to call him a coward. After his second failure to overawe France by raising the Morocco question, the ultra-patriotic *Post* of Berlin referred to him as a "poltron misérable" in leaded print. His friends and his own family, especially the Crown Prince, openly showed their disgust that the Emperor's bold words were never followed by suitable action. Many leading Germans began to despair of the Emperor and of the future of their country. William II. felt the ground on which he stood crumbling under his feet. Deeds, not words, were expected of him.

The Emperor's unceasing activity had alarmed the

nations around, and they had made arrangements for their mutual protection. Germany felt hampered and circumscribed by the Triple Entente. The balance of power was felt to be a powerful check to Germany's desire for expansion. Many of the most eminent military men demanded that Germany should endeavour to break up the Triple Entente and destroy the balance of power. General von Bernhardi, for instance, wrote in *Unsere Zukunft*:

"We can render secure our position on the Continent of Europe only if we succeed in bursting the Triple Entente and forcing France, which is never likely to co-operate with Germany, to accept that position of inferiority which is her due."

Numerous statements of similar import made by leading Germans might easily be given. Germany repeatedly tried to destroy the Triple Entente, but as her policy was no longer directed by a master-hand, every attempt at weakening the bonds connecting France, Russia, and Great Britain resulted in the strengthening of their determination to support each other. So Germany bided her time and waited for a favourable opportunity.

Many patriotic Germans, and especially the leaders of the Pan-Germanic League, advocated the creation of a Greater Germany, the territories of which should reach not only from Hamburg to Trieste, but from Hamburg to Constantinople, and to the lands beyond the Straits. Asia Minor was to become a German colony, the Bagdad Railway a German railway, and thus Egypt and India would fall into Germany's hands.

Austria-Hungary desired to make herself supreme in the Balkan Peninsula, and to acquire the harbour of Salonica. She allowed the Balkan War to break out, hoping that it would result in the defeat of the Slavonic Balkan States, or in the weakening of both sides, for either result would have facilitated Austria's progress in the direction of Salonica. However, Serbia blocked the way. The valley of the Vardar is the great natural highroad from Vienna and

Budapest on the one hand to Salonica and on the other hand to Constantinople. The Vardar runs through the centre of Serbia. To Austria's dismay the Balkan States were victorious. A stronger Serbia, holding the gateway to Constantinople, was likely to block Austria's and Germany's path to the Ægean Sea and the Bosphorus. Desiring to ruin Serbia, Austria brought about the second Balkan War. In the course of the Balkan War and during the peace negotiations she repeatedly threatened little Serbia with war by inventing outrages done to Austrians—the most notorious case was the infamous invention spread and maintained by the Austrian Government press for weeks that the Serbians had perpetrated an unnamable mutilation upon the Austrian Consul Prochaska—and by forbidding Serbia to acquire an outlet on the Adriatic. However, while Austria was threatening and blustering in public, she was very kindly but very firmly informed by Mr. Sazonoff in private that an Austrian attack upon Serbia would be equivalent to an Austrian attack upon Russia, that Russia was as strongly interested in Serbia's independence as was Great Britain in the independence of Belgium. Austria clearly knew what the consequences of an attack on Serbia would be.

When William II. had dismissed Bismarck he proclaimed that he would henceforth be his own Chancellor. He no longer required an able Chancellor, but only an obedient one. In Bismarck's words quoted above, obedience alone was made the qualification of the monarch's principal adviser. Up to 1914 Bismarck had four successors : General von Caprivi, who was accustomed to discipline and did what he was told ; Prince Hohenlohe, an outworn diplomat, who was made Chancellor at the age of seventy-five, and who, according to his Memoirs, was very badly treated by the Emperor ; Prince Bülow, a sprightly diplomat and an entertaining companion full of good jokes and stories ; and Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg, a dull but industrious bureaucrat, who had no experience whatever of diplomacy and of practical statesmanship. When, in the spring of 1892,

Bismarck learnt that General von Caprivi intended resigning, he said, according to Harden :

"I am not pleased with the news. At least he was a general. Who will come next ? That is the question. If you get for Chancellor a Prussian bureaucrat who has learned his trade solely at his desk, then you will see strange happenings which at present seem unbelievable."

This prediction of Bismarck's, as so many others, came true. The unbelievable happened.

From evidence which it would lead too far to give in detail in these pages it appears that the German Emperor and the late Archduke Franz Ferdinand agreed on common action against Serbia. Austria-Hungary was to pick a plausible quarrel with that country, and Germany was to support the action of her ally with her entire strength. Russia would either intervene or abstain from action. If she only threatened but did not act, Russia would lose all credit among the Balkan Slavs, and Austria-Hungary, backed by Germany, would, through Serbia and the Vardar valley, dominate the Balkan Peninsula with Salonica and Constantinople. An enormous step in advance would have been taken. If, on the other hand, Russia should attack Austria-Hungary, war between the two great groups of Powers would ensue. As Great Britain had no direct interests in Serbia, it was expected that she would keep neutral, especially if she should at the time have her hands full with problems of her own. If Great Britain should not take part in such a war, Italy would no doubt support Germany and Austria-Hungary in the hope of receiving valuable territorial compensation for her assistance. By raising the Serbian question there seemed to be a possibility of ranging the three Powers of the Triple Alliance against France and Russia. A war of three Great Powers against two seemed very promising. A few weeks before the Archduke's murder he was visited by the German Emperor at his castle at Konopischt. It has been asserted that a secret treaty was then concluded

between Germany and Austria, and very likely it dealt with the Serbian question in the manner described above.

After the Archduke's murder Austria-Hungary kept quiet for weeks. Apparently the outrage was to be treated as an ordinary crime, and there was much reason to treat it as such, for the murderers, though Serbs by race, were Austrian citizens. On the 20th of July Sir Edward Grey wrote to the British Ambassador in Berlin that Count Berchtold, in speaking to the Italian Ambassador in Vienna, had "deprecated the suggestion that the situation [between Austria-Hungary and Serbia] was grave." Three days later, on the 23rd of July, Austria-Hungary dispatched to Serbia, without any previous warning, a totally unacceptable ultimatum, accusing Serbia of being responsible for the Archduke's death. She gave no proof of her assertion, yet she demanded from Serbia that she should, within forty-eight hours, divest herself of her sovereign rights and place herself under Austria's protection and dependence. What had happened in the meantime ?

The Irish crisis had been watched by all the Continental Powers with the greatest interest. Civil war in Great Britain seemed unavoidable. At the eleventh hour the King called a conference of the leaders of all parties at Buckingham Palace. A settlement by consent seemed possible. That hope quickly disappeared. On the 22nd of July it became generally known in London that the Conference would be a failure, and on the 24th the leaders held their last and purely formal meeting, when the impossibility of reaching an agreement was announced. Great Britain not only had no direct interest in the Austro-Serbian quarrel, but seemed likely to be lamed by the imminence of civil war. Besides, Russia was expected to suffer from famine in consequence of a bad harvest, and both the French President and the French Prime Minister were abroad. Last, but not least, the Russian and French armies were not ready for war. Russia was about to reorganise and greatly increase her army and to construct most important strategical railways, while, according to Senator Humbert's report

confirmed by the Minister of War, France lacked heavy artillery, ammunition, and boots, and the French fortresses required strengthening against the heavy artillery introduced in Germany. The whole situation seemed most favourable to the Germanic Powers. The longed-for moment had arrived at last. Now or never was the time to strike. The moment seemed all the more propitious as Germany and Austria-Hungary had recently greatly strengthened their armies; as Russia had not yet followed suit and was believed to be unprepared; as, according to Senator Humbert's report, grave deficiencies existed in the French Army; and as, last but not least, the strategically most important Baltic and North Sea Canal had just been completed.

It has been asserted in Berlin that the initiative for Austria's Serbian policy came from Vienna. That assertion is quite inadmissible. Germany has unmistakably shown to Austria-Hungary in the past that she, as the stronger Power, was not willing to allow herself to be dragged into adventures at the heels of her weaker partner. Besides, Austria-Hungary had, ever since 1848, when Francis Joseph came to the throne, followed a policy of drift and surrender. Hence it seemed most improbable that her aged monarch would, at the end of his days, and upon his own initiative, act with such unexampled and reckless energy. It is true that at the outbreak of the crisis the German Foreign Office declared that they had no knowledge of Austria's ultimatum to Serbia. However, according to a dispatch sent by the British Ambassador in Vienna to Sir Edward Grey, "the German Ambassador [in Vienna] knew the text of the Austrian ultimatum to Serbia before it was dispatched and telegraphed it to the German Emperor." According to the British Ambassador's report the Emperor "endorsed every line of it." Apparently the German Emperor either inspired the fatal ultimatum himself or at least agreed upon it with Austria-Hungary, leaving the German Foreign Office in complete ignorance of his action. Similar things had happened before. William II. was his own Chancellor

and his own Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and he had no use for any but obedient Chancellors and Ministers.

From the hundred and fifty-nine documents contained in the *Correspondence respecting the European Crisis* (Cd. 7467), published with praiseworthy promptitude by the British Foreign Office, it appears that all the Great Powers except Germany urged Austria-Hungary to settle her quarrel with Serbia by agreement in some form or other. Only Germany raised difficulties by ominously declaring that the matter did not concern any Power except Austria-Hungary and Serbia, that arbitration, conference, or international discussion were out of the question, although she knew that every Balkan question had so far been treated as one of European concern by the Concert of Powers. Assured of Germany's unconditional support, Austria-Hungary absolutely declined all proposals towards an amicable settlement made by Sir Edward Grey, and on the 28th of July Count Berchtold informed Russia with haughty abruptness that he could not even discuss Austria's Note to Serbia.

But suddenly the aspect of affairs altered very seriously to the disadvantage of Germany and Austria-Hungary. On the 30th of July the British parties agreed to bury all their differences in view of the critical foreign situation. The second reading of the Home Rule Amending Bill was indefinitely postponed. Great Britain was united and stood ready for action. Immediately Austria's tone changed. She now declared in courteous tones her readiness to discuss her unacceptable ultimatum, and plainly displayed her anxiety to come to an understanding with Russia. Peace seemed secure. Unfortunately Austria-Hungary had reckoned without Germany. Although Austria was ready to negotiate, and although Russia declared on the 30th of July that she would "stop all military preparations," the German Emperor sent in hot haste an ultimatum to Russia, demanding that she should unconditionally demobilise within twelve hours. War would be the consequence of refusal. In order to make war with Russia absolutely certain, the Berlin *Lokalanzeiger* was made to bring out a

special edition which contained the untrue announcement that the German Army had been mobilised. That announcement was immediately telegraphed to Russia by the Ambassador. Soon afterwards the mobilisation of the German Army was officially declared to be untrue, but as the Government blocked the wires to Russia, the German denial, which also was telegraphed to Russia by the ambassador, did not reach his Government, which proceeded to mobilise its army. Thus war was brought about, not owing to the differences between Austria and Serbia or to Russia's intervention, for Russia and Austria were both willing to adjust matters peacefully. War was precipitated by the Emperor's action, taken apparently against the advice of his Chancellor and his Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

Why did William II. plunge his country and all Europe into war at a moment when peace was in his grasp ? Possibly he was urged into war by the war party. Possibly because he dreaded the supreme disgrace of another diplomatic failure, of another surrender. The governing class and his own family were exasperated at the Emperor's surrenders on the occasions of the first and second Morocco crises. They would never have forgiven him a third surrender, which would have been deadly to the prestige of Germany and to that of the crown. In rushing into this war the Emperor probably knew that he was endangering the very existence of the Empire, that Germany might possibly be defeated, for, addressing from the balcony of his Berlin castle the citizens below on the 31st of July, he said :

" A fateful hour has fallen for Germany. Envious people everywhere are compelling us to our just defence. The sword has been forced into our hands. I hope that if my efforts at the last hour do not succeed in bringing our opponents to see eye to eye with us, and in maintaining peace, we shall with God's help so wield the sword that we shall restore it to its sheath again with honour. War would demand of us enormous sacrifices in property and life, but we should show our enemies what it means to provoke Germany. And now I commend you to God. Go to

church and kneel before God and pray for His help and for our gallant army."

While the Emperor asserted in his speech that Germany was wantonly attacked, the White Book regarding the outbreak of war, published by his own Government, stated that Germany unconditionally backed up Austria-Hungary in her Serbian policy, with a view to foiling the policy of Russia, who aimed at disintegrating and destroying the Dual Monarchy; in other words, that she deliberately challenged that country. And, while protesting in an introductory memorandum that Germany urged Austria to preserve the peace, the German Government failed to publish a single one of its dispatches sent to Vienna at that critical period. No official document was published to show that Germany recommended moderation in Vienna. That omission was noteworthy. Germany was well aware that she would appear to be the aggressor, and herein lies perhaps the reason why the German Ambassador, shortly before leaving Paris, drove repeatedly up and down the Quai d'Orsay through the seething mass of the people. Perhaps he had orders if possible to produce an incident which would put France into the wrong. However, the Paris populace kept its temper and offered no insult to the Ambassador.

Germany protested to the world that she was attacked. Those who wish to find out whether Germany or her opponents were in the wrong need not study the numerous official publications of the governments concerned. The fact that Great Britain, France, and Russia promptly published all their dispatches shows that they had little to conceal. The fact that Germany published only a few picked communications, and none of the vitally important ones which she pretended she had addressed to Austria in the interest of peace, gravely prejudiced Germany in the eyes of the world. Moreover, it was most improbable that the military unready Powers should have attacked fully prepared Germany and Austria-Hungary. As a rule the prepared, not the unprepared, army is the aggressor.

At the moment when Germany sent her ultimatum to Russia it was evident that her position would be an extremely dangerous one in case of war. Although Germany and Austria-Hungary could conceivably hope to defeat France, Russia, and Serbia on land, they could hardly hope to defeat Great Britain on the sea. Besides, Italy was likely to desert Germany and Austria-Hungary, and would have to fear the vengeance of her former partners. Consequently she became vitally interested in the defeat of Germany and Austria-Hungary. Hence it was clear that, apart from higher considerations, she would draw the sword and help in the downfall of her former allies so as to establish her own security. Italy would in all probability try to recover from Austria-Hungary the Italian Tyrol, Trentino, and Trieste. These considerations must have been in the Emperor's mind and in that of his diplomatic advisers on the fatal 31st of July. Unfortunately military and naval men were closeted with the Emperor and his diplomats, and none of the Emperor's civil advisers possessed Bismarck's authority and determination and was ready to risk his position for the sake of his country. Bismarck would never have consented to such a suicidal war. He would rather have raised the country against his Emperor. However, it was observed that when, after the fatal and final decision, the Emperor and his Chancellor drove into Berlin, the Chancellor's face was so distorted that the people in the streets did not recognise him. Possibly he thought that the Emperor had signed the death warrant of Germany and of his dynasty.

When the Emperor resolved upon war with France and Russia it was perhaps still somewhat doubtful whether Great Britain would come to the aid of France, but soon the Emperor made Great Britain's hostility certain by invading Luxemburg and Belgium. That attack was not unexpected. The strategical intentions of a military nation in case of war can clearly be gauged by its strategical railways and especially by their military platforms. To detrain rapidly the gigantic armies used in modern war,

hundreds of thousands of horses and tens of thousands of guns and vehicles, enormous military platforms and sidings are required. By comparing the detraining capacity of the military platforms on the Belgo-German frontier with that on the Franco-German frontier, it was clear that Germany intended to strike at France by way of Belgium. As France had powerfully fortified her eastern frontier, it had been an open secret for more than thirty years that Germany would try to enter France by breaking through Belgium. In a confidential and authoritative monograph *Sketch of the Defences of France against Invasion from Germany*, marked "Secret," and published by Harrison & Sons in 1887, we read:

"It is from the recognition of the extraordinary strength of the north-eastern barrier that it is argued that Germany will in a future war be forced to direct her attack by way of Belgium. The best, shortest, and safest line of invasion from North or Central Germany, having Paris for its objective, lies unquestionably by the Meuse, Sambre, and Oise, and follows the latter river up to the gates of the capital. The roads and railways connecting Cologne and Düsseldorf with Aix-la-Chapelle lead thence on Liége, the northern key to the valley of the Meuse and distant only about nineteen miles (a two days' march) from the German frontier. From Liége, the valley of the Meuse, prolonged by the valley of the Sambre, opens up a broad road into France, which carries an invader without sensible interruption from the plains of the Meuse basin into those of the Seine basin."

The general staffs of all nations were prepared for Germany's breach of Belgium's neutrality. However, with regrettable insincerity the German Government pretended that France and Belgium were to be blamed for the universally expected invasion. On the 31st of July the German Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs complained to the British Ambassador that Belgium had "already committed hostile acts by placing an embargo on a consignment of corn to Germany." General von Emmich, the Commander of the invading army, put forth the still more ridiculous claim that invasion was justified because "some French officers had crossed the Belgian frontier in disguise

in motor-cars." His Proclamation to the Belgian people was as follows:

"To my great regret German troops are compelled to cross the frontier by inevitable necessity, the neutrality of Belgium having been already violated by French officers who crossed the frontier in disguise in motor-cars. Our greatest desire is to avoid a conflict between our peoples, who have hitherto been friendly and were formerly allies. Remember Waterloo, where the German armies contributed to found the independence of your country! But we must have a clear road. The destruction of bridges, tunnels, and railways will have to be considered hostile actions. I hope that the German Army on the Meuse will not be called upon to fight you. We want a clear road to attack those who wish to attack us. I guarantee that the Belgian population will not have to suffer the horrors of war. We will pay for provisions, and our soldiers will show themselves to be the best friends of a people for whom we have the highest esteem and the greatest sympathy. It depends upon your prudence and patriotism to avoid the horrors of war for your country."

Lastly the Imperial Chancellor, with greater candour than the German Foreign Secretary and the invading General, pleaded simply necessity in the following speech delivered in the Reichstag:

"Gentlemen, we are now in a state of necessity, and necessity knows no law! Our troops have occupied Luxemburg, and perhaps are already on Belgian soil. That, gentlemen, is contrary to the dictates of international law. It is true that the French Government has declared at Brussels that France is willing to respect the neutrality of Belgium as long as her opponents respect it. We knew, however, that France stood ready for the invasion. France could wait, but we could not wait. A French movement upon our flank upon the lower Rhine might have been disastrous. So we were compelled to override the justified protests of the Luxemburg and Belgian Governments. The wrong—I speak openly—that we are committing we will endeavour to make good as soon as our military goal has been reached. Anybody who is threatened, as we

are threatened, and is fighting for his highest possessions, can have only one thought—how he is to hack his way through."

These mutually contradictory and insincere explanations were highly suggestive, as were the equally clumsy attempts of the German Government to induce Belgium not to resist the German armies by promising to restore her independence "after a German victory"; and the incredibly foolish attempt of the Chancellor to induce Great Britain to forsake France, by promising on the 29th of July that in case of victory Germany would take no French territory, but only the French colonies—two days later, on the 1st of August, he improved this offer by stating that Germany might guarantee "the integrity of France and her colonies" —and to tolerate the invasion of Belgium against a promise that Germany would evacuate the country at the end of the War. They show that the German Foreign Office, which, under Bismarck's control, was the best organised and best informed Foreign Office in the world, had, under the personal government of William II. and under the nominal control of a bureaucrat unacquainted with diplomacy, become a byword for incapacity, confusion, and ignorance among the world's diplomats. The three contradictory explanations of Germany's reasons for invading Belgium were due either to the fact that the Foreign Office gave one explanation, while the Emperor gave totally different instructions without informing the Foreign Office, or to the fact that the Emperor himself, within a few hours, three times changed his mind as to the explanation which should be given. The German Ambassadors were appointed by the Emperor. They owed their position rather to favour than to merit, and they had learned that they would fare best if they reported not what was true and useful, but what the Emperor desired to hear. Of course there were exceptions to the rule. Prince Lichnowsky did his best to enlighten Berlin as to Great Britain's attitude. Still, in the misinformation supplied by her diplomatic representatives lay probably the reason

of Germany's endeavours by ridiculous and palpably insincere promises to induce Great Britain and Belgium to abandon their most vital interests without a stroke. Foreseeing that the War would lead to Germany's economic ruin, I stated in the *Nineteenth Century Review* in September 1914:

"Although Germany no longer actually feeds herself, although, after the United Kingdom, she is the largest importer of food, she can resist almost indefinitely as far as food is concerned. She produces about nine-tenths of her bread corn, and the remaining tenth can be replaced by potatoes and sugar, of which she has a huge surplus. . . . On the other hand, there should be a serious deficiency in butter, eggs, cheese, fish, coffee, tea, cocoa, and tobacco, of which she imports large quantities.

"While, even if the War lasts a year and longer, Germany will scarcely suffer from a shortage of the most necessary foods, her industries will suffer very severely through the cessation of her foreign trade and through shortage of coal and lack of imported raw materials, such as wool, cotton, silk, ore. Her people may also suffer from lack of coal, as the vast majority of the miners have been called into the army. . . . The war may well result in the destruction of Germany's manufacturing industries, shipping, and foreign trade, and in the general impoverishment of the people.

"If Germany should be defeated her political and economic position will become a very serious one. She will probably be deprived of large territories in the East, West, and North. She will certainly lose to France Alsace-Lorraine, the iron-ore beds of which are indispensable to her magnificent iron and steel trade, which is by far the largest German industry. . . .

"Germany's manufacturing industries, Germany's shipping and Germany's foreign trade may never recover from the War. When the War is over, and especially if it is very protracted, much of the German business will have fallen into foreign hands. In addition impoverished Germany may have to pay to the victors an indemnity compared with which that paid by France would appear a trifle. . . .

"Poverty combined with high taxation does not afford a congenial soil to the manufacturing industries. In the

countries of her antagonists, France, Belgium, Great Britain, and Russia, German business men have acquired huge interests, and these also will in part be lost. The War may totally destroy the great industrial position which Germany has acquired during the past three or four decades. It may convert Germany from a wealthy into a poverty-stricken land, and the Germans may be compelled to emigrate by the million to the United States and the British Colonies in the same way in which the Irish emigrated after the Potato Famine of 1846. The outlook for Germany would be terrible."

In the same article I foretold that Germany's defeat would lead to revolution and the break-up of the Empire. I wrote :

" The war may jeopardise, and perhaps destroy, not only the entire life-work of Bismarck and part of that of Frederick the Great, it may not only impoverish Germany very greatly, but it may also damage Germany's good name for generations. With the same ruthlessness with which her diplomats, following the principles of *Machtpolitik*, have disregarded the sacredness of treaties, making Germany's advantage their only law, her soldiers have disregarded the written laws of war, and, what is worse, the unwritten law of humanity. According to numerous accounts, the German soldiers have bombarded open and undefended towns, wantonly burned down villages, killed wounded soldiers and peaceful inhabitants of both sexes, and executed all Belgian civilians caught with arms in their hands, although, according to Article 2 of the Regulations respecting the Laws and Customs of War, signed at The Hague on the 18th of October 1907 by Germany herself :

' The inhabitants of a territory not under occupation who, on the approach of an enemy, spontaneously take up arms to resist the invading troops without having had time to organise themselves in accordance with Article 1, shall be regarded as belligerents if they carry arms openly, and if they respect the laws and customs of war.'

" Though many of the accounts published may be untrue, there is bound to be a considerable substratum of truth.

By these actions and by the infliction of crushing fines upon the conquered towns and territories, the German Government is not weakening resistance, but increasing the bitterness and determination of its opponents, and it is doing irremediable harm to the reputation of the race throughout the world. . . .

"The question now arises whether the docile Germans will bear their misfortunes patiently, or whether they will rebel against the crowned criminal who has brought about their misery. A revolt is possible, and it may take a two-fold shape. Conceivably the Southern States might, after a serious defeat of the German Army, detach themselves from Prussia, refusing to fight any longer for the German Emperor. The Empire may be dissolved. The secession of the Southern States would no doubt be encouraged by a victorious French Army. On the other hand, it is possible that there would be a general rising of the people against their rulers. The great majority of Germans are dissatisfied with their form of government. A well-educated people does not like to be governed like children. An absolutism thinly disguised by parliamentary forms is tolerable only as long as it is successful, and as the people are prosperous. The vast majority of the Germans are Liberals, Radicals, and Socialists. This majority has at present no influence whatever upon the government and policy of the country. Failure of the Government in the present war would make absolute government impossible in Germany. If Germany should experience a serious defeat, she may either become a strictly limited monarchy on the English model, or a republic. As both the Emperor and the Crown Prince are equally responsible for the present war, it may well happen that the German people will refuse to be ruled any longer by the Hohenzollerns. The rise of a German republic is certainly within the limits of possibility."

My forecast of the economic and political consequences of the War, which was made immediately upon its outbreak, was to prove correct.

CHAPTER XXII

WHY THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE BROKE DOWN IN 1914 [1]

AGREEMENTS between States are frequently compared with agreements between individuals because of the similarity of the quasi-legal wording used in both. However, notwithstanding the analogy of the language used, and the apparent similarity of the transaction, such comparison is not justified. A civil agreement is absolutely binding upon its signatories and can be enforced by a court of law. A merchant who has agreed to sell certain goods at a certain price cannot successfully try to avoid performance by advancing the plea that fulfilment of the contract would be unprofitable or disastrous to him. The binding force of a civil contract is absolute. On the other hand, an agreement between nations possesses neither unconditional validity nor unlimited binding force. By signing a contract a merchant binds only himself, and he must fulfil the contract even if he has signed away his property. His misfortune affects only himself. Hence it is right that the law courts enforce the unconditional fulfilment of private contracts. But an agreement between States bears a totally different character. Such an agreement is concluded, not by the principals—that is, by the nations themselves—acting in full knowledge of the case and of their responsibility, but only by their temporary agents who are acting on the nation's behalf, by statesmen who have been appointed to promote the interests of the nation and to increase the prosperity of the people. They are the trustees

[1] From the *Fortnightly Review*, January 1912.

of the nation, and they are neither entitled to sign away the happiness and prosperity of the nation on behalf of which they are acting, nor to fulfil treaty obligations if they are convinced that their performance would be ruinous to the people. Hence a statesman is in certain circumstances bound to deny the validity and binding force of an international agreement, even if it has been signed, not by a predecessor in office, but by himself. Treaties of alliance resemble laws in their conditional validity. Laws lapse automatically when they are no longer in accordance with the spirit of the time.

On the British statute book there are many laws which can no longer be enforced, although they have not been formally repealed. Similarly treaties of alliance, having been concluded between nations with the object of promoting their common interests, lapse automatically when the treaty Powers cease to possess those common interests and aims in furtherance of which the treaties were originally concluded. Bismarck, the father of modern statesmanship, explained repeatedly with his usual directness and lucidity that treaties of alliance possess neither unconditional validity nor unlimited binding force, that both were affected by changing times and circumstances. He stated, for instance, in the Reichstag on the 6th of February 1888 :

"No great Power can, for any length of time, be tied by the wording of a treaty which is opposed to the interests of the people, and if it has done so it will eventually be compelled openly to declare : 'The times have altered. I cannot do it.' And it must justify its action before the people and before its allies as best it can. But to ruin its own people by fulfilling one's treaty duties to the letter, that is an action which no great Power can assent to. However, this is by no means demanded in any treaty. . . . Treaties are only the expression of a community of aims and of risks which are run by the treaty-concluding Powers."

In his political testament, his *Gedanken und Erinnerungen*, Bismarck wrote :

"All contracts between great States cease to be unconditionally binding as soon as they are tested by the struggle for existence. No great nation will ever be induced to sacrifice its existence on the altar of treaty fidelity. . . . To-day it is hardly possible for the Government of a great Power to place its resources at the disposal of a friendly State when the sentiment of the people disapproves of it. . . . The clause *Rebus sic stantibus* is tacitly understood to apply to all treaties which involve performance."

The Triple Alliance was a purely defensive instrument. It was repeatedly renewed and retained its defensive character. Bismarck foresaw that this Alliance might come to an end by a change in the political conditions of Europe, for he wrote in his *Gedanken und Erinnerungen*:

"The Triple Alliance has the significance of a strategical position which was taken up in view of the threatening dangers which prevailed at the time of its conclusion. It has been prolonged from time to time, and it may be possible to prolong it still further, but eternal duration is assured to no treaty between great Powers, and it would be unwise to consider it as affording a permanently secure guarantee against all possible contingencies which may modify the political, material, and moral conditions under which it was brought into being. The Triple Alliance no more constitutes a foundation capable of offering perennial resistance to time and change than did the numerous other Triple or Quadruple Alliances which preceded it."

The great German statesman actually foretold that the Triple Alliance would come to an end if the relations between Italy and France should become friendly, that Italy might turn against Austria-Hungary if she could feel secure of French aggression. He told Moritz Busch in 1888:

"We cannot quite rely upon Italy. The French may again gain ground in that country. France and Italy may become friends not only after a change has taken place in France's form of Government, but even if the Republic should be maintained. In case of a reconciliation with

France, Italy might resume her Irredentist policy and renew her claims upon Austrian territory."

Bismarck had created bitter hostility between France and Italy by giving at the Congress of Berlin Tunis to France. Tunis lies at a distance of only a hundred miles from the coast of Sicily and from that of Sardinia. Italy had the strongest claims upon Tunis, partly because of her geographical proximity, partly because nearly all the European residents in Tunis were Italian citizens. Under these circumstances France's occupation of Tunis was felt as a serious attack upon Italy's interests. Soon after having taken possession of Tunis, France converted into a first-class arsenal and war harbour the port of Bizerta, which is equidistant from Sicily and Sardinia, and stationed a fleet there. Thus she was able to threaten Italy's enormous and exposed coast-line simultaneously in the north-west from Toulon and in the extreme south of the country. It is widely known that Bismarck caused Italy to join the Austro-German Alliance by giving Tunis to France, but only a few people, most of whom are diplomats, are aware that Bismarck threatened Italy with a war with Austria-Hungary unless she would ally herself with the two Germanic States, that Italy did not join the Austro-German Alliance by her own free choice, but was actually coerced into joining it. Describing the foreign policy of Count Robilant, a former Italian Minister of Foreign Affairs, who took a very prominent part in the conclusion of the Triple Alliance, the Marchese Cappelli, who himself has been a Minister of Foreign Affairs, wrote in his book, *La Politica estera del conte de Robilant*:

"None knew better than Count Robilant how much we were isolated and how great was the danger arising from the hostility which certain Powers displayed towards us. When Prince Bismarck went to Vienna in 1879 in connection with the conclusion of the Austro-German Alliance, the Italian Ambassador was the only Ambassador in Vienna who was not visited by the Prince. That was not the only

evidence of Germany's attitude towards Italy. The Austrian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Count Andrassy, told Bismarck that Austria had been constantly provoked by the agitation of the Italian Irredentists and that she might at last feel compelled to make war upon Italy, and he asked the Prince whether, in that event, Germany would have any objection to Austria taking possession of part of those Italian Provinces which had been Austrian and which Austria had lost to Italy in 1859 and 1866. Bismarck hesitated a moment and then answered : ' No, we would not raise any objections. Italy is none of our friends.' About the same time the Papal Nuncio inquired whether Germany would object to the re-establishment, or at least the partial re-establishment, of the Pope's temporal power, and he received exactly the same reply. These utterances showed Germany's sentiments towards Italy."

Monsieur A. Billot, who from 1890 to 1897 was the French Ambassador in Rome, wrote :

" Italy's hesitation to join the Austro-German Alliance was overcome by alarming the Italian Government. Germany pretended to be favourably inclined towards the Vatican, and took openly steps towards a reconciliation with the Pope. Thus Italy was trapped into an alliance of which the first advantage was to be this—that Italy would be guaranteed against all attempts to restore the temporal power of the Pope, a policy which was favoured, or at least not disapproved of, by Germany."

Bismarck had the greatest contempt for Italy. In 1880 he said to Busch : " The Italians are like carrion crows on the battlefield that let others provide their food. They were prepared in 1870 to fall upon us with others if they were promised a piece of Tyrol. At that time a Russian diplomat said : ' What ! They are asking for something again, although they have not yet lost a battle ! ' " Nevertheless he forced Italy into joining the Austro-Germany Alliance, because he wished to be sure that in a war between Germany and Austria-Hungary on the one side, and France and Russia on the other side, Austria-Hungary should be able to use her entire army against Russia.

Long before 1883, the year when Italy joined the Austro-German Alliance, it had been Bismarck's policy to create differences between France and Italy with regard to the Mediterranean, differences which, by weakening France, were likely to benefit Germany. He wrote, for instance, in 1868 to Count Usedom, his Ambassador in Italy :

"Italy is France's natural rival, and the two countries will always be rivals and sometimes enemies. Nature has thrown between the two an apple of contention, for which they will fight for ever : the Mediterranean, that wonderful inter-continental harbour of Europe, Asia, and Africa, that channel between the Atlantic and the Pacific, that basin which is surrounded by the fairest countries in the world. It is surely not idle to believe that France envies Italy and its position, which stretches far into the Mediterranean, and which possesses the most beautiful shores and the shortest route to the Orient. France and Italy can never become Allies, sharing the advantages of the Mediterranean, for this is an indivisible heritage. It belongs undoubtedly to Italy, whose Mediterranean shores are twelve times as extensive as are the Mediterranean shores of France."

How deeply Italy was wounded by France's occupation of Tunis will be seen from the fact that the signature of the Franco-Tunisian Treaty on the 12th of May 1881 was followed two days later by the fall of the Cairoli Cabinet. Franco-Italian relations became exceedingly strained. Italy began in haste to increase her army and to build a fleet able to encounter the strong French Navy. The tension between the two countries caused the outbreak of a customs war which lasted ten years. Her vast expenses on armaments, and the virtual closing of the French frontier to Italian products, and of the Paris money market to Italian loans, impoverished Italy greatly and brought her to the verge of national bankruptcy.

The policy of keeping France and Italy apart by artificial means was successful only as long as Bismarck directed Germany's policy. After his dismissal Germany's policy lacked a firm, directing hand, France began to display

independent diplomatic initiative, and to pull the diplomatic wires of Europe as Bismarck had done during thirty years. Monsieur Delcassé resolved to clear away the differences which Bismarck had created between France and Great Britain on the one side, and between France and Italy on the other, and he succeeded. The Franco-Italian understanding began with the Agreement of 1898 regarding Crete, and with a Treaty regarding Tripoli in 1899. The Franco-Italian customs war, which had been so disastrous to Italy, was ended. France and Italy arrived at a thorough understanding as to the Mediterranean, and the two Powers became friends. Italy felt no longer threatened by France, for France acted towards her with the greatest loyalty. As far as Italy was concerned, the Triple Alliance was no longer a necessity.

If we wish to understand Italy's foreign policy in the past, we must before all be acquainted with the Irredentist movement. *Irredenta Italia* means the unredeemed Italy. The larger part of Italy, including Florence, Milan, and Venice, was until lately under Austrian domination. Austria had terribly ill-treated her Italian subjects. The policy of the Irredentists was to "redeem" those territories which, though Italian in character, still belonged to foreign countries, and to unite them with the kingdom of Italy. The lands which the Irredentists claimed most loudly and most persistently belonged to Austria-Hungary. They were the Southern Tyrol and parts of the provinces of Istria and Dalmatia, with the towns of Trieste, Pola, etc. The spirit of the Irredentist became the spirit of Young Italy. In the school-book history of Giovanni Soli, which was used in the majority of elementary schools in Italy, occurs the following passage: "By the conquest of Rome Italy was freed nearly entirely from the domination of foreigners. We say *nearly* entirely, because two parts of Italy belong still to Austria—namely, the South of Tyrol and Istria with Trieste, two beautiful countries which possess more than 1,000,000 inhabitants."

The first need of a great country is security from foreign

aggression. The Italian Irredentists, indeed all Italian patriots, were anxious that their country should be secure from foreign attack. However, the mountain ranges which separated Italy from Austria-Hungary were situated, not on Italian but on Austrian soil, although their inhabitants were Italians. An Austrian army could without difficulty descend from the Tyrolese mountains into the plains of Italy, and, by the irony of Fate, the very Tyrolese mountains which should have protected Italy were inhabited by Italians.

Italy was extremely vulnerable, not only on her Austrian land frontier, but also on the coasts, and especially on the coasts of the Adriatic facing Austria. Many large towns, such as Genoa, Livorno, Naples, Reggio, Messina, Palermo, Catania, Taranto, Brindisi, Ancona, Venice, and countless smaller ones, are open coast towns which are exposed to forced contribution, bombardment, and capture from the sea. Rome, Padua, Ravenna, Pisa lie only about ten miles from the coast. Italy's principal railways and high-roads hug the shore from one end to the other of the peninsula, and they can easily be destroyed in many places by small landing-parties.

Nature had been very partial in creating the Adriatic. She had given an open and almost defenceless coast to Italy, and had created a large number of excellent, natural harbours protected by high surrounding hills and mountains all along the coast which faces Italy. The western, or Italian, shore of the Adriatic is mostly flat and sandy, and is devoid of natural bays and harbours. Therefore the ships anchoring in the small Italian ports are exposed to all winds, and especially to the Bora, the most dangerous wind of the Adriatic. The flatness of the shore makes the landing of an army on the beach easy. The eastern shore of the Adriatic is rocky and mountainous, and possesses a profusion of deep and excellent bays, harbours, and inlets. The Austrian ports of Pola, Cattaro, and Sebenico were among the finest and largest protected natural harbours in the world. Between Pola and Ragusa, a distance of three

hundred miles, there were some sixty ports on the Austrian part of the Adriatic shore which could be used as stations for torpedo-boats and submarines. The southern prolongation of the Austrian coast, the Albanian coast, also had excellent natural harbours, which could easily be fortified and converted into war harbours. Austria threatened Italy as much on sea as on land.

The modern history of Italy is the history of her wars with Austria. In the Southern Tyrol Austria held the key to Italy's door. In the Adriatic and in the Balkan Peninsula Austria opposed Italy's political and economic expansion. Besides, she oppressed the Italians living in Austria. Italy had been forced against her will to enter the Austro-Germany Alliance. It is therefore only natural that many patriotic Italians were bitterly opposed to Austria and to the Triple Alliance.

In the year 1906 Signor Pellegrini wrote in his important book, *Verso la Guerra ?—Il dissidio fra l'Italia e l'Austria* :

"I believe we cannot live any longer under an illusion which deceives us. We have lived under the impression that the internal difficulties of Austria-Hungary are so great as to prevent her from aggressive action towards ourselves and from expansion towards the East. We have believed that Austria-Hungary would fall to pieces after the death of the present Emperor. These views are erroneous. If the political crisis in Austria-Hungary should become more acute, and there is reason for doubting this, Austria-Hungary's need to expand and to acquire new markets in the East will become all the greater. And as long as Italian commerce pursues its triumphant course in the East, the more are the opposing interests of the two nations likely to bring about the final collision. . . .

"We cannot continue a policy of vassalage which will compromise for all time Italy's future in order to preserve the outward form of the Triple Alliance. We must ask ourselves: What are our interests ? Are we ready to defend them ? What are the conditions of the Italians who dwell on the shore of the Adriatic under foreign domination ? What are our interests on the Adriatic compared with those of Austria ? What are the wishes of our people,

and what is Italy's mission in the Balkan Peninsula? Is it possible to avoid a conflict with Austria? I believe I have shown that Austria-Hungary is at the same time our ally and our open enemy, against whom we must prepare for war."

Signor Pellegrini proposed to meet the danger of a collision with Austria-Hungary by an Alliance between Italy and Russia:

"We have to calculate in the future with the fact that the Austro-Hungarian Empire, though nominally our ally, is our determined enemy in the Balkan Peninsula. Therefore, it is meet that we should enter into more intimate relations with Russia, the only nation which, in co-operation with Italy, can act as an adequate counterpoise. Only thus we can secure the maintenance of the threatened balance of power in the Balkan Peninsula."

Already in 1902 Monsieur Delcassé had recommended to Italy, in an interview which was published in the *Giornale d'Italia* on the 4th of January of that year, that she should enter upon intimate relations with France and Russia for the protection of her interests in the Balkan Peninsula.

For some considerable time the Italians had been earnestly considering the possibility of a war with Austria-Hungary. The *Rassegna Contemporanea* began publishing in July 1911 a series of articles by Colonel Angelo Tragni, entitled "Ai Confini d'Italia," in which the military factors which are important in a war with Austria-Hungary are discussed at length. Italian military and naval men published many books, pamphlets, and articles on the same subject. However, the Italian soldiers were not alone in considering professionally and publicly the possibility of an Austro-Italian war, for their Austrian colleagues were similarly occupied. One of the leading Austrian military papers, the very important *Danzer's Armeezeitung*, printed during 1911 a series of articles on a possible Austro-Italian war. They were subsequently printed in pamphlet form under the

significant title, *Without Victory on Sea no Victory on Land : the Decisive Significance of a Naval Victory in the Conduct of a Land War with Italy.* The pamphlet had a preface written by the Austrian Vice-Admiral Chiari, in which we read :

" *Alliances do not last for ever and the ally of to-day may be the enemy of to-morrow.* One must not under-estimate one's opponents. We should no longer meet the Italian soldiers who were beaten by the Austrians at Novara, and *still less the Italian sailors who were beaten by the Austrians at Lissa.* I have always admired the splendid naval material of Italy with feelings of envy."

The most important passages of the pamphlet itself follow, and I would mention that the italicised portions of its preface and of its text were also italicised in the original. All military technicalities have been omitted :

" The crisis during the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina has shown that *notwithstanding our alliances we must still reckon with the possibility of a war on several fronts.* . . . In Italy nearly all warlike preparations are directed against Austria, her hereditary enemy, and her standard of armaments is supplied not by Italy's interests, but by our own military power. We must prepare armaments sufficient to meet the whole force of Italy, but not of the Italy of to-day, but of the Italy of *to-morrow*, when the unavoidable collision will occur. . . . *It is certain that we have to reckon with a war on several fronts.* Without hesitation one can prophesy that our ally in peace will be our enemy in war, that Italy will rather be found on the side of our enemies than on our side, that we shall have to meet the combined armies of Russia, Italy, Serbia, and Montenegro. That was probably in the mind of the Minister of War when he spoke of the possibility of a war on several fronts. . . . We should naturally aim our first and our strongest blow at our nearest and most dangerous opponent, at Italy. . . .

" During forty-five years we have been perfecting Austria's armaments in order to arrive at military superiority in general, and, since some time, to be able to defeat Italy in

particular. But we must not deceive ourselves. We shall no longer meet the Italians of Novara and Custoza, for Italy has not stood still. Nor shall we meet the Italians who were defeated on the Adowa, for she has made up for past neglect with redoubled energy. . . .

"*Is, in case of a European conflagration, the superiority of our armies operating in the Italian province of Venetia against the Italian army so striking that we may reckon upon the immediate and sweeping success which is necessary for us in view of the difficult position in which we may find ourselves?* Consideration of all factors shows that this question must be answered in the negative. Our superiority is not sufficiently great. The Italian army is, through its numbers, organisation, armament, and training, able to offer the most determined resistance even against the mightiest enemy, and its power of resistance will be greatly increased in a war which the Italian nation will wage with all its heart. . . .

"Whilst the North-east of Austria-Hungary has sufficient room for employing armies of from fifteen to twenty army corps, the territory of Venetia is limited. Its narrowness is a factor of the greatest importance. Owing to its narrowness *we can turn the flank of the Italian army only by operating oversea, and herein lies one of our best chances and the absolutely necessary condition of a victory on land. A decisive victory of our fleet enables us to turn the Italian position and leaves undefended the great centres of the country. Preparations must be made on the largest scale for the transport of troops across the sea in very large numbers. A decisive victory on sea! That will be the principal need of the situation in a land war against Italy.* The protection of our coasts and harbours, which, according to semi-official statements is the object of our fleet, is, in reality, an unimportant matter."

Deeds reveal most clearly a country's aims and intentions. For years the Italian and Austrian naval manœuvres were merely rehearsals of an Austro-Italian war. Both Italy and Austria greatly strengthened their fortifications and their garrisons on the Austro-Italian frontier, and, following Germany's example, Austria-Hungary began building a large fleet.

An alliance is an impossibility without mutual trust and without a community of aims and interests. Between Italy and Austria-Hungary there existed no trust and besides, there existed not a community, but an incompatibility, of aims and interests. The Triple Alliance was bound to break down on the day of trial.

CHAPTER XXIII

HOW THE MILITARY RULED GERMANY [1]

THE true character of the former German government, the fact that the military was absolutely supreme over the civil power, was startlingly revealed to the world six months before the outbreak of the Great War. The escapades of a very young lieutenant in the little German garrison of Zabern late in 1913, and the consequent differences between the military and the civil population of the town, filled the papers of the world during a couple of months and very nearly led to a most serious constitutional crisis in Germany in the beginning of 1914. The Zabern affair was most characteristic of modern Germany, and the little lieutenant may some day occupy a considerable space in the constitutional histories of that country.

The whole world was greatly interested in the conflict —the Italian papers in the South of Sicily, where I was staying at the time, published every day two columns of news regarding it—because it was generally recognised that the Zabern conflict was not an event but a symptom. It was not only a conflict between the officers and citizens of an unimportant town, but a trial of strength between the military and the civil authorities of Germany, between reaction and progress, between might and right, between absolutism and democracy, and herein lay its importance. There were two powerful currents in Germany, an autocratic and a democratic one, and no one can understand Imperial Germany's foreign and domestic policy who is not acquainted with the elements which clashed at Zabern.

[1] From the *Nineteenth Century and After*, February 1914.

Therefore it is worth while to consider the foreign and domestic policy of Germany in the light of the Zabern events.

Zabern is a little town of about nine thousand inhabitants in Alsace. The vast majority of the people were Germans by race and by language. They were thoroughly loyal to Germany, and there had been no conflicts between the civil population and the military until Lieutenant von Forstner, a youth of twenty, joined the garrison. He was tactless enough to make before his men, some of whom were French Alsatians, highly offensive remarks about France; to call the native Alsatian recruits "Wackes," which means rowdies, larrikins; to tell his soldiers that they should use their weapons with energy should they come into collision with the local civilians; and to offer a prize of ten marks to those who should succeed in "running a man through" with their side-arms. His remarks became the talk of the town, they found their way into one of the local papers, and as the rumour got about that an infantile and somewhat ludicrous physical mishap had occurred to Lieutenant von Forstner while in a state of intoxication, he was laughed at and teased by the people and especially by children and youths. His fellow-officers took his part, soldiers with fixed bayonets began to accompany the officers on their walks through the town, Lieutenant von Forstner was seen buying chocolates escorted by soldiers with fixed bayonets, and dining at a public restaurant with a revolver lying on the table. The merriment of the town increased through this ludicrous exhibition, and small crowds began to follow the officers and to collect before the barracks awaiting developments. Then Colonel von Reuter, the commander of the regiment, instead of sending Lieutenant von Forstner away, after complaining about insufficient police protection to the civil authorities, resolved to take the law into his own hands. He called his soldiers out, apparently had ball cartridge served out and machine-guns got in readiness, and threatened to fire upon the crowd in front of the barracks which, according to his own state-

ment before the military court, numbered only from forty to one hundred people. The people ran away. Orders were then given to the soldiers to arrest every civilian who lingered near the barracks or who insulted the soldiers or laughed at them, and thirty people were arrested, among them some of the local judges who came from the law courts. Soldiers, eager to arrest people who were supposed to have laughed or jeered, pursued the fugitives into their houses, and a front door was broken in during the man-hunt. The prisoners secured were locked up in a coal-cellar all night; they were brought next morning before the civil magistrates, who immediately set them at liberty. However, Lieutenant von Forstner remained a butt to the populace. One day, when marching along with his soldiers, he was jeered at by some youths. They were pursued by the soldiers, but escaped. A lame shoemaker was left behind. He was attacked by Lieutenant von Forstner with his sword and received a cut over the head.

The high-handed action of the military was loudly condemned by all the Liberal, Radical, Clerical, and Socialistic people of Germany and their press, but was praised by the small but powerful Conservative Party and its papers. When the matter was brought up before the Reichstag, the Imperial Chancellor, instead of promising immediate redress for the injustice done, expressed abstract views on the conflict of right and wrong in an impersonal, detached, and non-committal way, while the Minister of War, who followed him, instead of expressing regret for the occurrences, used the opportunity of making a glowing speech in praise of the virtues of the Prussian officers and of the army who were the defenders of the Throne and of the Fatherland. In consequence of the attitude of the Imperial Chancellor and the Minister of War, who seemed to flout the German Parliament and people, a vote of censure on the Chancellor was moved and was passed by the enormous majority of two hundred and ninety-three to fifty-four. The Conservatives alone supported the Government. To allay the anger of people and Parliament, a judicial inquiry was announced,

and Lieutenant von Forstner was promptly sentenced to forty-five days' imprisonment by a military court for wounding the shoemaker. Proceedings against Colonel von Reuter were delayed. Lieutenant von Forstner appealed against the sentence, and his appeal and the case of Colonel von Reuter came simultaneously before the higher military court at Strasbourg.

Before the appeal of the young lieutenant and the case of Colonel von Reuter came on for hearing, one of the most powerful officials in Germany, Herr von Jagow, the Police President of Berlin, who was considered a possible successor to Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg, published over his name in the Conservative *Kreuzzeitung* a manifesto in form of a letter in which he stated :

"Military exercises are acts of the State. Those who try to impede acts of the State are liable to be prosecuted and punished. Consequently Lieutenant von Forstner could not be placed on trial, and could still less be punished. The military court which condemned him has apparently failed to be guided by these considerations. If the law stood differently, its prompt amendment would be needed. For if German officers, who are garrisoned in what is nearly the enemy's country, are in danger of being prosecuted for illegal detention because they endeavour to make room for the exercise of the power of the State, the highest profession in the land is disgraced."

The legal arguments of the President of the Berlin Police were scarcely taken seriously, but his attempt to influence the decision of the military court in favour of the accused officers at a time when the matter was still *sub judice*, the fact that Herr von Jagow tried to use his great position and influence in order to secure for the officers a judicial verdict in their favour, outraged once more the Liberals, Radicals, Clericals, and Socialists of Germany, but was applauded by the entire Conservative Press.

The military court at Strasbourg declared both Colonel von Reuter and Lieutenant von Forstner not guilty—the colonel because, in detaining people, he had acted in ignorance

of the law, and the lieutenant because he had wounded the shoemaker in putative self-defence.

In the struggle between the military and civil power, between the military and the people, the military had proved victorious. Military absolutism and contempt of law had been declared legal by a high military court. The German nation was a well-drilled nation. From the tenderest age the children were taught in the schools that obedience to authority was the foremost duty of the citizen, that military officers belong to an exalted and highly privileged class, that the military uniform was sacred, that even the youngest lieutenant was the representative of the Emperor-King. In how high estimation officers were held in Germany may be seen from this—that many of the leading business men and estate owners whose names are generally known in Germany had printed on their visiting cards the fact that they were Lieutenants of the Reserve.

The German people apparently acquiesced in the Strasbourg verdict and were seemingly ready to pocket their defeat by the military. The enormous excitement caused at the time by the high-handed behaviour of the Zabern officers died down. Militarism in Germany became as all-powerful as ever. The well-known politician and publicist, Herr Eduard Bernstein, wrote in the *English Nation* of the 17th of January:

"It is no use concealing the truth. The hold of militarism on the German nation is certainly stronger than ever. Were it otherwise, Mr. Lloyd George's timely remarks upon the necessity of stopping the growth of armaments would not have been passed over with a few embarrassed remarks by the great Liberal Press of the Empire."

The significance of the Zabern verdict was recognised throughout Germany. Democratic Germany was profoundly depressed and humiliated, while Colonel von Reuter received more than fifteen thousand letters and telegrams of congratulation from the supporters of absolutist government. Herr von Jahn, who had presided at the

trial at Strasbourg, immediately after having read the verdict in court, sent telegrams of congratulation to Herr von Jagow, the Berlin President of Police, and to the famous Herr von Oldenburg-Januschau, who, as a deputy, had declared a few years before in the Reichstag, "The King of Prussia and Emperor of Germany must be able to tell a lieutenant at any moment: 'Take ten men with you and close the Reichstag.'"

The Zabern affair offers some most valuable and important lessons to all who are interested in Germany. Even the most casual observer must be struck with several curious phenomena which require explanation. He will ask: How is it that the phlegmatic, patient, and law-abiding German population, which is very slow to anger, has during the last few years twice been roused into such a passion by the action of its rulers—once over the Emperor's *Daily Telegraph* interview and then over the Zabern affair —that the vast majority of the newspapers and people have demanded an alteration of the Constitution by which the people should be given greater power over the national executive and administration? How is it that in both cases the German Reichstag failed to take action whereby to secure some control over the national executive and administration? And how is it that the angry passions died down as quickly as they arose? How is it that the Imperial Chancellor, Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg, instead of promising to make similar military excesses impossible in the future, adopted a weak and apologetic attitude? How is it that he remained Imperial Chancellor, although that vote of censure was the third which the Reichstag had passed upon him?—The inefficient and somewhat childish petulance of the German people, when provoked by its rulers, the fact that Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg did not promise that he would make recurrence of events like those at Zabern impossible, and the fact that the German Parliament did not even try to provide a permanent remedy for the grievances of the people by bringing pressure to bear upon the German Government and Administration,

sprang all from the same source. Germany, which had the most democratic franchise in the world, possessed a Parliament, but no Parliamentary Government; Germany was an almost autocratically governed military State which possessed merely the semblance of representative Government; the German Parliament, unlike the British Parliament, had not been created by the people, but had been bestowed upon the German people as a free gift by its rulers. As the Reichstag existed not by the will of the people, but by the permission of the Monarch, the Monarch could take away his gift as soon as the representatives of the people were no longer absolutely loyal and submissive to him and to the officials he had appointed, but tried to enter upon a conflict with the Imperial Government with a view to limiting its practically absolute powers.

Germany, as William I. said, was merely an enlarged Prussia. The Imperial Chancellor, like all German officials, was nominated and dismissed by the Emperor, for, according to Art. 18 of the Constitution, "The Emperor appoints the Imperial officials, has their oaths taken, and effects their dismissal if required." The Reichstag and the Party Leaders could neither bring about the appointment of a Government official, nor effect his dismissal or his resignation by a vote of censure. Moreover, a vote of censure upon the Imperial Chancellor would have been an interference with the Imperial prerogative, an attempt to influence the Imperial will. Therefore it would only have caused the censured Chancellor to be retained, for dismissal after a vote of censure would have made it appear that the Emperor had obeyed Parliament or given way to popular pressure. The German Emperor was not likely to do that. As the Reichstag knew that its votes of censure had no practical effect whatever, it did not take its own votes of censure very seriously, nor did any one in Germany. Hence the relations between the Reichstag and the censured Chancellor remained practically unchanged.

The arrogant attitude of the Zabern officers and the great reserve maintained by the Imperial Chancellor in

the Reichstag when dealing with the Zabern events were due to the fact that Germany was an almost autocratically governed military State. Neither the Reichstag nor the Imperial Chancellor had any influence over the army. Bismarck himself was quite powerless where the army was concerned. Article 63 of the Imperial German Constitution stated: "The whole of the military forces of the Empire will form a homogeneous army which is commanded by the Emperor in war and in peace." As the Emperor kept the command of the army in war and in peace absolutely in his own hands and allowed no interference from any quarter, least of all from any civilian, and as the Chancellor's authority extended only to civil affairs, Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg was of course powerless to promise the Reichstag that Lieutenant von Forstner should be punished or Colonel von Reuter reprimanded. Where the army was concerned the Imperial Chancellor had no greater power than any ordinary citizen.

Article 64 of the German Constitution stated: "All German troops are obliged unconditionally to obey the Emperor. That obligation is to form part of the military oath of fidelity." According to the Constitution, the Emperor's power over the army was unlimited. A conflict between the Imperial Army and the army of one of the smaller German States was unthinkable. The commanders of the troops and of the fortresses in the non-Prussian States had, according to their oath, to obey the Emperor. The independent armies of the individual States existed rather in theory than in fact. Moreover, while in all civil matters the orders of the Emperor required for their validity the counter-signature of the Chancellor, who thereby assumed responsibility for them, the Emperor's orders regarding the army needed not be countersigned even if they indirectly touched the budget. In military matters the authority of the Emperor was absolute. Interference with the army by the civil government or by Parliament was out of the question.

The German Army was, so to say, the Emperor's body-

guard, and had been given a highly privileged position. Officers were treated as the highest class of Society, not only at Court, but throughout Germany. According to the instructions they received, officers were not allowed to draw their weapons when insulted, but "immediate use of their arms was required should they be assaulted." According to Dilthey's widely read textbook "every officer, non-commissioned officer, and soldier is entitled to use his arms if assaulted. He may use the arms which the Emperor has given him for the protection of his person and of his honour. Therefore arms *must* be used on suitable occasions, and they must be used with an energy commensurate to the dangerousness of the opponent." A civilian who in peace time lifted his hand against a German officer, even if the officer was the aggressor, risked being sabred or shot. Their highly privileged position and the right to use their weapons were apt to make the German officers overbearing, create men of the von Forstner type, and arouse much dissatisfaction among the body of the citizens.

At the time of the excitement caused by the publication of the German Emperor's interview in the *Daily Telegraph* the Socialist members of the Reichstag proposed that the Imperial Chancellor should be made responsible to the Reichstag by an amendment of the Constitution. The Reichstag did not accept that proposal. After the Zabern scandal the *Frankfurter Zeitung* and other influential Liberal and Radical journals proposed that supplies should be withheld when the next budget came up for discussion, unless the outraged citizens received full satisfaction. However, once more it was unlikely that the Reichstag would quarrel with the Imperial Government, which meant with the Emperor himself, for the Emperor was the Government.

Parliament holds the power of the purse. The Reichstag could hope to limit the power of absolutism only by withholding supplies and bringing the Government to a standstill. Democratic Parliaments can use that power with great effect, but the German Reichstag could not do so. In parliamentarily governed countries the refusal of supplies

by the people brings the government to a standstill, and automatically brings about the fall of the governing statesmen. In Germany such a refusal would have had no similar effect. In Great Britain and other democratic monarchies the people rule through their elected representatives, who appoint the officials, and the King carries out the will of the people. In Germany the Emperor ruled through his officials with the assistance of the Reichstag, and if the Reichstag, as the less important part of the Government, should have refused to assist in governing the country, the Government would simply have been carried on without its assistance. According to Laband and other leading writers on German Constitutional Law the co-operation of the Reichstag for providing supplies was only theoretically necessary. If supplies were not voted, the last year's taxes and imposts were automatically renewed, and were collected by the officials, for the Reichstag had no authority to abrogate existing taxation. The *Handbuch für Sozialdemokratische Wähler* stated quite correctly :

" Opinions differ as to the Reichstag's power of withholding supplies. However, so much is certain, that taxes and other sources of the national income, which have once been voted, cannot be discontinued in consequence of the Reichstag's veto."

The question whether Prusso-Germany could be governed if the deputies should have refused to vote supplies was in the last resort rather a question of practical politics than of constitutional theory. In 1863 the Prussian Parliament refused to allow the doubling of the army and refused supplies. Nevertheless the army was doubled. Bismarck did not shrink from a conflict with Parliament, and the necessary taxes were collected against Parliament's will. The German citizens were very law-abiding and they possessed a strong sense of caution. It would have been dangerous for them to quarrel with a ruler who disposed

of 1,350,000 officials and of an army of 800,000 men in time of peace.

Both at the time of the *Daily Telegraph* interview and of the Zabern incident the Reichstag refused to act with vigour against the Government because it recognised its powerlessness. Had it entered upon a conflict with the Government, which would have meant with the Emperor, it would probably have been defeated by the Emperor, who not only absolutely controlled the bureaucracy and the army, but who had power over the national purse as well. In every conflict between the people and the Government the passionate outbursts of the Reichstag were only of momentary duration, because its members were aware that a serious conflict with the Emperor's Government would not have led to the resignation of the Chancellor or to the diminution of the Emperor's prerogative, but that it would have led either to the dissolution of the Reichstag—according to Article 12 of the Constitution the Emperor had the right to dissolve it—or to a *coup d'état* and an alteration of the Constitution, which would have made the Reichstag powerless for the future.

Prussia was a strongly Conservative, one might almost say an anti-democratic, State. Yet Bismarck created in the German Reichstag a Parliament based on the most democratic franchise in the world. He did so, not actuated by a sense of justice and fitness, but compelled by necessity. When, in 1866, Prussia risked her existence in a struggle with Austria, Bismarck offered to the people, who had been vainly clamouring for parliamentary institutions for decades, a democratic Parliament so as to obtain the necessary support of the very influential German Liberals and Democrats for that most dangerous war. However, Bismarck was not in love with the democratic franchise. He did not endeavour to democratise the Prussian Parliament (the Landtag), which was elected under the most anti-democratic franchise in the world, and he quarrelled incessantly with the Reichstag and contemplated its destruction by a *coup d'état*.

The historian Professor Hans Delbrück, a well-informed man, has told us in volumes 147 and 153 of the *Preussische Jahrbücher*, and in his *Regierung und Volkswille*, that Bismarck intended to destroy the power of the Reichstag by a *coup d'état*. In 1884 the Federal Council, which represented the rulers and the Governments of the individual German States, had, at Bismarck's desire, solemnly declared that the German Empire was a free and voluntary federation of the German sovereigns, and that this federation could, in case of need, again be dissolved. When William II. came to the throne Bismarck thought that the time was ripe for action. Having found himself confronted by a hostile majority in the Reichstag, he mapped out the following plan. He wished to dissolve the Reichstag by the Emperor's authority—expecting that the sudden dissolution would lead to Socialist demonstrations in the streets. These would be repressed with the greatest energy. Blood would flow in the principal towns. Riots and revolts would take place. A state approaching civil war would be created. Then the German Emperor was to declare that he could no longer govern Germany under the existing conditions. He would renounce the Imperial Crown. All the German sovereigns would be called to a conference. The suggestion would then be made by them that the German Empire should be reconstituted under the Presidency of the King of Prussia, but the King of Prussia would declare that he would be willing to reassume the Imperial Crown only if the Imperial Constitution was altered, if all those Germans who pursued a policy hostile to the State, and especially all Socialists, were disfranchised, and if the secrecy of the ballot was abolished. The sanguinary riots and the dramatic renunciation of the Crown by the German Emperor would have created an enormous sensation throughout Germany. In their patriotic excitement and zeal the German people would probably have enthusiastically supported the projected reform of the franchise. The crisis would have been over in a few days, and the electors would have discovered when it was too late that they had

assisted in destroying the only democratic institution of Germany.

Herr Delbrück's information as to Bismarck's intentions is amply corroborated by conversations between Prince Bismarck and the Prime Minister of Würtemberg, von Mittnacht, and between the German Emperor and Prince Hohenlohe reported in their Memoirs, by a conversation between Bismarck and Herr Kaemmel, published by the *Grenzboten* in 1907, and by Bismarck's letter to Herr von Helldorf, the leader of the Conservative Party, written in 1887, in which Bismarck stated: "I will devote the last years of my life to correcting my greatest mistake, the universal vote and the secrecy of the poll." Numerous allusions to the necessity of abolishing the secrecy of the vote and of disfranchising the Socialists and other enemies of the Empire may be found in Bismarck's public speeches and in his reported conversations. In his Memoirs we read: "I have hinted in public speeches that the King of Prussia might find himself compelled to lean for support on the foundations afforded to him by the Prussian Constitution, if the Reichstag should carry its hindrance to the monarchical establishment beyond the limits of the endurable." In other places also Bismarck expressed the hope that the German people would have the courage and strength to rid themselves of the Reichstag if it should prove itself a hindrance to Germany's development. According to the *Memoirs of Prince Hohenlohe*, William II. told the Prince that he was unwilling to act upon Bismarck's suggestion and to begin his reign by shooting his subjects and effecting a *coup d'état*. The Emperor's refusal to act his part was apparently the principal reason for his rupture with Prince Bismarck and for Bismarck's subsequent dismissal.

Since Bismarck's dismissal the idea of weakening the Reichstag and of abolishing Germany's democratic franchise by a *coup d'état* has frequently been contemplated by German statesmen and politicians. Especially the small but mighty party of the feudal Conservatives, who hate demo-

cracy, had been anxious that the Government should destroy the Reichstag's power by violence.

In 1906–1907, when there was a great agitation for the increase of the German Navy, and when the Reichstag seemed disinclined to vote the funds required, many leading German politicians and newspapers recommended that the Government should provide the necessary funds by a *coup d'état*, should the Reichstag prove obdurate; that the Government should levy the necessary taxes with or without the Reichstag, and should, in case of need, govern against the will of Parliament or without Parliament. At the time of the General Election of 1907 the possibility of a *coup d'état* was again universally discussed. Many Conservative politicians and many prominent Conservative journals, such as the *Kreuz-Zeitung*, the *Post*, the *Deutsche Tageszeitung*, the *Hamburger Nachrichten*, demanded an Imperial *coup d'état* disguised in the phrase "Reform of the Franchise"; and Prince Bülow seemed to contemplate the possibility of abolishing, or at least modifying, parliamentary government in Germany by force of arms if an anti-expansionist Reichstag should be elected, for in his election manifesto he threatened the anti-expansionist part of the German community in no uncertain tone with "the sword of Buonaparte." On the 19th of February 1910 Prince Hatzfeldt said in the Reichstag:

"The universal and secret vote has a history. The present franchise is indissolubly connected with the German Empire. It has welded together North and South Germany. However, an alteration of the franchise may come in question if the Reichstag should have a majority which threatens the conditions essential to the life of the Empire."

Until 1918 the Conservatives maintained a predominant position in the Reichstag, partly because the Conservative deputies belonged to the ruling caste and because the Conservative Party was considered to be the Government party, partly because they knew how to increase their weight in that assembly by a skilful policy and by a judicious

co-operation with other parties, partly because they were much over-represented. In 1871 Germany was divided into parliamentary districts. Since that time the population in the rural districts, which were dominated by the Conservatives, had remained stationary and had declined in many instances, while the population in the industrial towns had increased enormously. The Government and the Conservative Party had strenuously opposed the redistribution of seats, and the result was that the democratic towns were greatly under-represented, while the Conservative rural districts were greatly over-represented in the Reichstag. In 1907 the electoral district of Teltow near Berlin had 248,000 electors, while that of Lauenburg had only 13,000; the district of Bochum-Gelsenkirchen had 144,000 voters, while Schaumburg-Lippe had only 10,000 voters, etc. The parliamentary strength of the Conservative Party was largely due to the prevalence of rotten boroughs and to the intimidation of the rural voters by the Conservative landowners.

The under-representation of the democratic parties in the Lower House of Prussia was still more startling owing to the three-classes system by which the Prussian masses were disfranchised. By far the largest party in Germany were the Social Democratic Party. Yet, until 1908, not a single Social Democrat had been able to obtain a seat in the "Representative" Assembly of Prussia, while the Conservative contingent always exceeded two hundred. Previous to the War there were in the Prussian Landtag only six Social Democrats, as compared with 212 Conservatives, although there were in Prussia three times as many Social Democratic voters as Conservative voters.

Dissatisfaction with Governmental absolutism in all its manifestations—the Zabern incident was only one out of thousands—had greatly strengthened the democratic parties of Germany, and the overbearing attitude of the German bureaucracy and the sense of injustice done to the people had particularly increased the number of the democratic extremists, the Socialists. Since the foundation of

the Empire the number of Socialist votes polled at the Reichstag elections had increased as follows:

1871	101,927	votes
1881	311,969	,,
1890	1,427,098	,,
1903	3,010,771	,,
1912	4,250,400	,,

In 1912 considerably more than one-third of the men who voted for the Reichstag voted for Socialist candidates. That fact alone shows that there was something radically wrong in German domestic politics, that there was widespread dissatisfaction among the German people. While in 1912 the Socialists polled 4,250,400, the two Conservative parties polled together only 1,493,500 votes. Yet the influence of the fifty-eight Conservative members in the Reichstag was far greater than that of the 110 Socialists. Bismarck skilfully split up the German Liberal Party, setting one faction against the other. Had the democratic parties united, had the German Liberals and Socialists co-operated in the Reichstag against the Conservative parties, they would have had the majority. Although they could not have controlled the German administration, over which the Reichstag had no influence, they could at least have controlled German legislation, and absolutist legislation would have become impossible. Considering the parliamentary position of Germany, I wrote in the *Nineteenth Century and After* in February 1914:

"The Government is so strongly entrenched in its position by the Emperor's control over the services and over the national purse, and by Germany's feudal constitution, that a Democratic Parliament cannot hope to obtain control over the Government by gradual pressure, by orderly parliamentary means. A democratic Reichstag can obtain such control only by a revolution, and a revolution is impossible in Germany as long as the army remains loyal to the Emperor. Only a great defeat might democratise the country."

From year to year the German people was becoming more democratically inclined. From year to year the dissatisfaction of the population with the form of Government was increasing. With nearly every election the strength of the democratic elements in the Reichstag was growing, while that of the Conservative elements was dwindling. From year to year the Conservative elements were more hardly pressed by the advance of Democracy. Every year absolutist legislation became more impossible. German absolutism felt that its influence was waning. Hence its most daring supporters called from year to year more loudly for violent measures with which to stem the democratic tide.

Germany was rich, but Germany was very dissatisfied. Those who were powerful were discontented because they were not wealthy, and those who were wealthy because they were not powerful. The Conservatives were dissatisfied because Liberalism and Socialism were rapidly increasing, and the Liberals and Socialists because they had no power and no influence, although they formed the large majority of the citizens, possessed the bulk of the country's wealth, and paid by far the largest part of the taxes.

The German Conservatives believed in force as a policy. They wished to Prussianise Germany by force, and to establish by force the supremacy of absolutism in Germany, and the supremacy of Germany in Europe and in the world.

The views of many German Conservatives as to Germany's domestic policy were unreservedly given in Frymann's *Wenn Ich der Kaiser Wär'* (Leipzig, 1912). The book cost 3*s*., and had a large circulation. The copy in my possession is marked 12th to 15th thousand. "Frymann" is a pseudonym. As the author intimated that he was grown up at the time of the Franco-German War, he must have been about sixty years old. The views of German Conservatives as to Germany's foreign policy were well stated in the book *Unsere Zukunft* by General von Bernhardi (Berlin, 1912). An English translation of this book has been published

under the title *Britain as Germany's Vassal*, by Messrs. Wm. Dawson & Sons, Ltd., London. Both books were representative of a large literature.

"Frymann," like most German Conservatives, was very dissatisfied with the German franchise. He urged a reform of the election law and advocated the formation of five classes of electors. Votes should not merely be counted but be weighed. Agricultural estate-owners and other large employers of labour should be given a number of votes corresponding to the number of hands employed. On principle the weight of votes should be proportionate to the amount of taxation paid, but men of high culture and of great administrative ability should receive a considerable number of votes. Those paying no taxes should have no vote. The result of the policy advocated would be that the property-owning and educated classes would at all times command a majority in Parliament. Continuing, the author proposed that the Government should alter the franchise by a *coup d'état*. He wrote:

"We must alter the electoral law at any price, and even at the price of a conflict between the Government and people, at the price of a *coup d'état*. That sounds frivolous and brutal. However, it is the same thing as if a father resolves that a serious operation must be performed upon his child in order to save its life. Politically the German nation is ill unto death. It can be saved only by an alteration of the Constitution, and if the Constitution cannot be altered owing to the opposition of Parliament, then it must be altered notwithstanding the will of Parliament, exactly as a father orders the surgeon to operate on a child against the child's will.

"We must consider in this connexion the possible occurrence of foreign difficulties. England's envy, France's thirst for revenge, and Germany's need of expansion create antagonisms which cannot be abolished unless Germany is willing to abandon her position as a Great Power. Therefore all who love the German people, and wish to accelerate the advent of a crisis, will long for the outbreak of a war which will wake all the wholesome and strong forces of the nation.

"If Germany should be victorious there will occur a great

moral revival similar to that resulting from the Franco-German War, and it will have similar political results. A Reichstag with a large patriotic majority will be elected. As that sentiment may be only transient, it should immediately be utilised. Immediately the Constitution should be altered by the abolition of the present franchise.

"If we should be defeated—that, after all, is possible—the present internal disunion would increase. It would become a curse. It could be converted into order only by the absolute will of a Dictator. A Dictatorship, supported by the Army and all patriots, could then effect the necessary revision of the Constitution."

"Frymann" was anxious to combat Socialism by a drastic anti-Socialist Law drafted after the Bismarckian model. He wrote:

"In accordance with its provisions every action should be prohibited which might serve to undermine, or threaten to undermine, the existing order of State and Society. Meetings, societies, journals, and periodicals of subversive tendency should not be tolerated. The masses should be freed from the present leaders of the Party of Subversion. All Socialist members of the Imperial Diet and the various State Parliaments, all leaders and officers of the Socialist Party, all editors, publishers, and journalists connected with Socialist papers and publications, and all Socialist officers of Trades Unions, in short, all who stand in the service of the Socialist propaganda, should be expelled from the German Empire. All Anarchists should receive the same treatment."

The author was, of course, an uncompromising anti-Semite:

"It is absolutely necessary that the frontiers should be completely closed against the immigration of Jews. It is equally indispensable that foreign Jews who have not yet acquired citizen rights should be expelled without delay and without consideration.

"However hard it may seem to the German sense of justice, we must restrict the rights of resident Jews. The good may suffer together with the bad, but necessity must

steel our hearts to pity. We must demand that all Jews in Germany be placed under alien law.

"The question at once arises: Who is a Jew? We must differentiate between race and faith. Jews are a race, and those who have changed their faith are Jews still. We must further re-establish the old Germanic principle that in case of marriages between Jews and Christians the descendants belong to the inferior race. Therefore it should be laid down that all those are Jews who belonged to the Jewish faith on the 18th of January 1871 or who are descendants of those who were Jews at that date, even if only one of the parents was a Jew."

The following measures should be taken:

"Jews should be excluded from all public employments in the gift of the Empire, the single States and the local authorities, whether such employment be in consideration of a remuneration or purely honorary and gratuitous. Jews should not be admitted to the service of the Army and Navy. Jews should neither vote nor be elected. They should be excluded from the profession of the law, and they should not teach in schools. They should not manage theatres. Newspapers which have Jews for contributors should clearly state that fact. The other newspapers, which one may call German newspapers, should neither be owned by Jews nor have Jewish managers, editors, or journalists. Banks should not be conducted by Jews unless they are private banks. Landed property should neither be owned by Jews nor be hypothecated to them. In consideration for the protection which Jews enjoy as aliens they should have to pay double taxes."

The millions of Poles, Frenchmen, and Danes annexed by Germany should, according to "Frymann," be Germanised by force:

"We must demand that the members elected by the Polish nation into the German Parliament should have only the right to speak, but not to vote, and that they could demand to be heard only on questions which touch the Poles or the district inhabited by them. If it should be found that this provision is evaded by their co-

operating with one of the Parliamentary parties, the right to vote and the right to be elected should be definitely taken away from the Poles. Polish newspapers and periodicals should under all circumstances give a German translation of the Polish text, and the only language permissible at public meetings of Poles should be German. . . .

". . . We have acquired Alsace-Lorraine because the territory is militarily necessary to us. The inhabitants were thrown in. We have given them the option either to become German subjects or to emigrate into France after the acquisition of their country. Now we must give them a second option, but a more thorough one. Every inhabitant of Alsace-Lorraine who is of age should publicly declare that he is an unconditional supporter of the German Empire and he should enter into the obligation not to use the French language in public or within his own house, nor should he obtain newspapers, periodicals, or books from France. Those who refuse to enter into this obligation should have to leave the country without delay. Those who contravene the foregoing should be expelled. All private schools should be closed, and French should be taught only as a foreign language, and no more time should be devoted to it than is devoted to French in the other parts of Germany. Newspapers printed in French should be compelled to issue at the same time a German translation of the French text. The Constitution of Alsace-Lorraine should be abolished and its administration be placed under a Minister with dictatorial powers. The Danes in Schleswig-Holstein should receive the same treatment."

While " Frymann " recommended establishing the supremacy of absolutism in Germany by force, General von Bernhardi proposed in *Unsere Zukunft* to establish by force the supremacy of Germany in Europe and throughout the world. He recognised that Germany's expansion was restrained by the balance of power in Europe, that Germany could not expand because the forces of the Triple Alliance and the Triple Entente were about equally strong :

" We can render secure our position on the Continent of Europe only if we succeed in bursting the Triple Entente and forcing France, which is never likely to co-operate with

Germany, to accept that position of inferiority which is her due."

General von Bernhardi hated Great Britain with a passionate hatred, partly because her adhesion to the Franco-Russian Alliance had re-established the balance of power in Europe, partly because he envied Great Britain her enormous possessions, partly because he despised her for not possessing a national army. According to him "armed strength in its moral, intellectual, and physical aspects is the truest measure of civilisation." Moreover, he believed that Great Britain wished to destroy Germany:

"Only England has an interest in bringing about a general European war which would necessarily involve Germany. In the first place England finds it from day to day more difficult to man her rapidly increasing fleet. She seems to be approaching the limits of her naval capacity. In the second place the Baltic and North Sea Canal will soon be finished, and its completion will yield considerable military advantages to Germany. Lastly, the German Navy grows from year to year, so that the conclusion lies near that the comparative strength of the two countries will gradually be altered to England's disadvantage. In the Mediterranean the Austrian and the Italian navies are about to be strengthened. All these circumstances make it clearly desirable for England to bring about a war as soon as possible and to obtain the assistance of France and Russia for such an undertaking. . . .

"German competition, German enterprise, and German industry hamper Englishmen throughout the world, and often prove superior. It is England's interest to destroy Germany's competition, especially as the German nation has the greatest ability among the nations of Europe and the greatest hope of expansion, for it is a maritime State of the first rank. It threatens to obtain a predominant position on the Continent, to disturb the balance of power in Europe which is so profitable to England, and to develop a navy which may become dangerous to Great Britain. Great Britain has allied herself with Russia and France in order to keep Germany down, to prevent her political development and to destroy her fleet. We cannot be deceived on that point. The German Fleet must be de-

stroyed. That is the Alpha and the Omega of British policy. It is the necessary and logical consequence of the Triple Entente."

General von Bernhardi had not a very high opinion of the British Fleet :

"The British Fleet is an extremely powerful opponent. However, it suffers from a national weakness. It is already difficult to secure a sufficient supply of men, and especially of the higher ratings. Therefore, unless universal compulsory service be introduced, a distinct limit is put to the increase of the British Fleet. Besides, the German artillery is at least as good as the English ; perhaps it is better. The same applies to the torpedo boats. Lastly, the newest English ships correspond in no way to expectations."

The General thought that a war with Great Britain was inevitable because Great Britain would never allow Germany to acquire great colonial possessions. He wrote :

"We must enlarge Germany's colonial possessions and acquire adequate territories suitable for the settlement of white men. However, we cannot disguise from ourselves the fact that England will undoubtedly oppose Germany's acquisition of valuable Colonies, of coaling stations and naval bases. Colonies situated in the Temperate Zone can scarcely be acquired without a war with other States.

"Exactly as Bismarck clearly recognised in his time, that a healthy development of Prussia and Germany would be possible only when the differences between Austria and Prussia had finally been settled, so every German who looks at the matter without prejudice is convinced that Germany's further development as a world-Power is possible only when the existing Anglo-German competition has come to an end. Exactly as a cordial alliance was possible between Germany and Austria only after the Austro-German War of 1866, so we shall obtain an understanding with England, which from many points of view is desirable, only after an Anglo-German war."

General von Bernhardi recommended that Germany should secure the co-operation of the United States against

Great Britain and that Germany should weaken Great Britain's power of resistance by fomenting risings throughout the British Empire :

"There is a distinct conflict of interests between the United States and England, firstly, because the United States are England's most dangerous competitor in the trade of the world and especially with Eastern Asia ; secondly, because the United States are determined not in any case to submit to England's naval predominance. The Dominion of Canada forms another point of friction between the two States, whilst there are no material differences between the United States and Germany. It is true that peaceful division of the world between England and the United States is conceivable. However, no indications can at present be found of such an understanding. As matters are at present, the enormous increase in England's power which would flow from the defeat of Germany would be opposed to the interests of the United States. It follows that the co-operation of the United States and of Germany would be in the interests of both countries.

"It is to be borne in mind that in the English Colonies, in India, South Africa, and Egypt, there is explosive material in large quantities, so that it seems by no means unthinkable that revolts and national risings would occur in the event that England should be engaged in an unfortunate or dangerous war. These are circumstances with which we have to count, and it is our duty to make the best use of them. . . . England would probably feel inclined to conclude peace if, in the course of a European war in which she was engaged, risings and revolts took place in her Colonies which threatened her pre-eminent position. It may be considered as a matter which does not admit of dispute that in India, in Egypt, and in South Africa there is sufficient inflammable material."

General von Bernhardi thought that Great Britain and Germany could come to an understanding only if Great Britain was willing to abandon her allies on the Continent and allow Germany to deal with them as she pleased. He thought that Great Britain and Germany could conclude an alliance only if Great Britain agreed not to oppose in any way Germany's oversea expansion, and if she agreed to

redistribute her fleet so as to allow Germany to rule the North Sea. The General wrote :

"There are two possibilities of arriving at an understanding with England. An agreement with her can be either lasting or transient. If a lasting agreement is desired, the important interests of Germany must be safeguarded. Nothing must remain that could impede their necessary development. This demand makes it necessary for England to abandon its claim to a predominant position in the world. It involves England's recognition that England and Germany have equal rights. England would have to give an absolutely free hand to Germany in Europe, and would have to agree beforehand to any increase of power of Germany on the Continent which might arise out of a Central-European federation of States or out of a Franco-German war. England would have to abandon its diplomatic opposition to Germany's colonial policy as long as Germany does not strive to acquire Colonies at England's cost. England would have to agree not to oppose Austria's expansion in the Balkan Peninsula, nor to oppose Germany's economic policy in Asia Minor, nor the development of the German Navy and the acquisition of coaling stations.

"Whether such an understanding would take the form of an alliance is an open question. In reality it would for most purposes be equal to an Anglo-German alliance, and on the basis of such an understanding England and Germany could peacefully settle their economic interests. Such an agreement of the two great Germanic States would create an irresistible political force which would promote the development of both nations in every way. It would create a factor for civilisation which would more than any other promote human progress. Thus a practical way would be found to banish war and the danger of war for ever, or at least to restrict its danger. Peace in Europe would be secured by England's approaching the Triple Alliance. At the same time a powerful counterpoise would be created to the growing influence of the United States. The pressure of East European Slavism would be diminished and a powerful wall would be raised against the millions of yellow men in the Far East.

"It would be seen that such an understanding between England and Germany would have the most far-reaching

advantages not only to the two countries but to all mankind. However, it is clear that England would have to alter her entire policy. The basis of all negotiations should be the demand that England would abandon the Triple Entente and redistribute her fleet. After all, it is clear to every thinking man that England and Germany can never enter into friendly and cordial relations as long as Great Britain is allied with Germany's enemies. Besides, Germany could never have any confidence as to the honesty of England's peaceful intentions as long as the entire British Navy is concentrated in the North Sea and kept ready for an attack upon Germany."

General von Bernhardi evidently strove to secure for Germany not only supremacy in Europe but supremacy throughout the world. He wished to conclude an Anglo-German alliance, but Germany was to be the predominant partner. Great Britain was to help Germany to become a world-Power, but in order to be on good terms with Germany she was to disarm. She was to redistribute her fleet and apparently leave the protection of her shores to Germany. According to General von Bernhardi a durable understanding between the two Powers could be concluded only if Great Britain would consent to become Germany's vassal.

Concluding my article in the *Nineteenth Century and After* in February 1914 upon which this chapter is based I stated :

"The Germans are frequently described as a peaceful nation. They would more correctly be described as a well-drilled and well-disciplined nation. They are firmly ruled by a small class through an all-powerful bureaucracy, army, and police. Absolute obedience to official orders is the first duty of the citizen and the first law of the State. The well-drilled Germans are a law-abiding people and their obedience is absolute. Orderly grumbling, if done in moderation, is permitted. Hence, if the people are dissatisfied with their rulers or disapprove of their policy, they may protest but they will obey. That was seen in 1866. Then the Prussians passionately protested against the "Bruderkrieg," the fratricidal war, against Austria. Yet they obeyed and fought. The Government has crushed the spirit of the

people. This lack of spirit constitutes Germany's strength but also her weakness. German enthusiasts have always greatly admired democratic government, but, unlike Frenchmen, Englishmen, Americans, Italians, Swiss, and Dutch, they have never seriously fought for it. They were at best half-hearted supporters of revolution. The nation rose only, as in 1813 against Napoleon, when ordered by the Government. In Germany the Government does not carry out the will of the people, but the people execute the will of the Government, and those who try to prove that Germany is peaceful because the German merchants, clergymen, and working men do not wish for war, only show that they are unacquainted with Germany's political character and organisation and with the elementary facts of German history. *The majority of Germans are undoubtedly peaceful, but that peaceful majority will go to war with alacrity as soon as the ruling minority gives the signal.* There is a great difference between democratic and autocratic Germany, a difference which is not sufficiently appreciated in other countries. Democratic Germany talks much, but does not act; autocratic Germany acts, but does not talk. Democratic Germany has filled the newspapers with loud complaints about the Zabern incident; autocratic Germany has not talked at Zabern, but has acted, and the incident has closed with the victory of autocratic Germany. Herein lies the lesson of Zabern."

Only too soon my forecast was to come true.

CHAPTER XXIV

HOW THE ARMY HAS RUINED GERMANY[1]

On the 28th of February 1870, four months before the outbreak of the Franco-German War, Colonel Stoffel, the French Military Attaché in Berlin, sent to his Government a report in which he stated : "La Prusse n'est pas un pays qui a une armée ; c'est une armée qui possède un pays." Careful investigation will show that not the German Emperor, the Crown Prince, the Junkers, or the professors, but the German Army was chiefly responsible for the great tragedy of the War ; that the army was largely responsible for the mismanagement of Germany's foreign policy before the outbreak ; that the army had forced Great Britain and Italy into the ranks of Germany's enemies ; that the army was responsible for the unexampled treachery and mendacity of Germany's diplomacy ; that the army was responsible for the hideous barbarities perpetrated by Germany everywhere ; that the army drove the United States into open hostility with Germany. The army which had made modern Germany has been responsible for Germany's downfall not only by its illegitimate activities in the political sphere, but even by its professional failings, which will be described in these pages. Hence the army, not only its head, the Emperor, should be held responsible by the world, and especially by the German people themselves. In the course of these pages I shall show that the control of the German Army had fallen into the hands of military intriguers who completely mismanaged the War.

I shall show in these pages that, had Germany followed

[1] From the *Nineteenth Century and After*, April 1916.

the wise and far-seeing plan of campaign laid down by Moltke, with Bismarck's co-operation, for the eventuality of a war with France and Russia, Great Britain and Italy might have remained neutral and Germany might easily have defeated France and Russia and have acquired the domination of the Continent of Europe in a few months, and possibly in a few weeks, at a comparatively trifling cost in human lives and treasure. I shall show, furthermore, that she failed in this because she allowed the direction of her foreign policy and of the State to be grasped by reckless military adventurers who mismanaged both her diplomatic and her military campaigns.

Bismarck and Moltke had accustomed Germany to short and decisive wars, prepared by faultless diplomacy and carried out by matchless strategy. The war of 1864 against Denmark lasted only a few days. The war of Prussia against Austria, the Seven Weeks' War, began on the 26th of June 1866 with the fighting at Hühnerwasser. On the 3rd of July the battle of Königgrätz was won. The war was decided by seven days' fighting. On the 19th of July 1870 France declared war on Prussia. On the 2nd of August the first encounter took place at Saarbrücken. By the 2nd of September Napoleon III. and his entire army had been made prisoners at Sedan, and the remaining two French armies had been severely defeated and had withdrawn into Metz, which was closely invested by German troops. The issue of the war had been decided in exactly a month's fighting. If General Steinmetz had obeyed Moltke's orders, the two French armies would not have succeeded in reaching Metz, but would have found their Sedan in front of that fortress. All Germany looked, and not without reason, for another lightning campaign at the outbreak of the War.

Although it is universally believed that warfare by a few strokes of lightning-like rapidity was initiated by Moltke, that it is a Prussian invention, this is a mistake. It was first practised by Napoleon I. The most rapid and the most complete defeat known to military history was his defeat of Prussia in the Jena campaign of 1806. Modern

German strategy was based not on that of Frederick the Great but on that of Napoleon I. As Prussia had, in 1806, been completely defeated in a great and decisive battle three days after the beginning of hostilities, surprise attack and sudden defeat by a great and decisive battle became the watchword of German strategists. Karl von Clausewitz, the greatest German writer on strategy and a pupil of the celebrated Scharnhorst, who had taken part in the terrible Jena campaign as aide-de-camp to Prince August of Prussia, wrote in his classical treatise *On War*:

"From the very conception of war it is obvious that the following are the principal maxims regarding the use of battles:

"(1) The destruction of the enemy's military force is the most important object of war.

"(2) This destruction can best be effected by means of a battle.

"(3) Only great and general battles can have a decisive effect upon warfare.

"The battle is the bloodiest way of solving the problem of war. Its principal effect consists not in killing the enemy's soldiers, but in destroying his courage. A true conception of war and general experience lead us to look only to a great battle for the decision of a war. Instances of a great battle deciding the whole campaign have been frequent in modern times. A deliberately planned great battle must therefore be regarded as the principal aim and object of a campaign. A General must strive to throw his whole weight into the scales in the first battle. He must endeavour to win everything by a single but most powerful stroke. Bonaparte hardly ever entered upon a war without endeavouring to defeat the enemy and to conquer his country in a first and decisive encounter."

The wars of 1866 and 1870, like Napoleon's model campaign of 1806, were won by superior preparedness and superior numbers, by a surprise attack made with the greatest energy upon an unready and hesitating enemy. In accordance with Clausewitz's precept, they were rather won by killing the enemy's courage than by killing his

soldiers. One might almost say that these wars were won by bluff, for they were won at an incredibly small cost in lives. According to the German official account the two great wars by which modern Germany was created resulted in the following losses :

PRUSSIAN LOSSES IN THE WAR OF 1866

4,450	killed in battle
6,427	died of disease
16,177	wounded
Total . . 27,054	

The casualties of the Franco-German War of 1870–71 are stated in greater detail in the official history. They were as follows :

GERMAN LOSSES IN THE WAR OF 1870–71

	Officers.	Men.	Horses.
Killed or died of wounds .	1,871	26,397	7,325
Wounded . . .	4,184	84,304	5,547
Missing	102	12,752	1,723
Total . . .	6,157	123,453	14,595

Prussia defeated Austria in 1866 and acquired vast territories and the leadership of Germany at the cost of merely 10,877 human lives, and Germany defeated France in 1870–71 and acquired Alsace-Lorraine with more than 2,000,000 inhabitants at the cost of only 28,268 human lives. Compared with the present war, which has inflicted at least 8,000,000 casualties upon Germany, they were almost bloodless. Besides they were extremely profitable. They added vast territories and many millions of industrious citizens to the State. In addition, like Napoleon's campaign of 1806, they brought in vast sums of money owing to the heavy contributions and the colossal monetary indemnities exacted.

Germany owed her victory over France in 1870–71 chiefly to her overwhelming superiority in men and guns. According to the German official history the French and German

forces compared at the beginning of August 1870, when hostilities were opened, as follows :

	German Army.	French Army.
Battalions of Infantry . .	474	332
Squadrons of Cavalry . .	382	222
Guns	1,584	780

Napoleon III. wrote in his *Œuvres Posthumes* :

" Instead of having in line, as might have been expected, 385,000 men to oppose the 430,000 of Northern Germany combined with the Southern States, the army, when the Emperor arrived at Metz on the 25th of July, amounted only to 220,000, and, moreover, not only were the effectives not up to their full complement, but much indispensable war material was wanting."

On paper the German and French forces stood almost in the proportion of two to one. If superior readiness, better leading, and the moral factor be taken into account, they stood approximately in the relation of three to one. France had no chance against Germany. According to the official *Kriegsgeschichtliche Einzelschriften* of 1889 the French and German forces engaged in some of the most telling battles were as follows :

	German Strength.	French Strength.
At Weissenburg .	48,000 infantry	4,650 infantry
	2,950 cavalry	650 cavalry
	144 guns	18 guns
At Wörth . .	89,000 infantry	42,800 infantry
	7,750 cavalry	5,750 cavalry
	342 guns	167 guns
At Spichern . .	30,100 infantry	24,400 infantry
	4,500 cavalry	3,200 cavalry
	108 guns	90 guns
At Gravelotte .	166,400 infantry	99,500 infantry
	21,200 cavalry	13,300 cavalry
	732 guns	520 guns
At Beaumont .	116,200 infantry	90,700 infantry
	16,100 cavalry	10,000 cavalry
	545 guns	468 guns
At Sedan . .	133,500 infantry	90,000 infantry and cavalry
	21,350 cavalry	
	701 guns	408 guns

It will be noticed that Germany, especially in the opening battles of the war, had an absolutely overwhelming superiority in infantry, cavalry, and guns.

Tactics largely depend upon strategy. As Germany had made it a strategical principle to attack by surprise and in overwhelming numbers, she made it a rule to fight with sledge-hammer blows. In view of her enormous superiority in men and guns, she could afford to employ in battle the most sanguinary form of attack against the French, who usually stood on the defensive. The German generals sacrificed their men lavishly though not recklessly. That becomes clear from the casualty statistics given in this chapter.

Diplomacy and strategy, to be successful, must work hand in hand. After the Franco-German War, Moltke and Bismarck began to contemplate the contingency of a war with France and Russia combined and to prepare for it. Henceforth the possibility of a war on two fronts became the principal care and pre-occupation of these two men. That pre-occupation dictated Bismarck's foreign policy. To weaken Germany's possible antagonists, the Chancellor strove to keep France occupied with Colonial adventures in Africa and Asia, and he encouraged Russia to advance towards Constantinople and India. By skilful diplomacy he created friction between Russia and Great Britain, between France and Great Britain, between Italy and France, and he brought about the conclusion of the Triple Alliance which, by the adhesion of Turkey and Roumania, became a Quintuple Alliance in disguise. Bismarck thought Germany to be large and strong enough and he wished for peace. That may be seen from his posthumous memoirs and from his numerous speeches, letters, newspaper articles, and conversations. The Triple Alliance was a purely defensive, a conservative, instrument. Prince Bülow wrote in his book *Imperial Germany*, confirming the views expressed by Bismarck in his Memoirs :

" One may characterise the Triple Alliance as an alliance with emphatically conservative tendencies. . . . The three

Central-European States are bound to each other by the firm resolve to maintain the existing balance of power in Europe, and, should a forcible change of that balance be attempted, to prevent it, if need be, by force. The united strength of Central Europe stands in the path of any revolutionary European policy which might elect to follow the courses pursued by Louis XIV. or Napoleon I. . . . The founders of the Triple Alliance intentionally created a guarantee of peace.

As the Triple Alliance was a purely defensive and conservative arrangement devised to restrain rulers of the type of Louis XIV. and Napoleon I., it was obvious that a policy of aggression, such as that pursued by Germany, would very likely bring about its dissolution.

Bismarck attached the greatest value to Great Britain's good-will and support in case of a great war, especially as Italy was likely to follow England's lead. Soon after Bismarck's dismissal, William II., by estranging Russia and antagonising England, reversed Bismarck's policy and thus destroyed the political system which the great Chancellor had created by years of labour, a system which assured Germany's peace and her supremacy in Europe. I have shown in my book *The Foundations of Germany* by means of numerous newspaper articles emanating from the Chancellor, which had not previously been published in the English language, that Bismarck not only opposed the Emperor's venturesome policy with all his strength, but that he foretold in the clearest and most emphatic language that the Emperor's incessant and provocative meddling in foreign politics would lead to a great European war; that the war would be brought about by Austria's Balkan policy in which Germany had no interest; that Germany thus would be compelled to follow Austria's lead; that the unnecessary estrangement from England was bound to bring about Italy's desertion in the hour of trial; that Germany's interference in the Far East and her shameful treatment of Japan, whom she had ousted from Port Arthur, might arouse the hostility of that country; that the Emperor's

neurotic and exasperating activity and his bluster might bring about the creation of a world-wide combination of Powers hostile to Germany, and that it might lead to the ruin of his country. I shall now show by most interesting documents which also have not yet been published in England that, incited by military intriguers, William II. destroyed Moltke's work as recklessly as he destroyed that of Prince Bismarck.

In studying the possibility of a war on two fronts, Moltke attached the greatest value to the integrity of Switzerland, Luxemburg, and Belgium, for a twofold reason. These neutral States greatly shortened the frontier which Germany had to defend towards France. Besides they protected, like two huge fortresses, the Northern and Southern flanks of the German Army in the West. The Rhine, the Black Forest, and the Vosges provided a most powerful natural bulwark in the West of Germany. On Moltke's advice the vast natural strength of this position had been very greatly increased by extensive and most powerful fortifications. In Moltke's opinion the Western frontier of Germany was, owing to these enormously strong natural and artificial obstacles, the most formidable defensive position in the world.

The vast strength of the Western frontier of Germany and the advantage of its being protected on both flanks by neutral States and the special position of Belgium, the violation of which was likely to induce Great Britain to enter the War in defence of that country, were recognised in the leading military circles in Germany. Bernhardi gave expression to the highest military opinion in writing in his book *Unsere Zukunft*, which came out shortly before the outbreak of the War :

" Germany's Western frontier is exceedingly favourable for defence. Here a weak army can hold its own during a long time and inflict heavy losses upon the enemy. If the aggressor should endeavour to avoid the powerful Rhine front by marching through Belgium or through Switzerland,

he would raise further enemies against himself, and thus strengthen Germany."

Taking advantage of the tremendous strength of her Western frontier Moltke had prepared the following plan of campaign in case of a war with France and Russia combined. Germany was, in the beginning of such a war, to limit herself to the defensive on her almost impregnable Western frontier with by far the smaller part of her army, while the bulk of her forces was to be employed in the East. According to Moltke's plan, Germany was to defeat and destroy with the bulk of her forces, and with the help of her allies, the Russian Army, and after Russia's collapse she was to attack France with her whole strength.

That plan of campaign was safe and sound, and it had inestimable advantages for Germany. By respecting the neutrality of Belgium and Luxemburg she was likely to secure to herself the good-will, or at least the neutrality, of Great Britain. Besides, if England stood aside, Italy was likely either to co-operate against France, or at least to observe a benevolent neutrality, even if Germany should be the aggressor. If France, on the other hand, desiring to come to Russia's aid and being unable to break through Germany's immensely strong position in Alsace-Lorraine, should endeavour to get round the German flank, if she should try to invade Germany by marching through Belgium and Luxemburg, she would arouse the hostility of Great Britain. The only weak spot in Western Germany was the extreme south of Alsace. There a small and comparatively unimportant district was dominated by the fortress of Belfort. That was the only disadvantage of Moltke's scheme, and it was after all only a negligible one. The invasion of Southern Alsace could hardly be avoided under any plan of campaign, and indeed this district was invaded by the French at the beginning of this War and remained occupied by them throughout its course.

After Bismarck's dismissal in 1890 Germany's foreign policy was reversed, as I have shown in another chapter

and in my book *The Foundations of Germany*, and her military policy was reversed as well. Moltke resigned immediately after the Emperor's accession and died in 1891. His successors apparently intended to change the plan of campaign which that master of sane strategy had evolved with Bismarck's co-operation. The security of the small southern corner of Alsace against an attack from Belfort was made a welcome pretext for demanding a change of plans by those military men who, in case of a great war, wished to strike immediately at France with Germany's full force and desired to begin a war on two fronts by invading France by the easiest route, by way of Belgium. The German Press has often served as a mouthpiece not only to the Government, but also to powerful political and military intriguers. The danger which threatened Western Germany from Belfort was pointed out to the people in newspaper articles calculated to impress them with the seriousness of the position, which was greatly exaggerated. Bismarck was a great patriot, and through his friends he was kept well informed on current affairs after his dismissal. Desiring to prevent irremediable mischief, he did not hesitate to reveal Moltke's plan of campaign in a number of articles in the *Hamburger Nachrichten*, in order to be able to defend it. Ostensibly replying to those who had reproached him in the Press for not having acquired Belfort in 1870, as he might have done, Bismarck wrote on the 9th of January 1893 in that journal:

Field-Marshal Count von Moltke was so convinced of the strength of Germany's position in the West with the fortresses of Strassburg, Metz, Mainz, and Coblenz that he thought that, in case of a war on two fronts, it would be possible for Germany to fight on the Western frontier on the defensive until the war with Russia was brought to an end. Moltke was of opinion that, in view of the excellence of the railway system and the strength of the German fortifications in the West, the French Army would be unable to break through into Germany. Therefore he believed that Germany would be able to restrict herself to the

defensive in the West, and that she should embark upon an attack upon France only after the Russian war had been brought to an end."

A week later, on the 16th of January, he returned to the charge and stated in the *Hamburger Nachrichten*:

"It is a fact which cannot be doubted that Count von Moltke was of opinion that Germany, if engaged in a war with France and Russia, could, in the possession of Metz, Strassburg, Mainz, Cologne, and Coblenz, fight on the defensive for an unlimited time in the West, employing the bulk of her army in the East. . . . It might be considered an impertinence to reinforce the views of the great German strategist with a non-military opinion. Still, it should be added that in case of defensive warfare towards France, the left shore of the Rhine, where it flows near the French frontier, would be adequately protected. Only a part of Alsace would lack the protection of the German troops. Moreover, the position of the German Army, acting on the defensive, would be protected by the neutral territory of Belgium and Luxemburg on the one flank and by that of Switzerland on the other flank. Besides, if the French, issuing from Belfort, should invade Alsace, they might easily be thrown across the frontier into Switzerland."

On the 1st of February the great Chancellor wrote in the *Hamburger Nachrichten*:

It cannot be doubted that Moltke did not attribute an exaggerated importance to Belfort. It can as little be doubted that the Field-Marshal, when officially discussing with the Imperial Chancellor the possibility of a simultaneous war with France and Russia, declared in the clearest, in the most categorical, and in the most detailed manner that in case of such an undesirable event Germany should limit herself to the defensive in the West until the decisive battles had been fought and won in the East. Furthermore, when doubt was expressed whether such proceeding was advisable, he stated that the Rhine, with its fortresses, constituted the strongest defensive position possessed by any of the Great Powers.

It will be noticed that in her diplomatic and in her military campaign Germany acted in flagrant opposition to the plan

which Moltke, with Bismarck's co-operation and approval, had laid down. Its abandonment by the German General Staff, and the consenof th e German Emperor and Foreign Office to the violation of Belgium's neutrality at the bidding of military adventures, has proved the cause of Germany's ruin.

If the German General Staff had intended to carry through the wise and far-seeing plan of campaign devised by Moltke and Bismarck, Germany might, at the beginning of the Russo-Austrian controversy regarding Serbia, have declared, as indeed she did, that it was a purely Austro-Serbian quarrel. She might, in addition, have stated that, in case of a 'totally unjustifiable' Russian attack upon Austria, she would of course have to act in accordance with her defensive treaty and come to Austria's aid; that Austria was too weak to resist gigantic Russia single-handed; that Germany's assistance alone could save Austria from destruction. Lastly, the German diplomats might have expressed the hope that France would keep neutral in the quarrel in which France had no concern, that Germany would in no case attack France, but that she would of course defend herself with the strength of despair should France wantonly invade innocent and inoffensive Germany. In addition, the German statesmen might have appealed to England and have asked her to use her influence with France for the sake of peace. Had this been done, British public opinion, though perhaps not condemning France for coming to Russia's aid and attacking Germany, would scarcely have approved of Great Britain's intervention on France's behalf. It seems practically certain that the pacificist section of the Cabinet would have prevailed, that Great Britain would have observed an attitude of neutrality. Meanwhile, the two Central Powers, aided by Turkey and perhaps by Roumania as well, might have rapidly defeated Russia while the French were battering desperately but in vain against the powerful frontier position of Alsace-Lorraine. After Russia's defeat the Germans and Austrians, who possibly would have been reinforced, and would scarcely

have been opposed, by the Italians, would have defeated France. A comparatively short campaign would have brought about the downfall of France and Russia, and would have secured to Germany the undisputed predominance on the Continent and perhaps the possession of the French Colonies as well. A Greater Germany would have been organised, and in ten or twenty years she would probably have become so wealthy and powerful as to be able to challenge successfully Great Britain and the United States for the mastery of the sea and of the world. Thus Germany might have surprised the world with a *fait accompli* as did Bismarck and Moltke half a century before. The British people would have awakened to their deadly danger only when it was too late.

Why was the sane and safe diplomatic and strategical plan of campaign devised by Bismarck and Moltke abandoned? Why did the German Army invade Belgium, although that step was likely to arouse Great Britain's hostility and bring about Italy's secession? It is easy to surmise the reason. The German Emperor's chief characteristic was his vanity, and the military intriguers surrounding him played successfully on his weakness. They probably promised him the most dazzling military triumph known to history, a victory compared with which those won by Napoleon in 1806 and by Moltke in 1866 and 1870 would pale into insignificance.

Before the fatal invasion of Belgium the best-informed Germans had warned France not to come to Russia's aid should the Austro-Serbian quarrel lead to war between Russia on the one side and Germany and Austria-Hungary on the other. They had publicly and solemnly warned her that if she kept faith with her ally, the German troops would enter Paris within a month. They had foretold, in the same masterful tone which Napoleon employed towards Frederick William III. in 1806, that if France stirred she would be crushed in a few weeks. The German supreme command intended to destroy the power of France by a lightning campaign similar to that of 1806, and was firmly

convinced that success was certain. There was indeed good reason for this belief. France had assembled the bulk of her troops on her Eastern frontier, facing Alsace-Lorraine, anticipating that Germany would attack from the direction of Metz and Strasbourg. Germany, on the other hand, had sent to Alsace-Lorraine only sufficient troops to defend that powerful position against a French attack. The few German army corps which had been assembled there were to act on the defensive. They would occupy and detain the French main army. Meanwhile the principal body of the German troops was to rush through Belgium, to overthrow the few French army corps on the Franco-Belgian border, and to march upon Paris. Paris would be reached in about three weeks. Germany's colossal mortars, the existence of which was not suspected, would destroy the forts in a few hours. Paris would fall. Having seized the capital, the Germans would immediately wheel round and attack the French main army in the flank and rear, driving it against the walls of Strasbourg and Metz and across the Swiss frontier. It is an interesting link in the chain of evidence that the German Government, after invading Belgium and declaring that that country's resistance to the German invasion was a crime, admonished Switzerland by telegraph "to maintain and defend by all means in its power the neutrality and inviolability of its territory . . . trusting that the Confederation, owing to the unshakable will of the entire Swiss nation, will succeed in repelling any violation of its neutrality." In other words, Germany admonished the Swiss to disarm and intern the French army corps which, attacked in the rear, might be forced to cross into Switzerland. Had the German plan not miscarried, all France might indeed have been conquered in a month. Paris, the greatest fortress in the world, was believed by all Frenchmen to be impregnable. Had Germany, within about a month, taken Paris and destroyed and captured practically the whole of the mobilised French armies, the bewildered French, suddenly deprived of both capital and army, might indeed have given way to

despair and have abandoned all hope and all thought of resistance and have asked for peace, especially if their capital had been threatened with the fate of Louvain, as was apparently intended. Germany had undoubtedly invaded Belgium hoping, in the manner described, to create for the whole of the French armies a gigantic Sedan, to catch them as in a net, and thus to achieve a victory compared with which that won in 1870–71 would appear trifling.

The daring plan of the German General Staff to destroy or capture the whole of the French armies and to enter Paris within a month miscarried owing to Belgium's unexpected resistance. Liége blocked Germany's way for more than a week. As the German troops entering Belgium had no heavy siege artillery with them, orders were given to take the town and forts by assault at any cost. The German troops were mown down by the thousand. According to Baron de Beyens 36,000 German soldiers were killed in this desperate but unsuccessful effort. If that figure is correct, and there is no reason to doubt its approximate correctness, the Germans lost before Liége alone a considerably larger number of men than they lost during the whole war of 1870–71, in which, as shown on another page, only 28,268 men were killed in battle and died of wounds.

Who made the plan of invading France by way of Belgium? Who was responsible for that insane step which brought Germany no advantage, but which secured to her the hostility of Great Britain and Italy and the reprobation of the civilised world? The plan was probably adopted about the time when Bismarck made his disclosures in the *Hamburger Nachrichten.* His articles attracted at the time little attention because their meaning was understood only by the initiated few. However, the responsibility for carrying out the plan lay of course not with Count Waldersee, or any other General who first brought it forward, but with von Moltke junior, the nephew of the great Moltke, who was the Chief of the German General Staff at the outbreak of the Great War; with Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg, the Imperial Chancellor, who, however, only approved of it

more or less unwillingly, and especially with the Supreme Commander, the German Emperor, who, it is true, acted upon the advice of Moltke junior. This explains his resignation, soon after the beginning of the War, "for reasons of health."

The *Nineteenth Century* of June 1912 contained an article of mine, "The Failure of Post-Bismarckian Germany," in which I dwelt on the defects of the German Army, stating: "German generals complain that promotions are made less by merit and more by favour than in former times. . . . William II. has made the navy his hobby and attends to the army perfunctorily, and many say it is little better managed than his Foreign Office." In making this statement I thought particularly of von Moltke junior, the Chief of the General Staff.

The invasion of Belgium did not lead to the destruction and capture of all the French armies, the seizure of Paris and the surrender of all France, but merely to Great Britain's intervention. The violation of Belgium brought Germany no gain, but enormous loss. The greatest military triumph the world has seen did not materialise. The German Army leaders made the most fearful miscalculation and the most fearful blunder.

Of all her opponents Germany hated little Belgium probably most. By resisting the onslaught of her mighty opponent, Belgium made Germany's intended surprise attack upon France a failure. The German Army leaders, having grossly, and fatally, mismanaged the German campaign by disregarding the wise plan for the conduct of a war on two fronts laid down by the elder Moltke in collaboration with Bismark, damaged Germany still further by ill-treating the unhappy Belgians, by venting upon them their spirit of baffled rage, by deliberately practising upon them every kind of brutality, inhumanity, indignity, and extortion. The German Army thus destroyed not only Germany's hope of victory, but Germany's good name as well. The army, not the Emperor, was chiefly responsible for the atrocities perpetrated first in Belgium and then

elsewhere. The Emperor was essentially a vain and weak man, and, like Napoleon III., whom he resembled in many respects, the tool of the army.

In 1592, more than three centuries ago, the great Lord Bacon wrote in his *Certain Observations upon a Libel* :

"Wars are no massacres and confusions ; but they are the highest trials of right ; when princes and States, that acknowledge no superior upon earth, shall put themselves upon the justice of God for the deciding of their controversies by such success, as it shall please Him to give on either side. And as in the process of particular pleas between private men, all things ought to be ordered by the rules of civil laws ; so in the proceedings of the war nothing ought to be done against the law of nations, or the law of honour."

To the horror of mankind Germany disregarded the law of nations, the laws of war, and the law of humanity. She deliberately tried to plunge the world into barbarism and savagery.

The German Army and the German Navy stood, according to the Imperial Constitution, under the direct command of the Emperor. He was no doubt legally responsible for all the abominations which the German forces have committed on land and sea. However, study of German military literature makes it clear that the guilt lies perhaps not so much with the Emperor as with the Army. During the rule of William II. the Army had become a State within the State, as will presently be shown. It had become the principal governing factor. It had ceased to be a tool. It had established its own laws. For decades the military leaders of the forward school had been allowed to preach the doctrine of ruthlessness in war. They had taught that both in diplomacy, which they wished to control, and in warfare all means were good which were expedient, which were advantageous to Germany. That may be seen from the writings of many of the most eminent German soldiers—Bernhardi is a characteristic representative of that class—and from the handbook *Kriegsbrauch im Landkriege*, the

Customs of War, published by the General Staff in Berlin in 1902, and translated into English by Professor Morgan.

The Government Committee presided over by Lord Bryce concluded its Report on Germany's outrages in Belgium as follows :

"It is proved

"I. That there were in many parts of Belgium deliberate and systematically organised massacres of the civil population, accompanied by many isolated murders and other outrages.

"II. That in the conduct of the War generally innocent civilians, both men and women, were murdered in large numbers, women violated, and children murdered.

"III. That looting, house-burning, and the wanton destruction of property were ordered and countenanced by the officers of the German Army, that elaborate provision had been made for the systematic incendiarism at the very outbreak of the War, and that the burnings and destruction were frequent where no military necessity could be alleged, being, indeed, part of a system of general terrorisation.

"IV. That the rules and usages of war were frequently broken, particularly by the using of civilians, including women and children, as a shield for advancing forces exposed to fire, to a less degree by killing the wounded and prisoners, and in the frequent abuse of the Red Cross and the White Flag.

"Sensible as they are of the gravity of these conclusions, the Committee conceive that they would be doing less than their duty if they failed to record them as fully established by the evidence. Murder, lust, and pillage prevailed over many parts of Belgium on a scale unparalleled in any war between civilised nations during the last three centuries."

Surprise has been expressed that the citizens of a cultured, well-ordered, and highly disciplined nation should have been able to perpetrate the horrors described in Lord Bryce's Report, not only in Belgium but elsewhere as well ; that people who until recently were supposed to be kindly, humane, and somewhat over-sentimental should have been able to commit crimes for which savages would blush. I think the fault lay not in the character of the German

people, but in the teachings which they had received from their military leaders. The principal characteristic of the German people was their docility, their willingness to do as they were told. They were passive instruments in the hands of their rulers and superiors, as they always have been. The Germans were the only nation in Europe which, though suffering from tyranny and misrule, had never successfully revolted against their tyrants. The German soldiers were ordered to murder, burn, and plunder, and they did this as conscientiously and as unquestioningly as they obeyed the innumerable vexatious regulations and restrictions of their country.

Formerly the army and the militant section of the German nation were kept in bounds. Soldiers interested themselves only in their duties and did not mingle in politics. Louis Schneider, the reader of William I., has told us in his Memoirs that the old Emperor would neither tolerate that officers should discuss with him political questions nor would he allow Prince Bismarck to talk with him on military affairs. All this had changed under William II. The King of Prussia, the Emperor of Germany, was by tradition a soldier. Prusso-Germany was a military State. The army was the support of the throne. It was the true aristocracy, the ruling class, of the country. The military officers were naturally impatient of peace and were apt to demand war whenever political complications arose. Bismarck succeeded in curbing their ardour, in keeping them within bounds. He checked the aggressive proclivities of the army and the desire of the leading officers to give a warlike direction to the national policy. However, he foresaw that, under a weak and vain monarch, such as William II., the army might become the predominating factor and dictate the national policy. He foretold that under his rule the national policy might be directed by the General Staff. Desiring to protect his country against that danger, he wrote in his posthumous Memoirs :

" How keenly Moltke wanted to put in practice his military and strategic tastes and abilities I observed not only

on this occasion, in July 1870, when war with France seemed impending, but also in the days before the outbreak of the war of 1866 against Austria. . . .

"In both cases his love of combat and delight in battles were a great support to me in carrying out the policy which I regarded as necessary, and which I had to carry out in opposition to the intelligible and justifiable aversions in a most influential quarter. His desire for war proved inconvenient to me in 1867, in the Luxemburg question, and in 1875 and afterwards when the question arose whether it was desirable, as regards a war with France which we should probably have to face sooner or later, to bring it on *anticipando* before the adversary could improve his preparations. I have always opposed the theory which advocates aggressive wars, wars of precaution, of prevention, not only at the Luxemburg period, but likewise subsequently for twenty years, in the conviction that even victorious wars cannot be justified unless they are forced upon one and that one cannot look into the cards of Providence far enough ahead to anticipate historical developments and make one's own calculations accordingly.

"It is natural that in the Staff of the Army not only young officers desirous of promotion, but also experienced strategists, should feel the need of turning to account the efficiency of their troops and their own capacity to lead, and of making themselves prominent in history. It would be a matter of regret if an enterprising military spirit did not exist in the Army. It is the duty of the political, not the military, heads of the State to keep these sentiments within the limits which the nation's need of peace can justly claim. That at the time of the Luxemburg question, during the crisis of 1875, invented by Gortchakoff and France, and even down to the most recent times, the General Staff and its leaders have allowed themselves to be led astray and to endanger peace lies necessarily in the very spirit of the institution, which I would not forgo. It only becomes dangerous under a monarch whose policy lacks sense of proportion and power to resist one-sided and constitutionally unjustifiable influences."

William II. was the monarch "whose policy lacks sense of proportion and power to resist one-sided and constitutionally unjustifiable influences," described in Bismarck's

Political Testament. The German Foreign Office had become an annexe of the General Staff. In a most important German Official Secret Report, emanating apparently from the German General Staff, and relating to the proposed very great increase of the German Army which was effected previously to the War, dated the 19th of March 1913, and published in the French Yellow Book, we read :

" We must allow the idea to sink into the minds of our people that our armaments are an answer to the armaments and policy of the French. We must accustom them to think that an offensive war on our part is a necessity in order to combat the provocation of our adversaries. We must act with prudence so as not to arouse suspicion, and to avoid a crisis which might injure our economic existence. We must so manage matters that under the heavy weight of powerful armaments, considerable sacrifices, and strained political relations an outbreak (*Losschlagen*) should be considered as a relief, because after it would come decades of peace and prosperity, as after 1870."

The higher German officers did not disguise the fact that they meant to direct Germany's foreign policy, which was supposed to be managed by the Foreign Office. On the 6th of May 1913 the French Ambassador in Berlin reported to his Government in Paris :

" I have been informed of some remarks made in a German milieu by General von Moltke, who is considered here as the most distinguished officer of the German Army. The intention of the General Staff is to act by surprise. ' We must put on one side,' said General von Moltke, ' all commonplaces as to the responsibility of the aggressor. When war has become necessary it is essential to carry it on in such a way as to place all the chances in one's own favour. Success alone justifies war. Germany cannot and ought not to leave Russia time to mobilise, for she would then be obliged to maintain on her Eastern frontier so large an army that she would be placed in a position of equality, if not of inferiority, to that of France. Accordingly,' added the General, ' we must anticipate our principal adversary as soon as there are nine chances to one of going to war, and

begin it without delay in order ruthlessly to crush all resistance.' This represents exactly the attitude of military circles, and it corresponds with that of political circles."

It will be noticed that the German Army, as represented by its chiefs, considered itself to be not an instrument of government, but the Government, the State.

When complications arose between Serbia and Austria-Hungary, not the German diplomats, but the Generals, absolutely controlled the nation's foreign policy. The chiefs of the German Foreign Office had to make the humiliating admission that not they, but the heads of the Army, directed Germany's diplomacy. On the 30th of July 1914 M. Cambon, the French Ambassador at Berlin, reported to his Government two conversations which he had had with the Secretary of State, von Jagow, and with the Under-Secretary of State, Herr Zimmermann, which he summarised as follows :

" I pointed out to the Secretary of State that he had himself told me that Germany would only consider herself obliged to mobilise if Russia mobilised on her German frontiers, and that this was not being done. He replied that this was true, but that *the heads of the Army were insisting on it*, for every delay is a loss of strength for the German Army. . . ."

In another telegram of the same day M. Cambon reported :

" According to the Under-Secretary of State, *the military authorities are very anxious that mobilisation should be ordered*, because every delay makes Germany lose some of her advantages. Nevertheless, *up to the present the haste of the General Staff, which sees war in mobilisation, has been successfully prevented.*"

M. Cambon's statements were confirmed by Baron de Beyens, the Belgian representative in Berlin. He wrote on the 1st of August to his Government :

" *Herr von Jagow and Herr Zimmermann* went to the Chancellor and to the Emperor, in order to secure that the

order for general mobilisation should not be issued to-day, but they *were met by the inflexible opposition of the Minister for War and the Chiefs of the Army*, who must have represented to the Emperor the fatal consequences of a twenty-four hours' delay. The order was immediately issued and brought to the knowledge of the general public by a special edition of the *Lokal-Anzeiger*. I telegraphed it to you immediately."

It is a well-known fact that at the last moment Austria wished to draw back, but that Germany precipitated the War, making Austria's intended concessions towards Russia impossible by presenting an ultimatum at Petrograd. At the critical moment the Army leaders prevented the peaceful arrangement of the political difficulties. They forced the Emperor's hands.

On the 5th of August 1914 Baron de Beyens had a final conversation with Herr von Jagow, the Secretary, and Herr Zimmermann, the Under-Secretary, of the German Foreign Office. That conversation is reported in the second Belgian Grey Book. The Belgian Minister reported :

". . . Herr Zimmermann simply replied that the Department for Foreign Affairs was powerless. Since the order for mobilisation had been issued by the Emperor, all power now belonged to the military authorities. It was they who had considered the invasion of Belgium to be an indispensable operation of war. ' I hope,' he added with emphasis, ' that this war will be the last. It must also mark the end of the policy of alliances which has led to this result.'

" From this interview I brought away the impression that Herr Zimmermann spoke to me with his customary sincerity and that the Department for Foreign Affairs, since the opening of the Austro-Serbian conflict, had been on the side of a peaceful solution, and that it was not due to it that its views and counsels had not prevailed. To-day, even, it is my belief, contrary to what I wrote you at first, that Herr von Jagow and Herr Zimmermann spoke the truth when they assured my colleagues and myself that they did not know beforehand the text itself of the ultimatum addressed by Austria-Hungary to Serbia. A superior power intervened to precipitate the march of events."

The fact that the German Foreign Office, and even the Imperial Chancellor, had become subordinates to the General Staff, that generals, not statesmen, guided Germany's foreign policy, may be shown by numerous incidents of which I will mention only one because it was particularly striking. As I have previously stated, the Imperial Chancellor, Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg, probably agreed more or less unwillingly to the violation of Belgium, being unable to resist, in view of the assurance of the General Staff that the result would be a complete victory of unparalleled magnitude which would completely eliminate France as a military factor. Immediately after the invasion of Belgium Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg confessed candidly in the Reichstag that, in invading that country, Germany had perpetrated a wrong. The military evidently did not approve of the Chancellor's sincerity. General von Emmich, in invading Belgium, issued a proclamation to the inhabitants which probably had previously been drafted by the General Staff in Berlin. He stated in it that the German forces invaded Belgium because the neutrality of that country had previously been violated by the French. The military and the civil power contradicted one another. The civil power admitted a great wrong and the military pleaded justification. The German Government was bound to choose between the two views. Being under the control of the Army, the military view was adopted. It was proclaimed everywhere that France had "forced" Germany to invade Belgium by violating that country's neutrality. The highest officials at the German Foreign Office were perfectly aware that Germany had been in the wrong, that the violation could not be justified with the mendacious pretexts employed by the Army. That was made clear by Herr Zimmermann in his conversation with Baron de Beyens on the 5th of August, for the Belgian representative reported:

"Herr Zimmermann expressed to me, with much emotion, his profound regrets for the cause of my departure. But, he added, the passage through Belgium is an absolute

necessity for us—a question of life or death (*Sein oder nicht sein*). Germany must crush France as quickly as possible in order to be able then to turn against Russia.

"Herr Zimmermann sought no pretext to excuse the violation of our neutrality. He did not invoke the supposed French plan, alleged against France by the Chancellor in the speech which he had delivered the evening before in the Reichstag, of passing through Belgium in order to attack Germany on the lower Rhine, a plan to which Herr von Jagow had alluded in his conversation with me."

German policy was controlled by the military. The Foreign Office was a dependency of the General Staff. The Chancellor and the highest officials at the Foreign Office were forced to eat their words and to recant. As the General Staff pleaded justification they had to do the same. Official Germany proclaimed everywhere that the invasion of Belgium was justified because France, which had practically no troops on the Franco-Belgian border, intended to invade that country, and because Belgium "had sold herself" to England by discussing measures of defence with her in case the country should be invaded by Germany. The Belgian and the British Governments were, of course, entitled to discuss measures of defence in case of a German invasion which was threatened, long before the outbreak of the War, by Germany's strategical railways and military preparations which pointed to an attack upon Belgium. However, the Foreign Office authorities of Germany not merely repeated, like lackeys, the instructions which they received from the General Staff, but they endeavoured to "prove" Belgium's guilt by deliberate forgery, by changing the word "conversation" into the word "convention" in the document which recorded the Anglo-Belgian Conversations regarding the measures to be taken should Germany invade the country.

The German Army was also responsible for the U-boat campaign, for Hindenburg and Ludendorff controlled the navy. Thus the army forced the United States into the War with disastrous results for Germany. The army, not

the diplomats, were responsible for the peace of Brest-Litovsk and for that of Bucharest which finally disgraced Germany.

It has frequently been stated that not merely the German Emperor and Germany's leaders were responsible for the War, but that the whole nation was responsible for it because the whole nation enthusiastically approved of the aggression. It is true that the nation went to war with wild enthusiasm. However, it must not be forgotten that that enthusiasm was carefully raised before the War by the military leaders. The German officers were not satisfied with running the Government. They were not satisfied with dominating the Emperor, the Chancellor, and the Foreign Office. They strove, and strove successfully, to educate the nation and to arouse in it a spirit of reckless aggression. It is a fairly well-known fact that the German Press was, during the War, edited by the General Staff, but it is not so well known that during many years previous to its outbreak German military men had carried on a nation-wide campaign of incitement to war. In 1913 Professor Nippold published in Berlin a small but important volume, *Der Deutsche Chauvinismus*, which seems almost unknown. It contained numerous extracts from the German Jingo Press, and it summed up the character of the war agitators and their aims as follows :

" The German Chauvinists advocate war not merely occasionally ; they arouse systematically in the German nation a desire for war. They show not merely that the people should prepare for war ; they teach that the nation urgently *requires* war. War is depicted not as a possibility, but as a necessity. It must come, and the sooner the better. In the eyes of these men war is a necessity to the German people, and a prolonged peace is an evil. They do not care whether there is a reason for war or not. If there is no reason, one must simply make war without a reason. . . .

" It is interesting to study the policy pursued by our war agitators. They begin their activity with the children. We have seen in the *Jungdeutschland-Post* [the paper of an extensive boys' organisation of which General von der

Goltz is President] war described as the most desirable event. Some organisations strive to arouse the war fever in the young and some in the grown-up. Among the latter the *Alldeutsche Verband* and the *Wehrverein* should be mentioned. Their teaching may be summed up thus: A great war is a necessity, and it should arouse the delight of the whole nation. . . .

"These agitators have raised the dogma that war is inevitable, and as it is in their opinion inevitable, they advocate an aggressive war, a war of prevention, arguing 'As war is bound to break out, let us see that it will break out at the moment most favourable to Germany. Let us attack the others as soon as it suits us, and before all let us attack as soon as possible.' Having abandoned the idea of a defensive, of a necessary, war, they preach an aggressive war without cause, and believe that by their preaching they have succeeded in converting the German people from a peaceful nation into a nation of firebrands, eager to pick quarrels with others. In their opinion armaments are not intended to preserve the peace. Oh no! The German nation needs a war, and it would be a pity to leave the ready German Army unused.

"The leading war agitators are the Nationalist Press, the war organisations, such as the *Alldeutsche Verband*, and war-preaching Generals such as Generals Keim, Liebert, Bernhardi, Eichhorn, Wrochem. These men have lost all sense of responsibility. General Keim, who is probably the worst war agitator living, has ventured to assert that Germany was free from Chauvinism!

"In the eyes of these men Morality and Right are conceptions of little value. They look contemptuously down upon these qualities and upon all except the military achievements of mankind, preaching the denial of all civilisation, and eulogising the rule of unrestricted brutal might. That is their great ideal. They recommend us to embark upon a piratical war and to disregard international law and all moral obligations. Their teaching is bound to lead to the moral degeneration of the nation.

"Our war-preaching generals teach us that without a war the moral qualities of the German people would deteriorate. To them the problem of Germany's expansion is not a cause of war, for according to them a war would be necessary on moral grounds, had Germany all the colonies

she could wish for. They consider it a matter of course that Germany should embark as early as possible upon a war of aggression, and consider the advocacy of peace as a sign of weakness.

"The military should not be allowed to force their class ideas upon the German nation. It has never lacked military spirit. It is not necessary to arouse it artificially. These uniformed demagogues unceasingly raise the bogy of war and at the same time sing its praise. To them all professions, except that of arms, are contemptible. What is international law? Rubbish! What modern commerce, industry, and science? Effeminating occupations which have diverted the people from their true occupation, from war. To them war is the greatest blessing.

"Our war-generals despise our statesmen and politicians, for they wish to control the National Policy themselves. They think that the direction of the State in all its branches should be left to the army. In their eyes the German diplomats are incompetent.

"If the German Chauvinists should unhappily succeed in making the Government believe that they represent the people, that they are the people, then war may break out at any moment. They may carry the Government with them. These things have happened before, and they may happen again. We should bethink ourselves in time, for the spirit of aggression which these men have aroused constitutes for Germany a grave danger against which one can warn the nation neither too often nor too energetically."

Professor Nippold gave only the names of officers on half-pay. He should have added that many of the most eminent officers on active service were the principal leaders of the Jingo campaign in Germany. Both the Ministry of War and the Admiralty stimulated the desire for increased armaments and for war by maintaining a widespread agitation through their Press offices and by other means. Admiral Tirpitz was in the first place not a naval administrator, but a naval agitator. The Navy League was one of his instruments of agitation, exactly as the *Wehrverein* was a tool of the highest military authorities.

The details given in this chapter will suffice to show that

the German Army was principally responsible for bringing about the War; that the army dominated the German Foreign Office and controlled Germany's foreign policy before the outbreak of hostilities; that the German Army was responsible for the unparalleled mendacity of German diplomacy; that the German Army was responsible for the invasion of Belgium; that it was responsible for the intervention of Great Britain and Italy; that the men who brought about the War were responsible for abandoning the wise plan of campaign upon which Moltke and Bismarck had settled and which might have led to Germany's triumph within a few months. They suffice to show that the Army was responsible for the abominations of which the German forces were guilty, and that the Army, by carefully-planned agitation, had corrupted the mind of the nation. A powerful army is an invaluable tool, but a dangerous master. The German Army leaders had made themselves supreme in the State. They had been playing the same part as the Pretorians played in Ancient Rome, the Janissaries in Turkey and the Strelitzi in Russia. They have deserved the same fate.

The fear has been expressed that the great strengthening of the British Army might introduce militarism into England and Prussianise it. That fear is totally unfounded. The British Army, however strong, would be under the control of Parliament, of the people. In Germany Parliament and people had no control and, indeed, no influence whatever, over the army. According to the Imperial Constitution the Emperor had sole control over the military forces, and by the Constitution the strength of the army was laid down for all time, and could therefore not be altered by Parliament. By the fundamental law of the Empire every German citizen had to serve in the army, and by the same document its peace strength was fixed at 1 per cent. of the population for all time.

Imperial Germany was supposed to be a Constitutional Empire possessed of representative and very democratic institutions, for every male adult was given a vote. If we

look into the Constitution a little more closely we find that the country was ruled by a military oligarchy, that its democratic institutions were a farce, that the people were powerless. As military domination had been imposed upon Germany by the Constitution, and as the people could not alter the Constitution except with the consent of their rulers, it was obvious that Germany could free herself from the shackles of militarism only by a successful revolution. Germany bore domination by a military caste as long as she was prosperous and invariably successful in war. When she discovered that the military caste had ruined the country, when the immense prestige enjoyed by the army had disappeared, when the people saw in it the principal cause of their misery, they rose and swept out of existence the institutions which had brought about their downfall.

CHAPTER XXV

THE WAR AIMS OF THE GERMAN INTELLECTUALS [1]

THE most important factors of public opinion in Germany were three : the governing circles, the business men, and the intellectuals. The war aims of the intellectuals were authoritatively stated in a petition which was drawn up on the 25th of June 1915 and which was sent to the Imperial Chancellor. Appended to it were 1,341 signatures. Among the signatories were 352 University Professors, 158 educationalists and clergymen, 145 high officials, burgomasters, and councillors, 148 judges and lawyers, 40 Parliamentarians, 18 retired admirals and generals, 182 business men, 52 agriculturists, 252 artists, authors, and publishers. In view of the great prestige enjoyed by the German professors and their vast influence upon public opinion, the importance of the professorial demands was very great. The weight of the professorial petition was vastly increased by the signatures of eminent practical men which also were appended to the document. Among these was Herr Kirdorf, the principal director of the Gelsenkirchener Bergwerk, Germany's leading coal and iron undertaking. Herr Kirdorf was for many years the President of the powerful organisation which represents the German coal and iron industry.

Petitions which are intended to be signed by many of the most influential men are drawn up carefully and cautiously. They are as a rule worded with a good deal of reserve and restraint in order to avoid discussion and opposition. Therefore, the petition of the professors must not be treated as

[1] From Grumbach, *Germany's Annexationist Aims*, translated by J. Ellis Barker, John Murray, 1917.

if it were a rash statement made by some irresponsible hotheads. The document was worded as follows :

"The Petition of the Professors to the Imperial Chancellor

"The German nation and its Emperor have kept the peace during forty-four years. They have kept it until its maintenance became incompatible with the demands of national honour and of self-preservation. In spite of the growing strength and number of its population, Germany has never thought of overstepping the narrow limits of its continental territories as a conqueror. Its genius merely compelled the nation to enter the world's markets in order to secure there its economic existence in peaceful competition with the other nations.

"However, Germany's enemies wished to reduce our narrow territories and to hamper our indispensable activities in the world's markets. They made plans which went as far as the destruction of the German Empire. When they recognised their danger, the Germans, from the highest to the lowest, rose like one man, knowing that they had to defend not only their country, but also their individuality, their spiritual and moral treasures, the culture of Germany and that of Europe, against the flood of barbarians coming from the East and the desire of vengeance and the lust of domination of the nations of the West. Victoriously, with God's help, hand in hand with our faithful Allies, we have been able to defend ourselves against half the world.

"Now, when in Italy a new enemy has arisen to Germany, mere defence is no longer sufficient. Our enemies have forced the sword into our hands and have compelled us to make enormous sacrifices in blood and treasure. Now we must protect ourselves against a similar surprise attack from all sides, against a whole succession of wars waged with our enemies when they have regained their strength. To prevent this, we mean to establish ourselves so firmly and so broadly in a secured and enlarged homeland that our independent existence is guaranteed to us for generations.

"The people are unanimous and resolved in pursuing this principal aim. The plain truth which we meet wherever we look is this : There is only one fear among all the classes of the people, and that fear is particularly broad and deep

among the masses of the people. It is the fear that, through the delusive idea of foolish conciliatoriness, or through nervous impatience, a premature, doubtful, and transient peace might be concluded. It is feared that once more the diplomat's pen might give up what the sword has victoriously won, as happened a century ago. And that might happen in the most fateful hour of destiny known to German history, when peoples' minds display a greatness and unanimity such as have never been known in the past and may never be known in the future.

"Of a truth we do not strive after the domination of the world. However, we mean to possess a share of world-power proportionate to the greatness of Germany's cultural, economic, and warlike strength. Perhaps it will not be possible to achieve simultaneously all the aims of national security. This may not be feasible because of the number of our enemies. Still, the utmost limit of the possible should be obtained. Otherwise, the great sacrifices of the nation and our great military efforts during the war will have been vain. This is, we repeat it, the firm determination of the German nation.

"It is the duty and the right of those who, through their learning and position, have become the intellectual leaders and protagonists of public opinion, to give clear expression to the resolution and to the firm will of the nation, and to place the national wishes before the Government. It is their duty to give powerful support to the Government in its heavy task of enforcing Germany's necessary claims against the faint-hearted individuals within the country and against its tenacious enemies abroad.

"We invite all leaders of public opinion to fulfil this duty.

"We know full well that one must discriminate between the desirable aims of the war and the final conditions obtainable at the peace, that everything depends on the ultimate success of our arms, and that it cannot be our task to discuss the war objects of Austria-Hungary and Turkey. Hence we have in the following merely briefly expressed our opinion in giving utterance to our conviction that Germany must have certain guarantees for a lasting peace, and that there are certain aims which must be reached by the blood-sodden road of the present war.

"(1) *France.*—We wish to abolish for all time the French menace. We have been threatened by France for centuries.

We have been assailed with French cries of vengeance from 1815 to 1870 and from 1871 to 1915. All classes of the German people are convinced of this necessity. We cannot abolish this danger through useless efforts at conciliation, to which France has always replied with the utmost fanaticism.

"We would warn all Germans most seriously not to indulge in self-deception. Even after the terrible lesson of this disastrous war of revenge, France will continue thirsting for vengeance as long as she possesses the necessary strength. For the sake of our own existence we must enfeeble that land politically and economically, without scruple or compunction, and improve Germany's military-strategical position towards France. To achieve this end a thorough-going improvement of Germany's western frontier from Belfort to the coast is needed.

"In addition we must, if possible, conquer part of the French Channel coast in order to increase our strategical security against England and to obtain better access to the ocean.

"Special measures will have to be taken so that the German Empire should not be internally weakened by its external acquisitions. In order to avoid a position similar to that which obtains in Alsace-Lorraine, the undertakings and landed properties in the conquered districts which secure to their owners power and influence should be transferred from hands hostile to Germany to German hands, and the indemnification of the original owners should be left to France. No influence whatever upon the Empire should be allowed to that part of the French population which has been taken over by us.

"Furthermore, it is necessary that France—and France among all our enemies in the first place—should have imposed upon it a high war indemnity, and that no mercy should be shown to it, although it has financially been terribly bled through its own folly and British selfishness. Details will be given further on.

"We should also remember that France has a disproportionately large Colonial Empire, and that England might enrich itself by seizing the French Colonies unless we seize them ourselves.

"(2) *Belgium.*—Belgium, which we have won with so much of the best German blood, we must firmly hold politic-

ally, militarily, and economically, whatever reasons may be urged against such a step. On no point is the unanimity of popular opinion greater. To the nation it is beyond doubt a question of honour to hold on to that country.

"From the political and military points of view it is clear that an independent Belgium would be nothing but an English base for a very dangerous attack, a shield behind which our enemies would gather anew. Economically the acquisition of Belgium would mean a vast accession of power to Germany.

"Nationally also Belgium can become a great gain to Germany. The Flemish population, which is so closely related to the Germans by their culture, may free itself in course of time from its French shackles and may remember its Germanic origin and character.

"Of the problems which we have to solve when we have acquired Belgium we mention only this—that the inhabitants must be allowed no political influence within the Empire. As in France, the undertakings and landed properties which give power and influence to their owners must be taken out of the hands of persons hostile to Germany and be placed into the possession of German owners.

"(3) *Russia.*—On Germany's eastern frontier the population of Russia grows with the greatest rapidity, increasing by from 2,500,000 to 3,000,000 per year. Within a generation Russia's population will come to 250,000,000. As this overwhelming colossus threatens our eastern flank, constituting undoubtedly the greatest danger to Germany and to Europe in the future, Germany can maintain its place in the world only by constructing a firm wall which will protect us both against the stealthy progress of Slavism in peace-time and against menacing inroads in case of war. Besides, the healthy growth of Germany's national strength and man-power must be secured by all means.

"A firm wall of protection and a basis for an increase of the German race must be created on the land which Russia will have to cede to us. We must have land suitable for agricultural settlement, land where can be reared healthy peasants who are an inexhaustible source of national and racial power. We must have land which will receive part of our surplus population and which will afford new homes to those Germans abroad who wish to turn

their back on the hostile countries to which they had formerly migrated. We must have land which increases Germany's economic independence, which supplies us with food, which affords the necessary counterpoise to the progressive industrialisation and townification of the German people, which preserves that balance of economic activities which has proved so valuable during this war, and which prevents the dangerous development of a one-sided national economy such as that of England. We must have land which counteracts the reduction in the birth-rate in the towns, which prevents emigration and provides housing for the needy. We must have land the colonisation and Germanisation of which give new chances even to the learned proletariat. Such land, which is needed for our physical, moral, and intellectual welfare, is before all to be found towards the east of Germany.

"The military needs, and particularly our strategical requirements, will determine how far Germany's eastern frontier should be pushed forward. Along the eastern limits of Posen and Silesia, and along the southern frontier of East Prussia a belt of territory must be created which, as far as possible, is free from non-German owners of land, which would therefore be open for settlement to German colonists. This German frontier belt will separate the Prussian Poles from the Russian Poles and protect them against the direct influence of the latter, who may achieve their independence. We do not hesitate to point out that the Baltic provinces of Russia, which Germans have cultivated for 700 years, which possess a fruitful soil and which are thinly populated, are a promising land suitable for colonisation by German settlers. The inhabitants, Lithuanians, Esthonians, and Letts, who are racially not related to the Russians, will become useful as agricultural labourers for temporary work in Germany proper.

"We demand colonial land from Russia on which we can erect a frontier wall and create conditions for promoting the growth of our population. The colonial land demanded should, however, have a third function. It should be Russia's war indemnity paid to us. After the war it will probably be impossible to obtain from Russia an indemnity paid either in cash or in securities. The disappointment of the Russo-Japanese War, after which no indemnity was paid, might repeat itself. But Russia can very easily pay

an indemnity in kind. The country is overburdened with riches in land, and we demand that the territory which is to be ceded to us should to a large part be handed over without their owners. In view of Russia's administrative practice this is by no means a novel development. In Russia the people are not so deeply rooted in the soil as they are in Central and in Western Europe. Over and over again Russia has transplanted large portions of its populations from one district to other districts far away. The possibility of removing a settled population must not be measured with the insufficient standard of German civilisation. If the political acquisition of Russian land is to bring to us the necessary increase in power, we must be able to dispose freely of the bulk of it. A peace with Russia which does not bring about the waning of the Russian incubus and which fails to supply the land necessary to Germany, would mean that a great opportunity of improving Germany's political, economic, and social health had been thrown away. The final decision between Germany and Russia would then be adjourned to some future date. Another struggle for the existence of Germany and for European culture would then be certain.

"(4) *England, the East, the Colonies, Oversea Matters.*—Although the struggle with Russia has been particularly grand and exceedingly glorious, and although we must remember how dangerous the enormous bulk of Russia will remain unless we succeed in bringing about its decomposition, we must not forget for a moment that this war has been in the last resort England's war against the industrial, commercial, maritime, and colonial power of Germany.

"The cause of England's hostility must determine Germany's war aims with regard to England. This means that we must assert our position in the world's trade and assert Germany's sea power and oversea power as against England.

"We must admit that England has taught us a valuable lesson by blockading Germany during the war, and by forcing us to organise the country so as to make it a self-supporting State. We have learned in the first place—and this has particularly been shown in this petition—that we require a broader and better secured basis in Europe, so that we shall be independent of other nations from the

political, military, and economic points of view. We mean, therefore, to create on the Continent and about our national frontiers a continental economic sphere which should be as large as possible, and which will make us independent of England and of other world empires. In this respect Austria-Hungary and Turkey must be considered in the first place. They will unlock to us the Balkan Peninsula and Asia Minor. Therefore it is necessary to secure permanently, against Russian and English cupidity, Austria-Hungary, the Balkan Peninsula, Turkey, and Asia Minor as far as the Persian Gulf. The commercial relations with our political friends should be made closer with all means in our power.

"Henceforward, in spite of England's hostility and notwithstanding the security of our continental position, we must enter again upon the world-trade and become active in the lands across the sea. A substantial part of Germany's international trade will no doubt have to be established in totally different directions. Old-established commercial and maritime relations must be regained. In future we must learn to stand on our own feet. We must eliminate English mediation in finance and commerce, English arbitrage and English insurance. We have lost confidence in England. Hence England must lose the profit which she has formerly derived from Germany's commerce. We mean to recreate our colonial empire. It should be more closely jointed and stronger than it has been hitherto. Central Africa would give us large territories, but they are of insufficient value. We must therefore, in addition, acquire colonies elsewhere. Herein lies the importance of Germany's permanent connection with the world of Islam and the necessity of a secure sea-route. Those who, disregarding Germany's security against England's naval tyranny, desire the acquisition of colonies, while being in favour of giving up Belgium, under-estimate not merely the importance of securing Germany's European basis. They make the more serious political mistake of striving after colonial possessions without securing a safe connection oversea. They would once more place Germany at the mercy of England.

"We require the freedom of the sea. We fight England with the object of obtaining that freedom for all nations. In order to enforce the freedom of the sea, it is in the first

place necessary that Germany should obtain a strong position on the Channel coast. We must, as has previously been stated, have Belgium firmly in our grasp, and we must, if possible, obtain in addition part of the coast of the French Channel. Besides, it is necessary either to break the chain of naval bases which England has created around the world, or to neutralise them by calling into existence corresponding and equivalent German bases. Egypt, which connects England with English Africa, and English Asia on the one hand, and with Australia on the other, and which makes the Pacific Ocean an English lake, Egypt, which, to use Bismarck's words, is to the British Empire what the nerve at the back of the neck is to a man, is at the same time the iron clamp which firmly connects England's Eastern and her Western possessions and the instrument with which England subdues both. In Egypt England's vital nerve can be severed. If we succeed in this, we take the great trade-route which leads through the Suez Canal out of the hands of a single Power. In doing this the rights of Turkey should as far as possible be respected and preserved.

"England's power is based in the main upon its overwhelming influence upon Governments and the Press throughout the world. We are in bitter need of eliminating the English cable and telegram monopoly. Our best ally against England's influence throughout the world is the freedom which we shall bring to all. In fighting for our own deliverance from the English yoke we fight for the liberty of the universe. We do not mean to exploit the nations of the world, as the English have been doing, but, while protecting our own interests, to act as the pioneers and leaders of Europe who respect and secure the individuality and the free development of all nations.

"(5) *War Indemnity.*—We desire as far as possible to obtain a war indemnity which compensates us for the cost of the struggle, which enables us to rebuild what has been destroyed in East Prussia and in Alsace-Lorraine, which allows us to form a fund from which pensions will be paid to war invalids, war widows, and orphans, which permits us to make good the losses suffered by private German citizens, and allows us to replace and to improve the national armaments.

"We are, of course, aware that the question of war indem-

nities depends not only upon our military successes, but also upon the financial ability of our enemies. Should we be in the position of exacting an indemnity from England, which has always been so thrifty in devoting English blood to the war, no amount of money that could be exacted would be sufficiently large. England has raised the world against Germany chiefly with its money. If we wish to strike at the most sensitive part of this nation of hucksterers, we must strike at its purse. Before all, we must hit England as hard as possible by striking at its money-bags, if we have the power. However, it is more probable that France, either alone, or, in the first place, must be counted upon to furnish an indemnity. We should not hesitate to put upon that country the heaviest financial burden. Philanthropic sentimentalism would be totally out of place. If the French wish to find relief, they may address themselves to their Allies on the other side of the Channel. If these refuse to help their Allies financially, we should obtain at least a political result with which we may be satisfied. [The authors intimate that England's refusal to help France paying the indemnity demanded by Germany would lead to hostility between the two countries.]

"Before all, we believe that it is less important to find compensation for the damage suffered than to open to the German nation new roads for its powerful development in the future. Hence a monetary indemnity which compensates us for the cost of the war is of comparatively inferior importance. On the other hand, it is clear that, should we not be able to obtain an adequate monetary compensation, our demands for the surrender of land, of industrial values, and of colonies, stated in the foregoing, would gain both in political and in moral justification. We must not come out of the war, when it has come to a victorious end, with a loss. Otherwise posterity will still consider Germany defeated, her victories notwithstanding.

"We abstain from deciding how the important problem of compensating Germany for its outlay should be solved, but we would point out that it would be valuable to have part of the monetary indemnity paid in securities, the possession of which would strengthen Germany's economic position in the countries of her political friends and which would deliver these from the undue influence exercised

hitherto by England and France. [The signatories advocate that England and France should be compelled to hand over to Germany their investments in neutral countries.]

" (6) *Kultur and Force.*—If the signatories of this petition, and especially the representatives of science, art, and the Church among them, should be reproached that in the present petition they have raised only political and economic demands, relying upon force, and that they have forgotten the spiritual problems of Germany's future, there should be a threefold answer :

" The care of the German spirit is no part of Germany's war aims or of Germany's peace conditions.

" The German spirit is for us the treasure of treasures, the most precious possession of the nation and the root cause of its superiority among the other nations. Still, it is clear that before attending to Germany's spirit we must enable the country to live in political and economic security. Only then can we cultivate our spiritual treasures with the necessary freedom.

" Lastly, we would say to those who think of the German spirit as an abstraction divorced from power, to those who wish to pursue what is called a policy of culture pure and simple, that we do not wish for a spirituality which means disintegration and decay, that we do not wish for an unnational cosmopolitanism, which everywhere vainly tries to find a home, and which falsifies the national character because it lacks a healthy national body. With our demands we wish to create a healthy body within which the German spirit may dwell. The enlargement of the German body politic which we demand will not harm, but will benefit, the German spirit, provided that the increase is effected under the precautions which we have indicated.

" We are aware that we have put forth great aims, and that they are obtainable only if we are determined to make all the necessary sacrifices, and to negotiate with the utmost energy. We appeal to the Bismarckian principle : 'In political matters faith can indeed remove mountains. In political matters courage and victory do not stand in the relation of cause and effect, for the two are identical.' "

It will be noticed that the German intellectuals in their petition demanded not only far-reaching annexations in the

East and West, and vast monetary indemnities, but that they urged that a large part of the population dwelling within the conquered territories should be expropriated and expelled, and that the owners of land, industrial undertakings, etc., should be compensated at the cost of Germany's victims.

CHAPTER XXVI

GERMAN DEMANDS FOR THE DOMINATION OF THE WORLD [1]

MANY Germans desired to make Germany absolutely paramount on the European Continent, to make their country the leader of a Central European Federation of States which would comprise 200,000,000 inhabitants or more, and which would extend across the Narrows into Asia Minor. Many hoped to extend the German Empire far beyond Asia Minor, and to make Asia Minor a great military base whence the bulk of Africa should be conquered and India be threatened and attacked. Many, seeing still farther ahead, hoped that their country would dominate the Far East and that China would become a German Protectorate.

The views of German enthusiasts were limitless. Domination over the three continents of the old world should, in their opinion, logically have led to Germany's domination of the world. Diplomats, politicians, publicists, and business men shared that hope. A former diplomat, Freiherr von Mackay, wrote on the 27th of November 1915 in *Das Grössere Deutschland*:

"Germany must become the Centre State of Europe; owing to its organising force, and its political, economic, and moral superiority, it will become the president of the whole world and give the world rest and peace."

Many Germans saw in the Turkish Empire the indispensable instrument for the achievement of world domination. With the help of Turkey, India and China were to be con-

[1] From Grumbach, *Germany's Annexationist Aims*, translated by J. Ellis Barker, Murray, 1917.

quered. Having conquered these, Germany was to civilise and Germanise the world. The German language was to become the world language. Herr Theodor Springmann, a manufacturer, wrote in *Deutschland und der Orient*, Hagen, 1915 :

"Germany's connection with Turkey has become so intimate through their brotherhood in arms that after the happy close of the war we should found a friendship-colony. We must strengthen Turkey within and without, suppress corruption, improve the administration and the schools, introduce compulsory and universal military service, organise a war-ready army, and construct railways up to the frontiers of the Caucasus, as well as towards India and Asia. Enormous uncultivated territories await exploitation, and these can produce so much grain and cotton that Germany would never experience want in a future war. Enormous oil-wells, iron-mines, and manganese and copper deposits are awaiting us. All these circumstances combined yield such favourable conditions for an attack in case of future war with Russia or England, and these measures will be such an enormous help to us, that their aid will prove decisive. . . .

"If once we have succeeded in making Turkey a strong, faithful, and devoted ally, then we can advance towards our aim. India and China will be for Germany the perfection of its development. At the moment Germany is not ripe for world-embracing greatness. And it is not our misfortune, but a great blessing, that the Hindoos have not yet revolted against England. . . . England's old Colonial Empire must fall to pieces, for it is based on lies and tyranny. . . . We shall tell the awakening nations of the East : 'England has given you the knout, but Germany is presenting you with golden liberty. Come to us, learn our language, and study our achievements.' We shall close to our enemies the German schools, the mainsprings of our power, but open them to our friends, to India, Islam, and China. Then the German language will become the world language in this new world."

While some Germans, in accordance with the opinions of Herr Springmann, hoped to dominate the world by conquering Africa and Asia and by forcibly depriving the British

race of its imperial domain, seizing India, Egypt, the African possessions, etc., by an attack overland, others were of opinion that Germany should obtain the mastery of the world and the control of the British Empire by dominating the British Isles themselves. The latter recommended an invasion of England. After its successful accomplishment, Dover was to be permanently occupied by German troops, and the British Empire was to be allowed to lead a shadow existence. It should be nominally independent, but in reality it should be a German possession endowed with the appearances of self-government. A well-known publicist, Konrad von Winterstetten, wrote in *Nordkap-Bagdad*, Frankfurt, 1915:

"A glance at the map shows that the dyke protecting Germany against Russia must extend from the North Cape to the Black Sea and thence to the Caucasus and to the Persian Gulf. . . . It is of immense importance that Germany should possess lands producing cotton and ore. The third necessity of world-policy is the possession of settlement colonies where the surplus population can find room. . . .

"There should be a Federation: Germany, Austria-Hungary, Rumania, Bulgaria, Turkey—these States should enjoy full sovereignty in internal affairs. They should be firmly connected by a defensive and offensive alliance and by binding military and political agreements. Gradually a complete customs unity and economic unity would be established. A Central European Empire should arise from the war. An independent Albania; Serbia should be partitioned; the three Northern States and the small States of the West should be invited to join. This Federal Empire would have 185,000,000 inhabitants, and, inclusive of the Colonies, 240,000,000 inhabitants. . . .

"If the Central European State desires to be a World-Power it must reach the shores of the Pacific, and it can arrive there by way of Bagdad. If it has obtained a footing on the Pacific Ocean, it can defend the valuable possessions which Holland has in that sea. These Dutch possessions must be entrusted to the Central European State, for otherwise they may be lost. Holland has no option in this

new epoch of world revolution and in the creation of gigantic Empires. It can save its Colonies and independence only by entering the Central European Federation. Otherwise it will lose both. . . .

"Germany's territorial booty from France is not a problem of arbitrary geographic rearrangement, but one of political and economic necessity. It would be foolish for Germany to burden itself with more French territory than it needs. The ore-beds of Lorraine, the fortress of Belfort, and the rest of the frontier-lands cannot escape us even if our claims are drawn up with the utmost modesty. The appropriation of a belt of territory along the Belgian frontier from Verdun to Boulogne will probably be found necessary in order to obtain an open door for invading France, and a spring-board towards England. That would be the best security of the peace. . . .

"More important than the question of correcting the frontiers is the problem of the French Colonies. That subject must be discussed elsewhere. It cannot be doubted that the actual occupation of the French Colonies by Germany is possible only after the defeat of the British Fleet. . . .

"England must be made incapable of ever again fighting with Germany. . . . This can probably most easily be accomplished by making ourselves the masters of the European head of the British World-Empire. The road from Gravelotte-Verdun to Dunkirk-Boulogne might be continued by the occupation of the bridge-head of Dover by means of which England can be dominated. That proposal may seem fantastic, but it is as feasible as a landing in England without which the war would last for years. Only the conquest of London makes peace possible. After its conquest one condition of peace will be as easily enforceable as any other. England, possessing only part of her Fleet—the larger part being in our hands—England being militarily always in our power, yet administering freely the World-Empire, in which no customs duties would be allowed to be levied, would henceforth be a most convenient neighbour to Germany."

It is obvious that if Germany should succeed in making itself supreme within the three old continents, and should be able to dominate, or at least to over-awe, the British Empire, the United States would become a negligible factor.

Hence little consideration need be paid to the Monroe doctrine. Herr Alfred Hettner wrote in *Der Deutsche Krieg*, Berlin, 1915 :

" We must strive after the enlargement of Germany's colonial possessions, especially in Africa, and must particularly aim at connecting them and rounding them off. It would have been far easier to defend our colonies had they been interconnected. The idea of an expansion and a completion of our African colonies has been desired for a long time. . . .

" A portion of German public opinion is too modest with regard to America. Because the United States have raised the Monroe doctrine and have, so to speak, told us Europeans to clear out of America, it does not follow that we must bow to that doctrine. If we do it as a rule, this is due to the disunion of Europe, which has made it possible for the United States to fish in troubled waters. The Central and South American States have recognised the Monroe doctrine only when it has protected them against Europe. However, the three South American Great Powers have deliberately opposed it when the United States interfered in Mexico. . . . Territorial conquests in America are out of the question, for there Germany's interests are economic and cultural. . . .

" Germany cannot confine itself to its European area, even if it is enlarged."

If Germany should succeed in dominating Europe, Asia, and Africa, and in crippling or destroying the British power, there would be only two Great Powers left in the world—Germany and the United States. Some Germans believed, with Herr Konrad von Winterstetten, that the strength of a Germany dominating the three continents of the old world would be so vast, if compared with that of the United States, that that country need not seriously be considered. Others thought that Germany and the United States might agree to dominate the world jointly. They proposed a partition of the world similar to that which Napoleon proposed to the Czar Alexander I. on the raft on the River Niemen in 1807. Herr Max Schubert, a manu-

facturer, wrote in *Deutschland am Schicksalswege*, published in Leipzig in 1914 :

" Belgium, the bulk of whose population is of Germanic descent, will, after the disgraceful deeds of the population, probably remain permanently a part of Germany. If we succeed in seizing, in addition to the Belgian coast, part of the Atlantic coast of France, then we should obtain the possibility of breaking England's supremacy in European waters. If we can enforce peace with France and Russia, victory over England will surely follow. We can enforce our will upon apparently inviolable England by means of a Continental blockade and similar means. Possibly we may succeed also in throwing England out of the Mediterranean, where it has no business to be. . . .

" Production in large quantities, which is particularly beneficial to the national economy, is possible only within large economic areas. Already Germany forms such an area. Together with its friends, and allies, it would form a huge economic area which would be beyond compare, except in the United States. We could conclude friendship with the United States and then we could lay down the law to the world."

CHAPTER XXVII

THE FUTURE OF GERMANY AND OF THE GERMAN RACE [1]

History teaches us that the settlement of differences between neighbouring nations is a long-drawn-out process. England and France fought one another almost continually from prehistoric times through the Hundred Years' War and through a war period of more than a hundred years in the time of Louis XIV., Louis XV., the Republic, and Napoleon. Nations have long memories. Great, proud, and powerful nations, and even small ones, do not easily become reconciled to the idea of having been defeated and of having lost their position in the world. That may, for instance, be seen from the fact that in recent times the Serbians rose against the Turks largely in order to avenge the disastrous battle of Kossovo which was fought in 1389 and which they still remembered. Throughout history we meet with century-old passionate national resentments which have led to war. Hence even a peace dictated by the strictest justice and fairness may fail to prevent the renewal of the struggle on the part of a defeated nation, for if that nation should believe that it has a good chance of completely reversing the verdict of history, it will probably take up arms once more and fight for its rehabilitation. In his great speech on the political situation, delivered on the 11th of January 1887, Prince Bismarck stated :

"The fight for the Franco-German frontier began, historically speaking, when France seized the three Bishoprics of Metz, Toul, and Verdun. That event has been almost forgotten. However, since then there has been scarcely

[1] Written in November 1918

a generation of Germans which has not been compelled to draw the sword against France. Has then the epoch of the Franco-German frontier struggle now at last come to a conclusion ? You, gentlemen, can know that as little as can I. I would therefore only express to you my personal belief that the period of that struggle will not come to a close unless the character of the French nation or the entire international position should alter completely. I am of opinion that the historical process between Germany and France which has filled three centuries has not come to an end."

Bismarck's prediction has proved correct, and we may apply his opinion to the position arising from the present War. We must therefore ask ourselves : Will the German nation, which has been a military and a conquering nation, most successful in war, since the time when it destroyed the Roman Empire, plundered Rome, and overran and devastated all Italy, Greece, the countries on the Danube, France, Spain, North Africa, and Asia Minor, acknowledge the justice of its defeat and of the peace settlement following it ? Or will it endeavour to regain by war the great position which it has lost, if the situation should happen to be in its favour ? Germany's statesmen, politicians, historians, and school-teachers may ascribe Germany's downfall, not to her own disgraceful folly and criminal wickedness, but to the envy of her opponents and to their overwhelming strength, and they may arouse among the people the fervent hope of a war of revenge, and of a great national revival similar to that which followed the apparently irretrievable disaster which overtook Prussia in 1806. What, then, will be Germany's military chances in the future ? Can a renewal of the War in ten, twenty, or fifty years be prevented? These questions are at present on everybody's lips, and I shall try to answer them in the following pages.

It is difficult to foretell the events of the future. Still, I will endeavour to analyse the impending evolution of Germany, encouraged by the fact that my forecasts of that country's course of action have hitherto proved not incorrect.

From 1900 onwards I foretold Germany's attack on civilisation in numerous articles published in the *Nineteenth Century Review* and elsewhere. In July 1907 I went so far as to assert in that Review, in an article entitled "England, Germany, and the Baltic," that Germany would begin the Great War only after having completed the enlargement of the Kiel Canal. I stated:

"It is expected that eight years will be required to finish the Baltic and North Sea Canal. Therefore during the next eight years Germany will be unable to avail herself of the great advantages furnished by the Baltic and North Sea Canal, except for her smaller and older ships. Her magnificent new ships will for about eight years be restricted to one of the German seas. Consequently Germany will, during the next eight years, do all in her power to avoid a conflict with a first-class naval Power. During the next eight years Germany has every reason to keep the peace. Only when the enlargement of the Baltic and the North Sea Canal has been accomplished will she be ready for a great naval war."

Germany actually began her attack four weeks after the completion of the Canal.

Until autumn 1918 it was generally believed that the Hohenzollern dynasty was the most firmly-established dynasty in the world, that a revolution in Germany was inconceivable. Yet I foretold, even before the War, that William II. would lose his throne by a revolution if he should cause Germany to embark upon a wanton war of aggression which would lead to the defeat of his country. I wrote, for instance, at the time of the second Morocco crisis, in an article entitled "German Designs in Africa," which was published in the *Nineteenth Century Review* in August 1911:

"War has been brought within the limits of vision. . . . Persistence on the dangerous and unprecedented course which Germany is steering at the present moment may imperil Germany's future, and may cost the Emperor his

throne. The German nation is intensely loyal and patriotic, but it would never forgive a monarch who had driven the nation into a disastrous war without adequate reason."

Immediately after the outbreak of the War I repeated my forecast and added that defeat might lead to the break-up of the German Federation. In an article entitled "The Ultimate Ruin of Germany," which I was allowed to contribute to the *Nineteenth Century Review* in September 1914, I stated:

"The War may jeopardise, and perhaps destroy, not only the entire life-work of Bismarck and part of that of Frederick the Great, it may not only impoverish Germany very greatly, but it may also damage Germany's good name for generations. . . .

"The question now arises whether the docile Germans will bear their misfortunes patiently, or whether they will rebel against the crowned criminal who has brought about their misery. A revolt is possible, and it may take a two-fold shape. Conceivably the Southern States might, after a serious defeat of the German Army, detach themselves from Prussia, refusing to fight any longer for the German Emperor. . . . On the other hand, it is possible that there would be a general rising of the people against their rulers. The great majority of Germans are dissatisfied with their form of government. A well-educated people does not like to be governed like children. An absolutism thinly disguised by parliamentary forms is tolerable only as long as it is successful, and as the people are prosperous. The vast majority of the Germans are Liberals, Radicals, and Socialists. This majority has at present no influence whatever upon the government and policy of the country. Failure of the Government in the present War would make absolute government impossible in Germany. If Germany should experience serious defeat, she may either become a strictly limited monarchy on the English model, or a republic. As both the Emperor and the Crown Prince are equally responsible for the present War, it may well happen that the German people will refuse to be ruled any longer by the Hohenzollerns. The rise of a German republic is certainly within the limits of possibility.

In April 1916 I dealt once more in the *Nineteenth Century Review* with the probability of a German revolution in case of defeat, and concluded an article entitled "How the Army has Ruined Germany" with the words:

"Germany is supposed to be a Constitutional Empire possessed of representative and very democratic institutions, for every male adult is given a vote. If we look into the Constitution a little more closely we find that the country is ruled by a military oligarchy, that its democratic institutions are a farce, that the people are powerless. As military domination has been imposed upon Germany by the Constitution, and as the people cannot alter the Constitution except with the consent of their rulers, it is obvious that Germany can free herself from the shackles of militarism only by a successful revolution. Germany has borne domination by a military caste as long as she was prosperous and invariably successful in war. When she discovers that the military caste has ruined the country, when the immense prestige enjoyed by the army has disappeared, when the people see in it the principal cause of their misery, they may rise and sweep out of existence the institutions which have brought about their downfall."

Thirteen months later, shortly after the Russian Revolution, I stated in an article entitled "Will Germany follow Russia's Example?"[1] which appeared in the *Nineteenth Century Review*:

"History teaches us that the German race is as democratic as is the British race. . . . If we study the causes of successful revolution we find that they are two—political dissatisfaction and economic distress. People will stand oppression patiently and they will stand hunger, but they will not easily stand both combined. If the Germans should in due course suffer simultaneously from hunger and defeat, they may well turn against their rulers and call them to account. . . .

"Many who consider the possibility of a revolution in Germany imagine that it will be brought about by the huge Social Democratic Party. They are wrong. In

[1] *Nineteenth Century and After*, May 1917.

Germany, where Parliament is powerless, a revolution cannot be made by a single party, however strong. It can be brought about only if the bulk of the nation, regardless of party, is determined to change the existing form of government and if the army is with it. A serious German defeat would give a fatal blow to the privileges of the ruling aristocracy and of the military caste and to the prosperity of the great industrial and commercial middle-class. Therefore it seems likely that in case of defeat the aristocracy, the army, and the liberal middle-class may turn against the Emperor. . . .

"The German people have no doubt begun to recognise the folly and wickedness of the present War. They must see that defeat is inevitable, and that it will bring about not only the weakening of the State, but that it will leave the nation impoverished and disgraced throughout the world. They must recognise that, owing to the criminal conduct of the War, not merely the German State but the German race has become an outlaw throughout the world, that the German people can rehabilitate themselves in the eyes of the world only by repudiating the Emperor and their Government and by punishing the guilty. . . .

A revolution in Germany consequent upon defeat is not absolutely certain, but is highly probable in view of the historic character of the German nation. The German race is naturally democratic, and the events of the War have undoubtedly strengthened the democratic spirit to a very great extent. That may be seen by the concessions whereby the German Government tries vainly now to appease the people. What the German people require is not the reform of the Prussian franchise, but the direction of the policy of the State by their elected representatives. I think the German nation is too wise to allow again a single man, who may be a degenerate, a madman, a criminal, or merely a fool, to send millions of Germans to their death."

Germany's future may be considered from two very different points of view. We may start either with the assumption that Germany will retain her political unity and her social stability or with the assumption that Germany will go to pieces either politically or socially, or both politically and socially. Let us then in the first instance

consider Germany's future, on the assumption that she will succeed in remaining united and in evolving peacefully a democratic form of government.

In 1913 Germany had 67,000,000 inhabitants and France had 39,700,000 inhabitants. In consequence of her defeat Germany will lose Alsace-Lorraine and her Polish and Danish districts. Germany's Alsatian, Polish, and Danish subjects number about 7,000,000. The population of Alsace-Lorraine is a little less than 2,000,000. Therefore, as a result of the War, Germany's population should be reduced to 60,000,000 and that of France increased to 41,700,000 if we disregard the war losses of both countries. There would thus be three Germans to every two Frenchmen. In man-power Germany would still have a dangerous superiority over France. One of the consequences of the War may be that France will enter upon the most intimate relations with Belgium and Luxemburg. Very likely these three countries will form a union for mutual defence. As Belgium and Luxemburg have together about 8,000,000 inhabitants, the French group would then have a population of about 50,000,000. Germany's population would still exceed that of France, Belgium, and Luxemburg combined by 10,000,000. Her superiority in man-power would still be very great.

Germany has been so greatly exhausted by the War that an early war of revenge does not seem to lie within the limits of the possible. We must therefore rather study the prospective power of Germany than its present strength.

Unless the formation of a League of Nations should permanently and fundamentally change the historical character of States and the character, ambitions, and strivings of the men of whom they are composed, France will probably be most exposed to a German attack, for Germany can hope to re-establish her paramount position on the Continent of Europe only after having defeated that State which is at the same time her century-old opponent and which possesses the strongest army on the Continent and is therefore the natural protector of Europe against a German domination.

Military power depends largely on man-power. The prospective development of the man-power of a country can to some extent be gauged from its growth and increase in the past. According to the official statistics of France and of Germany the population of the two countries has grown as follows since the time of the Napoleonic Wars :

Year.	Germany within the Limits of 1914.	France (since 1871, without Alsace-Lorraine).
1816	24,833,000	29,480,000
1830	29,520,000	32,370,000
1850	35,397,000	35,630,000
1870	40,818,000	38,440,000
1871	40,997,000	36,190,000
1881	45,421,000	37,590,000
1891	49,762,000	38,350,000
1901	56,874,000	38,980,000
1911	65,359,000	39,602,000

Between the years 1816 and 1911 the population of Germany has increased in round figures by 40,000,000 and that of France by only 10,000,000. If we allow for the transfer of Alsace-Lorraine, the population of Germany has increased by 38,000,000 and that of France by only 12,000,000. During the century under review, the German people has increased more than three times as rapidly as the French population. A line divides the table at the significant date of 1870–71. It will be noticed that up to 1870 the population of France increased by 9,000,000 and that of Germany within the limits of 1914 by 16,000,000. Up to the Franco-German War the German population increased a little less than twice as fast as the French population. On the other hand, between 1871 and 1911 the French population increased by only 3,400,000 and the German population by no less than 24,500,000 or seven times as fast. The most startling fact, however, is that between 1901 and 1911 the French population grew by 620,000, and the German population by 8,500,000, or thirteen and a half times as fast as the French population. If the population of Germany and of France should increase as it has done during the last

decade, the population of the reduced Germany would expand from 60,000,000 in 1919 to about 100,000,000 inhabitants in the year 1950, while that of France, inclusive of Alsace-Lorraine, would grow from 42,000,000 to about 45,000,000 inhabitants. By 1950 Germany's superiority over France in man-power would be absolutely overwhelming, and by the year 2000 France might militarily occupy towards Germany a position not dissimilar to that which Belgium occupied in 1914. A Germany of 100,000,000 people, especially if supported by Austria and Hungary, would, by sheer weight of numbers alone, dominate the west and the south of the European Continent. As Russia may remain permanently divided against herself, a Germany of 100,000,000 inhabitants, especially if supported by a populous Austria and Hungary, might dominate the east of Europe as well, unless the numerous small nationalities dwelling about the Danube or the peoples inhabiting what once was the Russian Empire should combine in self-defence, forming either alliances or federating among themselves.

The fact that since the Franco-German War of 1870–71 the expansion of France's population has constantly slackened and has lately come almost to a standstill, while during the same time the population of Germany has increased ever more rapidly, is no mere chance coincidence. The phenomenon of an increasing expansion of population in Germany and of a growing stagnation of population in France is not due to racial reasons, to the vigour of the German race, and to the selfishness or to the exhaustion of the French stock, as the German Professors would have us believe, but is due to economic causes. Adam Smith stated correctly in his *Wealth of Nations* :

" The demand for those who live by wages necessarily increases with the increase of the revenue and stock of every country and cannot possibly increase without it. . . . The most decisive mark of the prosperity of any country is the increase of the number of its inhabitants. . . .

" The value of children is the greatest of all encourage-

ments to marriage. We cannot, therefore, wonder that the people in North America should generally marry very young. Notwithstanding the great increase occasioned by such early marriages, there is a continual complaint of the scarcity of hands in North America. The demands for labourers, the funds destined for maintaining them, increase, it seems, still faster than they can find labourers to employ. . . .

"The demand for men, like that for any other commodity, necessarily regulates the production of men ; quickens it when it goes on too slowly, and stops it when it advances too fast."

We live in the age of machinery. The advent of powerful machinery has vastly increased the productive power of men, and the result has been that a single worker can now produce as much as a number could by the more primitive processes. Hence population in the agricultural districts of Europe has become stagnant if not retrogressive. On the other hand, machinery has enabled millions of men to earn a good living by manufacturing in the cramped areas of the towns. For instance, the gigantic increase of the German population since 1871 has taken place exclusively in the towns, and particularly in the large manufacturing towns. Between 1871 and 1910 Germany's population in the towns of 100,000 inhabitants and more has increased from 1,968,537 to 13,823,348, or by 600 per cent. ; in the towns of from 20,000 to 100,000 inhabitants it has grown from 3,147,272 to 8,677,955, or by 150 per cent. ; in the towns of from 5,000 to 20,000 it has increased from 4,588,364 to 9,172,333, or by 100 per cent. ; in the towns of from 2,000 to 5,000 inhabitants it has grown from 5,190,801 to 7,297,770, or by only 50 per cent., and in the country towns and villages of less than 2,000 inhabitants the population has actually decreased from 26,163,818 to 25,954,587.

The increase of population in densely inhabited European countries depends chiefly, and almost entirely, on the progress of the manufacturing industries carried on in the

towns, and the expansion of these depends principally on the possession of cheap power, on steam raised by coal. Hence the possession of coal determines industrial power, national income, wealth, population, and military strength, for military strength is based upon man-power and industrial power. The enormous disadvantage at which France has been, compared with Germany, with regard to coal may to some extent be gauged from the following figures :

Coal and lignite resources possessed by Germany	.	423,356,000,000 tons
,, ,, ,, France	.	17,583,000,000 ,,
Coal and lignite production of Germany in 1913	.	273,650,000 ,,
,, ,, ,, France in 1913	.	40,190,000 ,,

Before the War Germany's store of coal was twenty-five times as large as that of France, and Germany's coal production was almost seven times as great as was French coal production. However, France suffered not only from a crippling shortage of coal, but from the fact that her coal occurs in irregular patches and in strata which are very thin and faulty. Hence coal is not only very scarce but is extremely dear in France—before the War it was sold in many districts at £5 per ton and over—while it is plentiful and exceedingly cheap in Germany. Germany owes the rapid increase of her wealth, and with her wealth of her population, chiefly to her vast store of cheap coal.

Population has more and more rapidly increased in Germany since 1871 because the industries of the country have prospered mightily since the unification of the Empire. The victory over France and the inflow of the great indemnity which France had to pay gave a mighty impetus to Germany's industries. France, on the other hand, was crippled by that war. Her industries suffered not only from lack of cheap coal, but they were furthermore handicapped by a great burden of taxation. The war had created a vast load of debt upon which interest had to be paid. For the sake of self-preservation, the French had to create and to maintain an army able to meet the German forces.

Of course the rapidly increasing military expenditure pressed far more heavily on the smaller French population, chiefly engaged in agriculture, than on the much larger and much wealthier population of Germany, chiefly engaged in exceedingly prosperous industries.

The French race is naturally a prolific race. The 65,000 Frenchmen who dwelt in Canada when it became English in 1763 have since then increased to about 3,000,000. The War of 1914–18 might, and ought to, lead to a vigorous expansion of the victorious peoples and to a slackened increase, and perhaps to the stagnation, if not to the numerical decline, of the German population.

The Allies have announced that Germany will have to make good the gigantic losses which she has inflicted upon the civil population of her opponents. These losses alone should amount to about £5,000,000,000, while the total war expenditure of the Allies should be about ten times as large. Germany will be required to pay the Allies to the limit of her ability. In addition, Germany will obviously have to deal with her own war expenditure either by paying interest on her enormous war debt by means of hugely increased taxes, or by repudiating her war loans. By the latter process she would, of course, utterly ruin her capitalists, both great and small. Germany is quite unprepared for so colossal a burden. Her financial plan of campaign has been as wildly reckless as her military plan of campaign. On the 20th of August 1915, when it must have been obvious to all well-informed Germans that Germany might conceivably lose the war, Herr Helfferich, the Secretary of the Imperial Treasury and a former Director of the Deutsche Bank, stated with criminal levity in the Reichstag:

"As long as the enemy does not condescend to acknowledge our invincibility in the field and acts accordingly, arms are the only means of convincing him of that fact. (Hear, hear.) Therefore, we must continue fighting and must bear all the sacrifices which the war involves. (Bravo.) Now as far as the necessary financial supplies are concerned we shall once more rely upon a loan. I have already in

March indicated the reasons which have caused the Government to abstain as long as possible from introducing special war taxes. The reasons then given exist still. We do not wish to add to the gigantic war burdens borne by the German people by increasing the taxes unless imperative necessity should compel us to do so. . . . As matters are, we mean to adjourn the settlement of our war expenditure to the peace and to the period following it. If God gives us victory and enables us to order our lives in accordance with our requirements, we must not forget the financial question. (Loud applause.) That we owe to the future of the people. (Hear, hear.) The future life of the German people must as far as possible be kept free from the burden which has arisen through the war. (Hear, hear.) The leaden weight of a debt of thousands of millions should deservedly be borne by those who have brought about the War. (Hear, hear.) Let our enemies, not the Germans, be crushed by that load for decades. (Loud applause.)

Similar speeches were delivered in the German Reichstag and elsewhere almost up to the final catastrophe. Scarcely an attempt was made to provide by means of taxes for even part of the interest of the huge war debt. Germany might have followed England's example and have raised in the course of the War £2,000,000,000 in war taxes. Her burden will now be doubly crushing to her.

Germany can, of course, not pay to the countries she has damaged indemnities of thousands of millions of pounds in cash. In the whole world there exists only about £1,000,000,000 in gold. She can pay the foreign indemnities only in goods, and as foreign nations do not wish to see their industries swamped and ruined by German manufactured imports, she will have to pay damages partly in raw material and partly in the form of services. German labour may have to rebuild what German soldiers have destroyed.

By nature's bounty Germany is exceedingly well supplied with minerals. Within her frontiers of 1914 she had by far the largest coal deposits in Europe, and huge iron ore deposits, and her subsoil contained an unfathomable

wealth of salts of all kinds. Her potash deposits have hitherto had a world monopoly and her deposits of these salts, which are of the greatest value to agriculture, and which are indispensable for certain chemical purposes, are absolutely inexhaustible. At a moderate valuation her principal minerals *in situ* represented before the War the following value :

		£
423,356,000,000 tons of coal at 10*s.* per ton	=	211,678,000,000
4,000,000,000 tons of iron ore at 5*s.* per ton	=	1,000,000,000
50,000,000,000 tons of potash at 10*s.* per ton	=	25,000,000,000
Total		£237,678,000,000

The importance of the amount given may be gauged from the fact that the so-called national wealth of the United Kingdom—which, by the by, merely means the present wealth of the present generation—is estimated to amount only to about £20,000,000,000 or to one-twelfth of the value of Germany's three principal minerals. The Ruhr coal-basin alone contains 213,566,000,000 tons of coal, which, at the low price of 10*s.* per ton, would represent a capital value of £106,783,000,000. It is therefore obvious that Germany can pay in minerals, though not in cash, in the course of years all the damage she has done, however large the amount may be.

The gigantic values represented by her minerals were the basis of Germany's abounding and rapidly-increasing prosperity, were the principal cause of the rapid growth of her population, and of her vast military strength. Unfortunately for Germany, a very large part of her mineral wealth occurs on territory inhabited by nationalities oppressed by Germany which will be lost to her in consequence of the War. Of her 4,000,000,000 tons of iron ore, 2,630,000,000 tons, or two-thirds of her store, occur in Lorraine-Luxemburg—Luxemburg was part of the German Zollverein. The remaining third is scattered over eighteen separate districts and their exploitation is comparatively uneconomical. Moreover, the quality of her Lorraine ore was superior to that of the other German ores. Hence the

eighteen iron-ore fields in Germany proper furnished Germany in 1910 only with about one-tenth of the metallic iron which she consumed.

The War will seriously cripple Germany's purchasing power, and if she should be unable to obtain vastly increased imports of iron ore from France, Belgium, Sweden, etc., as a set-off for her loss of the ore of Lorraine her gigantic iron industry may well decline to insignificance.

Before the War Germany had by far the largest iron industry in Europe. She then produced approximately three times as much iron and steel as the United Kingdom. Germany's iron exports exceeded those of Great Britain, and her exports of machinery, etc., were gigantic. Her iron industry was expanding far more rapidly than that of the United States. The iron industry occupied in Germany a position of commanding pre-eminence. Directly and indirectly it employed 2,250,000 workers. The decline of the German iron industry would seriously affect many German industries connected with it. It would vastly reduce Germany's wealth and income and would very notably weaken, if not disarm, the country militarily. Germany's great military strength was largely due to the fact that she produced more iron and steel than all the countries of Europe combined.

Germany's defeat will deprive her not only of the bulk of her iron ore but also of vast quantities of coal. Germany possesses two large coal-fields and a small one. Her large coal-fields are in Southern Silesia and about the Ruhr valley. The Ruhr coal-basin lies within Germany proper. The other large coal-field, that of Silesia, lies within the indisputable Polish zone. It seems likely that at the Peace Congress Southern Silesia and its coal-field will be handed over to Poland together with the numerous and important industries which have arisen on and around the coal measures.

The Silesian coal-field contains, according to the best geological information available, 165,987,000,000 tons of coal. The importance of that figure may be seen from the fact that the United Kingdom is supposed to possess

altogether 189,535,000,000 tons of coal. In other words, Germany seems likely to lose to Poland almost as much coal as the entire store of coal of the United Kingdom. At the low figure of 10*s*. per ton the coal of Southern Silesia would represent a truly fabulous wealth.

Coal is heavy and bulky. Consequently manufacturers like to place their works as closely as possible to the coal-pits. Coal-fields attract manufacturing industries from far and wide. After the peace, many industries in the north-east, the centre, and the south-east of Germany will feel compelled, for the sake of the coal which they need, to transfer their establishments from German territory to Polish soil, thus impoverishing Germany and enriching Poland. Formerly hundreds of thousands of Polish labourers, anxious to find work, migrated temporarily to Germany or settled permanently in the country. In future hundreds of thousands of Germans, who will be unable to find work in Germany and who will have to take to unskilled labour, may have to migrate to Poland in order to make a living, and they may in course of time become Polonised. The German Province of East Prussia with about 2,000,000 inhabitants will become an enclave of the new Polish State. That backward province is almost certain to become absorbed by the Poles who surround it.

The portion of Poland which formerly belonged to Russia has highly-developed manufacturing industries. Industrial Warsaw had before the War 1,000,000 inhabitants, and Lodz —the Russian Manchester—had 500,000 inhabitants. In view of the vast quantities of coal and of other minerals which occur in Polish territory, it cannot be doubted that Poland is destined to become one of the greatest industrial countries in Europe, especially when the navigation on the Vistula, the great natural artery of all Poland, which has deliberately been stifled in the past by Germany and Russia, is energetically developed.

The French, as has previously been stated, suffer acutely through lack of coal. By the acquisition of Alsace-Lorraine they will obtain by far the largest iron-ore fields in Europe,

and very naturally will try to create in Lorraine the largest iron industry of Europe, which hitherto has been possessed by Germany. Until now the iron ore of Lorraine has been smelted in Lorraine itself, and especially in the Ruhr district, with coke made from Ruhr coal. It must, therefore, be expected that Germany will be required at the peace to pay the indemnity due to France largely in Ruhr coal. Germany cannot complain if this should be made one of the peace conditions, for she has created a precedent by exacting payments in raw materials and food from famished Russia and from ruined Rumania.

The peace settlement should have very far-reaching economic consequences. It should transfer vast quantities of coal and numerous valuable industries from Eastern Germany to the new Poland, and vast quantities of coal and iron ore and many valuable industries depending on these minerals from Alsace-Lorraine and from Western Germany to France. Besides, France will obtain large quantities of potash and of petroleum which are known to exist in the regained provinces.

Raw products determine and dominate manufacturing. It is only natural that many of the German manufacturing industries which are dependent upon Silesian coal and Lorraine iron may have to follow the transferred minerals into France and Poland, even if they are located well inside the new German frontier. The migration of Germany's industries towards France and Poland would of course be accelerated if taxation should be heavier in Germany than in France and in Poland, or if manufacturing, or social, conditions should be more favourable outside Germany than within that country. Moreover, the Governments of France and Poland will no doubt do their utmost to tempt and to attract the wealth-creating industries of Germany across the border by those fiscal and administrative measures which Germany has taught them.

The departure of numerous industries from Germany would, of course, lead to a considerable decrease in Germany's wealth and income, and would harmfully affect the develop-

ment of Germany's population and military strength. On the other hand, the rise and growth of powerful industries in France and Poland would, in accordance with Adam Smith's dictum, lead to a more or less rapid augmentation of the population in those countries, for the demand for men regulates the supply of men. The transfer of industries on a large scale from Germany to her neighbours in the east and west would materially alter the balance of man-power, and therefore the balance of military power as well, between Germany and her neighbours.

Germany is principally an industrial State. Her manufacturing industries constitute her chief resource. The German manufacturing industries will suffer not only through the loss of vast quantities of coal and of iron ore. Before the War Germany was as dependent on foreign raw materials —such as cotton, wool, silk, hides, oil, fat, rubber, iron ore, copper, tin, fertilisers, etc.—as was Great Britain. In addition she imported from abroad coffee, tea, cocoa, tobacco, etc., and vast quantities of the most necessary food-stuffs for men and beasts. Before the War Germany's foreign trade was only slightly smaller than that of the United Kingdom. Germany paid for her huge imports of indispensable raw material and of food chiefly with manufactured articles, particularly with machinery and iron-ware, cotton, woollen and silk goods, chemicals, electrical ware, glass, porcelain, paper, etc. In the course of the War Germany has been absolutely denuded of imported raw materials. Their purchase will require gigantic sums. In view of the scarcity of shipping, of the urgent necessity of repatriating the troops, and of carrying food-stuffs to Europe, and in view of the world-wide demand for imported raw products, Germany will have to wait a considerable time for the materials which her industries require. Besides their purchase will be difficult, for Germany has been greatly impoverished by the War, and she will have to pay vastly enhanced prices owing to the depreciation of her currency and exchange. Furthermore she may not find it easy to obtain the necessary shipping, partly because she

will have to make good the losses which her U-boats have inflicted, partly because the foreign sailors may refuse to handle Germany's trade. Lastly some of the raw material exporting nations, particularly Australia, may refuse to supply her. Hence Germany will be able to obtain the indispensable raw materials only with very great delay, and her manufacturing rivals have already reserved for themselves vast quantities of these raw products.

Germany can pay for the bulk of her indispensable imports only with the exports of manufactured goods. However, their sale abroad will be exceedingly difficult owing to the universal hatred which she has aroused. Even if foreign Governments should not discriminate against her by special tariffs, both importers and the public will decline for a long time to buy German goods. During the four years of war Germany's foreign markets have been captured by her enemies and the neutrals, and she will find it difficult to recover them, for German business men and German commercial travellers will be shunned almost universally. Germany will find it exceedingly hard to re-create her extremely valuable foreign trade, even if she carries it on through neutral intermediaries. She will have to begin at the bottom rung of the ladder and to work her way slowly up.

Before the War Germany possessed the second largest mercantile marine in the world. The War has destroyed Germany's great position on the sea and her valuable connections abroad. Remembering the U-boat outrages, foreign nations may refuse to German ships harbour, dock, and coaling facilities, and merchants may refuse for decades to employ the German carrying trade. Here again Germany will have to work her way up from the very bottom. Possibly she may try to disguise the identity of her ships by placing them under foreign flags. Possibly she will abandon her ocean trade altogether.

Before the War Germany had gigantic and extremely profitable investments in foreign countries. She dominated the banks and many of the most profitable industries in

Belgium, Italy, Rumania, Russia, Turkey, Argentina, Chili, and various other countries. She had huge investments in the United States and in the British Empire. Her foreign investments have been liquidated during the War. Her financiers and bankers will everywhere be unwelcome. In addition to a large portion of her foreign investments made before the War, she will lose the enormous sums which, during the War, she has advanced to Austria-Hungary, Turkey, and Bulgaria.

Professor Werner Sombart has correctly pointed out that Germany's economic success was very largely due to the activity of Jews. They dominated German finance and banking (Gwinner, Mendelssohn, Bleichröder), the shipping trade (Ballin), the non-ferrous metal trade (Merton, Hirsch), the electrical trades (Rathenau), etc. If, as seems likely, Germany should become a declining country, her keen Jewish business men will probably transfer their energies to expanding and progressing lands, especially as they have been treated by her as pariahs.

This necessarily brief and incomplete survey shows that the War has inflicted upon the German body economic injuries from which Germany will suffer for decades. Owing to the War, Germany is bound to lose 7,000,000 valuable wealth-creating citizens, large agricultural territories, the bulk of her iron ore, almost one-half of her coal, large quantities of potash and oil, a large portion of her foreign trade, the bulk of her shipping trade, the bulk of her international financial, banking and insurance business, the bulk of her foreign investments, her colonies, and a large portion of her manufacturing industries. Yet the impoverished German people will have to pay out of their vastly diminished income not only their own war expenditure but also a gigantic indemnity. Hence poverty and unemployment are likely to become widespread. In consequence of their difficulties many manufacturers will have to transfer their operations to countries where conditions are less unfavourable. Germany may therefore witness an unprecedented emigration of industries and of

the workers employed in them, and in view of the feelings which they have aroused German emigrants may obtain only the roughest work.

The increase or decrease of population depends upon national economic conditions. Owing to the War the population of Germany may become stagnant, and may possibly retrocede. She will remain poor for decades. Possibly the War has destroyed for all time Germany's greatness and military power by destroying her economic position and prosperity. While her population should remain stagnant or decline, that of regenerated France and of most other countries should rapidly increase. In a few decades the British Empire, and even France, may be far ahead of Germany in white population. Before long Germany may sink to the position of a second-rate Power, and for financial reasons alone she may be unable to maintain an army or to think of a war of revenge. Autocratic Germany led the world in the policy of national armaments and military preparedness. A democratic, impoverished, and sobered Germany may lead the world in the policy of disarmament.

Germany has lost not only her military preponderance and her great economic position in the world, but also her prestige and reputation. Her defeat has destroyed the legend of the invincibility of her army and of the excellence of her generals, and her ghastly diplomatic and administrative failures have destroyed the legend of German genius for statecraft, organisation, and administration which Bismarck had created. The world has come to believe that German economic success was largely due to unscrupulousness, and German science has become despised by the contemptible attitude of her venal, blatant, and servile professors during the War. The fact that ninety-three of her most eminent scientists—among them many legists, historians, and theologians—should have addressed a manifesto to the world in which they proclaimed that innocent Germany had been feloniously attacked by her enemies, that she fought a holy war of self-defence, and

that she employed the most civilised methods of warfare will never be forgotten, nor will it be forgotten that practically all the German historians have falsified not merely Prusso-German history in order to glorify the Hohenzollerns and to defend their misdeeds, but that they have distorted foreign history as well with a view to exalting Prusso-Germany and depreciating all the non-German peoples and their achievements. Coming generations will find it interesting to compare the rhapsodies of Ranke, Sybel, Treitschke, and other courtier-historians with the more critical and more truthful histories of Germany written by the republican German historians of the future, and to compare the teachings of the imperial and of the republican German professors of philosophy and of international law. The crimes perpetrated by the German Army, and their condonation by the German people, will discredit for decades the educational system of Germany. The whole German race has become disgraced. Dr. Muehlon, a former Director of Krupps, burning with shame and horror at Germany's actions, wrote in his diary, on the 25th and 27th of August 1914, when Germany's triumph seemed certain :

" They are like savages, drunk with any victory—be it only over unarmed victims—and dividing up the spoils, the treasure, and the prisoners with fierce exultation in their camp of tents. . . .

" If the Germans should now achieve the hegemony of Europe, a universal flight of Europeans will begin. Even the Germans will fall out among themselves and fly from one another. Europe's remotest corners will become the most coveted havens of refuge. An immense shifting of the centres of intellectual life will take place. And should no spot in Europe be left free from German rule, a regular ' migration of the peoples ' will set in, whole peoples flocking to the countries oversea, everywhere and anywhere to be safe from the Germans. Europe will become so unpleasant a continent that it will hardly be worth while to put up with the discomforts of a visit to it. Outside the frontiers of the new Germanic Empire, however, no German

will be able to show his face. There, either the Germans must quit the field or the others will. Disdain and abhorrence will make every one insist upon being spared the sight of a German. . . .

"Since Germany's cause in this War is the wrong cause, Germany's exertions to win adherents can in any case only be characterised as attempts at corruption. It is inevitably only the inferior members in the European system who are drawn into alliance with Germany: the most charitable interpretation of their action is to suppose they are deceived or influenced by motives belonging to a lower plane of civilisation.

On the 6th of October he wrote:

"No wonder that Germany has not a friend outside the country; she deserves none. To speak frankly, such an outside friend would be a suspicious individual, a friend of materialism, lies, and bribery."

The Germans have become a race accursed. Before the War Germans abroad were proud of their country of origin, were proud of their nationality and tried to preserve it. German schools, newspapers, clubs, etc., were to be found everywhere. Henceforward, Germans abroad will have to hide their heads and to disguise their origin through shame. They will endeavour to lose their identity as soon as possible and to forget the German language and the fact that they have come from a country which has disgraced itself for all time. German institutions abroad will disappear. The German language will not be spoken outside of Germany.

By her inhuman methods of warfare Germany has destroyed for all time the widely held hope of her patriots of a Greater Germany. According to the Handbook of the Pan-German League of 1911 the world contained 97,600,000 Germans. Of these 70,000,000 dwelt in Germany and in Austria-Hungary, 2,500,000 inhabited Switzerland, 12,000,000 were in the United States, 10,000,000 were so-called "Low-Germans"—Belgians (Flemish), Dutchmen, Luxemburgers, and Dutch Afrikanders—while about

3,000,000 Germans were dispersed over the five continents. Some of the figures given were of course grossly exaggerated. In consequence of the shame which Germany has brought upon the race, the Germans in the United States and elsewhere will hasten to become completely de-Germanised. The hope of attaching to their country, by bonds of affection and esteem, the German-Swiss, the Flemish, and the Dutch peoples, has been destroyed for all time. The dream of a Greater Germany will never materialise. Germany's greatness has been destroyed by the War. She will neither become a world-Power nor a great European Power.

So far Germany's future has been considered with the assumption that she will be able to preserve her political unity and her social stability. Let us now inquire whether this assumption is correct.

Rightly considered the Germans are not of a single race. They are men belonging to several races who happen to speak the same language. For practical purposes it will suffice to divide the Germans into Prussians and non-Prussians. The important point to remember is that the Prussians are in the minority in Germany and that that Prussian minority has conquered the non-Prussian peoples in the south, in the west, and in the north, and has imposed upon them by force not a Prussian civilisation but merely a Prussian administration. Prussia proper consists of the provinces east of the Elbe. To the west of that river dwell Saxons, Hanoverians, Westphalians, Hessians, Rhinelanders. The people in the south of Germany are Bavarians, Würtembergers, and Badeners, and the sea-faring people of the north call themselves Hanseatics. The Prussians have conquered and ruled the peoples of the north, south, and west of Germany, but they have failed to assimilate them. They have known how to make themselves feared, but they have not succeeded in making themselves loved or even liked.

The rule of the Prussians has been exceedingly severe, for they are a stiff, hard, and harsh people. They are the

Spartans of Germany, and the non-Prussians may perhaps be compared to the Athenians and Corinthians. Prussia's rule has been imposed by force on the non-Prussians and has been borne with reluctance, for the non-Prussians—especially the people in the south and west—are genial, gay, and easy-going, who hate sullen and brutal martinets. Moreover, the people in the south and west are chiefly Roman Catholics, while the Prussians are unbending Protestants. Prussia represents force, and particularly military force, while the non-Prussians represent German intelligence, sociability, and progress. Prince Bülow wrote in his book *Imperial Germany*:

"German intellectual life, which the whole world has learnt to admire and which even the first Napoleon respected, is the work of the southern and western German lands, achieved under the protection of her princes, small States, and free cities. . . . German intellect was developed in the west and the south, but the German State in Prussia."

The great religious reformers of Germany, Luther, Melanchthon, Hutten, and Reuchlin, were non-Prussians. Of the great German poets and musicians, the following were born outside Prussia: Hans Sachs, Opitz, Gellert, Lessing, Wieland, Goethe, Schiller, Jean Paul, Schlegel, Körner, Arndt, Uhland, Heine, Platen, Grimm, Hölderlin, Scheffel, Händel, Bach, Gluck, Haydn, Mozart, Beethoven, Spohr, Weber, Schumann, Schubert, Mendelssohn, Richard Wagner, Strauss. Of the German philosophers, scientists, and historians born outside Prussia I would mention Leibniz, Fichte, Hegel, Schelling, Nietzsche, Liebig, Friedrich List, Savigny, Mommsen, Ranke, Raumer, Rotteck, Niebuhr, Sybel, Treitschke. Not so very long ago Prussia was a barbarous country. She owes her rise and growth very largely to the ability of statesmen and generals born outside Prussia. Among these were Stein, Hardenberg, Derflinger, Seydlitz, Schwerin, Blücher, Gneisenau, Scharnhorst, Schill, Moltke, Roon, Voigts-Rhetz, Steinmetz. The Hohenzollerns themselves are Suabians, South Germans.

Stein, Hardenberg, Blücher, Gneisenau, Schill, and Scharnhorst—the statesmen and soldiers who freed Prussia from the yoke of Napoleon ; Fichte, Körner, and Arndt—who inspired the Prussian people with their pen during the War of Liberation ; Friedrich List—the father of the Zollverein and of Bismarck's economic policy ; Schneckenburger who wrote *The Watch on the Rhine*, and Karl Wilhelm who set it to music ; Hoffmann von Fallersleben who wrote *Deutschland, Deutschland über Alles*, and Thiersch who wrote the Prussian national anthem ; Nietzsche who provided Prussia with the philosophy of the Superman and of ruthlessness ; Ranke, Sybel, and Treitschke who falsified Prussia's history ; Moltke, Roon, Steinmetz, and Voigts-Rhetz who created modern Germany on the battlefields of France ; and Rauch and Schlüter who beautified Berlin, were all non-Prussians by birth. Nearly all the "great Prussians" were non-Prussians. Bismarck, who was of very old Prussian stock, is one of the few exceptions. Kant had a Scotch grandfather and the brothers Humboldt had Huguenot ancestors.

The fact that German civilisation is almost entirely non-Prussian is very little known because the Prussians, after having annexed the territory of Germany, annexed German civilisation as well. With the same justification the Spartans might have claimed Athenian art, science, commerce, navigation, and industry as their own after the battle of Aegospotami. As the Prussians were barbarians, the Hohenzollern rulers employed in their public services preferably South Germans and foreigners whose immigration they favoured. Therefore, a large percentage of the most eminent Prussians bear French, Italian, Dutch, English, Polish, and Slavonic names, such as Du Bois-Reymond, Verdy du Vernois, L'Estocq, Lassalle, Fouqué, François, Hutier, Lucchesini, Brentano, Caprivi, Yorck, Keith, Chodowiecki, Lichnowsky, Bülow, Jagow, Virchow, etc. Culture and character go hand in hand. Comparison of Prussian with non-Prussian civilisation enables us to understand the fundamental differences which exist between

the Prussians and the non-Prussians, and the dislike which the Prussians and non-Prussians have for each other.

It is not unnatural that the people of the south and of the west of Germany dislike Prussian manners and Prussian methods of government. Prussian administrators and Prussian officials have a positive genius for making themselves feared and hated. The vast majority of the people of Alsace-Lorraine are German by language—in 1910 only 204,262 knew French—they bear German names, and they may be of German race, as the Germans maintain. Yet the vast majority of the people, though ignorant of French, were not grateful for their reunion with Germany in 1871. On the contrary, they were anxious to return to France because they had learnt to hate their Prussian administrators and their brutality. When the French troops entered the lost provinces they were cheered and hugged by delirious people who often did not know a word of French. Not so very long ago the South German States and Hanover, dreading their Prussian neighbours, wished to place themselves under French protection. When, in 1857, Napoleon III. visited South Germany, he was received with universal jubilation. His triumphal progress caused amazement and consternation in Berlin. Up to 1866 the Germans to the west of the Rhine, who had come under the administration of Prussia in 1815 and who thirsted for freedom from the Prussian yoke, would gladly have placed themselves under French rule. The revolution of the Rhenish Provinces in 1848 was anti-Prussian in character. Up to 1870 the South German States had hoped that France would free them from the Prussians who had become their masters in 1866. If, in 1870, Napoleon had won the first battles and had crossed the Rhine, all South Germany would have risen against Prussia. The South German Sovereigns were forced into the North German Confederation and into the German Empire and did not dare to resist, dreading that they might share the fate of the King of Hanover.

Prussia and the Prussians were in the past bitterly dis-

liked and hated in Hanover and in the south and west of Germany and they were not liked in the Hanseatic towns. In the course of years considerable portions of the population, mesmerised by Prussia's success and prestige and Prussianised to some extent by a Prussian education, seemed to have become reconciled to Prussia's rule. It remains to be seen whether the West Germans, and especially the South Germans, will care to remain "Muss-Preussen," Prussians by compulsion, subject to Berlin, after the present disaster which has destroyed the glamour of Prussia. The most powerful cement of Germany was Prussia's strength, ability, and prestige, and a common pride in the common Imperial Army. That cement has disappeared. Germany's unity was not a thing of natural growth, but a highly artificial political creation. It was an enforced partnership. It may not be able to stand the acid test of disaster. Many Germans in the south and west are bound to see the cause of their sufferings not merely in the person of William II. and his Government, but in the system and traditions of the Prussian State and in the character and aspirations of the Prussian people. It seems therefore by no means impossible that not only the South German States but the non-Prussian parts of Prussia also may secede. It is not inconceivable that the South and West German people, and especially the people west of the Rhine, might wish once more to place themselves voluntarily under the protection of France as they did in the time of the French Revolution and of Napoleon I. The tendency towards secession may be strengthened by the hope of thereby escaping the penalty of the war indemnity.

The non-Prussian States have their own government and administration. The Bavarians, Saxons, etc., think and feel locally. They may create independent democratic administrations of their own. They may federate among themselves, but it seems questionable whether they would care to federate with Prussia, for Prussia's preponderance in sheer bulk and numbers is so great that they would once more become helpless adjuncts of the Prussian State

and be forced to follow once more a Prussian policy and to submit to Prussian dictation. As the South Germans resemble the Austrians in character, and as both Austria and her neighbour Bavaria are Roman Catholic States, Bavaria and the other South German States may perhaps once more unite with the country on the Danube.

For decades the Hanoverians have remembered their old independence and their former connection with England. It is quite possible that they also may wish to cut themselves adrift from their Prussian conquerors.

While racial differences and incompatibilities and strongly felt resentments seem to favour a secession of part, or of all, the non-Prussian parts of Germany from Prussia, powerful economic reasons may conceivably preserve Germany's unity, at least for a time. All the individual States participate in the great German market. The disintegration of Germany might lead to the erection of customs barriers within Germany. It would accentuate the economic difficulties of the people. Another cause which may counteract the separatist tendencies in the south and west of Germany lies in the fact that Prussia possesses practically all the coal in Germany, which, however, lies in Westphalian and Rhenish territory.

If the non-Prussian parts of Germany should be guided merely by prudential considerations, they will probably maintain the connection with Prussia. However, as people, especially at revolutionary times, are rather influenced by their passions than by cool calculations of profit and loss, separation between the Prussians and non-Prussians of Germany seems quite possible, especially in view of the overbearing character and domineering ways of the Prussians. The non-Prussians are probably no longer willing to obey their Prussian masters implicitly, and the Prussian bureaucracy and people may not be able to adjust their ways and manners to the altered conditions of the times.

The secession of the non-Prussian parts of Germany would be absolutely fatal to Prussia. Prussia proper is a backward agricultural State which owes to the non-Prussian

parts of Germany not only its culture but also its wealth. Prussia's wealth has been created by the conquest of the south, west, and north. In the south lie the teeming factories of Saxony, in the west the coal-fields of the Ruhr and the Rhine Valley, Germany's foreign trade is concentrated in Hamburg and Bremen, and her financial strength and ability are derived from Frankfort. Berlin's wealth is won in non-Prussian Germany. If the non-Prussian portions of Germany should abandon Prussia, that country would sink back into its original poverty and Berlin would once more become a provincial town.

So far the German revolution has, as we are told, been the most orderly and the most bloodless revolution in history. It is ominous that the same praise was bestowed upon the Russian revolution at its beginning. It is easy enough for an indignant people to depose its ruler, capture the government machine, and change the men at the top and the ancient symbols of power, but it is difficult for a nation which has lived in abject docility and servility for centuries to establish an orderly Government on a democratic basis. The Germans have lost the spirit of self-reliance and initiative through centuries of drill. Moreover, democracies cannot be artificially created. They are plants of natural and very slow growth. It takes generations of patient endeavour to evolve the democratic spirit and democratic traditions, and it is particularly difficult to create an orderly democratic Government at a time when the passions have been roused and when the people are suffering. An orderly democratic Government can be created only by men of moderation, who possess the instinct of fairness, of reasonableness, and of self-control, who possess the spirit of give and take. Unfortunately the German Government has only cultivated among the people the spirit of "take." By allowing the soldiers to murder, plunder, outrage, steal, and burn, the late German Government has aroused among the people a spirit of violence and of lawlessness for which all Germany is likely to suffer in due course. Germany has encouraged and has

created Bolshevism in Russia. That movement has been a mighty weapon to Germany, but it may prove to be one in the nature of a boomerang. Germany may conceivably become known to history as the first country which has produced an orderly and bloodless revolution, but the greater probability seems to be that the birth of German democracy will by no means be a painless and bloodless process.

Germany will probably remain poor and weak for decades. She may never recover from the War. She may decline while other nations increase. Perhaps she will for a long time be a prey to civil convulsions if not to anarchy.

Revolutions almost invariably breed counter-revolutions. History teaches us that rulers who maintain that they are responsible to God alone cannot be bound by any undertaking, however solemn. Sovereigns who have abdicated have more than once again seized power. William II. is absolutely unscrupulous. The Allies should therefore reckon with the possibility that the privileged classes or the Emperor may try to seize power by a *coup d'état* or by trickery. They must reckon with the possibility of an Imperial revival, of a military dictatorship, of a renewal of the War. It seems probable, however, that by her attack of 1914 Germany has destroyed not only the Empire but the future of the German race. To coming generations it may seem as inexplicable that Germany challenged the world and for a time held it at bay as it seems to the present generation that, a few centuries ago, the Turks made all Europe tremble. The Turks have fallen because they put all their trust in brute force and in frightfulness. Thus they raised the world against themselves. Turkey was ruined because the State became an appendage to its standing army, the Janissaries. Those who live by the sword shall perish by the sword, or, as the German poet put it, *Die Weltgeschichte ist das Weltgericht.*

CHAPTER XXVIII

THE FUTURE OF GERMANY AND OF THE GERMAN RACE (*continued*)—THE PROBLEM OF AUSTRIA

BEFORE the War Germany had 67,000,000 inhabitants. Of these about 7,000,000 dwelled in Alsace-Lorraine, in the Polish district in the east of the country, and in the Danish district in the north. Their loss would reduce the German population to 60,000,000 if we disregard both Germany's losses in men during the War and the excess of births over deaths since 1914. Austria-Hungary adjoins Germany in the south. German Austria is a prolongation of Bavaria. Austria and Bavaria are strictly Roman Catholic countries. On racial, on political, and on economic grounds the union of Germany and of Austria seems only natural. In case of a union of Austria with Bavaria, racial, political, and economic reasons for an amalgamation would be reinforced by religious ones as well. We are told that Austria-Hungary contains 12,000,000 Germans. If these should be united to Germany, Germany's population would be increased to 72,000,000. Germany would therefore be stronger in man-power after the War than she had been before its outbreak. Under these circumstances, it is only natural that many consider the possibility of a German-Austrian reunion with grave concern. Hence it seems worth while to study Austria's position and to cast a glance into its future.

German Austria adjoins Bavaria in the east. It stretches from Lake Constance in the west to Pressburg in the east, and from Gmünd in the north to Klagenfurt in the south. Those who believe that 12,000,000 Germans dwell in a compact mass in German Austria in immediate contact with Bavaria are mistaken. At the Census of 1910

11,987,701 Germans were enumerated in the Dual Monarchy, and they were distributed as follows :

In the Provinces of German Austria (Lower and Upper Austria, Salzburg, Styria, Carinthia, Tirol, and Vorarlberg)	6,118,546
In the Czecho-Slovak Provinces (Bohemia, Moravia, and Austrian Silesia)	3,512,682
In the other Provinces of Austria (Galicia, Bukovina, etc.)	319,038
In Hungary, especially in the Southern and Eastern Districts	2,037,435
Total	11,987,701

Of the 12,000,000 Germans who were enumerated in 1910 in Austria-Hungary, only about 6,000,000 lived in German Austria in the immediate vicinity of Bavaria. Of the remaining 6,000,000 Germans 3,500,000 dwell in the districts claimed by the Czecho-Slovaks and 2,500,000 in the extreme south and east of the late Dual Monarchy. The 2,500,000 Germans who live in Southern Hungary and in the far-off Bukovina and Galicia are out of all contact with Germany and with German Austria. They may be considered to be lost to Germany. On the other hand, the bulk of the 3,500,000 Germans in Bohemia, Moravia, and Austrian Silesia occupy a long and narrow strip of land on the west, north, and east of the new Czecho-Slovak State. They form a German fringe of that new State along the borders of German Silesia and Saxony.

It should be observed that the Germans are in a distinct minority in the lands of the Czecho-Slovaks. According to the Census of 1910 the 2,467,724 Germans of Bohemia constituted 36·76 per cent. of the population of that country. The 719,435 Germans of Moravia formed 27·62 per cent., and the 325,523 Germans of Austrian Silesia formed 43·90 per cent. of the population. In the remaining provinces of the late Austrian Empire, namely Carniola, Trieste, Gorizia, Istria, Galicia, Bukovina, and Dalmatia, the 319,038 Germans formed only 3·03 per cent. of the population. The position of the Germans in Austria is therefore as follows : 6,000,000 Germans adjoin Bavaria,

forming a solid block, 2,500,000 Germans live in the far-off parts of the late Monarchy or are dispersed in insignificant numbers among non-German peoples, and 3,500,000 Germans live in the districts claimed by the Czecho-Slovaks, where they constitute approximately one-third of the population. The question now arises as to the future of the German fringe of Czecho-Slovakia, of Bohemia, Moravia, and Austrian Silesia.

The Czechs claim, and with reason, that the German bureaucracy of Austria and the Magyar bureaucracy of Hungary have manipulated the census returns for political reasons, that the number of Czecho-Slovaks has been very seriously understated and that of the Germans and Magyars considerably overstated. Possibly there are only about 2,500,000 Germans in Greater Bohemia—that is Professor Benes's estimate—and many of these live not on the German border, but inland among the Czechs. Many Germans demand that the frontier districts of Bohemia should be separated from that country and either be made independent or be joined to Germany proper. On the other hand, the Czecho-Slovaks not unnaturally desire to retain their historical frontiers which coincide with the boundaries set by Nature.

It is not easy to divide Bohemia along racial lines, for the political and natural boundaries of the country coincide.

The boundary of Bohemia towards Germany is formed by a number of important mountain chains—the Bohemian Forest, the Ore Mountains, the Giant Mountains, and the Sudetes. After all the problem of Bohemia's boundaries is not a local but a European question. Bohemia, together with Moravia and Austrian Silesia, occupies one of the strongest and one of the most important strategical positions in Europe. That country separates Berlin from Vienna and Buda-Pesth on the one hand and Bavaria from German Silesia on the other. It forms a gigantic salient which penetrates deeply into the centre of Germany, and it lies right across the great natural high-road along the Elbe which runs from Central Germany via Prague and Vienna

to the Black Sea, to Constantinople and to the Near East. Bohemia is easily defendable, for it is a great natural fortress. It is surrounded, especially in the direction of Germany, by steep and lofty mountain walls, and it contains vast agricultural, mineral, and industrial resources useful in war and a highly intelligent and very martial population. The strategical importance of Greater Bohemia may be gauged from the fact that within a distance of about fifty miles from that country lie some of the most important German, Austrian, and Hungarian towns, such as Munich, Nuremberg, Regensburg, Erfurt, Chemnitz, Dresden, Leipzig, Glogau, Breslau, Linz, Vienna, Buda-Pesth. The great German industrial districts of Upper Silesia and of Saxony lie just across the Bohemian border. Bismarck stated repeatedly that the Power which controls Bohemia may dominate Europe. Professor Lyde wrote in his book, *The Continent of Europe*, London, 1913 :

" Bohemia, though only two-thirds the size of Scotland, is the most important province of the Austrian Empire, and its importance, political and historic, has been by no means confined to the Empire. Much more truly than Switzerland it is the heart of Europe, at about equal distances from all the great seas, a marked physical unit cut off by forested mountains, and yet with easy access to those seas by the Saxon and Moravian, the Austrian and the Magyar Gates, holding the balance between the north-westward-flowing Elbe and the south-eastward-flowing Danube, for centuries a focus of political, intellectual, and ethnic interests and to-day one of the most important industrial areas in the world."

The Czecho-Slovaks desire to possess the whole of their country not only for historical and sentimental reasons, but also for very practical considerations. Bohemia is naturally an exceedingly wealthy land which has always been coveted by its neighbours. Besides, it forms a huge wedge, the advance guard of Slavdom, which separates the Germans on the Elbe from the Germans on the Danube, the Germans on the Upper Rhine from those of Silesia, the

Protestant Germans from the Roman Catholic Germans. Because of its great natural wealth and its central and dominating position right across the great strategical main-road which connects Central Europe with Asia, Bohemia has been one of the most important battle-grounds of the world since time immemorial. It was, for instance, one of the principal theatres of war during the Thirty Years' War when its population was reduced from 2,000,000 to 800,000. An independent and powerful Bohemia restrains and restricts Germany's liberty of military action as much towards the East as an independent and powerful Belgium does towards the West. Therefore the Germans consider it a thorn in their side. A strong and hostile Bohemia would make it exceedingly difficult, if not impossible, for the German peoples to resume their career of conquest in the direction of Constantinople. Hence the Czecho-Slovaks have to reckon with the possibility that Germany may be hostile to them. They must be prepared for a surprise attack on the part of the Germans who hem them in on three sides. Therefore the Czechs demand that they should control the protecting mountain walls which surround their country and the passes through which the invader may enter. Their security would be gone should the mountain barriers be placed into German hands.

The Czecho-Slovaks have suffered from German hostility for centuries. They have tried to shake off the German yoke ever since the time of Huss, who was animated quite as much by hostility to the tyrannous Germans as by religious motives, who was quite as much a patriot as a religious reformer. For centuries the Germans have endeavoured to destroy the independence, the language, and the culture of the Czechs and to extirpate the race. However, the Czechs are too wise to seek revenge for their sufferings upon the Germans in their midst who may become valuable citizens. President Masaryk has announced that the Czech Government will treat the Germans dwelling in Bohemia with every consideration, spare their susceptibilities, and not interfere with their institutions

and language. His statesmanlike attitude has been received with joy by the Germans of Bohemia, and they will probably gladly acquiesce in the supremacy of the Czechs and endeavour to co-operate with them. After all, the people of the German fringe of Bohemia could scarcely form a separate State. They might of course wish to unite with Germany for sentimental reasons, but if they did so they would obviously have to share in the heavy burdens which, in consequence of their defeat, the German people will have to bear for decades. Therefore their secession seems unlikely. If they choose to remain citizens of Bohemia, they will participate in the prosperity which that wealthy country is certain to experience. It can therefore scarcely be doubted that, prompted by prudence and self-interest, practically all the Germans dwelling in the new Czecho-Slovak State will cut themselves adrift from the Germans in Germany and in course of time they will probably become completely merged with the dominant people. Freedom, toleration, and prosperity are the best nationalisers. In half a century the Germans of Bohemia may have become loyal Czechs and the German language may have disappeared from the country, provided, of course, that the Czecho-Slovak Government continues pursuing a wise policy towards the German citizens.

It seems most probable that the bulk of the 6,000,000 Germans of Austria-Hungary who live dispersed among the Magyars, Rumanians, Poles, and Czecho-Slovaks will retain their domicile and will earlier or later be absorbed by the nationalities which surround them. Let us now consider the position of the 6,000,000 German Austrians who form a solid block adjoining Bavaria.

The development and strength of a race depends obviously upon the economic factor. A people which possesses vast wealth-creating resources can develop large and rapidly-expanding industries, and these will give employment to an increasing population. A nation which lacks adequate resources is condemned to poverty and insignificance. Its numbers can increase only slowly. Lastly, a

nation which loses a large portion of its wealth-creating resources and which is weighed down by heavy taxes will either remain stationary or it will shrink in numbers, because the people cannot make a living in their country and are forced to seek work abroad. The latter is the position in which Austria, and Hungary as well, finds herself owing to the War.

The two principal economic resources of continental countries are agriculture and the manufacturing industries, for commerce and trade enrich only the few. Besides, commerce and trade are dependent for their prosperity on a flourishing home market. The provinces of German Austria are very unfavourably situated for the pursuit of agriculture and of manufacturing. German Austria is a very mountainous, and a largely alpine, country in which agriculture is only little developed. It is more suitable for forestry than for farming. Consequently the population of German Austria depends largely on imported food for its subsistence. The imported food consumed by the inhabitants of German Austria came hitherto partly from Hungary, partly from the non-German provinces of the Austrian Empire, especially from Bohemia, Moravia, Silesia, and Galicia. German Austria paid for its imports of food with exports of manufactured articles.

Unfortunately German Austria is also very unfavourably situated for the pursuit of manufactures. The prosperity of modern industry depends on an abundance of machinery, depends on the possession of cheap motive power with which to set machines in motion, depends very largely on an abundance of cheap coal. According to the Report *Coal Resources of the World* which was placed before the International Geological Congress held in Canada, 1913, the coal possessed by the Dual Monarchy compared as follows with the coal possessed by Germany and the United Kingdom :

Germany . . .	423,356,000,000	tons of coal and lignite
United Kingdom .	189,535,000,000	,, ,, ,,
Austria . . .	53,876,000,000	,, ,, ,,
Hungary . .	1,717,000,000	,, ,, ,,

It will be noticed that the store of coal possessed by the late Austrian Empire was only small, while that possessed by the Kingdom of Hungary was quite insignificant. Herein lay the reason that the Austrian industries were comparatively small, while Hungary was an almost purely agricultural country.

Industries habitually settle on or near the coal measures, so as to save the heavy cost of transportation for the bulky fuel which they require. Unfortunately for German Austria practically all the coal possessed by the late Austrian Empire occurs on non-German territory, in Bohemia, Moravia, Austrian Silesia, and Galicia. Hence the manufacturing districts of the Austrian Empire were situated on territories inhabited by Czecho-Slovaks and Poles, who have made themselves independent owing to the War. German Austria is a densely populated country which is poor both in agricultural and in industrial resources.

The superiority of the non-German provinces of Austria in the production of food and the dependence of the Austro-Germans upon food raised by the Czecho-Slovaks of Bohemia, Moravia, and Silesia and by the Poles of Galicia may be gauged from the following figures, the latest which I have been able to obtain :

AUSTRIAN HARVEST IN 1912 IN QUINTALS

	Wheat.	Rye.	Barley.	Oats.	Pulse.
Bohemia, Moravia, Silesia, Galicia . .	14,703,661	22,997,531	14,637,698	18,901,686	2,085,922
All other parts of Austria .	4,248,978	6,750,502	2,428,058	5,399,312	407,915
Total .	18,952,639	29,748,033	17,065,756	24,300,998	2,493,837

	Hops.	Potatoes.	Sugar-beet.	Fodder Roots and Carrots.	Straw.
Bohemia, Moravia, Silesia, Galicia . .	180,684	105,596,875	74,017,630	24,944,605	136,184,065
All other parts of Austria .	20,776	19,819,230	5,220,065	14,225,572	46,624,328
Total .	201,460	125,416,105	79,237,695	39,170,177	182,808,393

	Horses.	Cattle.	Pigs.
Bohemia, Moravia, Silesia, Galicia	1,328,974	5,793,303	3,626,480
All other parts of Austria .	473,874	3,366,706	2,805,600
Total . . .	1,802,848	9,160,009	6,432,080

It will be noticed that the Czecho-Slovak and the Polish provinces of Austria produced in 1912 about three-quarters of the wheat, oats, and straw raised by the Austrian Empire, about five-sixths of the rye, pulse, and potatoes, about six-sevenths of the barley, about two-thirds of the fodder roots and carrots, about nine-tenths of the hops, and about fifteen-sixteenths of the sugar-beet. The superiority of the Czecho-Slovak and Polish districts in live-stock is similarly marked, for they possessed in 1912 about two-thirds of the cattle, three-fourths of the horses, and three-fifths of the pigs. The bulk of the agricultural wealth of the late Austrian Empire was situated in the non-German districts of the Monarchy.

By far the most valuable minerals of the Austrian Empire were black coal, brown coal (lignite), and mineral oil. These three minerals combined furnished exactly seven-eighths of the value of the entire mineral production of the country. The production of black coal, brown coal, and mineral oil was distributed as follows between the Czecho-Slovak and Polish provinces of Austria and the remaining ones in 1911, the last year for which I have been able to obtain official figures:

Austrian Mineral Production in 1911 in Quintals

	Black Coal.	Brown Coal.	Mineral Oil.
Bohemia, Moravia, Silesia, Galicia	142,951,315	210,841,498	14,897,824
All other parts of Austria .	846,857	41,811,840	None
Total . . .	143,798,172	252,653,338	14,897,824

Practically all the black coal and four-fifths of the brown coal produced by the late Austrian Empire came from Bohemia, Moravia, Austrian Silesia, and Galicia, while all the mineral oil produced came from Galicia.

The figures given show that German Austria was dependent on its subject nations for food and fuel. Consequently the revolt of the Czecho-Slovaks and Poles at the end of the War led to starvation in Vienna and to a complete absence of coal in the capital.

The great industries of the Austrian Empire were situated in the non-German lands of the Monarchy and particularly in Bohemia, which is singularly blessed by Nature's bounty with agricultural and mineral resources of every kind. The great Austrian sugar industry, which provides by far the largest export item, was centred in Bohemia. Bohemian glass ware, porcelain, earthenware, and musical instruments are known throughout the world. The Austrian iron industry was domiciled on Czech soil. The guns of the Austrian artillery were made at Skoda near Pilsen. About one-half of the beer brewed in Austria was made in Bohemia. Pilsen beer was exported to all countries. Bohemia possesses very important textile industries and excels in the production of embroideries, lace, leather, boots, hardware, chemicals, furniture, etc. It abounds not only in minerals of all kinds, but in mineral springs and health resorts, such as Karlsbad, Marienbad, Franzenbad, and many others. Bohemia had the most highly-developed railway system in Austria and the best roads. The bulk of Austria's exports was furnished by Bohemia, which is drained by the Elbe. Hence Hamburg on the mouth of that river was the most important harbour for Austria's foreign trade.

The enormous industrial superiority of the non-German portions of Austria over the German provinces may be gauged from the following figures :

	Factories in 1912.	Number of Steam Boilers.	Beet-sugar production in Quintals.	Brewery Output in Hectolitres.
Bohemia, Moravia, Silesia, Galicia	10,044	28,868	43,685,473	14,764,326
All other parts of Austria .	6,885	10,702	4,333,770	7,945,105
Total . . .	16,929	39,570	48,019,243	22,709,431

As the non-German portions of the Empire of Austria produced the bulk of the food, minerals, and manufactures

of the country, they created the bulk of the national wealth and income and furnished therefore the bulk of the national taxes as well. That may be seen from the following comparison:

	Taxes on Consumption in 1911.	Land Tax in 1912.
Bohemia, Moravia, Silesia, Galicia	341,995,090 crowns	44,209,196 crowns
All other parts of Austria .	103,717,229 ,,	25,050,325 ,,
Total . . .	445,712,319 crowns	69,259,521 crowns

The facts and figures given show that the people of German Austria lived by exploiting the non-German portions of the Empire. Vienna was wealthy, but its wealth was created in the non-German provinces. The wealthy people of Vienna derived their income from the non-German lands. The Austrian capital was the centre of Austrian Society, of the national administration, of science, of art, of music, of education, of commerce, of banking, of finance, of sport, of amusements of every kind, of fashion, and of the culinary arts. It was, to some extent, a cosmopolitan town. About 600,000 visitors came to the capital every year. Men of non-German nationality who made their income in Bohemia, in Galicia, and elsewhere spent it in gay and brilliant Vienna. Besides, the whole country was made tributary to Vienna by the wealthy landed aristocracy of the Monarchy, by absentee landlords who possessed huge estates in the non-German provinces, and by the Viennese capitalists who possessed the bulk of the economic undertakings which were carried on by the Germans and non-Germans in the non-German provinces. The whole Empire was thus mortgaged to the Viennese. The magnificent Imperial Court and a garrison of 30,000 soldiers brought a large amount of money to the capital, and wealthy Czechs, Poles, Rumanians, Russians, Turks, Greeks, etc., spent habitually a large portion of their income in that town, which was considered to be the capital of south-eastern Europe. Vienna, being a centre of wealth and of fashion,

became, like Paris, a centre of the luxury trades which are patronised by the rich and the elegant.

In consequence of the War the wealth of Vienna has disappeared. The German-Austrian landlords who derived their wealth from Polish, Bohemian, and Hungarian estates will probably be expropriated by the Poles, Czechs, and Magyars. The aristocratic idlers of Vienna will have to turn to work. The wealthy financiers, bankers, and investors of Vienna, to whom the whole Empire was in debt, will be compelled to sell the bulk of their investments situated in non-German Austria partly owing to the pressure which will be probably exercised upon them by the non-German peoples, who will decline to continue paying tribute to Vienna, partly owing to the ruin which the War will undoubtedly inflict upon them. The Czecho-Slovaks, Poles, Bohemians, etc., will create capitals of their own and will shun Vienna. With the disappearance of the Court and the wealthy aristocracy the glamour of Vienna will go. Vienna which was the capital of a great Empire will become the principal town of a small State of 6,000,000 inhabitants. It stands to reason that a little nation of 6,000,000 people cannot maintain a capital inhabited by 2,000,000. Vienna's luxury industries will decline and decay. Prague, Bucharest, Warsaw, and Belgrade may put Vienna in the shade.

The Austro-Germans will suffer through the War in a twofold manner. Their income, which was principally derived from the non-German districts, will be vastly reduced by the loss of their principal wealth-creating resources. In addition, they will be weighed down by the burden of the war debt and of the indemnities which they will have to pay to the countries which the Austrian armies have devastated. During the War the Government of the Dual Monarchy has raised an enormous debt, which was taken up chiefly by the financiers, bankers, and wealthy investors of Vienna and Buda-Pesth. The non-German portions of the Austrian Empire will of course refuse to take over their share. Consequently the 6,000,000 Austro-Germans will have to assume a financial burden which would have been

unbearably heavy to the 30,000,000 inhabitants of the Austrian Empire. The Austrian Government will therefore be compelled to repudiate the larger part or the whole of the National Debt. The Austro-German bankers, financiers, and investors will consequently be ruined.

The new Austria will be an exceedingly small and poor country. German Austria will of course not be able to support a capital of 2,000,000 people. Vienna will in course of time become an insignificant provincial town with a rapidly declining population, and house property should become exceedingly cheap. Having lost its agricultural, mineral, and industrial resources, and the bulk of its paper wealth, German Austria may become one of the poorest countries in the world. Possibly its population will decline very quickly. It is of course conceivable that misfortune should cause the Austrian people to pull themselves together and to make a new start. Agriculture and forestry in German Austria may be improved. Lack of coal may cause the Austro-Germans to convert their water-power into electricity. New resources may be discovered in the country. However, the greater probability seems to be that German Austria will decline and decay, for the population lacks energy and enterprise. The Austrian manufacturers, bankers, and business men will probably go to Bohemia, Poland, and other countries where conditions are more favourable for the exercise of their abilities, and the Austrian workers will emigrate by the hundred thousand from their ruined country to the more prosperous lands around them and to countries oversea. The position of Magyar Hungary is very similar to that of German Austria. Buda-Pesth may share the fate of Vienna. On the other hand, the Magyars have an advantage over Austria in the possession of the exceedingly fruitful Hungarian plain, the productivity of which can be enormously increased.

If German Austria should unite with Germany, Germany's population would be augmented not by 12,000,000, as is often asserted, but by only 6,000,000, and that number may rapidly shrink if economic pressure and distress should

lead to the reduction of the Austrian population. A German-Austrian reunion may take place, but it need not be a lasting and a permanent union. It seems questionable whether the Germans and the Austrians will care to combine. The accession of an utterly impoverished and exhausted Austria might appear to the Germans rather a loss than a gain. Besides, the Austro-Germans themselves may no longer wish to become citizens of Germany. Their desire to enter the German Federation was exceedingly strong as long as the German Empire enjoyed its great prestige. At that time the Austro-Germans were anxious to become members of a State which was rapidly progressing, immensely wealthy and powerful, reputed invincible, and believed destined to achieve the domination of the world. The glamour which surrounded Imperial Germany has disappeared. Austria has been disillusioned by the War. Many Austrians see in the Germans the cause of their downfall and of their sufferings, and they curse the day on which they went to war at the bidding of Berlin. During the course of the War the Germans have treated the Austrians not as allies, but as underlings, with deliberate insolence and contempt. Vienna starved while Berlin feasted.

Austrian admiration of the Germans may give way to resentment and to bitter hatred. The Austro-Germans may endeavour to forget that they were ever a great and a conquering nation. They will probably seek peace and rest, and they may strive to live their own life in humble and isolated insignificance. Possibly the alpine portions of Austria which incline towards Switzerland may try to find security by joining that country. Vorarlberg may be the first province to undertake this step. I think those are mistaken who believe that the Austro-Germans desire to join the Germans of Germany with the object of embarking at Germany's command upon a war of revenge at the earliest opportunity. Very possibly the Great War has led not only to the downfall of Austria, but to its final extinction. It seems not inconceivable that in a few decades the stationary or shrinking population of Austria will have been

absorbed by the surrounding Swiss, Italians, Czechs, Magyars, and Poles. Austria's military and economic strength, as that of Magyar Hungary, was derived from its subject nations. The War has knocked away the props on which both these States were erected. To-day Austria is only a shadow of its former self. In a century the State which at one time dominated the world may be but a remembrance and its history may seem a romance or a fable to those reading it.

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